Category Archives: Employment Counseling

September 9, 2014

Employee Equity Purchase Programs: Ensuring a Great Idea Remains a Good Idea

With the return of some prosperity in the economy, we have seen an uptick in employers granting or selling equity (stock or partnership interests) in their businesses to their employees. In some cases, these grants are part of a broad-based employee stock purchase program. In other cases, employers use equity to reward and incentivize key players in their business. In all cases, these programs can be very successful in creating loyalty and incentivizing employees. However, these arrangements are subject to a variety of regulatory requirements. A few insights on some common issues that arise with respect to these arrangements:

Sale of Equity to an Employee May be Compensation. The transfer of equity to an employee (or other service provider) in connection with the performance of service to the employer is a compensatory transaction under Internal Revenue Code Section 83. The amount of the compensation income to the employee is the difference between the fair market value of the equity at the time of grant and the amount the employee pays for the equity. Depending on the situation, an independent valuation of the business may be necessary to establish the fair market value of the equity granted. In all cases, the employer should document that a reasonable valuation method was followed in establishing the fair market value of the equity.

Employees May Elect Early Taxation of Unvested Equity. If an equity award requires the employee to continue to provide services after the date of grant in order for the employee to retain the right to the equity, the equity may be unvested. Unvested equity is not taxable to the employee at the time of grant, but becomes taxable to the employee once the equity vests. An employee who believes an equity award will increase in value and generate a larger tax hit on the vesting date rather than the grant date may elect to accelerate the taxation of the equity to the date of grant (and thus pay taxes when the equity is worth less). This election is commonly referred to as an 83(b) election. Employers should ensure that employees are aware of the 83(b) election option.

Unvested Equity May Not Create Ownership. The Internal Revenue Code provides that an employee is not treated as the owner of the equity granted to an employee unless the equity is fully vested or the employee files an 83(b) election with the IRS. Further, employment agreements, operating agreements and shareholder agreements often contain provisions that create ambiguity as to whether an equity award is vested or unvested. Accordingly, if the parties want to ensure that an employee receiving an equity grant is treated as an owner for tax purposes, including allocations, distributions and dividends, a protective Section 83(b) election could be filed to ensure the employee is treated as the owner of the equity.

Equity Grants May Impact Employee Benefits. Equity grants of partnership interests or stock in an S corporation may have a significant impact on the medical and fringe benefits of employees receiving those grants. If the equity is vested or the employee files an 83(b) election, the employee may be treated as an owner for benefits purposes. Partners in a partnership and owners of more than 2% of the stock of an S corporation are generally not eligible to participate on a pre-tax basis in the medical benefits and other fringe benefit programs otherwise available to employees. In addition, employers should review their retirement plans when granting equity awards to employees to ensure that the compensatory value of the equity awards are accounted for in accordance with the terms of the plan document.

Equity Grants Should Be Accomplished Through a Compensatory Plan. In general, unless securities exemptions exists at both the state and federal levels, the grant or sale of employer stock or partnership interests to employees must be registered under the Securities Act of 1933. This rule applies to private non-publicly traded companies as well as publicly traded companies. Many private companies may take advantage of a special federal securities exemption from the registration requirement by satisfying what is referred to as Rule 701. However, Rule 701 and many state securities laws may only be relied upon if the grants were made pursuant to a written compensation contract or compensatory benefit plan for employees, consultants and/or directors. Further, in some cases it may be required, but it is always a good practice, to provide the award recipients a summary of the material terms of the equity award, a risk of investment statement, and annual financial statements to minimize misunderstanding and the risk of legal claims.

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August 7, 2014

Favoritism to Paramour is Not Gender Discrimination

By Brad Cave

Friendship, cronyism, nepotism, affairs – many types of personal relationships may result in one employee being treated better than another employee. But is that favoritism discriminatory? Does the non-favored employee have a discrimination claim against the employer? No, Title VII does not prohibit favoritism based on a special relationship, says the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.

“I Like You Best”

If an employer pays the CFO’s sister a higher wage than other employees doing similar work, offers the most lucrative deals to an employee who is the boss’s best friend or gives playoff tickets as a bonus to the manager’s boyfriend who works at the company, that special treatment is permissible because it is based on the special relationship or bond between the parties, not on a protected characteristic. It is only when the differential treatment is based on an impermissible classification, such as gender, race or age, that it crosses the line into unlawful discrimination. In a recent decision, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that distinction, ruling that a supervisor’s favoritism toward a female subordinate based on their purported intimate relationship did not amount to reverse gender discrimination against her male counterpart. Clark v. Cache Valley Elec. Co., No. 13-4119 (10th Cir. July 25, 2014).

Reverse Gender Discrimination Under Title VII

Project manager Kenyon Brady Clark sued his employer, Cache Valley Electric Company, alleging violations of Title VII. Clark’s discrimination claim alleged that his supervisor, Myron Perschon, favored a female project manager, Melissa Silver, over him because Perschon and Silver were in a romantic relationship. Clark asserted that Perschon gave Silver better work assignments, paid her more for performing less work and performed most of Silver’s job duties himself. Although it turned out that there had been no affair, Clark still asserted that “whether they were having sex or not, there was favoritism.” When asked about the reason for the favoritism at his deposition, Clark admitted that if the favoritism was not due to a romantic relationship, he did not know the reason for it.

The Court analyzed Clark’s claim as a reverse gender discrimination case under which Clark needed to show circumstances that would support an inference that his employer discriminates against the majority (i.e., males) or that “but for [his] status the challenged decision would not have occurred.” Significantly, Clark did not assert that the favoritism was due to Silver being a female or that Cache Valley treated women more favorably than men. Instead, Clark focused on the preferential treatment that his supervisor offered to one specific female employee. That deficit was fatal to his reverse gender discrimination claim. The Court cited numerous cases where the motives for preferential treatment were other special relationships, such as friendship, nepotism or personal fondness or intimacy, in which it had ruled that such favoritism was not within the purview of Title VII’s anti-discrimination provisions. Because Clark’s discrimination claim was based only on the favoritism shown to a special friend and not on a protected characteristic, his claim was not covered by Title VII. The Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of Cache Valley.

Retaliation Claim Fails Too

Clark also raised a retaliation claim in his lawsuit against Cache Valley. Clark asserted that his supervisor, Perschon, retaliated against him by trying to get a competitor to hire him, refusing to communicate with him and otherwise distancing himself from Clark. Clark also alleged that he was fired in retaliation for complaining about Perschon’s favoritism and retaliation. He had complained to management about the alleged affair between Perschon and Silver, stating that it was difficult to continually respond to vendors and suppliers who had questions about the purported relationship. He reported that they were acting like a married couple. He later complained about the preferential treatment that Silver received from Perschon, including receiving better job assignments and higher bonuses. In a letter to the company’s CEO and to human resources, Clark wrote that over the past three years, he had personally and professionally suffered serious and real adverse effects to his employment due to the alleged affair. He wrote that the affair created a hostile work environment and that it was the company’s responsibility to ensure that the workplace was free of harassment and retaliation. Shortly after meeting with HR and the company’s legal counsel to discuss his letter, Clark was terminated.

The Court rejected Clark’s retaliation claim. To make out a Title VII retaliation claim, Clark needed to show that (1) he engaged in protected opposition to discrimination, (2) a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, and (3) a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the materially adverse action. The Court concluded that Clark failed to show that he engaged in protected opposition to discrimination. He needed to show that he had a reasonable good-faith belief when he complained to the company that he was engaging in protected opposition to discrimination and that his good-faith belief was reasonable both subjectively and objectively. He failed to do so. Although he made statements about a “hostile work environment” and “discrimination” in his complaints to the company, the Court found such statements to be conclusory and not related to gender discrimination. The statements were about Perschon’s favoritism to Silver based on the alleged inappropriate relationship, which was not gender discrimination. Therefore, Clark’s retaliation claim failed.

Just ‘Cuz It’s Legal Doesn’t Make It Smart

Clark’s reverse discrimination claim was a little more cut and dried than most because he essentially admitted that the preferential treatment shown by his supervisor to a female colleague was not due to her status as a female. Consider whether the outcome would have been different had Clark provided evidence that the supervisor historically treated women better than men. Or think about other situations where special relationships result in favoritism, such as when the boss takes all his male cronies to play golf with clients while the female employees toil away at work. Even though the courts have been clear about distinguishing favoritism based on special relationships from discrimination based on a protected class, employers are wise to steer clear from favoring some employees over others, especially when it comes to pay, bonuses and benefits where the non-favored employees can prove financial harm. Keeping the terms and conditions of employment on an even footing will help keep your workplace productive, the morale of employees high and your company out of court.

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May 13, 2014

Independent Contractor Status — Colorado Supreme Court Sets Forth Applicable Test

By Bradford J. Williams

Yesterday we posted an article describing the unsettled test for independent contractor status under Colorado’s unemployment insurance benefits laws after the Colorado Court of Appeals issued a new decision last week. Now, that test has been settled as the Colorado Supreme Court issued its decision in the Softrock and Western Logistics cases.

The Colorado Supreme Court ruled yesterday that determining whether a worker is “customarily engaged in an independent trade, occupation, profession, or business” in order to be deemed an “independent contractor” under Colorado’s unemployment insurance benefits laws requires an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the relationship between the worker and the putative employer. In two companion cases, the Court rejected a stringent, single-factor test for determining whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor for purposes of unemployment insurance tax liability and benefits. Reversing decades of case law, the Court ruled that no single factor is dispositive of an employer-employee relationship. Instead, courts and agencies may consider nine factors enumerated in a statute pertaining to independent contractor agreements, as well as “any other information relevant to the nature of the work and the relationship between the employer and the individual.” ICAO v. Softrock Geological Servs., 2014 CO 30; Western Logistics, Inc. v. ICAO, 2014 CO 31.

Putative Employer Must Prove Independent Contractor Status

Under the Colorado Employment Security Act (CESA), employers must pay unemployment taxes on wages paid to employees, but not on compensation paid to independent contractors. Similarly, employees are entitled to collect unemployment insurance benefits under the CESA whereas independent contractors are not. Putative employers bear the burden of proving that workers are independent contractors, not employees, for purposes of the CESA.

In order to establish that a worker is an independent contractor, a putative employer must prove that the individual (i) is free from control and direction in the performance of his or her service, and (ii) is customarily engaged in an independent trade, occupation, profession, or business related to the service performed. C.R.S. § 8-70-115(1)(b). The CESA does not define what must be shown to satisfy the second part of this test.

2012 Court of Appeals Decisions on the Single-Factor Test

For years, the Colorado Division of Employment and Training and most courts have applied a single-factor test, rejecting claims that workers are independent contractors, and thus ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits, where they do not provide similar services to others while working for the putative employer. It has not mattered, for instance, whether the workers were directed or controlled by the putative employer, whether they maintained separate business entities, whether they set their own hours, whether they were trained by the putative employer, whether they were paid an hourly or fixed rate, whether they provided their own equipment, whether they had their own offices, or whether they advertised their own businesses. If they did not provide similar services to others while working for the putative employer, they were almost always deemed to be employees for purposes of receiving unemployment insurance benefits.

In 2012, one division of the Colorado Court of Appeals reaffirmed this decades-old case law effectively mandating a single-factor test. Western Logistics, Inc. v. ICAO, 2012 COA 186. Another division of the Court of Appeals, however, rejected the stringent, single-factor test, holding for the first time that agencies and courts must instead apply a multi-factor test to determine whether an individual “is customarily engaged in an independent trade, occupation, or business related to the service performed.” Softrock Geological Servs. v. ICAO, 2012 COA 97. In Softrock, the Court of Appealsstated that the factors to be considered in the “customarily engaged” inquiry are the nine factors set forth in statutory section 8-70-115(1)(c), which defines evidence that must be included in an independent contractor agreement to create a presumption that a worker is an independent contractor rather than an employee. In March 2013, the Colorado Supreme Court agreed to hear the appeals in both the Western Logistics and Softrock cases in order to finally determine the appropriate test for deciding whether a worker is customarily engaged in an independent business for purposes of the CESA.

Single-Factor Test No Longer Dispositive

In its decision yesterday, the Supreme Court concluded that the appropriate test for courts and agencies to apply is a totality of the circumstances test that looks at all the relevant factors bearing upon the relationship between a worker and his or her putative employer. The Court rejected the stringent, single-factor test used in Western Logistics and numerous other cases, finding that relying on a single factor – i.e., whether a worker provides similar services to others at the same time he or she works for the putative employer – is unfair to putative employers because it leaves the independent contractor determination up to the unpredictable decisions of workers. For instance, it ignores the putative employer’s own intent regarding the working relationship, and also ignores whether workers even desire to find other work in the same field.

In its decision, the Court broadly adopted the Court of Appeal’s approach in Softrock, concluding that the statutory factors should be considered in determining whether a worker is engaged in an independent business under the CESA. However, the Supreme Court went even further, holding that other factors may also be relevant to this determination. The Court rejected “a rigid check-box type inspection,” and opted instead for a fact-specific inquiry into the nature of the working relationship between a worker and his or her putative employer where no single factor is dispositive of the worker’s status.

Interestingly, just last week, yet another division of the Colorado Court of Appeals anticipated the Supreme Court’s ruling in these two cases, concluding that virtually any relevant circumstances may be considered in weighing independent contractor status. The decision rejected both the Western Logistics single-factor test and the Softrock multi-factor test that limited the determination to just those factors specifically delineated in statute. See Visible Voices, Inc. v. ICAO, 2014 COA 63.

Many Factors May Determine Independent Contractor Status

The Supreme Court’s new totality of the circumstances test is very helpful to putative employers because it allows them to prove independent contractor status based on the entire working relationship between the worker and the putative employer. A putative employer seeking to prove that a worker is an independent contractor engaged in an independent business or trade may now produce evidence bearing upon the nine factors set forth in statute, showing that the putative employer did not:

Require the worker to work exclusively for the putative employer; except that the worker may choose to work exclusively for that business for a finite period of time specified in the independent contractor agreement;
Establish a quality standard for the worker; except that the putative employer can provide plans and specifications regarding the work but cannot oversee the actual work or instruct the worker as to how the work will be performed;
Pay a salary or hourly rate but rather a fixed or contract rate;
Terminate the worker during the contract period unless the worker violates the terms of the contract or fails to produce a result that meets the specifications of the contract;
Provide more than minimal training for the worker;
Provide tools or benefits to the worker; except that materials and equipment may be supplied;
Dictate the time of performance; except that a completion schedule and a range of mutually agreeable work hours may be established;
Pay the worker personally but rather makes checks payable to the trade or business name of the worker; and
Combine the putative employer’s business operations in any way with the worker’s business, but instead maintains such operations as separate and distinct.

The putative employer may also invoke other evidence not set forth in the statute, but nonetheless relevant to whether the worker maintains an independent trade or business. As suggested in recent cases, these factors include, but are not limited to, whether the worker:

Maintains an independent business card, listing, address, or telephone;
Has a financial investment in the project or risks suffering a loss;
Uses his or her own equipment on the project;
Sets the price for performing the project;
Employs others to complete the project; or
Carries liability insurance.

Although we have yet to see how the courts and agencies will apply this new totality of the circumstances test, putative employer should try to satisfy as many of these factors as possible in order to establish that workers are independent contractors, not employees. Putative employers should also continue to use independent contractor agreements that satisfy all the statutory factors needed to create a presumption that workers are independent contractors. However, there is now no limit to the types of evidence putative employers may invoke to establish independent contractor status, and putative employers are no longer bound by the outdated rule that workers must always offer their services to others at the same time the work for the putative employer in order to be considered independent contractors.

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May 12, 2014

Independent Contractor Status Dependent On More Than One Factor, Says Second Colorado Court

By Bradford J. Williams

A second division of the Colorado Court of Appeals has just rejected a stringent, single-factor test for determining whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor for purposes of receiving unemployment insurance benefits. On May 8, 2014, a division of the Court of Appeals issued a decision in an unemployment insurance tax liability case, rejecting longstanding case law holding that a worker is an employee, and thus entitled to unemployment insurance benefits, unless he “actually and customarily provides similar services to others while working for the putative employer.” Visible Voices, Inc. v. ICAO, 2014 COA 63.

For years, the Colorado Division of Employment and Training has rejected claims that workers are independent contractors, and thus ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits, based solely upon the fact that they do not provide similar services to others while working for the putative employer. It has not mattered whether the workers were directed or controlled by the putative employer, whether they maintained separate business entities, whether they set their own hours, whether they were trained by the putative employer, whether they were paid an hourly or fixed rate, whether they provided their own equipment, whether they had their own offices, or whether they advertised their own businesses. If they did not provide similar services to others while working for the putative employer, they were almost always deemed to be employees for purposes of receiving unemployment insurance benefits.

In rejecting this stringent, single-factor test, the Visible Voices court followed the 2012 lead of another division of the Colorado Court of Appeals in Softrock Geological Servs. v. ICAO, 2012 COA 97 (cert. granted Mar. 25, 2013). First breaking with the decades-old, single-factor assessment, the Softrock court held that the Division of Employment and Training must instead apply a multi-factor test to determine whether an individual “is customarily engaged in an independent trade, occupation, or business related to the service performed.” This multi-factor test considers factors set forth in Colorado statute.

While broadly adopting the Softrock court’s reasoning, the Visible Voices court went even further, holding that factors not listed in the Colorado statute may also be considered in assessing independent contractor status. The Visible Voices court further noted that some of the statutory factors might also not be relevant to a particular worker depending on the circumstances. In short, the Visible Voices court concluded that virtually any relevant circumstances may be considered when weighing independent contractor status, and rejected the argument that the multi-factor test is limited to just those factors specifically delineated in statute.

By choosing to consider multiple factors, the Visible Voices court expressly declined to follow Western Logistics, Inc. v. ICAO, 2012 COA 186 (cert. granted Mar. 25, 2013), in which yet another division of the Colorado Court of Appeals recently reaffirmed the decades-old cases effectively mandating a single-factor test. Unlike the Western Logistics court, the Visible Voices and Softrock courts have decided that no single factor is determinative of independent contractor status.

Two divisions of the Colorado Court of Appeals have now rejected the single-factor test that has long stymied putative employers’ attempts to prove that their workers are independent contractors for purposes of unemployment insurance benefits. However, the Colorado Supreme Court will have the last word on the proper test for determining independent contractor status as it is currently reviewing both the Softrock and Western Logistics cases. The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in both cases on March 6, 2014 (audio of the oral arguments may be accessed here), and a decision is expected in the coming months. Based on the oral arguments, a favorable ruling for putative employers seems possible. We will let you know the outcome as soon as the Supreme Court rules on this issue.

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May 9, 2014

Colorado Legislative Wrap-Up: Wage Theft, Disability Definition and Workers’ Comp Physician Choice Bills Pass

By Emily Hobbs-Wright

The Colorado General Assembly wrapped up its 2014 Legislative Session this week, passing a number of bills that change the landscape for Colorado employers. Here is a look at the significant employment-related bills that passed and are expected to be signed into law by Governor Hickenlooper as well as other bills that were introduced but did not make it through the legislative process.

Bills that Passed This Session.

Wage Protection Act of 2014. Senate Bill 14-005 establishes an administrative procedure to adjudicate wage claims under Colorado law. For wages and compensation earned on or after January 1, 2015, the Colorado Division of Labor may receive complaints and adjudicate claims for nonpayment of wages or compensation of $7,500 or less. The written demand for unpaid wages to the employer may come from or on behalf of the employee and is satisfied if a notice of complaint filed with the Division is sent to the employer. In addition to existing fines that may be levied against employers who fail to pay wages, the new law allows the Director of the Division of Labor or a hearing officer to impose a fine of $250 on an employer who fails to respond to a notice of complaint or any other notice from the Division when a response is required. All fines collected will be credited to the State Wage Theft Enforcement Fund to be used for enforcement of this law.

The Wage Protection Act also requires Colorado employers to keep payroll records, including the information contained in an employee’s itemized pay statement, for at least 3 years after payment of wages and to make such records available to the employee and the Division of Labor. (C.R.S. §8-4-103 (4.5)). Employers who violate this record retention requirement are subject to a fine of $250 per employee per month, up to a maximum fine of $7,500.

This new law also provides for the recovery of reasonable attorney fees and court costs for an employee who recovers unpaid wages under Colorado’s minimum wage requirement. Additionally, the new law sets forth procedural requirements for employers responding to a demand for payment and procedures for resolving wage disputes through the administrative procedure. The majority of the new provisions in this law go into effect on January 1, 2015.

Definition of Disabled Individuals Aligned with Americans With Disabilities Act. Senate Bill 14-118 conforms state law definitions of a disability to match definitions under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Specifically, the terms “disability” and “qualified individual with a disability” under Colorado Revised Statute section 24-34-301 are given the same meaning as under the ADA. This bill also moves the definition of “sexual orientation” out of the Employment Practices definition section (C.R.S. § 24-34-401) and into the general definition section for the Civil Rights Division (C.R.S. § 24-34-301.) It also changes the term “assistance dog” to “service animal” and provides additional penalties for violations of the rights of an individual with a disability who uses a service animal and for persons who cause harm to service animals. The law also expanded the available remedies for retaliation and violations of the fair housing and public accommodations discrimination prohibitions. Once signed into law by the Governor, these provisions will go into effect on August 6, 2014.

Expanded Doctor Choice for Workers’ Compensation. House Bill 14-1383 changes the Colorado workers’ compensation law to allow injured workers more choice of doctors. Currently, an employer or workers’ compensation insurer must provide a list of at least 2 physicians or corporate medical providers from which an injured employee may select a treating physician. This bill expands that number to 4. There are additional provisions related to the location and shared ownership status of the health care providers. After signed into law by the Governor, this law will become effective on April 1, 2015.

Clarification of Credit Report Restriction Allowing Employment Use By Financial Institutions. Senate Bill 14-102 amends last year’s Employment Opportunity Act which restricts an employer’s use of credit reports. This amendment clarifies that all positions at a bank or financial institution are jobs for which credit information is deemed to be “substantially related to the employee’s current or potential job.” As a result, financial institutions will be able to obtain and use credit information on employees and applicants when making employment decisions for all job positions. Governor Hickenlooper signed this bill into law on March 27, 2014 and it became effective immediately.

Bills that Failed to Pass This Session.

Paid Sick Leave. Called the Family and Medical Leave Insurance Act (FAMLI), Senate Bill 14-196 sought to create an insurance program to provide pay to employees who take unpaid FMLA or sick leave. The program would be paid for by employees who pay premiums into a “fund” in the state treasury; employers would not be funding it. Eligible employees would be able to receive a percentage of their pay while on leave, not to exceed $1,000 per week. The bill would have prohibited Colorado employers from discharging, discriminating or retaliating against employees who seek to use benefits under the program or assist in a related-proceeding. Advocated by the Colorado chapter of 9 to 5, this bill, introduced on April 15th, differed from previous paid sick leave bills as it did not require employers to fund the program. On May 1, this bill was postponed indefinitely in committee and therefore, did not make it to a vote.

Drug Testing Misdemeanor. House Bill 14-1040 would have established a drug misdemeanor for an employee who is legally required to undergo drug testing as a condition of his or her job and either tests positive for a controlled substance without a prescription, or knowingly defrauds the administration of the drug test by an employer. To “defraud the administration of a drug test” is defined in the bill to include submitting a sample from someone else or a sample collected at a different time or some other conduct intended to produce a false or misleading outcome. This bill passed the House but the Senate sent it to committee where it was postponed indefinitely.

Anti-Union Bills. – House Bills 14-1087 would have prohibited collective bargaining for the state’s public employees. House Bill 14-1098 and Senate Bill 14-113 would have prohibited employers from entering into agreements to require employees to join a union. All three bills failed shortly after introduction as expected due to the democratic majority in both chambers of Colorado’s legislature.

The bills that passed in the 2014 Legislative Session reflect a continued trend at the state level to implement new or refine existing employment-related laws. We will keep you posted on any further developments.

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May 6, 2014

Separation Agreements Targeted By EEOC Again

By Mark Wiletsky

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) recently filed a lawsuit seeking to stop a Colorado employer from using its form separation and release agreement and to allow employees who have signed the form agreement to file charges of discrimination and participate in EEOC and state agency fair employment investigations. In its federal court complaint, the EEOC alleges that CollegeAmerica Denver violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) by conditioning employees’ receipt of severance benefits on signing a separation and release agreement which, according to the EEOC, chills and interferes with the employees’ rights to file charges and/or cooperate with the EEOC and state fair employment practice agencies.

As we wrote on this blog earlier, the EEOC has been scrutinizing employers’ separation agreements. This is the second such lawsuit challenging language in the separation agreements that does not permit the filing of discrimination or retaliation charges with the EEOC or other government agencies. As in the EEOC’s earlier complaint against a national pharmacy, the recent complaint against CollegeAmerica Denver targets numerous provisions in the separation agreement, including the release of claims, a non-disparagement clause and provisions in which the employee represents that he/she has not filed any claims, has disclosed to the company all matters of non-compliance and will continue to cooperate with and assist the company with any investigation or litigation.

Many of the targeted provisions are standard clauses in form separation agreements. Although it remains to be seen whether the courts will agree with the EEOC’s claims, it is always a good idea for organizations to review their agreements and ensure they do not raise any red flags for the EEOC while still protecting the company from future payouts for employment-related claims. We will continue to provide updates as new developments arise.

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April 3, 2014

Severance Payments Are Wages Subject to FICA Tax

By Arthur Hundhausen and Mark Wiletsky

Employers offer severance payments to separating employees for numerous reasons, including rewarding long-time employees affected by a plant closure, to maintain goodwill, to secure a release and waiver of existing or potential claims, or to comply with company policies or agreements that require such payments. But whether the severance is dictated by policy or an individually-negotiated benefit, one sticky issue that employers may neglect to address is whether severance payments are subject to FICA taxes. The U.S. Supreme Court recently settled that issue by confirming that severance payments made to employees terminated against their will are taxable wages under FICA. United States v. Quality Stores, Inc., No. 12-1408, 572 U.S. ___ (2014). The Supreme Court’s ruling was consistent with the longtime IRS historical position on this issue.

Involuntary Terminations Due to Bankruptcy Triggered Severance Payments

Quality Stores terminated thousands of employees in connection with its involuntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing in 2001. The employees received severance payments under one of two plans, ranging from six to eighteen months of severance pay. Initially, Quality Stores reported the severance payments as wages for FICA purposes on the Forms W-2 filed with the IRS and the employees. Consistent with such reporting, Quality Stores paid the employer’s required share of FICA taxes and withheld the employees’ share of FICA taxes as well. Quality Stores then decided to file FICA tax refund claims with the IRS, totaling over $1 million in paid FICA taxes. The IRS neither allowed nor denied the refund claims, so Quality Stores sought a refund as part of its bankruptcy proceeding. Both the District Court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that severance payments were not “wages” under FICA, meaning Quality Stores and its affected employees were entitled to a refund of the FICA taxes paid.

The Sixth Circuit’s decision, however, directly contradicted rulings by other Courts of Appeals, which concluded that at least some severance payments constitute “wages” for purposes of FICA taxes. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to review the issue to resolve the split among the courts.

FICA’s Broad Definition of Wages Includes Severance Payments

FICA defines wages as “all remuneration for employment, including the cash value of all remuneration (including benefits) paid in any medium other than cash.” Under the plain meaning of this definition, the Court found that severance payments made to terminated employees constitutes “remuneration for employment.” The Court noted that severance payments are made to employees only, often will vary depending on length of service, and are made in consideration for past services in the course of employment.

Looking at statutory history, the Court noted that in 1950, Congress repealed an exception from “wages” for “[d]ismissal payments which the employer is not legally required to make” from the Social Security Act and since that time, FICA has not excepted severance payments from the definition of “wages.” Agreeing with the government’s position in the case, the Court ruled that severance payments are taxable wages for FICA purposes.

Implications for Employers

The Court’s ruling confirms that employers are obligated to pay their portion of FICA taxes and withhold the employees’ portion of FICA taxes from severance payments. Depending on the amount of the severance at issue, this FICA obligation can greatly change the total payout amount for the employer. It also can catch unknowing employees off guard if they are expecting to receive a higher severance payment without FICA taxes being withheld. Employers should factor the FICA tax obligation into any severance offer to ensure that both the company and the separating employee understand the total amount that is at issue and the final amount that the employee will receive. In addition, employers offering severance payments should review their policies and practices to ensure that proper tax payments are made.

If employers identify past severance payments where no FICA taxes were paid or withheld, such employers should consult with their tax counsel to determine whether any corrective steps are required. In general, the applicable statute of limitations for an employer’s payroll tax liability begins on April 15 of the year following the year in which wages are paid (when prior year payroll tax returns are “deemed” to be filed), and expires after three years. For example, the applicable statute of limitations for payroll taxes owed for 2010 began on April 15, 2011 and expires on April 15, 2014.

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March 25, 2014

2014 Wyoming Legislature Keeps Status Quo, But Changes On The Horizon?

By Brad Cave

The 2014 session of the Wyoming Legislature did not pass any significant employment legislation, but the Legislature’s actions on some of the measures it did consider could portend a much more interesting 2015 legislative session.

Independent Contractors. The issue of independent contractors garnered the most legislative attention of any employment issue in the 2014 session. In February, we reported on House Bill 16 which would have created misdemeanor criminal penalties for “knowingly failing to properly classify an individual as an employee” leading to a reduction in unemployment contributions or workers compensation premiums or benefits. (A companion measure, Senate File 112, was introduced in the Senate but failed to get sufficient votes for introduction.) This measure was sponsored by the Joint Corporations, Elections and Political Subdivisions Interim Committee. Although it failed to garner the two-thirds vote required for introduction during a budget session, a majority of the representatives in the House voted in favor introduction in the 32-26 vote. This bill may rear its ugly head again in the 2015 general session, where introduction requires only a majority vote.

On the bright side of the independent contractor issue, Senate File 96 proposed an amendment that would have relaxed the definition of independent contractor in the unemployment and workers compensation statutes. Those two identical definitions currently require that a person classified as an independent contractor meet three requirements:

The person is free from control or direction over the details of the performance of services by contract and by fact;
The person represents his services to the public as a self-employed individual or an independent contractor; and,
The person may substitute another individual to perform his services.

These three factors have always been part of the commonly accepted definition of an independent contractor, as recognized by courts, other statutes and the Internal Revenue Service. But courts and the IRS weigh these and several other factors, without any single factor or group of factors controlling the determination. This approach permits employers to fashion independent contractor relationships under a variety of circumstances. Because of the “and” between the second and third factor, the Wyoming definition requires employers to meet all three of these factors, regardless of the other circumstances surrounding the independent contractor relationship. Add to that the fact that the second factor is wholly outside of the employer’s control, and you have a very strict and onerous definition.

Senate File 96 would have added a second test to the unemployment and workers compensation definitions to give employers two ways to prove independent contractor status. Under the second option, a person providing services would be properly classified as an independent contractor if the person:

is free from control or direction, asserted directly by the person or entity contracting for the services, over the details of the performance of services by contract and by fact; and,
has substantial investment used in connection with the performance of the services. The investment may include physical assets, financial assets, education, experience, intellectual property or any combination of these factors.

This proposed change would obviously open the door to a broader range of independent contractor relationships, and recognize the importance and prevalence of the sole proprietor independent contractor, particularly in technology services.

Senate File 96 passed the Senate with strong support, but the House defeated the measure by a vote of 54 to 6. Reasons for its demise may include timing – it was brought to the floor of the House on the last day for the entire House to consider new measures. Also, there may have been some confusion about whether the changes would be consistent with the IRS definitions of independent contractors and other statutory definitions. Because the House had little or no time to resolve these questions, the measure died. We encourage the Legislature to address this topic again next session.

Employer Access to Social Media Accounts. The surprise proposal of the session was Senate File 81, which would have put Wyoming on the bandwagon of other states which are restricting employer access to employees’ social media accounts. This proposal would have amended the Wyoming Fair Employment Practices Act to make it an unfair employment practice for employers to “request or require” any employee or applicant to disclose any username, password or other method of accessing personal social medial accounts. Social media accounts was broadly defined under the proposal, to include videos, images, blogs, podcasts, instant and text messages, email, internet websites or locations and other online services or accounts.

The measure included exceptions to the general restrictions for (1) access to employer social media accounts used for the employer’s business purposes; (2) when personal social media is reasonably believed to be relevant to an investigation of allegation of employee misconduct or violation of laws or regulations, if access is limited to the investigation or a related proceeding; (3) when conducting an investigation of an employee’s social media when required to comply with the requirements of state or federal law, or the rules of a self-regulating organization; or, (4) when an applicant applies for law enforcement employment.

Senate File 81 flew through the Senate with strong support, and started strong in the House, but was then defeated by a House vote of 36-16.

Our experience suggests that this is a solution in search of a problem. The huge majority of employers already avoid efforts to access employees’ social media because learning such information can cause all sorts of headaches for employers. In fact, employers usually learn about employees’ social media content when employees report to the employer some other employee’s bad behavior as described on social media, and usually expect the employer to do something about it. Although the exception for investigation-related access is helpful, even that language forces employers to couch their requests in terms that will simply raise the stakes of workplace situations.

Wyoming employers should pay attention next session to see if the Legislature takes up this topic.

Misconduct Disqualifications from Unemployment Benefits. Senate File 76 added a new definition of misconduct to the unemployment compensation statute to outline the circumstances under which a former employee may be disqualified from unemployment benefits. It was signed by Governor Mead on March 10, 2014, and will become effective on July 1, 2014.

The unemployment compensation statute already states that an employee will be disqualified from benefits if the Department of Workforce Services finds that the employee was discharged for “misconduct connected with his work” but does not define that phrase. To fill the gap, several years ago the Wyoming Supreme Court adopted a definition that required a showing of an act of the employee that indicated a disregard of the employer’s interests or the commonly accepted duties, obligations and responsibilities of an employee, to include carelessness or negligence of such a degree or recurrence as to reveal willful intent or intentional disregard of the employer’s interests or the employee’s duties and obligations. Violation of company policies or rules could qualify as misconduct under the court’s definition, provided the employee acted intentionally. The court’s definition also provided that inefficiency, failure of good performance due to incapacity or inability, ordinary negligence or good faith errors in judgment were not adequate to disqualify an employee.

The new definition of “misconduct connected with work” seems to adopt much of the Wyoming Supreme Court’s interpretation of the phrase. The phrase is now defined as “an act of an employee which indicates an intentional disregard of the employer’s interests or the commonly accepted duties, obligations and responsibilities of an employee.” The amendment also excludes from the definition of misconduct, (1) ordinary negligence in isolated instances; (2) good faith errors in judgment and discretion, and (3) inefficiency or failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity.

Because the new statutory definition is very similar to the definition the Supreme Court has used for years, we will need to see how the definition is applied by the Department and the courts to determine whether the misconduct standard has changed at all through this amendment.

Computer Trespass. Although not an employment measure, House Bill 178 created a new criminal offense that may give employers a new tool to help prevent employee sabotage. This measure, which passed both houses and was signed by Governor Mead, created the crime of computer trespass. A computer trespass occurs when a person knowingly and without authorization, with the intent to damage or cause the malfunction of a computer, system or network, sends malware, data or a program which alters, damages or causes the malfunction of the computer, system or network, or causes it to disseminate sensitive information.

The measure also created a civil remedy for computer trespass, and permits a person who suffers damage due to a trespass to sue the computer trespasser for damage to computers, systems, or networks, and the costs incurred because of the loss of use of those assets. The person brining the action can recover the damages caused by the trespass, as well as the costs incurred to identify the trespasser and to serve a complaint on the trespasser.

House Bill 178 was passed by both houses, and signed by Governor Mead on March 10, 2014. The new law will become effective on July 1, 2014.

This new law may be useful to employers if former or disgruntled employees attempt to misuse an employer’s computer systems. Employers should adopt and periodically review technology policies that carefully define when and how employees are authorized to use the employers’ computer, systems and networks. If an employee causes computer damage under questionable circumstances, such policies may help employers draw clear lines about when an employee’s access is unauthorized and pursue civil remedies under the statute.

And the Rest of the Pack. A few other employment measures never saw the light of day during the 2014 session. House Bill 45, which would have raised the minimum wage, and House Bill 57, which would have restricted employers’ ability to restrict the post-termination value of accrued vacation, both failed to get enough votes for introduction.

Bottom Line. The 2015 legislative session should be interesting, with the possible return of independent contractor and social media legislation. These are significant issues for Wyoming employers. We will keep you posted.

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March 13, 2014

Harassment Training for Supervisors is Key in Minimizing Risk

By Mark Wiletsky

Most employers today have policies prohibiting harassment. But if your supervisors and employees are not trained on those policies, and if harassment is allowed to occur, your organization could face significant liability.

Female Bailiff Alleges Egregious Sexual Harassment By Her Supervisor

Camille Kramer was employed as a jailor and later as a bailiff by the Wasatch County Sheriff’s Department. While working at the jail, male co-workers allegedly made offensive comments about Kramer’s breasts, she was subjected to sexually explicit materials on work computers and had to listen to graphic sexual conversations. Kramer complained to Sheriff Kenneth Van Wagoner, the head of the Sheriff’s Department. Sheriff Van Wagoner said he’d “take care of it” and proceeded to call a staff meeting at which he used Kramer as a volunteer to act out the exact harassing scenarios that she had reported to him. Van Wagoner told the group: “[t]hat’s harassment. Don’t do it.” When the harassment got worse after the meeting, Kramer complained again to the Sheriff, who told her she might want to avoid that area.

Kramer transferred to the courthouse to work as a bailiff. Sergeant Rick Benson, also a bailiff, supervised both Kramer and one other bailiff. According to Kramer, Benson subjected Kramer to a campaign of sexual harassment and sexual assault that ranged from demanding foot rubs to groping and rape. Kramer did not report Benson’s conduct to the Sheriff because Benson threatened her job if she said anything and she believed nothing would be done about it anyway.

Later, Kramer told female co-workers about the rape and assault. She also told them that she was having a consensual affair with another man and was pregnant from that relationship. Sheriff Van Wagoner found out about Benson’s sexual assault of Kramer and her pregnancy from one of Kramer’s co-workers. He assigned a detective who was not trained in human resources or in conducting sexual harassment investigations to look into the misconduct. The detective focused his investigation exclusively on finding out who fathered Kramer’s baby, not on Benson’s conduct. When it was learned that Kramer was involved with a married county firefighter, the detective urged Kramer to resign and Kramer was disciplined with her certification suspended for six months for “actions unbecoming an officer.” Although the Sheriff decided to terminate Benson, Benson resigned before that could happen.

Benson directly supervised Kramer’s work as a bailiff. He wrote her performance evaluations, which could cause her to be promoted, demoted or fired. He could create a corrective action plan for her which might include transfer, reassignment or separation, if he deemed her performance was substandard. At all times, however, the Sheriff was the final decision-maker and the only person who had the actual authority to take tangible employment actions against Kramer.

Kramer sued the County and the Sheriff for sexual harassment in violation of Title VII, among other claims. The district court granted summary judgment to the County, holding that because Benson did not have the actual authority to unilaterally fire Kramer, the County could not be vicariously liable for Benson’s conduct. It also ruled that supervisor status could not be based on Benson having apparent authority over Kramer because no reasonable juror could find that Kramer reasonably believed that Benson had the power to fire her. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the County and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Kramer v. Wasatch Cty. Sheriff's Office, No. 12-4058 (10th Cir. Feb. 25, 2014).

Delegation of Power and Apparent Authority

The Tenth Circuit pointed to wording in the Supreme Court’s recent case, Vance v. Ball State, 570 U.S. ___ (2013), to determine whether the County could be vicariously liable for Benson’s conduct. Vance held that a “supervisor” for purposes of determining employer liability for workplace harassment under Title VII includes only those individuals who have the authority to take tangible employment actions against the victim. Although that seemed like a bright-line test, the Tenth Circuit stated that if Benson had or appeared to have the power to take or substantially influence tangible employment actions or used the threat of taking such actions to subject Kramer to a hostile work environment, then the County could be vicariously liable for Benson’s severe or pervasive sexual harassment. Because the Court found sufficient evidence in the record that raised genuine issues of fact as to whether the Sheriff effectively delegated to Benson the power to cause tangible employment actions by relying on Benson’s recommendations and performance evaluations when making decisions regarding firing, promotion, demotion and reassignment, the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment to the County. The Court stated that even if the Sheriff took some independent analysis when considering input from Benson on employment decisions, Benson could qualify as a supervisor if his recommendations were among the proximate causes of the Sheriff’s decision-making. The Court also found that there was evidence to suggest that Kramer reasonably believed that Benson had the power to take tangible employment actions against her meaning Benson qualified as a supervisor under apparent authority principles.

No Tangible Employment Actions

If Benson is a supervisor under the definition established in Vance, the County would be strictly liable for Benson’s harassment if it resulted in a tangible employment action. Kramer asserted that four actions constituted tangible employment actions. First, she argued that Benson’s rape was a tangible employment action. The Court disagreed, stating that while the rape was inarguably a severe form of sexual harassment, Benson did not commit the rape in an official company action. Next, Kramer asserted that Benson prepared a negative performance evaluation of her and argued that was a tangible employment action. However, Benson improved the evaluation after speaking with Kramer and before submitting it to the Sheriff, so even though the threatened poor evaluation contributed to a hostile work environment, it did not constitute a tangible employment action. The Court similarly rejected the final two alleged employment actions, a denial of leave time and assigning Kramer to an unfavorable duty that denied her the training needed for a promotion. The Court found that the loss of one day’s leave time was not a “significant” change in Kramer’s benefits and the assignment to an unfavorable duty did not have a deleterious economic consequence for Kramer or reduce her opportunity for advancement. Finding that Kramer did not suffer a tangible employment action, the Court remanded for consideration of whether the County established the Faragher/Ellerth defense.

Teachable Moments from the Tenth Circuit

The Court’s thorough discussion of Benson’s conduct and what the Sheriff did/did not do when he learned of potential misconduct reveals many teachable moments for employers. First and foremost, make sure to train your supervisors and employees on prohibited forms of harassment, and how important it is to promptly and appropriately address issues when they arise. For example, when an employee reports harassing behavior, as Kramer did when she first worked at the jail, take it seriously. Do not simply tell workers to “stop it” or tell the person who complained to “avoid the area” or stay away from the perpetrators. Make sure that the person conducting the investigation is trained in workplace harassment investigations. Do not focus the investigation solely on the potential wrongdoing of the complaining party, as the detective did when trying to determine the father of Kramer’s baby. Talk to all parties implicated in the misconduct, including any witnesses who may have knowledge of the hostile work environment. If the investigation reveals harassing behavior, take immediate steps to correct it and prevent it from happening again. Follow up with the person who reported it to make certain your corrective actions are effective and that no further incidents have occurred. And finally, do not retaliate against the complaining employee. Learning from these missteps will go along way in minimizing your risk of harassment liability.

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February 20, 2014

EEOC Challenges Separation Agreements

By Mark Wiletsky

If you use standard separation agreements to secure a release and waiver of claims from employees who are laid off, fired, or who otherwise threaten a claim, you might want to review your agreement. In a lawsuit filed recently in Illinois federal court, the EEOC alleges that a company with national operations interfered with its employees’ right to file charges with the EEOC and state fair employment practices agencies by conditioning the employees’ receipt of severance pay on signing an overly broad separation agreement.

According to the EEOC, five separate paragraphs (which are commonly found in separation agreements) are improper:

Cooperation: Employee agrees to promptly notify the Company’s General Counsel by telephone and in writing if the employee receives a subpoena, deposition notice, interview request or other process relating to any civil, criminal or administrative investigation or suit.
Non-Disparagement: Employee will not make any statements that disparage the business or reputation of the company or any of its officers or employees.
Non-Disclosure of Confidential Information: Employee agrees not to disclose to any third party or use for him/herself or anyone else Confidential Information without the prior written authorization of the company.
General Release of Claims: Employee releases company for any and all causes of action, lawsuits, charges or claims, including any claim of unlawful discrimination, that the employee may have prior to the date of the agreement.
No Pending Actions; Covenant Not to Sue: Employee represents that he/she has not filed or initiated any complaints prior to signing the agreement and agrees not to initiate or file any actions, lawsuits or charges asserting any of the released claims.

Disclaimer Allowing Workers to Bring Claims to the EEOC Not Enough

Recognizing that employers may not prevent workers from filing charges with the EEOC or participating in EEOC or state agency investigations, the paragraph containing the covenant not to sue contained a sentence stating “[n]othing in this paragraph is intended to or shall interfere with Employee’s right to participate in a proceeding with any appropriate federal, state or local government agency enforcing discrimination laws, nor shall this Agreement prohibit Employee from cooperating with any such agency in its investigation.” In its complaint, the EEOC says this disclaimer is insufficient as it is contained in only one of the paragraphs that contain limits on the employees’ rights.

What does this mean for employers?

It’s important to remember that the Court has not agreed with the EEOC’s allegations—and, in fact, it might reject them outright. Regardless, the risk of such actions is enough to justify a closer look at your standard separation or release agreement. Even an agreement that has been repeatedly reviewed and revised can likely be improved for clarity. Make sure the agreement is understandable, does not contain excessive “legalese,” and it should not contain provisions that interfere with an employee’s right to file a charge with the EEOC or state agency.

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