Category Archives: Current Affairs

June 21, 2012

New Case Clarifies Test for Contractor Status

Many organizations rely on independent contractors–sometimes referred to as consultants or just contractors–to perform a variety of services. But determining who is a contractor, as opposed to an employee, is not an easy task. A variety of state and federal rules apply, each with different factors and tests. If you misclassify an individual, the penalties can be severe. For example, in Colorado, a business may be fined up to $5,000 per misclassified employee for the first offense, and up to $25,000 per misclassification for subsequent violations if the violations were willful. Businesses may also be liable for back taxes, interest, failure to pay overtime, and a variety of other penalties for failure to provide benefits. Therefore, it's very important to ensure an independent contractor fits the tests for contractor status. A new Colorado case provides some important guidance on this subject.

In Softrock Geological Services, Inc. v. ICAO, the Colorado Court of Appeals had to decide whether an individual who provided services to Softrock as a contractor over a three-year period, without performing similar services for others during that period, was a contractor or employee. Under Colorado's unemployment statute, an individual is presumed to be an employee unless the organization demonstrates that the individual: (1) is "free from control and direction in the performance of the service" and (2) "is customarily engaged in an independent trade, occupation, professional, or business related to the service performed." The second part of the test is often difficult to prove. A number of Colorado cases have concluded that unless the contractual arrangement is relatively brief, an individual must perform services for more than one entity to be a contractor. Such a test, however, places a heavy, and often unfair, burden on businesses.

Businesses do not always track the outside activities of a consultant, and a consultant may choose to work for only one entity for a period of time. Recognizing this, the Court of Appeals in Softrock concluded that it is improper to classify an individual as an employee solely because that person did not perform similar services for others while performing services for the alleged employer. Instead, the failure to perform services for others is merely one factor to be considered. The other factors include: the existence of a quality standard; payment of a salary/hourly rate as opposed to a fixed or contract rate; ability to terminate the individual for limited reasons, such as failing to produce results or violating the contract; whether training is provided; whether tools and benefits are provided; whether the individual is subject to a set schedule or has authority to set his or her own schedule; payment to a business or tradename as opposed to an individual; and whether the individual and the business have combined operations or maintain separate and distinct operations. The court remanded the case to the Industrial Claims Appeals Office for reconsideration, though it is possible this case will be reviewed by the Colorado Supreme Court.

The court's guidance in Softrock is helpful because many times, individuals will meet the test for contractor status even though they choose to perform work for only one entity for an extended period. Still, as this case demonstrates, repeatedly retaining an invidual to perform services as a contractor over an extended period, without confirming that he or she is working for others, is risky. As a result, it is best to ensure that individuals are, in fact, working for others or making their services available to others while performing services for your business.

Here are some additional tips to keep in mind when retaining a contractor:

1. Don't classify someone as a contractor just because that person asks to be a contractor. The business bears the responsibility, and liability, for appropriately classifying its workers.

2. A signed contract is not enough. A court or auditor will look beyond the contract to determine whether the individual meets the appropriate tests for contractor status.

3. Do not pay an individual; instead, ensure you are paying a tradename or business entity. Payment to an individual is a red flag for auditors, even when the person is legitimately a contractor.

4. Avoid hiring former employees as contractors, unless you are certain they meet the test for contractor status. Again, this is a red flag for auditors, as employees are sometimes reclassified as contractors even though their actual duties have not changed.

5. Get a business card, print out a website, or maintain some other evidence that the individual has a business and makes his or her services available to others. This type of evidence can be very helpful in the event of an audit.

6. Get your attorney involved early to ensure the person meets the appropriate tests. Although a written agreement is not dispositive, it can help, and analyzing the issue before an audit is generally better than analyzing it for the first time during or after an audit has begun.

7. Do not treat the individual like an employee, i.e., do not have the person sign an employment contract, do not evaluate the individual with the same forms you use for employees, and if you give the person a business card, be sure it notes the individual is a contractor.

8. Do not retain someone as a contractor with the idea of hiring that person as an employee if he or she does well. Most likely, that person will not fit the tests for contractor status.

9. Do not assume that individuals performing short-term projects or part-time work are automatically contractors. Often times, they are part-time or short-term employees.

10. When in doubt, err on the side of employee status.

Contractor misclassification is a big issue in Colorado and many other states. Therefore, be cautious when retaining contractors, and be sure they meet the appropriate tests for contractor status.

June 7, 2012

Last-Chance Agreements — Employer beware!

The EEOC, in its recent press release (http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/5-29-12.cfm) of May 29, 2012, announces a rare victory on summary judgment in what could be a bad trend for employers. In the underlying case of EEOC v. Cognis Corporation, a foreign multinational corporation, the federal judge ruled that the company retaliated against an employee for refusing to waive his rights to file a discrimination charge, both for past conduct and prospective conduct.

The employee, as a condition of continued employment, was asked to sign a last-chance agreement that prohibited him from filing a discrimination charge. According to the EEOC, Cognis conditioned the employment on the execution of the last chance agreement and when the employee refused to be bound by that agreement he was fired. As the Court noted in its opinion, it is not often that an employee is granted summary judgment on a Title VII retaliation claim.

The outcome here is problematic for two reasons. First, in most cases there is often a fact issue over the stated motivation for the adverse action taken by the employer because the motivation for the underlying decision is almost always in dispute; thus, there is a necessary question of fact that would defeat a summary judgment. Second, the Court’s willingness to discount the fact that had the employee not executed the last-chance agreement in the first instance he would have been terminated for a legitimate and non-discriminatory reason – poor performance – is worrisome. In rejecting Cognis’s argument on this point, the Court reasoned that even if it credited Cognis’s argument; it was the employee’s revocation of the last-chance agreement that constituted an adverse action, an act that might dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. (See Opinion). This reasoning, of course, doesn’t adequately address the fact that the worker essentially was given consideration to remain employed under the last-change agreement.

What is clear from the Court holding in Cognis is the fact that the last-chance agreement is said to have threatened termination for undertaking future protected activity, which the Court says satisfies one element of the prima facie case of retaliation – a preemptive retaliatory act. Now, all that remains for the Court is a determination of damages. If the Cognis last-chance agreement had not included this prospective provision, I wonder how the case would have turned.

This holding is sure to motivate the EEOC to seek out similar cases of this kind. The EEOC concludes its release by indicating that “[f]iling EEOC charges is a fundamental right of American employees, and this agency always stands ready to protect that right.” EEOC’s Chicago District Director John Rowe further states, “This court’s opinion should cause employers to remember that seeking to dissuade employees from exercising that right is not only bad policy, it’s a violation of federal law which can give rise to very substantial liability.”

Despite the Court’s finding and the threats by the EEOC, this author maintains that narrowly crafted last-chance agreements are often useful to employers, both to ensure employees understand that future satisfactory performance is demanded and to give the employee fair opportunity to improve his/her conduct.

For more information contact Steven M. Gutierrez.

May 15, 2012

Court Invalidates NLRB’s “Ambush Election” Rule

A federal district court judge invalidated the National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB's) controversial "ambush election" rule yesterday, ruling that the Board had lacked a three-member quorum needed to pass the rule last December. The ruling followed a failed Congressional attempt to halt the rule, and came just two weeks after the rule became effective on April 30th. For more information, see the article written by my colleagues Brian Mumaugh and Brad Williams.

April 16, 2012

Court Strikes Down NLRB Notice-Posting Requirement, Leaves Employers Hanging

By Brian M. Mumaugh and Bradford J. Williams

The U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina just became the second federal district court to weigh in on the legality of a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) rule requiring most private employers to post a notice informing employees of their rights under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). In his April 13, 2012, decision, Judge David C. Norton held that the notice-posting rule exceeded the NLRB’s authority in violation of administrative law. The decision leaves employers hanging regarding their obligations in advance of the April 30, 2012, notice-posting deadline.

In August 2011, the NLRB issued a final administrative rule requiring all private employers covered by the Act to post 11-by-17 inch posters “in conspicuous places” advising employees of their rights under the NLRA. These rights include the right to form, join, or assist unions; to negotiate with employers through unions; to bargain collectively through representatives of employees’ own choosing; and to strike and picket. The rule was stridently opposed by business groups which felt that it violated employers’ First Amendment rights, and mandated the posting of an excessively pro-union message. The final rule required employers who customarily communicate with employees regarding personnel matters using an intranet or internet site to post the notice prominently on that site.

To ensure compliance, the rule provided that failure to post the required notice would be deemed an unfair labor practice (ULP) under Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The Board could automatically toll (or stay) the six-month statute of limitations for all ULP actions—not just those arising out of a failure to post—where employers failed to post the notice. In addition, the knowing and willful refusal to post the notice could be used “as evidence of unlawful motive” in ULP cases in which motivation was at issue.

In late 2011, the NLRB’s final administrative rule was challenged in lawsuits filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, and the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina. Due in part to this pending litigation, the rule’s effective date was postponed to January 31, 2012, and then to April 30, 2012.

On March 2, 2012, Judge Amy Jackson of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued a ruling in the first of the two lawsuits, National Association of Manufacturers v. NLRB, No.11-1629 (ABJ) (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2012). Judge Jackson broadly upheld the NLRB’s right to issue the notice-posting rule, but struck down automatic sanctions for failure to post the required notice. She held that failure to post might constitute an ULP, and might toll the statute of limitations, but found that the Board would have to make specific findings in each ULP case to impose such sanctions. Judge Jackson’s decision is currently on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and the appellate court has not yet ruled on a motion that would enjoin the rule’s enforcement pending the court’s decision.

Last Friday, Judge Norton stepped into this fray by issuing a diametrically opposed decision in the second of the two lawsuits, Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, No. 11-cv-2516 (DCN) (D.S.C. Apr. 13, 2012). Judge Norton found that the Board had exceeded its authority under Section 6 of the Act by issuing the notice-posting rule. Noting that Section 6 gives the Board the power to make “such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of the [NLRA],” the judge found that the notice-posting rule was not “necessary” to any of the Act’s provisions. On the contrary, the NLRA empowers the Board to prevent and resolve ULP charges and to conduct representative elections. Judge Norton noted that these duties are inherently “reactive,” and found that nothing in the Act requires employers to “proactively” post notices of employee rights. As Judge Norton concluded: “Neither Section 6 nor any other section of the NLRA even mentions the issue of notice posting.”

Judge Norton further rejected the argument that the Board had acted appropriately by filling a statutory “gap” in the NLRA. He observed that Congress had inserted at least eight explicit notice requirements into federal labor statutes since 1934, while the NLRA had “remained silent.” He concluded that Congress “clearly knows how to include a notice-posting requirement in a federal labor statute when it so desires,” but found that there is “not a single trace of statutory text that indicates Congress intended for the Board to proactively regulate employers in this manner.”

Interestingly, Judge Norton did not discredit the Board’s factual finding that there is an increased need for employees to learn of their NLRA rights, and he did not dispute Judge Jackson’s conclusion that the Board had articulated a rational connection between this finding, and the Board’s decision to promulgate the notice-posting rule. Nonetheless, he implicitly found that any such connection was irrelevant in light of the plain language and structure of the Act, which he said compelled his conclusion that the Board lacked the authority to promulgate the rule.

Judge Norton’s decision is extremely favorable for employers, but is it unfortunately only likely controlling in the District of South Carolina. Conversely, Judge Jackson’s decision is broadly disappointing for employers, but is only likely controlling in the District of Columbia. Courts in other jurisdictions—including in the Tenth Circuit—have yet to weigh in on the issue. If Judge Norton’s decision is eventually appealed (as is likely), and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reaches a different decision than the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the notice-posting issue could end up before the U.S. Supreme Court.

A spokesman for the NLRB announced last Friday that the Board was studying Judge Norton’s decision, and would be deciding on an appropriate course of action. As it has done before, the Board might postpone enforcement of the rule pending further court action. Alternatively, the Board might take the position that the rule is only unenforceable in the District of South Carolina, but is enforceable elsewhere. The U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, or the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (or even the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, if Judge Norton’s ruling is appealed), could separately enjoin enforcement of the rule given the current split in legal opinion.

In the wake of Judge Norton’s decision, employers are advised to monitor further developments in both the District of South Carolina case, and in the District of Columbia case. Employers may also want to monitor the NLRB’s website. As the April 30th notice-posting deadline approaches, employers may wish to consult with legal counsel about the potential costs of posting an arguably pro-union poster, and the likelihood that the notice-posting rule may eventually be invalidated in their jurisdiction.

For more information or advice on compliance, please contact Brian M. Mumaugh or Bradford J. Williams of Holland & Hart’s Labor & Employment Practice Group.

April 2, 2012

EEOC Issues Final Rule On Disparate Impact

By Mark Wiletsky

Last week, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued its final rule governing disparate impact claims arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). A disparate impact occurs when a policy or practice that is facially neutral has a disparate, or significantly greater, impact on older workers than younger ones. The EEOC's final age bias rule addresses the “reasonable factors other than age” defense, or RFOA, under the statute. According to the EEOC, the rule “makes the existing regulation consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding that the defense to an ADEA disparate impact claim is RFOA [reasonable factors other than age], and not business necessity[.]” For more information, see the post by my colleague, Scott Randolph.

March 27, 2012

Furor Over Facebook Continues

By Mark Wiletsky

Following up on my post last week, the flap over employers asking applicants to turn over their passwords to social media accounts, such as Facebook, rages on. Two senators–Sens. Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) and Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.)–on March 25 asked the Department of Justice and the EEOC to investigate this practice (http://blumenthal.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/blumenthal-schumer-employer-demands-for-facebook-and-email-passwords-as-precondition-for-job-interviews-may-be-a-violation-of-federal-law-senators-ask-feds-to-investigate). Facebook joined the fray by warning employers about this practice, and of course the ACLU has raised concerns as well (http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/23/tech/social-media/facebook-employers/index.html?hpt=hp_t3). Is this issue being overblown? Other than media reports about a couple of public entities, it is unclear how many employers are demanding applicants turn over passwords to social media accounts as a condition of employment (or consideration for employment). Still, the heightened media attention is a good reminder for employers to review their hiring practices and their social media policies. If you have not yet read the NLRB's January 25, 2012 Operations Management Memo (http://www.nlrb.gov/news/acting-general-counsel-issues-second-social-media-report), I recommend doing so. Even though I disagree with certain aspects of the Memo, it provides some good examples of things to avoid in both social media policies and discipline/termination situations involving social media–for Union and non-Union work environments.

March 23, 2012

Hiring and Social Media: Beware

By Mark Wiletsky

Should you require prospective employees to provide you with access to their Facebook page and other social media accounts, as a condition of being considered for the job? Some public agencies apparently are doing so. But Richard Blumenthal, a Democratic senator from Connecticut, is writing a bill to prohibit the practice. (Not surprisingly, you can find more information about his proposed bill by visiting his Facebook page: http://www.facebook.com/dickblumenthal). Relying on social media for hiring decisions can be risky, but it happens. People Google a candidate’s name, check LinkedIn profiles, browse a Facebook page, or surf the web to see if they can learn some information about the candidate. It’s so easy to do, and there is so much information about people on the web that it is hard to resist. The problem is that the information on the Internet may or may not be relevant to the job. The information also might disclose protected characteristics that you would not otherwise know from simply reviewing a job application (e.g., a person’s race, a disability, etc.). My own thought is that for most private employers, it is not a good idea to require candidates to turn over passwords to their social media accounts. Regardless of whether the candidate agrees to do so, it is clearly not a voluntary decision, and it raises a host of potential problems for private employers, beyond even the typical problem of not hiring someone due to a protected characteristic, e.g., what happens if someone at the company loses the password, abuses it, or protects it but is later accused of being responsible for hacking into the account? The law in this area continues to evolve, but I would avoid becoming a “test case” for having gone too far.

March 5, 2012

Court Upholds NLRB Notice-Posting Requirement, Strikes Down Automatic Sanctions for Failure to Post

By Bradford J. Williams

The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued a highly anticipated ruling last Friday, broadly upholding the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB’s) right to issue a rule requiring most private employers to notify employees of their rights under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by posting a notice. The ruling struck down automatic sanctions for failure to post the required notice, but did not altogether eliminate the possibility that failure to post might constitute an unfair labor practice (ULP) under the Act. Absent further Board postponement in light of a likely appeal, or a contrary ruling from a second district court still considering the matter, the notice-posting requirement will go into effect on April 30, 2012.

In August 2011, the NLRB issued a final administrative rule requiring all private employers covered by the Act to post 11-by-17 inch posters “in conspicuous places” advising employees of their rights under the NLRA. Employers who customarily communicate with employees regarding personnel matters using an intranet or internet site were further required to post the notice prominently on that site. As originally written, the rule provided that failure to post would be deemed an ULP under Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. It further permitted the Board to automatically toll (or stay) the six-month statute of limitations for all ULP actions—not just those arising out of a failure to post—where employers had failed to post the required notice.

In late 2011, the NLRB’s final rule was challenged in lawsuits filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, and the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina. Due in part to this pending litigation, the rule’s original November 14, 2011, effective date was initially postponed to January 31, 2012, and then postponed again to April 30, 2012.

Last Friday, Judge Amy Jackson of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued her ruling in one of the two lawsuits, National Association of Manufacturers v. NLRB, No.11-1629 (ABJ) (D.D.C. March 2, 2012). The judge rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that the NLRB had exceeded its authority in promulgating the notice-posting requirement. Finding that Congress had not “unambiguously intended to preclude the Board from promulgating a rule that requires employers to post a notice informing employees of their rights under the Act,” she upheld the notice-posting requirement as a valid exercise of the Board’s authority under the deferential standard of review applicable to administrative rulemaking.

Despite upholding the notice-posting requirement, Judge Jackson found that the NLRB had nonetheless exceeded its authority in automatically deeming all failures to post to be ULPs under the Act. Because Section 8(a)(1) only prohibited employers from “interfer[ing]” with rights guaranteed by the Act, it only prohibited employers from “getting in the way – from doing something that impedes or hampers an employee’s exercise of the rights guaranteed by [Section 7] of the statute.” The automatic sanction of an ULP for any employer who failed to post would not distinguish between situations in which an employer’s failure was intended to or did exert influence over employees’ organizational efforts, and those in which an employer merely declined or failed to post the required notice. As such, the judge found that the automatic sanction of an ULP was inconsistent with the Act’s plain meaning.

Critically, Judge Jackson noted that her decision did not “prevent[] the Board from finding that a failure to post constitutes an unfair labor practice in any individual case brought before it.” As such, the Board may still determine that any particular failure to post constitutes an ULP, at least assuming it makes specific findings that the failure actually interfered with an employee’s exercise of his or her rights.

For similar reasons, Judge Jackson struck down the rule’s provision permitting the Board to automatically stay the statute of limitations in any ULP action where the employer had failed to post the required notice. The judge found that the Act provided an unambiguous six-month statute of limitations, and that the rule effectively supplanted this limitations period for a broad class of employers regardless of particular circumstances. Again, she nonetheless observed that, under a well-established common law doctrine, her decision did not “prevent the Board from considering an employer’s failure to post the employee rights notice in evaluating a plaintiff’s equitable tolling defense in an individual case before it.”

Judge Jackson’s March 2nd ruling is broadly disappointing for employers. It upholds the notice-posting requirement that will go into effect on April 30th absent further Board postponement, or a contrary ruling in the second pending lawsuit, Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, D.S.C., No. 11-cv-2516. It further permits the NLRB to find individual failures to post to be ULPs under the Act, at least given appropriate factual findings. Finally, the judge’s statute of limitations ruling may expose employers to stale ULP charges where employees succeed in showing that they were unaware of their rights under the NLRA due to an employer’s failure to post.

The plaintiffs in National Association of Manufacturers have already vowed to appeal Judge Jackson’s ruling. Pending any eventual reversal by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, or any contrary ruling by the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, employers should prepare now to comply with the rule’s notice-posting requirement before April 30th. For more information or questions, please contact Bradford J. Williams of Holland & Hart’s Labor & Employment Practice Group at (303) 295-8121 or bjwilliams@hollandhart.com.

February 23, 2012

EEOC’s New Strategic Plan

Wow! The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission approved a new strategic plan on February 22, 2012.

In summary, the four-year strategic plan, adopted by a 4-1 vote, will focus on efforts to stop and remedy unlawful employment discrimination as a core mission. Commissioner Constance Barker noted that the plan’s focus will emphasize enforcement and litigation rather than education and outreach, which she believed was contrary to the EEOC’s legislative focus.

Perhaps the most dangerous component of the new plan will be the EEOC objective to increase the number of systemic discrimination cases it handles. These cases are focused on pattern or practice, policy, or class cases where the alleged discrimination has a broad impact on an industry. Systemic cases are also exceedingly expensive to defend. The EEOC will work over the next months to create the framework to “inform, justify and support the quantitative and qualitative performance measures throughout the plan.”

Fasten your seatbelts, it's going to be a bumpy night!

You can find the announcement at: http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/2-22-12.cfm

For more information, contact Steven M. Gutierrez.