Category Archives: Discrimination

April 29, 2015

EEOC Conciliation Efforts Are Reviewable, Says Supreme Court

By Dustin Berger 

Employers have a narrow right to seek judicial review of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC’s) statutory obligation to give an employer adequate notice of the charges against them, including the identity of the employees (or class of employees) claiming discrimination, and to engage in informal resolution of the charges. In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that courts have the authority to review whether the EEOC has met its duty under Title VII to attempt informal resolution of alleged discriminatory practices prior to filing suit. Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 575 U.S. ___ (2015). 

While the scope of review is limited, it is good news for employers as it limits the EEOC’s ability to take high priority cases to court without first engaging in any discussion with the employer to remedy the alleged unlawful practices. Unfortunately, however, under the Supreme Court’s decision, the courts’ review of the EEOC’s conciliation efforts will be too limited to ensure that the EEOC makes a genuine and meaningful attempt to reach a voluntary resolution of a charge before the EEOC sues. 

Title VII Mandates Informal Methods of Conciliation 

Title VII, the primary federal law that prohibits employers from discriminating against individuals on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or national origin, sets forth a procedure to be followed by the EEOC when handling a complaint of employment discrimination. In part, the law requires that when the EEOC finds reasonable cause to believe discrimination occurred, it must first attempt to eliminate the alleged unlawful practice through “informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.” The EEOC may choose which informal method it chooses to attempt resolution of the charge, and the agency ultimately retains the right to accept any proposed settlement or to sue the employer. 

Letter From EEOC Without Follow-Up Was Insufficient Conciliation Effort 

In the case before the Court, a female applicant filed a charge alleging that Mach Mining, LLC had refused to hire her as a coal miner because of her sex. The EEOC investigated her charge and found reasonable cause to believe that Mach Mining had discriminated against not only that applicant, but also a class of women who had similarly applied for mining jobs. 

The EEOC sent Mach Mining a letter inviting both the company and the female applicant to participate in informal conciliation and stated that an EEOC representative would contact them soon. That never happened. Instead, about a year later, the EEOC sent Mach Mining a second letter stating that “such conciliation efforts as are required by law have occurred and have been unsuccessful” and further stated that any further efforts would be “futile.” The EEOC proceeded to sue Mach Mining in federal court alleging sex discrimination in hiring. 

Mach Mining asserted that the EEOC had failed to conciliate in good faith prior to filing suit, as was required by Title VII. Although the federal district court agreed with Mach Mining that it should review whether the EEOC had met its conciliation duty, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals overruled that decision and held that a party could not assert as a defense that the EEOC had failed to conciliate the claim as Title VII required. The Seventh Circuit explained that conciliation was solely within the EEOC’s expert judgment and that there was no workable standard that would allow judges to review that process. Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit believed that court review of conciliation would complicate Title VII lawsuits by allowing the focus of the litigation to drift from the merits of the Title VII claim to the sufficiency of the EEOC’s conciliation effort. 

Although other federal appellate courts, however, have held that Title VII does allow a court to review the EEOC’s conciliation effort, there was no uniformity among the other appellate courts in what that review should entail. The Supreme Court agreed to take the Mach Mining case to resolve whether and to what extent courts may review the EEOC’s conciliation attempts.

 

Notice to Employer and Discussion Required 

Justice Kagan, writing for a unanimous Court, first explained that courts routinely enforce compulsory prerequisites to suit in Title VII cases. Although Congress had given the EEOC wide latitude over the conciliation process, the Court refused to allow the EEOC to police itself on whether it had complied with its conciliation duty. Accordingly, it overruled the Seventh Circuit’s decision and held that courts have the authority to review whether the EEOC has fulfilled its Title VII duty to attempt conciliation of discrimination charges. 

The Court then turned to the proper standard of judicial review. In other words, it considered what the EEOC must show in order to meet its conciliation duty as a precondition to filing suit. The agency argued for minimal review, suggesting that its letters to Mach Mining were a sufficient attempt at conciliation. Mach Mining argued for a much deeper review, urging that the Court adopt a standard from the National Labor Relations Act that would require a negotiation in good faith over discrimination claims. The Court rejected both approaches and took a middle line. 

The Court explained that judicial review was available but was limited to ensuring that the EEOC provided the employer with notice and an opportunity to discuss the matter tailored to achieving voluntary compliance. The Court stated that the EEOC must inform the employer not only about the specific allegations of discrimination, but also about which employees (or what class of employees) have suffered as a result. Ordinarily, the Court noted, the EEOC’s “reasonable cause” letter will provide this notice.  Then, the EEOC must attempt to engage in some form of discussion with the employer to give the employer a chance to remedy the allegedly discriminatory practices prior to being sued. That discussion may be in written or oral form and the EEOC will retain a great deal of discretion about how to conduct its conciliation efforts and when to end them. 

Evidence of the conciliation efforts may be supported or challenged through written affidavits. Ordinarily, the EEOC’s affidavit will show it has met its conciliation duty, but employers may create a factual issue through affidavits or other credible evidence that indicates that the EEOC did not provide the requisite information about the charge or attempt to engage the employer in discussion prior to filing suit. If a reviewing court finds in the employer’s favor on such a challenge, the appropriate remedy is for the court to order the EEOC to engage in conciliation. 

Confidentiality of Conciliation 

In reaching its decision, the Court focused in part on Title VII’s non-disclosure provision. This provision states that “[n]othing said or done during and as a part of such informal endeavors may be made public by the [EEOC], its officers or employees, or used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding without the written consent of the persons concerned.” Mach Mining argued that this confidentiality provision meant only that the actions taken and statements made taken during conciliation could not be used as evidence of the merits of the claim. The Court rejected that argument and reiterated that the non-disclosure provision protects actions and statements made during conciliation from disclosure for any evidentiary purpose. And, the Court explained, the non-disclosure provision alone precluded the courts from engaging in any deeper inquiry into the EEOC’s actions during conciliation.  

What This Means For You 

As the EEOC has been aggressively pursuing employers on novel theories of discrimination, it is beneficial to have the ability to ask a court to review whether the EEOC provided proper notice of the allegedly discriminatory practice and the employees allegedly affected by it and offered the employer an effort to discuss the matter for the purpose of achieving voluntary compliance. Although this review is narrow, it is an improvement over the Seventh Circuit’s view because it gives employers a limited opportunity to hold the EEOC accountable for satisfying its statutory obligation to conciliate claims. If your organization receives a “reasonable cause” finding, be sure to track what efforts the EEOC makes to engage you in discussions to pursue voluntary compliance. If those efforts do not meet the standard announced by the Court, you can seek to compel the EEOC to make an effort compliant with its statutory obligations before it proceeds with its suit. 

What the Mach Mining decision will not do, however, is allow an employer to seek the aid of a court in requiring the EEOC to make a genuine effort to achieve a voluntary resolution of a charge. For instance, the Mach Mining decision does not require the EEOC to negotiate in good faith, apprise an employer of “the smallest remedial award the EEOC would accept,” lay out the legal and factual basis for its position or any request for a remedial award, refrain from “take-it-or-leave-it” offers, or provide any particular amount of time for an employer to consider and respond to the EEOC’s position or offers. Accordingly, you are well advised to set expectations of the conciliation process at a low threshold and, to the extent you believe voluntary resolution is desirable, take the initiative in working with the EEOC after receiving a reasonable cause determination letter.

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April 20, 2015

You’ve Received a Discrimination Charge from NERC or the EEOC – Don’t Throw It in the Trash!

Lane_DBy Dora Lane 

When asked about a discrimination charge sent to them months ago, a client once answered “I did not know what to do with it, so I threw it in the trash.” Needless to say, that was a bad idea. Unfortunately, many employers do not understand their obligations when faced with a discrimination charge and that can backfire if the charge is not informally resolved. 

What is a discrimination charge? 

Ordinarily, before an employee can bring a harassment, discrimination, or retaliation lawsuit in court, the employee must “exhaust their administrative remedies.” In plain English, they have to file a complaint (called a “charge”) with one of the administrative agencies responsible for enforcement of the respective employment laws before they sue the employer in court. 

In Nevada, a charge may be filed with either the Nevada Equal Rights Commission (NERC) (state administrative agency) or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) (federal administrative agency). Because of a work-sharing agreement between the two agencies, a charge filed with NERC is also deemed filed with the EEOC (though the opposite is not true). A charge ordinarily includes the name of the employee who submitted it, a brief summary of the employee’s allegations, and certain applicable deadlines. Where the charge is filed matters because different requirements for responding to it apply. 

What are the differences between responding to a NERC charge versus an EEOC charge? 

An employer should respond to any discrimination charge, regardless of the agency in which it was filed, or risk an adverse determination based only on the employee’s evidence. However, there are differences in the type of information you must provide and the timing of your response, depending on which agency sends you the charge. 

EEOC charge notifications are usually accompanied by Requests for Documents/Information. These requests must be answered and submitted along with a position statement addressing the allegations in the charge. The requests are frequently quite sweeping, requiring a lot of time and attention. NERC does not usually include Requests for Documents/Information in its charge notification packets. Rather, such requests may be sent – on a case-by-case basis – as part of the investigation process. (Of course, the EEOC may also request additional information during the course of its investigation.) 

Another difference is the timing of submitting a position statement if the charge proceeds to mediation (called “Informal Settlement Conference” by NERC). If you receive a charge notification from NERC, the notification comes in a packet, which also usually contains an Election of Response form. That form lets you choose whether or not you wish to participate in an Informal Settlement Conference, which is automatically scheduled on a certain date. If you do not respond by the election deadline or you decline the conference, the charge is ordinarily placed into investigation. 

Even if you choose to participate in the Informal Settlement Conference before NERC, however, you still must submit a position statement approximately a week before the conference. A potential cost-saving measure is to provide a brief, summary position statement first, in anticipation that the matter will resolve at the Informal Settlement Conference, and reserve the right to supplement at a later date in the event it does not. 

By contrast, with EEOC charges proceeding to mediation, you are only required to submit a position statement if the case does not settle during mediation. That said, in some cases, it may be useful to give the mediator a brief factual background offering your company’s perspective prior to the mediation. 

What if I did not get notice that I can mediate or participate in an Informal Settlement Conference? 

If you receive a NERC charge notification without an Election of Response form, you might consider contacting NERC to ask for one. NERC schedules Informal Settlement Conferences as a matter of course, and it is highly unusual not to be invited to one. Sometimes lack of invitation has resulted from inadvertent administrative oversight so if you want to pursue early settlement, ask for a conference. 

If you receive an EEOC charge notification that does not allow for mediation, it may stem from various reasons, which may or may not be a cause for concern. For example, there might have been an unintentional failure to check the “Mediation” box. Or, it is possible that the complaining party was not interested in mediation. Or, in the worst case scenario, the charge was not eligible for mediation because it was characterized as a “Category A” charge. “Category A” charges involve matters considered priorities by the EEOC, allegations of widespread legal violations by the employer, or other matters where the EEOC has concluded that further investigation would probably result in a cause finding (i.e., determination against the employer). 

If you are interested in mediating an EEOC charge, consider contacting the EEOC to inquire whether mediation would be available, even if the mediation box is not checked, as the EEOC’s response may offer some information as to the basis for the initial mediation unavailability. And, while the EEOC would rarely admit that the charge is “Category A,” that information might enable you to prepare for the EEOC’s upcoming investigation. 

What should I do when I get the charge?  

First and foremost, you should immediately preserve all relevant documents and information, in both paper and electronic format. You should also suspend all automatic electronic deletion policies and direct your employees not to destroy anything related to the allegations in the charge. In some cases, it may be appropriate to make forensic images of computer hard drives to preserve the integrity of metadata and other electronic information. 

Second, if an internal investigation has not already been conducted, you should investigate the complaining party’s allegations and begin gathering relevant information to prepare for defending the charge. Sometimes that includes collecting employee statements which can later be used to support your response to the charge. 

Finally, take your obligation to provide a position statement seriously. Position statements should be prepared by – at a minimum – an experienced human resources professional. Better yet, contact your employment counsel. Position statements not only shape the administrative agencies’ investigations and conclusions, but they are also discoverable in litigation. So, even though employment disputes are not criminal in nature, it is wise to heed the Miranda warning that “anything you say will be used against you” in court. 

Bottom Line: Responsibilities Flow From Receipt of a Charge 

As tempting as it may be to ignore or dismiss an EEOC or NERC charge, resist the temptation and take steps to protect your organization from potential liability. Deadlines are triggered from the charge notification. Failure to preserve all relevant evidence can result in severe sanctions, including ruling against your organization on the ultimate discrimination, harassment, or retaliation issue. Failing to conduct an internal investigation can limit your ability to properly defend against the employee’s claims and to determine your possible liability. In short, no good can come from ignoring a charge. Instead, follow the steps outlined above to put you in the best position to handle the allegations and minimize liability to your organization.

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April 14, 2015

EEOC Fails to Show Telecommuting Would Be A Reasonable Accommodation

Wiletsky_MBy Mark Wiletsky 

The Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) “does not endow all disabled persons with a job—or job schedule—of their choosing,” according to the majority of judges on the full Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. In an 8 to 5 decision, the Sixth Circuit Court ruled en banc that Ford Motor Company did not violate the ADA when it denied an employee’s request to telecommute up to four days per week in order to accommodate her irritable bowel syndrome. EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., No. 12-2484 (6th Cir. Apr. 10, 2015). 

“Good, Old-Fashioned Interpersonal Skills” Made In-Person Attendance Essential 

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) argued that a resale buyer for Ford, Jane Harris, who had irritable bowel syndrome that made it difficult for her to be far from a restroom, should be allowed to work from home up to four days per week. The agency cited Ford’s telecommuting policy that allowed other workers, including some resale buyers, to telecommute as evidence that Harris’ telecommuting request was a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. 

The Court disagreed. It ruled that regular and predictable on-site attendance was an essential function of the resale-buyer position at Ford. Resale buyers needed to purchase raw steel from steel suppliers and then resell it to parts manufacturers to make parts used in Ford vehicles. Although some interactions could be done by email and telephone, the Court found that many required “good, old-fashioned interpersonal skills,” and resale buyers needed to be able to meet face to face with suppliers, parts manufacturers and Ford employees during core business hours. 

Importantly, the Court reiterated the general rule is that regular attendance at work is essential to most jobs, especially interactive ones. It pointed to past court opinions as well as to EEOC regulations that support the premise that regular and predictable on-site attendance is an essential job function. The Court even relied on that “sometimes-forgotten guide” – common sense, stating that non-lawyers (as well as judges in other appellate circuits) recognize that regular in-person attendance is an essential function, and a prerequisite to other essential functions, of most jobs. 

Other Buyers Telecommuted on a Predictable, Limited Basis 

But what about the fact that Ford had a telecommuting policy that allowed other employees, including resale buyers like Harris, to work from home? Wouldn’t that make telecommuting a reasonable accommodation for Harris? 

The Court said no, because she proposed to telecommute four days per week on a schedule of her choosing. The other resale buyers who telecommuted did so only one established day per week and they agreed in advance that they would come into work that day, if needed. They were also able to perform well and maintain productivity. Harris, on the other hand, wanted to be able to pick and choose which days she would telecommute, up to four days per week, without agreeing to come in those days, if necessary. The Court found that none of these other employees’ more predictable and more limited telecommuting schedules removed regular on-site attendance from the resale buyer’s job. 

As a result, the Court ruled that Harris’ proposed telecommuting accommodation unreasonable.

In addition, Ford had allowed Harris to telecommute on an as-needed basis on three separate occasions and her performance suffered. Other attempts to improve Harris’ attendance also failed. The Court found that Harris could not perform the essential functions of her job and was unable to establish regular and consistent work hours. Therefore, it ruled that she was not a “qualified individual” under the ADA. 

Technology Did Not Carry the Day 

The EEOC argued that advances in technology make on-site attendance less essential. The Court disagreed in this case, stating that there was no evidence presented that specific technology made personal interactions unnecessary for resale buyers. 

No Blind Deference to Employer’s Judgment 

The Court made a point of stating that its opinion did not open the door for courts to blindly accept as essential whatever an employer says is essential for a particular job. It emphasized that an employer’s words, policies and practices were all important in deciding whether a particular task or requirement is an essential job function. 

In Ford’s case, the evidence supported Ford’s judgment that regular and predictable in-person attendance was essential for resale buyers. The Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Ford. 

No Retaliation For Termination 

The Court also ruled that Ford did not retaliate against Harris when it fired her for poor performance just four months after she had filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Key was Ford’s good documentation of Harris’ performance and interpersonal issues. She had been ranked in the bottom 10% of her peer group before she filed her charge. Documentation showed that she failed to update spreadsheets, complete her paperwork, schedule training sessions, price items correctly and finish her work on time. Despite the closeness in time of the firing to her charge filing, the Court ruled that the EEOC failed to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the real reason that Ford terminated Harris was unlawful retaliation instead of poor performance. 

Dissent: Either Physical Presence is Not Essential or Telecommuting is A Reasonable Accommodation 

Five judges on the Sixth Circuit dissented, believing that the EEOC had presented enough evidence to send the EEOC’s claims to a jury. Specifically, the dissent stated that the evidence was sufficient to show that there remained genuine disputes over whether Harris was a qualified individual, either because in-person attendance was not an essential function of her job, or because telecommuting would be a reasonable accommodation for her. It pointed to Ford’s telecommuting policy which allowed for “one to four days” of telework each week. It noted that Harris proposed that she be able to work from home up to four days each week, as was arguably allowed under the policy, not that she be permitted to telecommute four days each and every week. 

The dissent also asserted that Harris’ past attendance issues that were a result of her disability should not be used against her in deciding whether a telecommuting arrangement during core business hours would be a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. Moreover, the dissent found that Ford should have engaged in a more interactive process to clarify Harris’ telecommuting accommodation request. Finally, the dissent believed that there was a genuine dispute over whether Ford retaliated against Harris for filing her discrimination charge. 

Lessons for Employers Facing ADA Telecommuting Accommodation Requests 

The majority’s decision finding that regular and predictable in-person attendance is an essential function of most jobs, especially interactive ones, is favorable for employers. But it does not mean that telecommuting can never be a reasonable accommodation. In fact, the dissent in this case demonstrates that telecommuting requests for disabled employees is likely to continue to be an issue with which employers will grapple in coming years.  

If face-to-face interactions and in-person attendance at meetings or other work-related functions is essential for certain jobs at your workplace, be certain to include those tasks in your job descriptions. If you generally allow telecommuting, be sure to have a written policy and apply it consistently. If presented with a request to telecommute in order to accommodate a disability, engage in an interactive process to discuss whether telecommuting would be appropriate for that particular position and employee, whether it would constitute an undue hardship for your organization and if alternative accommodations would allow the employee to perform his or her essential functions. And by all means, make sure you have concrete documentation of an employee’s poor performance or policy infractions before taking adverse action against anyone who has filed a discrimination charge.

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March 26, 2015

Supreme Court: Pregnant Worker With Lifting Restrictions May Continue Lawsuit

Biggs_JBy Jude Biggs 

In a divided decision, on March 25, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court released a long-awaited ruling involving a pregnant worker’s claim under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA). In its ruling, the Court held that the worker could proceed with her lawsuit, because disputes remain as to whether her employer treated more favorably at least some non-pregnant employees whose situation could not reasonably be distinguished from hers.

The majority of the Court forcefully rejected the 2014 guidance of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) concerning the application of Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to the PDA, as it fell short on a number of fronts needed to “give it power to persuade.” Without ruling for either party, the Court adopted a new standard for courts to use when deciding PDA cases brought under a disparate treatment theory. Young v. UPS, 575 U.S. ___ (2015).  

Despite the Court’s guidance, employers still will face many questions on what accommodations will be required in the future. The standards for “disparate treatment” and “disparate impact” cases may be more confusing in the future for employers who need to make decisions regarding whether and how to accommodate pregnant employees. As a result, employers are wise to respond carefully to accommodation requests by pregnant workers. Employers should review any policies that might have a disproportionate effect on pregnant workers, such as rules limiting job accommodations. In addition, employers should be careful to review restrictions on use of sick pay/sick time, leave eligibility outside of FMLA, lifting restrictions, and light duty assignments to determine: (1) if they disparately affect pregnant employees while accommodating others; and (2) what “strong” business rationale you can offer to defend the distinction.

For additional analysis of the Court's opinion and what it means for employers, please see our full article here.

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March 17, 2015

Utah Adds Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity to Anti-Discrimination Laws

Romero_CBy Cecilia Romero 

On March 12, 2015, Utah signed into law a bill that protects individuals on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity in employment and housing. The law contains certain exceptions for religious organizations and permits employers to maintain reasonable dress codes and sex-specific facilities. Here are the details on the employment protections. 

Discrimination, Harassment and Retaliation Prohibited 

The new law adds sexual orientation and gender identity to the list of protected characteristics under Utah’s employment discrimination law, making it unlawful for Utah employers to refuse to hire, promote, discharge, demote, terminate, retaliate against, harass or discriminate in compensation or any other terms of employment because of an individual’s sexual orientation or gender identity. The full list of protected groups under Utah law is now race, color, sex, pregnancy/childbirth, age, religion, national origin, disability, sexual orientation and gender identity. 

Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Defined 

Sexual orientation is defined as an individual’s actual or perceived orientation as heterosexual, homosexual or bisexual. Gender identity is defined by reference to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-5) which refers to individuals who see and feel themselves to be a different gender than their assigned gender. 

Reasonable Dress Codes and Sex-Specific Facilities Permitted 

The new law specifically addresses two frequent concerns for employers. First, the new law allows employers to adopt reasonable dress and grooming standards and second, employers are allowed to adopt reasonable policies that designate sex-specific facilities, such as restrooms, shower rooms and dressing facilities. 

Exemptions for Religious Organizations and Protecting Religious Expression 

The new law protects religious organizations and the expression of religious beliefs. The list of excluded religious groups was expanded through this law to include not only religious organizations, associations and corporations, but also religious societies, educational institutions and leaders, and the Boy Scouts of America. 

State Law Trumps Local Laws 

This new state law supersedes and preempts any laws, ordinances or regulations related to the prohibition of employment discrimination passed by a city, county or other local or state governmental entity. This should help employers maintain uniform policies statewide without having to account for local anti-discrimination laws. Complaints will be handled by the state antidiscrimination division. Recovery under the law is limited to actual damages, not punitive damages. 

Practice Points to Employers 

These new employment protections will affect many of your employment communications so take time now to: 

  • Review and understand the new law;
  • Revise harassment and retaliation policies to include sexual orientation and gender identity as prohibited bases for harassment and retaliation; remember such statements might be contained in your employee handbook, on your job applications, in recruiting and training materials and on your website; and
  • Train managers and supervisors on the new law.

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March 12, 2015

EEOC Strategic Enforcement Priorities: More Insight from Denver’s Director (Part Two)

Biggs_JBy Jude Biggs  

As we wrote last week, John Lowrie, the new director of the EEOC’s Denver Field Office, recently offered insight into the agency’s national Strategic Enforcement Plan (SEP) and how his office will approach those enforcement goals. Here is the second article in the series exploring the third and fourth priorities in the EEOC’s SEP. 

Priority #3 – Developing Issues 

Field Director Lowrie explained the EEOC and its individual field offices are working to advance a number of developing issues. These include: 

  • Reasonable ADA accommodations – one example is telecommuting, where an employee’s physical presence at the company is not an essential job function. The EEOC has successfully pursued this in a case against the Ford Motor Company but the case is being reexamined by the full Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals so may not stand.
  • Pregnancy discrimination – Mr. Lowrie discussed the lengthy Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) enforcement guidance issued last July. The guidance document contains many hypothetical situations that the agency deems would violate the PDA as well as a section on employer best practices.
  • Title VII accommodations – Mr. Lowrie pointed to the Abercrombie & Fitch religious accommodation case which is currently before the U.S. Supreme Court as an example of how the agency looks to ensure employers make reasonable accommodations for characteristics protected by Title VII. At issue in the Abercrombie case is whether a Muslim job applicant who wore a headscarf to her job interview and was denied employment was required to request a reasonable accommodation on religious grounds in light of the company’s “look policy” which would not have permitted wearing the headscarf at work. 

Priority #4 – Equal Pay Act 

The fourth priority in the EEOC’s SEP is enforcement of the Equal Pay Act (EPA). Mr. Lowrie noted that Jenny Yang, who was appointed as the EEOC’s new chairperson last September, had made a recent visit to the Denver field office during which she specifically mentioned EPA issues to the Denver investigators and staff. Because equal pay issues are high on the Chair’s agenda, charges involving allegations of unequal pay based on gender will receive additional attention by EEOC investigators and attorneys. 

Mr. Lowrie also noted that Wyoming is the worst state in the nation for pay disparity issues. Because the Denver field office has jurisdiction over Wyoming (as well as Colorado), the Denver field office may look to change Wyoming’s poor ranking through vigilant enforcement of equal pay charges that come into its office. 

Steps to Avoid Additional Scrutiny 

Because the EEOC is giving priority status to these types of charges, you need to take time to review your compliance efforts related to these issues. First, take a look at your reasonable accommodation process. Have you trained your managers and supervisors to recognize when an accommodation is being requested? Do you engage in an interactive process with the applicants and employees who make accommodation requests? Be certain to document your interactive process and all accommodations decisions you make. Second, review your policies as they relate to pregnant employees. Make sure that you do not treat pregnancy less favorably than other medical conditions and consider possible ADA accommodations if circumstances so warrant. Third, audit your pay grades and compensation structure to make sure that you are paying workers doing the same work equally, regardless of gender. 

Next Installment Will Focus on Final Two EEOC Priorities 

In the next and final article in this series, we will offer insight into the last two of the EEOC’s strategic priorities. Both are areas in which the EEOC has vigorously sued employers whose policies and practices it deems are discriminatory, so stay tuned.

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March 2, 2015

EEOC Strategic Enforcement Priorities: Insight from Denver’s Director (Part One)

EEOCBy Jude Biggs  

Knowing the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC’s) top priorities can help you direct your risk management efforts and avoid enhanced scrutiny. John Lowrie, the new director of the EEOC’s Denver Field Office, recently spoke to the Labor and Employment Section of the Colorado Bar Association about the agency’s national Strategic Enforcement Plan (SEP) and how his office will approach those enforcement goals. This article is the first in a series that will share Mr. Lowrie’s insight into how EEOC investigators and attorneys in the Denver Field Office work toward fulfilling the national enforcement priorities. 

Certain EEOC Charges Get Immediate Attention 

The Denver field office currently has 12.5 investigators, 7 attorneys, 3 mediators and 1 administrative law judge. With the volume of charges received by the Denver office remaining steady at between 1,800 to 2,000 charges each year, charges alleging certain types of claims get enhanced attention which can include immediate review by the legal staff, up to and including the director himself. 

Which charges receive this immediate attention? Any charge that touches on one of the EEOC’s six national strategic enforcement priorities. Here we discuss the first two priorities in the national SEP, including Mr. Lowrie’s perspective from the Denver Field Office. 

Priority #1 – Remove Barriers to Employment 

According to Field Director Lowrie, there are two main components to the EEOC’s first enforcement priority of removing barriers to employment: (1) arrest and conviction records, and (2) medical screening questions and procedures.  If a charge alleges discriminatory use of criminal background checks in hiring or the inappropriate timing or use of medical questions or exams, the EEOC will escalate that charge for immediate review. 

The EEOC has brought several high-profile lawsuits in the past few years alleging that blanket “no hire” policies that prohibit hiring an applicant with a criminal record have a discriminatory impact on African Americans and other protected classes in violation of Title VII. In the Peoplemark case, however, the EEOC was ordered to pay the prevailing employer over $750,000 in attorneys’ and expert witness fees when the court ruled that no company-wide criminal background check policy existed, an allegation that was essential to the EEOC’s case. Similarly, in the Freeman case, a federal appeals court recently upheld the dismissal of the EEOC’s case, calling its expert’s analysis “utterly unreliable.” Despite its losses, the EEOC is pursuing claims based on criminal background checks, with lawsuits against BMW, Dollar General and other companies still ongoing. 

Priority #2 – Vulnerable Workers 

The second strategic enforcement priority is the protection of vulnerable workers. Field Director Lowrie explained that this includes agricultural workers, immigrant and migrant workers and mentally disabled workers. 

When discussing immigrant and migrant workers, Mr. Lowrie noted the EEOC does not look at whether the workers are authorized to work in the U.S. or if they are in the country illegally, commenting that the EEOC is not ICE or Homeland Security. Instead, the EEOC looks to enforce the anti-discrimination laws under its jurisdiction so that employers do not escape enforcement just because they use unauthorized workers. 

As for protecting mentally disabled workers, Mr. Lowrie specifically mentioned the EEOC’s win in a case against a turkey farm in the Midwest in which over thirty men with intellectual disabilities were housed in substandard facilities, denied medical care and harassed both verbally and physically for years. 

Stay Tuned for Insight into Other Top EEOC Priorities 

In the next few weeks, we will explore the EEOC’s remaining strategic priorities. In the meantime, review your background check policy to ensure you do not have a blanket “no hire” criminal record exclusion. Check that your employment application does not state that applicants will be automatically excluded if they have a criminal record. Make sure that you do not ask for medical information, such as family medical history, or send applicants for a medical exam until after a conditional job offer has been made. Be careful with wellness programs, ensuring they are voluntary. And if you employ vulnerable workers, make certain that your policies and practices do not single them out for disparate treatment in pay, job assignments or other conditions of employment.

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February 16, 2015

Lessons From a $15M Discrimination Verdict

Mark Wiletsky of Holland & HartBy Mark Wiletsky 

A Colorado federal jury reportedly awarded $15 million last week to 11 workers who claimed they had been subject to workplace harassment, discrimination and retaliation because of their race and national origin. Ten of the 11 current and former workers who sued their employer, a trucking and mail-sorting company at Denver International Airport, were black men. Three had been born in the United States and the remaining seven were from Mali, Guinea and Brazil. Their allegations included that racist comments pervaded the workplace, that they were discriminated in work assignments, layoffs and pay and were segregated into certain unfavorable job categories and shifts, and that they faced retaliation after complaining about the harassment and discrimination. 

Although we do not know exactly which facts or claims persuaded the jury to award this large sum, the fact that the jury awarded $13 million dollars for punitive damages suggests that it believed the company’s actions (or inactions) were particularly bad. 

What can you learn from this significant discrimination verdict? Even if the verdict is later reversed or reduced, you can learn what not to do when managing a racially and ethnically diverse workforce. 

Ignoring Complaints and Promoting the Harassers 

The workers in this case alleged that they complained internally about racist comments and slurs made by supervisors, leads and co-workers and that nothing was done. Examples of some supposed comments directed toward the workers were “lazy, stupid Africans,” “go back to your f***ing country,” “they need to fire all the n***ers here” as well as regular use of the N-word. Instead of stopping the comments, management supposedly turned a deaf ear and even promoted some of those who made the slurs. 

Don’t ignore inappropriate comments when you hear them. It is up to you to stop racial and ethnic slurs immediately and take action to ensure they are not pervasive in your workplace. If an employee complains about discriminatory name-calling and threats, you need to investigate the report and take appropriate action. Be sure to confirm—in writing—that you met with the accuser(s) to discuss the results of your investigation, and ensure there is no retaliation. Then follow-up again to ensure things have improved. Doing so will demonstrate your commitment to a workplace free from discrimination and harassment – so long as you are prepared to take action against those who violate your policies. 

Failing to Enforce EEO and Harassment Policies 

You likely have an Equal Employment Opportunity and a Harassment policy in your employee handbook, but they do no good if you fail to enforce them. Review your policies, train your supervisors on them and enforce them uniformly and consistently. 

Retaliating Against Those Who Complain or Their Supporters 

The eleventh worker who sued the trucking company in this case was a white man who offered support for the African workers and provided evidence supporting their allegations. After being terminated from his job, he alleged his firing was in retaliation for his support. 

Retaliation is within company control and in many cases, is preventable. Train your supervisors not to treat an employee who has complained of discrimination or harassment, or who has participated in a charge or lawsuit, differently than other employees are treated. Carefully analyze any adverse decision that would affect such an employee and make sure your decision is based on legitimate business reasons and is well-documented, in case you have to defend a retaliation complaint. 

Fifteen Million Reasons To Do It Right 

You don’t want to end up in front of a jury defending your employment practices, but if you find yourself in that position, you want to be able to show a jury you did everything you could to prevent discrimination and harassment in your workplace. If you don’t take those actions, a jury may very well punish you for it.

October 21, 2014

EEOC’s Failure to Engage in Conciliation Dooms Its Separation Agreement Lawsuit Against CVS Pharmacy

Wiletsky_MBy Mark Wiletsky 

Chalk up a loss for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in its lawsuit against CVS Pharmacy’s separation agreements.  As we reported earlier, the EEOC sued CVS alleging that CVS’s separation agreements deterred employees from filing charges and communicating with the EEOC about discrimination and retaliation.  Dismissing the case, a federal judge recently ruled that the EEOC failed to engage in the required procedural steps, including conciliation, before filing its lawsuit. 

EEOC Dismissed Employee’s Charge, Then Went After Employer 

This lawsuit is an example of the aggressive, proactive nature of the EEOC in extending the protections of Title VII to new and novel claims.  The case arose after CVS terminated Tonia Ramos, a pharmacy manager.  Ms. Ramos signed CVS’s standard separation agreement, which included a release of claims and a covenant not to sue.  She then proceeded to file a charge with the EEOC claiming that her discharge was based on sex and race in violation of Title VII.  Almost two years later, the EEOC dismissed Ms. Ramos’s charge.  

The EEOC then contacted CVS asserting that based on the separation agreement, CVS was engaging in a pattern or practice of resistance to their employees’ full enjoyment of rights under Title VII.  In other words, the EEOC concluded that even though the individual employee did not have a valid discrimination claim against CVS, it would bring a pattern or practice case against CVS based on the language in its standard separation agreement used with potentially hundreds of former employees. 

No Conciliation, No Lawsuit 

Under Title VII enforcement procedures, the EEOC has the authority to investigate and act on a charge of a pattern or practice of discrimination, whether filed on behalf of an allegedly harmed employee or by the EEOC itself.  The procedures require that the EEOC try to resolve any alleged unlawful employment practices through informal means before filing a lawsuit.  Such means include conferences, conciliation and persuasion.  Although the EEOC and CVS discussed potential settlement by telephone twice before the EEOC filed suit, the EEOC failed to engage in conciliation, which proved fatal to its case.  Because an attempt at reaching a conciliation agreement is a prerequisite to the EEOC filing suit and it was undisputed that the EEOC did not engage in any conciliation process, the federal court dismissed the EEOC’s case against CVS. 

Judge’s Guidance is in the Footnotes 

The case was dismissed on procedural grounds, but the judge took the opportunity to offer his view on the merits of the EEOC’s arguments in several footnotes in the opinion.  First, the EEOC argued that the term “resistance” as used in Title VII should be interpreted broadly to extend to the language in CVS’s separation agreement even if that language did not amount to discrimination or retaliation under the Act.  The judge rejected that argument, stating that the term “resistance” requires some retaliatory or discriminatory act. 

Second, the judge discussed the “covenant not to sue” provision in CVS’s separation agreement.  Even though the provision stated that an employee could not “initiate or file . . . a complaint or proceeding asserting any of the Released Claims,” the release of claims (in another paragraph of the separation agreement) stated that it did not limit “any rights that the Employee cannot lawfully waive.” In addition, the agreement contained two carve out provisions specifying an employee’s “right to participate in a proceeding with any appropriate federal, state or local government agency enforcing discrimination laws” and that the agreement did not prohibit the employee from cooperating with any such agency in its investigation.  The judge wrote that these provisions would allow an employee to file an EEOC charge.  He went on to write that even if the separation agreement explicitly banned filing charges, those provisions would be unenforceable and could not constitute “resistance” under Title VII. 

One Case Down; One Still Pending 

The dismissal of the CVS lawsuit is good news for employers who use separation agreements, especially in light of the judge’s comments signaling that the EEOC’s arguments were without merit.  However, a similar case filed by the EEOC against College America is still proceeding through the federal court in the District of Colorado.  (We wrote about the College America case here.) Like CVS, College America has asked the court to dismiss the EEOC’s case.  We will let you know when the court rules on that motion.  In the meantime, employers should review their separation agreements to ensure they include a provision that the agreement does not prohibit employees from filing a charge, participating in an investigation or otherwise cooperating with an appropriate federal, state or local government agency that enforces discrimination laws.

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September 23, 2014

Cheyenne Jury Awards $1,481,000+ On FMLA Retaliation Claim

Cave_BBy Brad Cave

The series of large verdicts for Wyoming employees seems to be marching forward.  The most recent example occurred recently when a Cheyenne jury awarded over $740,000 to a trona miner after deciding that he was fired because he took FMLA leave.  With liquidated damages available in an FMLA case, the Wyoming court entered judgment in an amount in excess of $1.48 million in favor of the employee. This case stands as yet another example about the importance of supervisor training and careful, well-documented and consistent decision making. 

Long Term Employee With A Pain in the Neck.  We first told you about this case in March of this year, when the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals sent the case back to Wyoming for trial after reversing the trial court’s dismissal of the case.  (Safety Violation or Too Much Intermittent FMLA Leave?). Here is a short recap of the facts. 

Steven Smothers had been employed by Solvay Chemical for 18 years when his employment was terminated.  Smothers had experienced back problems since 1994 resulting in three surgeries on his neck and other medical procedures, and an extended course of medical treatment by specialists.  Over the years, Smothers took intermittent FMLA leave for his medical appointments and when he was unable to work due to the pain.  The amount of FMLA leave he took did not go unnoticed.  He was pressured by the production superintendent to change shifts to lessen the additional overtime cost caused by his absences, but such a change would have cost him about $7,000 per year in shift differential pay.   Solvay also gave Smothers a negative rating on his performance evaluation because of his absences, and he was told that he was rejected for a promotion because of the leave. 

Smothers’ Safety Rule Violation.    In August 2008, Smothers and his coworkers were performing an acid wash, which Solvay did every six months to clean residual trona out of the equipment.   When Smothers noticed that a damaged spool piece had caused a leak, he began to fix it without obtaining a line break permit which was required by Solvay safety rules.  Smothers and a co-worker, Mahaffey, argued about whether the permit was necessary, and after Smothers removed the spool piece without first getting the permit, Mahaffey immediately reported Smothers’ actions to a supervisor. 

Solvay terminated Smothers’ employment on August 28, 2008, based on a joint decision of six Solvay managers.   Five of the six decision makers testified that the argument between Smothers and Mahaffey weighed heavily in the group’s decision to fire Smothers. Although the trial court originally dismissed the case, the Tenth Circuit believed that Smothers had presented enough evidence to create doubt about the real reasons for Smothers’ termination.   So, the case was sent back to the trial court for trial. 

What’s the Real Reason for Smothers’ termination? Like all retaliation cases, the jury in this trial was asked to decide whether Smothers was fired for a safety rule violation, as the employer contended, or because his employer retaliated against him for using intermittent FMLA leave or discriminated against him because of his disability.   We don’t have a transcript of the trial, so we cannot tell you what evidence the jury heard or what facts persuaded the jury.  We do know that the Tenth Circuit reasoned that the jury could disbelieve Solvay’s reasons because: 

  • Supervisors criticized Smothers informally and in his performance evaluation for taking FMLA-protected leave, and rejected him for a promotion because of his time off;
  • Solvay did not give Smothers an opportunity to describe or explain his side of the argument with Mahaffey, even though the argument was a central reason for the decision to terminate Smothers’ employment;
  • Other Solvay employees who committed safety rule violations were not terminated. 

And the Jury Returns.The jury found in favor of Smothers on his FMLA claim, and awarded Smothers the amount of $740,535 for his lost wages and benefits from the date of his termination, August 27, 2008, through the date of trial.  But the potential damages don’t stop with the lost wages.  Under the FMLA, the successful employee may be entitled to an additional amount equivalent to the jury’s award for liquidated damages – in other words, a penalty against the employer for the violation.  As a result, the court has entered judgment against Solvay in the total amount of $1,481,070, twice the amount of the jury’s verdict, plus interest since the date of termination.  The trial court declined to award Smothers any future lost wages.  However, Smothers is entitled to an additional judgment for his reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, which could add hundreds of thousands of dollars to the total. 

Bottom Line.  Regardless of the final number after adding prejudgment interest and attorneys’ fees, this is one of the largest judgments ever entered against a Wyoming employer.  We cannot speculate about what evidence led the jury to its verdict, but we can share some lessons, with the benefit of twenty-twenty hindsight, that will help any employer avoid this kind of result: 

  • Managers and supervisors must be trained and committed to the fact that taking FMLA leave is protected by federal law, and must not be the reason for formal criticism, denied opportunities, or informal complaining.  FMLA-protected leave cannot be held against an employee for any reason whatsoever.  Any comment or suggestion to the contrary can be used as evidence of pretext.
  • Investigations must be thorough and even-handed.  While we don’t know all the evidence in this case, the jury may have heard that Solvay spent much more time asking Mahaffey about the argument with Smothers, while never asking Smothers for his side of the argument.  Everybody should get the same opportunity to tell their side of the story.   An inadequate investigation can be used as evidence of pretext.
  • Employees must be treated consistently.  Smothers had evidence that other Solvay employees intentionally violated safety rules without being terminated.  Employers need to mete out comparable discipline for comparable violations, or have a compelling reason why an employee gets tougher punishment.
  • Employers must respect long years of service.  Of course, keeping a job for eighteen years does nothing to technically change the legal relationship or create any new rights or protection for the employee.  But, after that length of time with a good performance record, it becomes difficult for a jury to believe that termination is an appropriate response for one incident. 

Wyoming juries have delivered substantial employee verdicts over the last few years.  Employers should pay attention. 

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