Category Archives: Employment Counseling

February 4, 2014

Colorado General Assembly Considers Labor and Employment Bills

By John Karakoulakis 

Colorado’s 2014 Legislative Session began on January 8th and nearly 400 bills have been introduced already.  Below is a description of proposed legislation impacting labor and employment issues for Colorado employers. The proposed changes to the workers’ compensation system could result in one of the more controversial bills this session.  We will keep you apprised of these and any other bills affecting employment matters as they progress through the legislative process.

2014 Labor & Employment Legislation

Number

Title

Summary

Draft

Workers’ Compensation Benefits

The bill seeks to make changes to the following three areas of the workers’ compensation system: 1) Allow for more doctor choice for workers; 2) Address the issue of job separation when a claim is made; and 3) Add a penalty provision for employers that willfully placed employees in a dangerous situation. This last provision is drawing the most concern because it is seen as overly broad and would expose employers to litigation.

Draft

Worker Access to Employment Records

Would allow employees to have access to their personnel records and provide written rebuttal information to be added to their file.  Creates a new civil cause of action for an employee to file against an employer for not complying with the provisions of the bill. The employee can seek actual damages, back pay, reinstatement, or other equitable relief, and reasonable attorney fees and costs.

SB-005

Wage Claims

Reintroduced this year after significant changes from the version of the bill that was killed by the business community last year. The bill speeds up the process by which workers can claim they did not get their full wages and creates a process by which the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment can adjudicate those claims.  These changes which remove last year’s criminal penalties and a provision to require claims to be settled in district court resulted in most business associations taking a neutral stance on the bill, so it is now expected to pass.

HB-1033

Regulatory Reform

Provides relief for business under 100 employees that unknowingly violate a regulation that was put in place within the prior year and one that is defined as a “minor violation” which is mostly clerical in nature and does not affect the life safety of the public or workers.  The first violation of such a rule will result in a warning and written education sent to the business.

HB-1040

Drug Testing Criminal Provisions

Establishes a level 1 drug misdemeanor for an employee who is legally required to undergo drug testing as a condition of the person's job and who uses a controlled substance without a prescription; or knowingly defrauds the administration of the drug test. Also establishes a level 2 drug misdemeanor for any other person who knowingly defrauds a drug test.

   

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December 26, 2013

ERISA Plan’s Limitation Period Is Enforceable, Says U.S. Supreme Court

By Elizabeth Nedrow 

The U.S. Supreme Court recently issued a decision that provides some welcome guidance to insurers and employers sponsoring ERISA employee benefit plans.  The Court upheld a three-year limitations period in a long term disability plan.  The terms of the plan required participants to file a lawsuit to recover benefits within three years after “proof of loss.”  Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co.,No. 12-729, 571 U.S.  ___ (Dec. 16, 2013).  The Court ruled that because ERISA itself does not specify a limitations period, the plan’s three year deadline was reasonable and therefore enforceable.  

Benefit Plan Participant Filed Lawsuit After Benefits Were Denied 

Julie Heimeshoff, a senior public relations manager for Wal-Mart Stores, was a participant in a long term disability plan administered by Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Company (Hartford).  In 2005, she filed a claim for disability benefits following a diagnosis of lupus and fibromyalgia.   On her claim form, her rheumatologist listed her symptoms as extreme fatigue, significant pain and difficulty in concentration.  Hartford denied her claim after her rheumatologist failed to respond to its requests for more information.  In 2006, Heimeshoff provided Hartford with an evaluation from another physician who also determined that she was disabled.  Hartford retained a physician to review Heimeshoff’s records who concluded that she was able to perform the activities of her sedentary job.  Hartford again denied her disability claim.  

After granting Heimeshoff an extension to the appeal deadline to provide additional evidence and retaining two additional physicians to review her claim, Hartford issued its final denial of benefits on November 26, 2007.  On November 18, 2010, Heimeshoff filed suit in district court seeking review of her denied claim under ERISA’s judicial review provision, known as ERISA Section 502.  Hartford and Wal-Mart asked the court to dismiss her suit because she did not file the case within the limitations period provided for in the plan, namely within three years after the time that written proof of loss is required to be furnished to Hartford.  The district court agreed that the lawsuit was untimely and dismissed her case.  On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed.  The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case in order to resolve a split among the Courts of Appeal on the enforceability of an ERISA plan’s contractual limitations period. 

ERISA Contractual Limitations Provisions Should Be Enforced As Written 

The long-term disability plan at issue stated that legal action against Hartford could not be taken more than three years after the time that written proof of loss is required to be furnished according to the terms of the policy.  Written proof of loss is necessarily due before Hartford and the participant complete the internal review process and before a plan participant is notified of a final denial of benefits which is necessary before filing a lawsuit in court.  The result of this contractual limitations period is that a participant has less than three years to file a lawsuit in court after learning that their benefit claim has been finally denied. 

In reviewing whether to enforce this limitations period, the Supreme Court relied on well-established precedent which states that in the absence of a limitations period provided by a controlling statute, a provision in a contract may validly limit the time for parties to bring an action on such contract to a period less than that prescribed in the general statute of limitations as long as the shorter period is reasonable.  The Court noted that ERISA does not specify a statute of limitations.  Consequently, the Court ruled that a participant and a plan may agree by contract to a particular limitations period as long as it is reasonable.  

Heimeshoff argued that the contractual limitations period at issue was not reasonable because it began to run before a claimant could exhaust the internal review process which is required before seeking judicial review.  The Court unanimously disagreed, concluding that the three-year limitations period from the date that proof of loss is due was not unreasonably short and therefore, was enforceable.  Although Hartford’s administrative review process took longer than usual, Heimeshoff still had approximately one year to file suit before the limitations period was up.  Because Heimeshoff filed her lawsuit more than three years after her proof of loss was due, as required contractually by the plan, her complaint was time barred.  Therefore, the Court upheld the dismissal of Heimeshoff’s suit. 

Significance for Employee Benefit Plans 

The Court’s decision is welcome news for insurers and employers who want efficient resolution of ERISA claims disputes.  Plan documentation should be reviewed, and where appropriate, language should be added or clarified to provide a reasonable limit on the time a participant has to bring a lawsuit to challenge a denied claim for benefits. 


Disclaimer: This article is designed to provide general information on pertinent legal topics. The statements made are provided for educational purposes only. They do not constitute legal advice and are not intended to create an attorney-client relationship between you and Holland & Hart LLP. If you have specific questions as to the application of the law to your activities, you should seek the advice of your legal counsel.


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December 9, 2013

Holiday Party Checklist—Plan Ahead to Minimize Employer Risks

Company partyBy Mark Wiletsky 

Delicious food, fine wines, music, camaraderie, laughter – all ingredients for a great holiday get-together.  What could go wrong?  Too much, unfortunately.  Employees may drink too much, act inappropriately, offend co-workers or guests, hurt themselves or others, or even start a brawl. Depending on the circumstances, your company may find itself potentially liable for the inappropriate or unlawful actions of your employees at company-sponsored parties.  You can help minimize the risks associated with holiday parties by following these five tips. 

  • Avoid or Limit Alcohol 

Employers face potential liability when providing alcohol at a company holiday event when someone gets hurt due to drunk driving, falling down, etc., or when inappropriate behavior crosses the line from embarrassing to unlawful, such as sexual harassment or violence during an argument.  You can limit your company’s exposure for such conduct by either banning alcohol entirely (we know that may not be well-received in some situations), or limiting each person’s consumption through the use of drink tickets or a 2-drink limit.  If you choose to allow alcohol at your events, don’t allow free access to the alcohol (e.g., open bar, self-serve beer or unlimited wine bottles).  Instead have a professional, licensed bartender serve the alcohol as they are trained not to over-serve patrons.  Be sure to offer plenty of food and non-alcoholic beverages.  Arrange for taxis or hotel stays if someone over-indulges.  Schedule the event during the week so folks are less inclined to get carried away. Set an end time for the party and shut down the bar at least a half hour before the event closes.  Do not authorize or condone “after parties.” Finally, designate some supervisors or managers to refrain from drinking alcohol to make sure things don’t get out of hand. 

  • Keep Harassing Behavior in Check 

Make sure that your sexual harassment policy is up-to-date and that it applies to company parties, even if held off company premises.  Send out a reminder to employees in advance of the party that all company policies, including those prohibiting harassment and other inappropriate conduct, apply to the party. Consider making the event a family party where employees may bring their spouse, significant other, or children as the presence of family members and children often deters inappropriate behavior which could give rise to a harassment complaint.  Make sure that supervisors and managers watch out for potentially harassing conduct and are trained to intervene as necessary. 

  • Respect Religious Differences and Keep the Party Neutral  

Although many holidays toward the end of the year are religious in nature, be sensitive to your employees’ varying religious beliefs and avoid any conduct that could be construed as favoring one religious group over another.  Refrain from calling your party a “Christmas Party” and stick with the neutral “Holiday Party” instead.  Do not make attendance at the company-sponsored events such as parties, volunteer activities, food drives or other holiday outings mandatory.  Make sure the timing of the company party does not exclude any employees for religious reasons.  For example, because the Jewish Sabbath starts on Friday night, a party on a Friday evening may exclude Jewish employees.  Avoid decorating with religious symbols, such as nativity scenes, menorahs or angels.  There are plenty of neutral decorations, such as snowflakes, holly and reindeer, that can be used instead.  

  • Be Wary of Gift Exchanges 

Gift exchanges between employees may seem innocuous enough, but consider the potential issues a gift exchange may cause.  Employees may not be able to afford to participate, even within a recommended cost guideline.  Other employees may give sexy or “funny” gifts that end up offending others.  The best practice is to avoid a company or department sponsored gift exchange altogether.  If you decide to allow one among your employees, make sure it is entirely voluntary and no one is pressured or made to feel uncomfortable for not participating.  Set cost guidelines and remind participants that gifts must be appropriate for the workplace. 

  • Remember Wage and Hour Laws 

If you assign any non-exempt employees to plan, prepare for and staff the party, their hours are likely work hours for which they must be paid.  For example, if your office receptionist is required to be at the door of your holiday party to greet guests and hand out name tags, that individual is likely working and you need to include those hours in his or her weekly work hours when determining regular and overtime wages.  You do not need to pay employees who are attending the party if their attendance is voluntary and they are not expected to provide services that benefit your organization. 

Follow this checklist and you’ll avoid last minute holiday headaches and keep your organization out of trouble.


Disclaimer: This article is designed to provide general information on pertinent legal topics. The statements made are provided for educational purposes only. They do not constitute legal advice and are not intended to create an attorney-client relationship between you and Holland & Hart LLP. If you have specific questions as to the application of the law to your activities, you should seek the advice of your legal counsel.


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December 3, 2013

Divided Fifth Circuit Overturns D.R. Horton on Enforceability of Employer’s Arbitration Agreement Prohibiting Class Claims

By Jeffrey T. Johnson 

In a much-anticipated decision, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the National Labor Relations Board’s controversial D.R. Horton decision, which held that an arbitration agreement requiring an employee to waive his or her right to bring class claims violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).  Agreeing with its sister circuit courts, the Fifth Circuit held that the NLRA did not override the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) meaning the employer’s arbitration agreement must be enforced according to its terms, including the agreement’s preclusion of class claims.  D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, No. 12-60031 (5th Cir. Dec. 3, 2013).  The Court upheld, however, the NLRB’s finding that the arbitration agreement could be misconstrued by employees as precluding the filing of unfair labor practice charges which violates Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. 

Arbitration Agreement Prohibiting Class Claims Does Not Violate NLRA 

The Fifth Circuit’s ruling puts to rest a thorny issue for employers who have struggled with the Board’s D.R. Horton decision.  The controversy arose in early 2012 when the NLRB concluded that home builder D.R. Horton violated Sections 7 and 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by requiring employees to sign a Mutual Arbitration Agreement that precluded employees from filing class or collective claims related to their wages, hours or other working conditions. In re D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB No. 184 (Jan. 3, 2012).  The Board found that the agreement interfered with the exercise of employees’ substantive rights under Section 7 of the NLRA which allows employees to act in concert with each other for their mutual aid or protection.  

Two of the three judges on the Fifth Circuit panel disagreed.  First, the majority found that the use of class action procedures is not a substantive right but is instead a procedural device.  Then, the judges analyzed whether there is a conflict between the NLRA and the FAA that would preclude application of the FAA to enforce the arbitration agreement according to its terms.  Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011), the Fifth Circuit determined that requiring a class mechanism is an impediment to arbitration and violates the FAA so the Board’s attempt to fit its rationale into the FAA’s “savings clause” failed.  The Court then concluded that neither the NLRA’s statutory text nor its legislative history contains a congressional command to override the FAA.  Failing to find an inherent conflict between the NLRA and the FAA, the Court ruled that the arbitration agreement must be enforced according to its terms under the FAA. 

The Fifth Circuit pointed out that every one of its sister circuits to consider this issue had refused to defer to the NLRB’s rationale in D.R. Horton, and had held arbitration agreements containing class waivers enforceable.  The two judges in the majority stated, “we are loath to create a circuit split.”  Judge Graves dissented, stating that he agreed with the Board that the arbitration agreement interfered with the exercise of employees’ substantive rights under Section 7 of the NLRA. 

Agreement Violates NLRA Because Employees Might Believe it Prohibits Filing Unfair Labor Practice Charges 

The arbitration agreement used by D.R. Horton required that employees agree to arbitrate “without limitation[:] claims for discrimination or harassment; wages, benefits, or other compensation; breach of any express or implied contract; [and] violation of public policy.”  Although the agreement provided four exceptions to arbitration, none of the exclusions referred to unfair labor practice charges.  All three judges found that this could create a reasonable belief that employees were waiving their administrative rights, including the right to file unfair labor practice charges under Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.  Therefore, the Court enforced the Board’s order that D.R. Horton violated Section 8(a)(1) because an employee would reasonably interpret the arbitration agreement as prohibiting the filing of a claim with the Board, validating the need for D.R. Horton to take the ordered corrective action. 

Challenges to Composition of the Board Rejected 

While this case was on appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the D.C. Circuit issued its Noel Canning decision which vacated an order of the three-member panel of the Board by ruling that recess appointments of the panel members were invalid.  Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C.Cir. 2013) cert. granted 133 S.Ct. 2861 (U.S. June 24, 2013)(No. 12-1281).  Because the panel that decided the D.R. Horton case included a member appointed by recess appointment, the Fifth Circuit asked the parties to submit briefs on whether it must consider the constitutionality of the recess appointments.  The Court ultimately decided it need not consider the issue, finding that it retained jurisdiction to resolve the dispute at hand and leaving it to the U.S. Supreme Court to decide the constitutionality of the Board’s recess appointments.  The Fifth Circuit also rejected D.R. Horton’s challenges that Board Member Becker’s recess appointment expired before the Board issued its decision, and that the Board had not been delegated authority to act as a three-member panel. 

Favorable Result for Employers 

Although there are pros and cons to using arbitration agreements in the employment context, today’s ruling by the Fifth Circuit (absent review by the Supreme Court) removes the impediment to incorporating class action waivers in employment arbitration agreements.  The decision reinforces, however, that certain language within an arbitration agreement may violate the NLRA if it is reasonably seen as limiting an employee’s right to file an unfair labor practice charge.  Employers should consult with employment counsel to review whether arbitration agreements are appropriate for their workforce, and if so, to ensure the wording of the agreement is enforceable.


Disclaimer: This article is designed to provide general information on pertinent legal topics. The statements made are provided for educational purposes only. They do not constitute legal advice and are not intended to create an attorney-client relationship between you and Holland & Hart LLP. If you have specific questions as to the application of the law to your activities, you should seek the advice of your legal counsel.


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November 14, 2013

No Age Discrimination Established by “Shelf Life” Comment

By Mark Wiletsky 

MessagingAn HR manager asks about an employee’s “shelf life” in an instant message to another HR manager.  Evidence of age discrimination?  The employee argued it was, but the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled it was not.  In Roberts v. IBM, the Court recently held that the comment did not amount to direct evidence of age discrimination and “was nothing worse than an inartful reference to [the employee’s] queue of billable work.”  The employee’s alternative argument that the term “Project Blue” somehow constituted evidence of age discrimination similarly failed. 

Employee Terminated For Poor Performance 

George Roberts worked for IBM and was assigned to provide technical assistance to one of IBM’s clients, the Williams Companies (Williams).  Williams’ employees repeatedly complained about Roberts’ work, resulting in a critical performance review.  Although a subsequent review reflected some improvement, he later received more criticism.  IBM offered Roberts the option of resigning with a severance package or committing to a 60-day performance improvement program with the understanding that failure to show sustained improvement would lead to termination.  Roberts chose to complete the program.  Once again, although he showed some improvement, the client continued to complain.  IBM terminated Roberts for his continued negative performance.  

Absence of Direct Evidence of Age Discrimination  

Roberts sued IBM in federal court, alleging that instant messages between two HR managers showed that IBM fired him because of his age.  The HR managers were discussing whether IBM should eliminate Roberts’ position because he did not have enough billable work to do.  One of the HR managers questioned Roberts’ “shelf life,” which he argued referred to his age.  The Court, however, disagreed, finding that the fair reading of the comment within the context of their discussion was that it referred to his workload, not his age.  The Court found that any inference related to the “shelf life” comment would, at most, be circumstantial rather than direct evidence of age discrimination.  

Roberts then asserted that the name “Project Blue,” which was IBM’s program of eliminating positions that were not cost-justified, constituted direct evidence of age discrimination.  Surmising that Roberts believed that “blue” referred to older people who sometimes have blue hair, the Court rejected the argument, stating that the HR department’s use of the color blue cannot reasonably be taken as a reference to anyone’s age, especially in light of the fact that IBM is itself often called “Big Blue.”  Moreover, because Roberts was not terminated as part of that project but through a different process months later, the project name could not lead to the conclusion that IBM fired him because of his age. 

No Evidence of Pretext 

Leaving no stone unturned, the Court then considered whether Roberts’ claim could proceed as a circumstantial case of age discrimination.  Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis, if a terminated employee can establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing the employee.  Upon such showing, the employee can still succeed on his or her claim by establishing that the employer’s reason is a mere pretext for discrimination.  In this case, assuming (without deciding) that Roberts could establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the Court held that Roberts could not show that IBM’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating him was pretext.  

Roberts’ poor performance was well-documented and even if there were times where his performance improved, the prior improvements were not sufficient to show that later unsatisfactory evaluations were pretextual.  Roberts also tried to show pretext by pointing to a handful of other employees for whom IBM received customer complaints but who were not disciplined for it.  The Court found that some of the other employees were not similarly situated as they were not supervised by the same HR manager as Roberts.  In addition, none of the other employees had the extensive history of performance issues as Roberts.  Therefore, the Court held that Roberts failed to establish any sign of pretext. 

The Court went on to reject Roberts’ state law claims as well. 

Even Informal Communications Can Land You in Court 

While IBM won this case, it also serves as an important reminder for managers and human resources personnel to be careful when discussing employees via e-mail and instant messaging.  Avoid using words or phrases that can be taken out of context or have multiple meanings.  It is sometimes easy to use shorthand or be informal when communicating via e-mail, or text or instant messaging.  But such communications are discoverable, and when taken out of context or misinterpreted, they can turn an otherwise legitimate termination into a hotly contested case.    To avoid that from happening, train your managers, supervisors and HR personnel to draft all communications carefully and deliberately, even if using more informal communication technology.


Disclaimer: This article is designed to provide general information on pertinent legal topics. The statements made are provided for educational purposes only. They do not constitute legal advice and are not intended to create an attorney-client relationship between you and Holland & Hart LLP. If you have specific questions as to the application of the law to your activities, you should seek the advice of your legal counsel.


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October 21, 2013

Tips for Paying Wages via Payroll Cards

By Mark Wiletsky 

DebitcardOffering payroll cards for the payment of employee wages may be a viable, cost effective alternative to paper paychecks.  It also can be an attractive offering for workers who do not have a checking or savings account at a bank or other financial institution.  Employers must be aware, however, that certain federal and state laws regulate payroll card accounts.  The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) recently issued Bulletin 2013-10 describing the application of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA) and Regulation E, which implements the EFTA, to payroll card accounts.  Here are some tips for keeping your payroll card program in compliance with these laws. 

  • No Mandatory Use of Payroll Cards. You may not require that employees be paid on a payroll card from a particular institution.  You may offer payroll cards as a method of wage payment as long as you offer an alternative method, such as direct deposit to an account of the employee’s choosing or paper paychecks.  Acceptable methods of paying wages typically are governed by state wage payment laws.
  • Disclosure of Fees, Transfers, and Other Payroll Card Requirements. Employees to be paid on a payroll card are entitled to be informed of any fees, limitations or requirements related to making electronic fund transfers with the card that will be imposed by the financial institution who issues the card.  Clear, understandable written disclosures must be provided to cardholders in a form that the consumer may keep.
  • Account History Must Be Accessible.  The payroll card issuer must make each cardholder’s account history available, either through periodic statements, telephone balance inquiries, internet/web-based account history, or by providing 60 days of written account history upon request of the cardholder. 
  • Cardholder Liability for Unauthorized Use Must Be Limited.  Payroll cardholders are entitled to limited liability protections for the unauthorized use of their payroll cards, however they must report any unauthorized transfers in a timely period.
  • Cardholders’ Rights to Error Resolution.  Upon the timely report of an error regarding a payroll card account, financial institutions must respond to the cardholder.  In order to ensure a response, the cardholder must report an error within 60 days of either accessing his or her payroll card account history or receiving a written account history containing the error, whichever is earlier, or within 120 days after the alleged error occurred. 

In addition to the federal payroll card laws, state wage payment laws often regulate when and how payroll cards may be used to pay employee wages.  For example, in Colorado, employers may deposit employee wages on a payroll card provided the employee may access the full amount on the card for free at least once during the pay period, or the employee is given the choice to receive their pay through other means, such as direct deposit to an account of the employee’s choosing or a paycheck.  Be certain to check the wage payment laws in the states in which you operate to ensure compliance with any state payroll card requirements.


Disclaimer: This article is designed to provide general information on pertinent legal topics. The statements made are provided for educational purposes only. They do not constitute legal advice and are not intended to create an attorney-client relationship between you and Holland & Hart LLP. If you have specific questions as to the application of the law to your activities, you should seek the advice of your legal counsel.


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October 14, 2013

“Pretaliatory” Firing Recognized as Wrongful Discharge Claim in Utah

By Elizabeth T. Dunning 

Does an employee have to actually file a workers’ compensation claim to be protected from retaliatory termination?  No, says the Utah Court of Appeals.  In the recent Stone v. M&M Welding and Constr. Inc. decision, the Court ruled that an employee who was fired after expressing his intention to file a workers’ compensation claim could pursue a retaliatory discharge claim even though he failed to actually file his worker’s comp claim until eight months after he was fired.  

Employee Discusses Desire to File Workers’ Compensation Claim 

Terry Lee Stone was injured at a party hosted by M&M Welding and Construction in November of 2009.  Within days of the injury, Stone informed the company president that he wanted to file a workers’ compensation claim.  The president dissuaded Stone from doing so, instead holding his position open for two months until he could return to work.  Upon his return, however, Stone’s hours were reduced.  In March and April of 2010, Stone again informed the company that he intended to file a workers’ compensation claim, but failed to do so. 

In early May, a customer demanded that Stone be fired, believing that he exaggerated in reporting a spill of contaminated water at the customer’s site. A few days later, Stone contacted M&M to obtain insurance information for his workers’ compensation claim.  M&M fired him the following day.  Stone sued, alleging that M&M terminated him in retaliation for expressing his intent to file a workers’ compensation claim.  M&M argued that because Stone did not file his workers’ compensation claim until eight months after he was fired, his termination could not be in retaliation of the filing.  The trial court agreed, awarding summary judgment to M&M. 

Utah Court of Appeals Rules that Notifying Employer of Intent to File Workers’ Compensation Claim is Enough 

On appeal, the Court pointed to the Utah Supreme Court’s decision in Touchard v. La-Z-Boy Inc. which recognized that “retaliatory discharge for filing a workers’ compensation claim violates the public policy of this state; thus, an employee who has been fired or constructively discharged in retaliation for claiming workers’ compensation benefits has a wrongful discharge cause of action.”  In Stone, the Court of Appeals extended the basis for a wrongful discharge claim by concluding that conduct short of actually filing a workers’ compensation claim was protected conduct.  The Court wrote that preparing a claim, notifying the employer of the intent to file a claim or discussing his claim with coworkers could be sufficient to support a claim of retaliatory discharge.  In Stone’s case, he had repeatedly expressed to the company president and others that he intended to file a workers’ compensation claim so that conduct was sufficient to proceed with his retaliatory discharge lawsuit.

 

Policy Behind Recognizing “Pretaliatory” Discharge 

The Court recognized that a rule that protected employees only after they actually filed a workers’ compensation claim “would create a perverse incentive for an employer to discharge an injured employee as soon as the employer learns of the employee’s intention to file a claim.”  The Court found such a rule would contradict the important public policy embodied in the state’s workers’ compensation act. 

The Court’s ruling also squares with the conduct that can underlie a retaliation claim under other employment laws.  For example, retaliation claims under Title VII can be based on conduct where the employee either opposes workplace discrimination or participates in a discrimination claim, investigation or proceeding.  “Opposing” discrimination can include the threat of filing a discrimination charge as well as complaining about or reporting discrimination at work.   The Stone decision recognizing a retaliation wrongful discharge claim based on an employee’s expressed intent to file a workers’ compensation claim is analogous to the “opposition” retaliation claims recognized in such other employment laws. 

Employer Take-Aways 

Employers should be careful when making adverse employment decisions related to an employee who has either filed a workers’ compensation claim or is preparing to do so. Decisions should be unrelated to the claim or threat of claim and should be based on a reason that can be clearly articulated and is supported by thorough documentation.  Anything less may lead the affected employee to conclude that the adverse action was in retaliation for the workers’ compensation claim and make it difficult to defend a retaliation lawsuit.


Disclaimer: This article is designed to provide general information on pertinent legal topics. The statements made are provided for educational purposes only. They do not constitute legal advice and are not intended to create an attorney-client relationship between you and Holland & Hart LLP. If you have specific questions as to the application of the law to your activities, you should seek the advice of your legal counsel.


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August 29, 2013

DOJ Will Not Challenge State Marijuana Legalization Laws – New Federal Enforcement Policy Unlikely to Affect Colorado Employers

By Emily Hobbs-Wright 

Cannabis-leaf-mdOn August 29, 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that it will not challenge the state ballot initiatives in Colorado and Washington that legalize the possession and use of small amounts of marijuana under state law.  The DOJ makes clear, however, that marijuana remains an illegal drug under the federal Controlled Substances Act.  This clarification means Colorado employers may still enforce their drug-free workplace policies and take appropriate action when an employee or applicant tests positive for marijuana. 

DOJ Expects States to Enforce Strict Regulatory Schemes 

In its August 29, 2013 Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement, the DOJ identifies eight enforcement priorities for federal law enforcement and prosecutors, such as preventing distribution of marijuana to minors, preventing the diversion of marijuana from states where it is legal to other states, and preventing drugged driving and the exacerbation of other public health consequences of marijuana use.  The DOJ states that it expects that states and local governments to not only establish, but also enforce robust controls in their marijuana regulatory schemes to meet its federal objectives.  The guidance instructs federal prosecutors to review marijuana cases on an individual basis, weighing all available information and evidence but to no longer “consider the size or commercial nature of a marijuana operation alone as a proxy for assessing whether marijuana trafficking implicates the Department’s enforcement priorities . . .”  The DOJ further stated that if states fail to develop or enforce a strict regulatory scheme and the stated harms result, federal prosecutors will step in to enforce federal marijuana priorities and may challenge the regulatory schemes in those states. 

Courts in Colorado Uphold Employer Terminations for Employee Marijuana Use 

In April 2013, the Colorado Court of Appeals ruled that terminating an employee who tested positive for marijuana following his off-duty, off-premises use of medical marijuana did not violate Colorado’s lawful activities statute.  Coats v. Dish Network LLC, 2013 COA 62.  Brandon Coats, a quadriplegic who obtained a license to use medical marijuana under Colorado’s Amendment 20, was fired for violating his employer’s drug policy after testing positive for marijuana. Coats asserted that he never used marijuana on his employer’s premises, was never under the influence of marijuana at work and never used marijuana outside the limits of his medical marijuana license.  He sued his employer, Dish Network, alleging that his termination violated Colorado’s lawful off-duty activities statute, CRS § 24-34-402.5(1), which prohibits an employer from discharging an employee for engaging in “any lawful activity off the premises of the employer during nonworking hours.”

The Coats court looked to the plain meaning of the term “lawful” in the statute and decided that “for an activity to be ‘lawful’ in Colorado, it must be permitted by, and not contrary to, both state and federal law.”  Because marijuana was, and remains, illegal under federal law, the court held that marijuana use is not a “lawful activity” under the Colorado lawful activities statute and therefore, the employer did not violate the statute when it terminated him for testing positive for marijuana.

Earlier this week, the federal district court in Colorado ruled that enforcement of a drug-free workplace policy is a lawful basis for an employer’s decision to terminate an employee who tests positive for marijuana, whether from medical or any other use.  Curry v. MillerCoors, Inc., No. 12-cv-2471 (Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, D.Colo. Aug. 21, 2013). In granting the employer’s motion to dismiss, the federal court rejected all of the former employee’s claims related to his medical use of marijuana that resulted in a positive drug test and his termination under the employer’s drug policy.  Significantly, the court dismissed his disability discrimination claim under Colorado’s anti-discrimination statute as a matter of law, finding that it was lawful for the employer to discharge the employee under its drug-free workplace policy despite the employee’s allegation that he was terminated because of using medical marijuana to treat disabling medical conditions.  Judge John L. Kane wrote “anti-discrimination law does not extend so far as to shield a disabled employee from the implementation of his employer’s standard policies against employee misconduct.”  In dismissing the employee’s claim for violation of Colorado’s lawful activities statute, Judge Kane relied on the Coats decision and similarly ruled that because marijuana use is illegal under federal law, the employee’s medical marijuana use was not a “lawful activity” under the statute. 

DOJ’s Announcement Should Not Change Workplace Decisions 

The DOJ’s announcement of relaxed marijuana enforcement in states that have legalized marijuana does not alter employers’ ability to enforce their drug-free workplace policies.  On the contrary, because the DOJ reinforced that marijuana remains an illegal drug under federal law, the analysis used by courts in Colorado to uphold termination decisions based on positive drug tests should continue to apply.  Employers should create or revise their drug policies to state that use of any drug that is illegal under state or federal law will violate the policy.  Employers then should enforce their policies in a consistent and uniform manner, regardless of the legalization of marijuana use in Colorado.


Disclaimer:This article is designed to provide general information on pertinent legal topics. The statements made are provided for educational purposes only. They do not constitute legal advice and are not intended to create an attorney-client relationship between you and Holland & Hart LLP. If you have specific questions as to the application of the law to your activities, you should seek the advice of your legal counsel.


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August 20, 2013

NLRB Judge Strikes Down Employer’s Dress Code Following “Slave” Shirt Discipline

By Brian Mumaugh 

What is wrong with an employer’s dress code that prohibits clothing that displays vulgar or obscene phrases, remarks or images which may be racially, sexually or otherwise offensive as well as clothing that displays words or images that are derogatory to the Company?  It is overly broad and interferes with employees’ Section 7 rights under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act) to engage in union and/or protected concerted activity, according to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).  The ALJ’s review of the dress code came after the employer disciplined an employee who wore a T-shirt with the word “slave” on it next to a picture of a ball and chain and the employee’s time clock number. Dismissing the employer’s argument that the shirt would be racially offensive to visitors who toured its facility, the ALJ found that the employer violated the Act by sending the employee home without pay to change his “slave shirt.” 

The History of the “Slave Shirt” 

Mark Gluch was a long time employee of automotive parts manufacturer Alma Products Company and a vigorous supporter of the union representing his bargaining unit.  The 2012 incident that gave rise to this case occurred when Gluch wore the “slave shirt” to work during a period of contentious negotiations for a new union contract.  The origin of the shirt, however, dated back to 1993 when company employees developed and paid for the “slave shirts” to send the company a message during an earlier round of difficult contract negotiations.  The shirts resurfaced in 1996 when the bargaining unit employees wore them while picketing during a strike.  Immediately following the strike, as many as 30% of the unit employees wore the “slave shirts” to work on any given Friday.  No discipline or policy infraction was noted or enforced at that time. 

Company Seeks to Avoid Racially Offensive Shirt 

When a new president and CEO, Alan Gatlin, took over for Alma Products in 2005, he noticed employees wearing the “slave shirt.” Finding the shirts to be racially offensive, he felt embarrassed that customers and visitors to the facility would see employees wearing the shirt and be offended.  He testified that in his view, the shirts did not reflect well on the Company with customers as they tried to get new business.  Gatlin asked the human resources manager to draft a dress code policy which was implemented in early 2006.  The dress code policy did not specifically reference the “slave shirt” but included general prohibitions against clothing that displayed “vulgar/obscene phrases, remarks or images which may be racially, sexually or otherwise offensive and clothing displaying words or images derogatory to the Company . . .”  The policy also stated “[i]f you are uncertain whether an article of clothing is appropriate under this policy, follow the old adage of better safe than sorry and refrain from wearing it at work.”

 

After implementing the dress code in 2006, it appears that employees seldom wore the “slave shirt” to work.  However, during difficult union contract negotiations in April 2012, Gluch and other employees began wearing pro-union shirts and pins and Gluch wore the “slave shirt” to work.  Gluch’s supervisor gave Gluch the option of removing the shirt or turning it inside out so that the writing would not be visible.  When Gluch refused to do so, he was sent home without pay for wearing the shirt. 

ALJ Rejects Company’s Concerns About Racial Discrimination 

The union filed an unfair labor practice charge claiming, among other things, that the policy and the Company’s enforcement of the policy, violated the Act.  The Company argued that the shirt’s “slave” reference was offensive to African-Americans due to the history of slavery in the United States.  Noting that an important buyer from Chrysler was African-American as was a new production supervisor at the facility, the Company asserted that it was entitled to discipline Gluch for wearing the racially offensive shirt.  The ALJ rejected this argument, stating that the NLRB has repeatedly found employees to be protected even when they displayed messages that likened their working conditions to those of a slave.  The ALJ noted that the dictionary definition of “slave” does not reference race, but instead focuses on the condition of servitude or being subject to a person or influence.  In addition, given the shirt’s history that it had been worn to work over the past two decades as support for the union, the ALJ determined that it would not be seen as carrying a racial message.  Moreover, the Company had a policy prohibiting racial discrimination since the 1990s, yet had failed to take any action to prohibit wearing the “slave shirt” as racially offensive prior to Gluch’s wearing of the shirt in 2012.  

Key to the ALJ’s analysis of the dress code policy was its general prohibition of words or images that are derogatory to the Company.  The ALJ found that the policy interfered with employees’ Section 7 activity, such as protected statements to coworkers, supervisors or third parties who deal with the Company, because it would prohibit employees from objecting to their working conditions and seeking the support of others in improving them.  The dress code policy was found to be unlawfully overbroad because it prohibits all communications derogatory to the company regardless of whether the words are racially or sexually discriminatory or are protected as concerted activities under the National Labor Relations Act.  In addition, by directing employees to be “safe” not “sorry,” the ALJ stated that the policy directs employees to construe the prohibition on derogatory comments such that it prohibits Section 7 activity. 

Dress Code Policies That Do Not Restrict Section 7 Activity 

With the NLRB (and its ALJs) striking down a variety of employer policies relating to both union and non-union employees, it is difficult to draw a bright line to determine which policies pass scrutiny and which do not.  That said, employers can learn lessons from this recent decision that may help keep their dress code policy away from NLRB review.  First, use specific examples of acceptable versus unacceptable attire rather than general statements that require interpretation.  Second, if your workplace warrants different dress standards for different segments of employees (e.g., public-facing employees vs. behind the scenes employees), make those standards clear and justified by business necessity.  Third, if you include a statement that prohibits derogatory words or images on clothing, include a statement that communications protected by Section 7 are permissible under the dress code.  Finally, enforce your policy in a uniform and consistent manner, so that all dress code violations are treated similarly regardless of the employee or supervisor involved.


Disclaimer:This article is designed to provide general information on pertinent legal topics. The statements made are provided for educational purposes only. They do not constitute legal advice and are not intended to create an attorney-client relationship between you and Holland & Hart LLP. If you have specific questions as to the application of the law to your activities, you should seek the advice of your legal counsel.


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August 14, 2013

DOL Updating FMLA Guidance to Reflect DOMA Decision

By Brad Cave 

New Labor Secretary, Tom Perez, indicated that the Department of Labor (DOL) has updated departmental guidance regarding spousal leave provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) to reflect the Supreme Court’s recent decision that struck down certain provisions of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).   As the DOL updates its policies, employers too need to examine and update their FMLA policies.  Here is what you need to know. 

Unconstitutionality of DOMA Means FMLA Spousal Leave Applies to Legally Married Same-Sex Couples 

The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Windsor focused on Section 3 of DOMA which defined “spouse” as a husband or wife of the opposite sex for purposes of federal laws or regulations.  Because of that definition, legally married same-sex couples were not entitled to federal benefits or rights.  As a result, FMLA leave benefits did not extend to employees needing time off to care for a same-sex spouse with a serious health condition.   

In finding Section 3 of DOMA unconstitutional, the Court stated that the regulation of marriage traditionally rests exclusively with the states and the federal government violates equal protection principles by denying rights and benefits to same-sex couples who are legally married under state law.  The result is that federal rights and benefits, including FMLA spousal leave benefits, now apply equally to state-sanctioned same-sex couples and heterosexual couples.  

DOL Implementing Court’s Decision 

Secretary Perez affirmed the availability of spousal leave under the FMLA based on same-sex marriages.  He indicated that the DOL has removed references to DOMA from some of its guidance documents and will continue to take steps to implement the Court’s Windsor decision. 

When Do Employers Need to Recognize Same-Sex Marriages for FMLA Purposes? 

With some states legally recognizing same-sex marriages and others not, a key question for employers is which state’s law applies for FMLA spousal leave purposes?  According to the DOL’s 2009 FMLA regulations, “spouse” means a husband or wife as recognized by the state where the employee resides.  This means that the employer must determine if same-sex marriages are lawful in the state where the employee requesting FMLA leave lives, not where the employer is located or where the employee actually works.  At present, 13 states plus the District of Columbia recognize same-sex marriages as lawful:  California, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont and Washington.  

Some groups are urging the DOL to adopt a rule that would recognize FMLA rights based on the state where the marriage was celebrated, not the state of residency.  Although the DOL has not yet proposed any rule changes on this issue, we will keep an eye on it and will let you know if any changes to the marriage recognition rules are proposed. 

Update Your FMLA Policy for Same-Sex Spousal Leave 

If you have employees living in one or more states that recognize same-sex marriages (or in the District of Columbia), update your FMLA policy, forms and practices to incorporate spousal leave benefits for recognized same-sex marriages.  This includes FMLA leave for an employee who needs to care for a same-sex spouse with a serious health condition, leave because of a qualifying exigency due to the employee’s same-sex spouse being on “covered active duty” and FMLA military caregiver leave for an employee who needs to care for a same-sex spouse who is a “covered servicemember” or “covered veteran.”  Be sure to look at the state where the employee resides when determining whether same-sex marriage is deemed lawful and recognized for FMLA purposes.  If you use an FMLA tracking mechanism, make sure the system properly tracks for same-sex spousal leave.  As always, train your managers, supervisors and human resource professionals on this change in FMLA benefit coverage.


Disclaimer: This article is designed to provide general information on pertinent legal topics. The statements made are provided for educational purposes only. They do not constitute legal advice and are not intended to create an attorney-client relationship between you and Holland & Hart LLP. If you have specific questions as to the application of the law to your activities, you should seek the advice of your legal counsel.


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