Monthly Archives: March 2018

March 20, 2018

Settlements Reached in Joint-Employer Case That Could Have Affected Franchisors Nationwide

Steven Gutierrez

Franchisor McDonald’s USA LLC has agreed to settle the high-profile labor disputes over whether it is a joint employer with its franchisees. Although the settlement still needs to be approved by the administrative law judge overseeing the litigation, McDonald’s and its franchisees negotiated settlement agreements with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to settle allegations of unfair labor practice charges without admitting liability or wrongdoing. In doing so, McDonald’s avoids prolonged litigation and a potentially adverse decision that would have had sweeping ramifications for franchisors and their franchisees nationwide.

Protracted Litigation Over Joint-Employer Status

In 2012, multiple McDonald’s employees filed unfair labor practice charges against their employer, seeking to improve their working conditions. In 2014, former NLRB General Counsel, Richard Griffin, approved filing dozens of unfair labor practice complaints against the larger franchisor, McDonald’s USA, under a theory that McDonald’s USA is a joint employer of the employees of McDonald’s franchises. By pursing the franchisor, the 2014 NLRB signaled that it was attempting to hold the larger, nationwide entity responsible for treatment of its franchisees’ employees.

McDonald’s USA, along with many restaurant, industry, and employer groups, vigorously objected, arguing that a franchisor is not a joint employer with its franchisees and therefore, cannot be held liable for any labor law violations made by a franchisee. The joint-employer test at the time was based on whether the putative employer exercises direct control over the employees and McDonald’s USA argued that it did not exercise such control over its franchisees’ employees.

In 2015, the NLRB issued its controversial decision in Browning-Ferris Industries that significantly broadened the joint-employer test so that an entity could be deemed a joint employer if it reserved contractual authority over some essential terms and conditions of employment, allowing it to have indirect control over the employees. (See our post here.) Under that expanded test, McDonald’s USA faced higher scrutiny from the NLRB as to whether it was a joint employer and whether it retained some indirect control over the employees of its franchisees.

Due to changes in the makeup of the NLRB under the Trump Administration, as well as a new NLRB General Counsel, the NLRB has sought to reverse Browning-Ferris Industries and return to the former joint-employer test that required direct and immediate control. In December 2017, the NLRB overturned Browning-Ferris in its Hy-Brand decision, only to have to vacate Hy-Brand in February 2018 because new Board member William Emanuel should not have participated in that decision. As a result, the 2015 Browning-Ferris joint-employer test is still the standard used to determine joint-employer status under the National Labor Relations Act.

Leaving The Status Quo on Joint-Employer Status – For Now

By settling these cases, both McDonald’s USA and the current NLRB avoid having to litigate and have a judge rule on whether franchisors like McDonald’s can be deemed a joint employer under the current Browning-Ferris test. Although the Board (and Congress) continue to seek to overturn Browning-Ferris, the McDonald’s settlement will push the issue down the road to another day.

According to the NLRB’s March 20, 2018 announcement, the settlement will provide a full remedy for the employees who filed charges against McDonald’s, including 100% of backpay for the alleged discriminatees. The settlement also will avoid years of potential additional litigation.

Take Aways

Franchisors, staffing companies, and other entities who have some contractual authority or obligations related to employees of a second entity need to use caution to ensure that the second entity complies with all applicable labor laws. With the broad Browning-Ferris test in place, entities with reserved contractual control or indirect control of another entity’s employees may be found to be a joint employer under the NLRA. This could open the door to liability for labor law violations as well as union organization and collective bargaining obligations related to joint employees. If in doubt about your exposure, consult with an experienced labor attorney.

Photo credit: AP2013/Jon Elswick

March 13, 2018

Physician’s Noncompete Unenforceable After He Dissents To Merger

By Mark Wiletsky

Are physician noncompete agreements enforceable? They can be, depending on the circumstances, though there are few reported decisions in Colorado analyzing such agreements. In one recent case, the Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that, following a merger, the surviving physicians entity could not enforce a noncompete provision against a dissenting shareholder-physician. The Court also concluded that an amount of damages calculated under a liquidated damages clause in the agreement must be reasonably related to an actual injury suffered by the entity as a result of the physician’s departure and competition, not simply a prospective injury estimated at the time the contract was created. Crocker v. Greater Colorado Anesthesia, P.C., 2018 COA 33.

Noncompete and Liquidated Damages Provision

Anesthesiologist Michael Crocker was a shareholder in, and employee of, Greater Colorado Anesthesia, P.C. (Old GCA). In April 2013, Dr. Crocker signed a shareholder employment agreement with Old GCA that contained a noncompete provision. In relevant part, the noncompete stated that if Dr. Crocker competed with Old GCA by participating in the practice of anesthesia within fifteen miles of a hospital serviced by Old GCA in the two years following termination of the agreement, he would be liable for liquidated damages as calculated by a stated formula. The restricted geographic area included nearly all of the Denver metro area, from Broomfield on the north to Castle Rock on the south. The agreement further stated that the liquidated damages provision would survive termination of the agreement for a period of two years, or until all amounts due by the employee to the company were paid in full.

Physician Objects To Merger

In January 2015, the shareholder-physicians of Old GCA faced a vote on whether to approve a merger that would result in a 90-doctor corporation. In exchange for accepting a 21.3% reduction in pay and making a five-year employment commitment, the shareholder-physicians would receive a substantial lump sum of cash plus stock. Dr. Crocker voted against the merger and provided notice under Colorado law that he would demand payment for his share of Old GCA in exercise of his dissenter’s rights. The other shareholder-physicians approved the merger resulting in a new corporation (New GCA).

Dr. Crocker never worked at New GCA. In March 2015, he signed an employment agreement with a different anesthesia group that included providing services at Parker Adventist Hospital, which was within GCA’s noncompete restricted area. Old GCA sent him $100 for his share in the group, which he refused. New GCA sought to enforce Dr. Crocker’s noncompete provision, seeking liquidated damages under the stated formula, while Dr. Crocker sought a higher valuation of his share in Old GCA.

Physician’s Shareholder Rights Were Intertwined With Employee Rights

The Colorado Court of Appeals noted that generally, a noncompete provision will survive a merger, allowing the surviving entity to enforce the noncompete restrictions. But it drew a line in Dr. Crocker’s scenario, finding that his shareholder rights were wed to his rights as an employee. He could not be an employee without being a shareholder, and he could not be a shareholder without being an employee. Consequently, when he exercised his dissenter’s rights in opposing the merger and sought payment for his share in Old GCA, Dr. Crocker was forced to quit his employment with GCA. Therefore, the Court stated that it could not construe the enforceability of the noncompete provision without consideration of Dr. Crocker’s rights as a dissenter. Finding no prior authority evaluating a noncompete under such circumstances, the Court decided that it could only enforce the noncompete if it is reasonable, and to be reasonable, it must not impose hardship on the employee.

Noncompete Unreasonable Due to Hardship on Employee

Because an anesthesiologist must live within approximately 30 minutes of where he or she works, enforcement of the Old GCA noncompete provision against Dr. Crocker would require that he either move outside of the restricted geographic area or pay liquidated damages to GCA. The Court stated that enforcement in that circumstance would “further penalize [Dr.] Crocker’s exercise of his right to dissent, rather than protect him from the conduct of the majority.” The Court ruled that the noncompete provision imposed a hardship on Dr. Crocker and therefore was unreasonable. Read more >>

March 7, 2018

Federal Appeals Court Rules Sexual Orientation Discrimination Violates Title VII

By Cecilia Romero

Overturning prior precedent, the full panel of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex discrimination that violates Title VII. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc.. With this landmark ruling, the Second Circuit joins the Seventh Circuit in extending Title VII sex discrimination protection to employment discrimination based on sexual orientation. However, this opinion further highlights a split in circuits over this issue—the Eleventh Circuit which holds the opposite. The EEOC has taken the position consistent with the Second Circuit.

Facts of Case

Donald Zarda, who worked for Altitude Express as a skydiving instructor in New York, was gay. To preempt any discomfort his female students might feel being strapped to an unfamiliar man, Zarda often disclosed he was gay. Before one particular tandem jump with a female student, Zarda told her that he was gay and had an ex-husband to prove it. After the successful skydive, the student told her boyfriend that Zarda had inappropriately touched her and disclosed his sexual orientation to excuse his behavior. The woman’s boyfriend told Zarda’s boss, who fired Zarda shortly thereafter. Zarda denied touching the student inappropriately and believed that he was fired solely because of his reference to his sexual orientation.

After filing with the EEOC, Zarda filed a lawsuit against his former employer in federal court asserting, among other claims, that his firing violated Title VII under a sex stereotyping theory as well as violating New York law (which prohibits sexual orientation discrimination). In March 2014, the district court granted summary judgment to Altitude Express on his Title VII claim, stating that he failed to establish a prima facie case of gender stereotyping discrimination.

Zarda appealed, pointing to a 2015 EEOC decision that held that allegations of sexual orientation discrimination state a claim of discrimination on the basis of sex and therefore, violate Title VII. In April 2017, a three-judge panel of the Second Circuit refused to reverse the lower court’s ruling on Zarda’s Title VII claim because it was bound by the Circuit’s prior precedent in which the court had ruled that discrimination based on “sex” did not encompass discrimination based on sexual orientation. The three-judge panel noted, however, that the full court sitting en banc could overturn its earlier precedent and subsequently ordered a rehearing so that the full court could determine whether to sexual orientation was prohibited under Title VII.

Sexual Orientation Discrimination Recognized as Sex Discrimination Claim

In deciding whether Title VII prohibits sexual orientation discrimination, the full Second Circuit Court of Appeals examined the phrase “because of . . . sex” as used in Title VII. The Court stated that Congress had intended to make sex irrelevant to employment decisions, leading the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently to prohibit discrimination based not only on sex itself, but also on traits that are a function of sex, such as non-conformity with gender norms. The Second Circuit concluded that sexual orientation is a function of sex, because one cannot fully define a person’s sexual orientation without identifying his or her sex. The Court wrote, “Logically, because sexual orientation is a function of sex and sex is a protected characteristic under Title VII, it follows that sexual orientation is also protected.”

The Court also concluded that sexual orientation discrimination is a subset of sex discrimination by considering associational discrimination. Pointing to decisions where courts have held that an employer may violate Title VII if it takes action against an employee because of the employee’s association with a person of another race, the Court extended that prohibition to address when an adverse action is taken against an employee because his or her romantic association with a person of the same sex.

Some judges on the Second Circuit dissented, writing that the drafters of Title VII included “sex” in the civil rights law in order to “secure the rights of women to equal protection in employment” with no intention of prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The majority of the judges respectfully disagreed.

What Employers Need to Know

Because the Eleventh Circuit (which includes Florida, Georgia, and Alabama) refused to recognize a Title VII claim for sexual orientation discrimination in 2017, the split in the circuit courts make this issue ripe for consideration by the U.S. Supreme Court. However, until the Supreme Court is presented with, and agrees to hear, a case raising this issue, we are left with varying protections in different jurisdictions.

Employers with operations located in the Second and Seventh Circuits, which have recognized sexual orientation discrimination as prohibited by Title VII, should update their policies and practices to reflect that protected category. That means, employees located in New York, Vermont, Connecticut, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Indiana are protected against harassment, discrimination, and retaliation on the basis of sexual orientation under federal law.

Employers also need to comply with state and local laws that may prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. At present, approximately 20 states plus the District of Columbia have laws banning private employers from engaging in sexual orientation discrimination. Additional states ban such discrimination by government employers. And more and more cities and counties are enacting ordinances to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination. To ensure compliance, employers may wish to implement policies prohibiting such discrimination regardless of jurisdiction. Otherwise, employers are forced to examine the laws applicable to each of their locations and alter their policies accordingly.