Category Archives: Idaho

June 26, 2015

Same-Sex Marriage Equality: What Employers Need to Know After Obergefell

Same-sex couples have a Constitutional right to marry and have their marriages recognized nationwide. In a 5-to-4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that states are required to license a marriage between two people of the same sex under the Fourteenth Amendment. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015). As a result, same-sex couples may now legally marry in all states. This ruling has massive implications, as rights and benefits extended to opposite-sex spouses will be available to same-sex spouses across the United States.

Marriage Equality Prevails

In an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court recognized that same-sex couples were not seeking to devalue the institution of marriage, but instead sought for themselves the respect, rights, and responsibilities that accompany a legal marriage. The Court held that under both the Due Process and the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, same-sex couples have the fundamental right to marry.

The Due Process Clause provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” The Court determined that same-sex couples may exercise the right to marry under this Clause for four reasons:

the right to make the personal choice of who to marry is inherent in the right of individual autonomy; choices concerning family relationships, whether to have children, and whether to use contraception are protected intimate decisions that extend to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation;
the right of couples to commit themselves to each other and enjoy intimate association extends to same-sex couples just as it does to opposite-sex couples;
protecting same-sex marriage safeguards children and families because without the recognition and stability of marriage, children of same-sex couples suffer harm and humiliation as well as material costs because of the stigma attached to “knowing their families are somehow lesser” than families of opposite-sex couples; and
marriage is a “keystone” of our country’s social order and national community; governmental recognition, rights, benefits and responsibilities depend in many ways on marital status and same-sex couples should not be denied the benefits that accompany marriage.

The Court also ruled that the right of same-sex couples to marry is a liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws. The Court admonished that state laws that ban same-sex marriage deny same-sex couples the benefits afforded to opposite-sex couples, disparage same-sex couples’ choices, and diminish their personhood. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits such “unjustified infringement of the fundamental right to marry.”

Recognition of Marriages Performed in Other States

The Court also ruled that a state may not refuse to recognize the same-sex marriages lawfully performed in another state. The result is that any lawful marriage that has already taken place in the United States, whether same- or opposite-sex, must be recognized in all 50 states.

What This Means for Employers

Multi-state employers that have been dealing with state-specific policies that were dependent on state-law recognition of same-sex marriages may now want to implement a uniform policy that applies to all locations. Here are steps you should consider in light of the legalization of same-sex marriages nationwide:

FMLA leave: Same-sex spouses will be deemed spouses under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) no matter where the marriage took place or where the employee resides. This means that you need to permit eligible employees to take FMLA leave to care for their same-sex spouse with a serious health condition, for qualifying exigency leave if the spouse is being deployed and other qualifying reasons. Update your FMLA policies, forms and practices to permit this leave.
Bereavement and other leaves: If you offer bereavement leave for the death of a spouse or in-laws, you should update your policy to reflect that this leave includes same-sex spouses and relatives of the same-sex spouse. If you offer any other leaves that define immediate family or extend to familial situations, such as non-FMLA medical leave or military leave, update those definitions as well.
Marital status discrimination: If you operate in states that prohibit discrimination based on an employee’s or applicant’s marital status, you will be prohibited from discriminating based on same-sex marriages.
Emergency contacts and beneficiaries: Employees with a same-sex spouse may want to update their emergency contact or beneficiary information listed on group life insurance or retirement plans. Be prepared to administer these changes.
Employee benefits: Group insurance, retirement and other employee benefit plans will need to be reviewed and updated. Be certain to consult your benefits attorney and plan administrators for advice on required changes.
W-4 Forms and tax updates: In light of potential income tax implications for newly recognized same-sex spouses, some employees may want to change their tax withholding information. Be prepared to update W-4 and state withholding amounts upon request.

These and additional policies and procedures impacted by the Court’s ruling may require that you update your employee handbook, policies on your intranet, plan documents, forms, beneficiary designations and other personnel documents. Be sure to notify and train your human resources professionals and supervisors on all changes.

The Court’s landmark decision grants “equal dignity in the eyes of the law” to same-sex couples. Take this opportunity to review your employment policies and practices so your company does the same.

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June 25, 2015

Affordable Care Act Survives Challenge: Tax Credits Available For Federal Exchanges

By Bret Busacker and Gabe Hamilton

To avoid an economic “death spiral” of insurance markets, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that tax credits are available to individuals in states that have a federal exchange under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. ___ (2015). In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court relied on context and policy to resolve an ambiguity in the statute, supporting the ACA’s tax credit in states where the health care exchange is established by the federal government.

An Exchange Established by the State-or the Federal Government

The question before the Court was whether the ACA’s tax credits are available to individuals in states that have a health exchange established by the federal government, or only to those in states where the exchange was established by the state. The ACA provides that individuals are only eligible for premium tax credits under the ACA if the individual obtains insurance through “an Exchange established by the State.” But the Act also provides that if a state fails to set up its own exchange, the federal government will establish “such Exchange.”

The Internal Revenue Service issued a regulation making ACA premium tax credits available regardless of whether the exchange was established and operated by the state or the federal government. The parties challenging that IRS regulation in this case argued that tax credits should not be available in states with a federal exchange as that was not an exchange “established by the State.”

Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the majority, acknowledged that the challengers’ “plain-meaning” arguments were strong, but concluded that the context and structure of the statutory phrase meant that Congress intended the tax credits to apply to eligible individuals purchasing insurance on any exchange created under the ACA. He wrote that the statute is ambiguous and that plain meaning of a statute is but one means the Court uses to resolve an ambiguity. In this instance, context and structure of the statute were more persuasive.

Roberts noted that Congress passed the ACA to improve health insurance markets, not to destroy them. He cited studies that suggested that if tax credits did not apply to federal exchanges, premiums would increase between 35-47 percent and enrollment would decrease by about 70 percent. He wrote, “It is implausible that Congress meant the Act to operate in this manner.”

Tax Credits Are One of The ACA’s Key Reforms

The Court defined the tax credit scheme as one of the ACA’s three key health insurance reforms. The first key reform is the “guaranteed issue” requirement, which prevents insurance companies from denying health care insurance based on a person’s health, and a “community rating” requirement, which prohibits insurers from charging higher premiums to those in bad health.

The second key reform is the individual insurance mandate, requiring individuals to have health insurance coverage or pay a tax penalty. This reform is designed to get more healthy people into the insurance pool, lowering premiums across the board. Individuals are exempt from this requirement if the cost of buying insurance would exceed eight percent of their income.

The third key reform is providing tax credits to certain individuals in order to make insurance more affordable. People with household incomes between 100 and 400 percent of the federal poverty line are eligible to purchase health insurance on the exchange with tax credits which are provided directly to the insurance provider. The availability of premium tax credits through state and federal exchanges is seen as essential in getting more individuals insured and spreading the risk pool.

Acknowledging that the ACA included many instances of “inartful drafting,” the Court decided that limiting tax credits to state exchanges would gut the second and third key reforms in states with a federal exchange. The combination of no tax credits and an ineffective coverage requirement would result in insurance markets plunging into a “death spiral.” The Court concluded that Congress meant for all of the key reforms to apply in every state, including those with federal exchanges.

Result: No Change for Employers in ACA Requirements

By upholding the tax credit scheme in all states regardless of whether an exchange was set up by the state or the federal government, the Supreme Court supported the overall scheme of the ACA. Although Justice Scalia wrote a scathing dissent that was joined by two other justices, the ACA remains intact. Employers should continue to comply with all applicable ACA requirements.

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June 22, 2015

New FMLA Certification Forms Include GINA Safe Harbor Notice

By Jude Biggs

The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) unceremoniously published new FMLA forms with an expiration date of May 2018. The only significant revision is the addition of a notice to employees and health care providers on the medical certification forms informing them not to reveal genetic information in violation of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA).

Genetic Information Off-Limits to Employers

GINA, which went into effect in late 2009, applies to employers with 15 or more employees. It not only makes it unlawful for employers to discriminate or retaliate against employees and applicants because of their genetic information, but it also prohibits employers from requesting, requiring, purchasing or disclosing genetic information.

Genetic information is defined to include information about an individual’s genetic tests and the genetic tests of an individual’s family members, genetic services and an individual’s family medical history. Family medical history is included because it often reveals whether someone has an increased risk of getting a disease, disorder or condition in the future.

FMLA and GINA Intersect

Under the FMLA, employers may require that an employee requesting leave for his or her own serious health condition or to care for a family member with a serious health condition provide a medical certification form completed by a health care provider. Through the medical certification form, health care providers provide medical facts about the condition, such as the expected duration, the nature of treatments, and whether the employee is unable to perform his or her job functions as well as information about the amount of leave needed. In some circumstances, responses by health care providers may reveal genetic information that is protected by GINA.

Because of this intersection of the FMLA and GINA, the regulations implementing GINA offer suggested language that covered employers may use to specify that no genetic information should be provided when medical information is offered to support a request for FMLA leave. By utilizing this safe harbor language and advising the employee and the health care provider not to provide genetic information when completing the FMLA medical certification form, the inadvertent receipt of genetic information by the employer will not be deemed a violation of GINA.

In the past, the DOL’s model FMLA certification forms lacked this GINA safe harbor language. Consequently, employers had to offer it separately or utilize their own FMLA forms in order to take advantage of GINA’s safe harbor provision. Now, the DOL has included the following language in its model FMLA certification forms:

Do not provide information about genetic tests, as defined in 29 C.F.R. § 1635.3(f), or genetic services, as defined in 29 C.F.R. § 1635.3(e).

The certification form for an employee’s own serious health condition includes a statement that no information about the manifestation of disease or disorder in the employee’s family members, 29 C.F.R. § 1635.3(b), should be provided.

Use New FMLA Forms Or Update Your Own Forms

The new FMLA model forms, with fillable form fields, are linked here:

Take steps now to update your FMLA practices to use the new DOL forms, or if you use your own FMLA forms, update them to reflect the added recommended language.

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June 15, 2015

Employee Termination For Off-Duty Marijuana Use Legal, Says Colorado Supreme Court

By Emily Hobbs-Wright

In a nationally awaited decision, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld an employer’s termination of an employee who tested positive for marijuana due to his off-duty, off-premises marijuana use. Issued on June 15, 2015, the Court’s narrow decision in Coats v. Dish Network, LLC turned on the fact that marijuana use remains illegal under federal law. Construing the term “lawful” to encompass activities that are permitted by both state and federal law, the Court ruled that Coats’s off-duty marijuana use was not a protected activity within the meaning of Colorado’s lawful activities statute because marijuana use remains unlawful under the federal Controlled Substances Act. The Court refrained, however, from addressing the issue of whether the state’s Medical Marijuana Amendment confers a state Constitutional right to such use.

Although binding only on Colorado, this decision provides employers nationwide guidance in enforcing drug-free workplace policies as more and more states legalize some form of marijuana use.

Coats v. Dish Network: Employee Not Impaired By Marijuana At Work

Dish Network, LLC terminated Brandon Coats, a quadriplegic, for violating its zero tolerance drug policy after he tested positive for marijuana in a random workplace drug screen. Coats claimed he only used marijuana after work at home to treat painful muscle spasms caused by his quadriplegia. He stated that he did not use marijuana on Dish’s premises and was never under the drug’s influence at work.

After his termination, Coats sued Dish claiming his termination violated Colorado’s lawful activities statute, which broadly prohibits discharging employees for engaging in “any lawful activity off the premises of the employer during nonworking hours.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-402.5(1). Coats argued that because his use of marijuana was legal under state law, he engaged in a lawful off-duty activity for which he could not be discharged. He further argued that the phrase “lawful activity” in Colorado’s statute must be defined in reference to state, not federal law.

Dish countered by focusing on the fact that marijuana remains illegal under federal law, and therefore, its use could not be a “lawful activity” under the Colorado statute, making Coats’s termination legal. The trial court agreed with Dish and dismissed the lawsuit finding that marijuana use is not lawful under state law. A divided Colorado Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision on separate grounds (i.e., that in order for an activity to be “lawful” it cannot contravene state or federal law), which the Colorado Supreme Court has now affirmed.

“Lawful” Means Permitted By Both State and Federal Law

The Colorado lawful activities statute does not define the term “lawful.” Coats argued it should be read as limited to activities that are lawful under state law, which could include legalized marijuana use. The Court disagreed. It looked to the plain language of the statute to conclude that the term “lawful” means permitted by law, or not contrary to, or forbidden by law. The Court refused to impose a state law limitation to the term, ruling that because marijuana use is unlawful under federal law, it is not a “lawful” activity under the Colorado statute.

A successful appeal of the Court’s interpretation of the lawful activities statute to the U.S. Supreme Court is unlikely as the Colorado Supreme Court based its decision on a straightforward common sense construction of a state statute, which is deemed to be within the state’s highest court’s jurisdiction to decide.

Coats’s Impact on Marijuana in the Workplace

The Coats decision is significant to Colorado employers because it confirms that employers are entitled to enforce drug-free workplace policies without fear of violating the state lawful activities statute. Although this case dealt with marijuana use for medical purposes, the Court’s reasoning should apply to recreational marijuana use as well.

Notably, the Court did not decide whether off-duty marijuana use is protected under Colorado’s Medical Marijuana Amendment, which arguably only creates an exemption from criminal prosecution. Any such narrow ruling would almost certainly have spawned additional litigation over the different wording in Colorado’s more recent Recreational Marijuana Amendment, and whether that amendment made off-duty marijuana use “lawful.”

While the Coats decision resolves an important open issue under Colorado law, Colorado employers should continue to exercise caution when dealing with employee marijuana use outside the workplace. Drug testing policies should provide employees with clear notice of consequences for off-duty marijuana use. Further, employers must enforce zero tolerance policies consistently in order to avoid discrimination claims brought under statutes such as the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act. When dealing with an employee who uses marijuana off-duty and off-premises, employers should carefully evaluate the facts of each situation and consider the risks of violating other employment laws before making adverse employment decisions.

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June 1, 2015

Religious Accommodation: Employer Need Not Have Actual Knowledge of Accommodation Need, Says High Court

By A. Dean Bennett

An employer’s motives, not its actual knowledge, determine whether it has discriminated against an applicant or employee in violation of Title VII, ruled the U.S. Supreme Court today. In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court ruled that an employer that refuses to hire an applicant in order to avoid accommodating a religious practice may be liable for discrimination even though the applicant did not inform the employer of the need for an accommodation. As long the applicant can show that her need for an accommodation was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision to refuse to hire her, the employer can be liable for disparate treatment under Title VII. The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit’s opinion which held that liability for failure-to-accommodate a religious practice applies only when the applicant directly informs the employer about the need for an accommodation. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. ___ (2015).

Head Scarf Versus “Look Policy”

This case arose when Samantha Elauf, a seventeen-year old applicant, went to an interview for an in-store sales position at an Abercrombie & Fitch store wearing a headscarf. Although the topic of religion did not come up at the interview, the interviewer, assistant store manager Heather Cooke, assumed that Elauf was Muslim and that she wore the headscarf due to her Muslim religion.

Cooke rated Elauf as qualified to be hired but was concerned that the headscarf would conflict with Abercrombie’s strict “Look Policy” which forbids wearing of “caps.” Cooke consulted with her district manager who told Cooke not to hire Elauf because wearing the headscarf would violate the Look Policy, as would all other headwear, religious or otherwise.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued Abercrombie on Elauf’s behalf. The District Court granted summary judgment to the EEOC, finding Abercrombie liable for failing to accommodate a religious practice in violation of Title VII, with a jury awarding $20,000 in damages. Abercrombie appealed and the Tenth Circuit reversed, concluding that Abercrombie could not be liable for failing to accommodate a religious practice where Elauf never provided Abercrombie with actual knowledge of her need for an accommodation. The EEOC appealed to the Supreme Court.

No Knowledge Requirement in Title VII

“An employer may not make an applicant’s religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a factor in employment decisions,” stated the Court in an opinion written by Justice Scalia. Intentional discrimination under Title VII looks only to the employer’s motives in making its employment decisions, not its actual knowledge. Consequently, if an employer thinks that a job applicant might need an accommodation, such as time off to attend religious observances, and denies the applicant a job in order to avoid that prospective accommodation, the employer violates Title VII, regardless of whether the employer actually knows of the applicant’s religious practices or need for accommodation.

ADA Has Knowledge Requirement

The Court recognized the difference in the reasonable accommodation duty under Title VII versus under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Discrimination under the ADA is defined to include an employer’s failure to make reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an applicant. However, Title VII does not include the knowledge requirement. Therefore, failure to accommodate a religious practice will be deemed discrimination under Title VII as long as the employer’s desire to avoid the accommodation was a motivating factor in its employment decision.

Neutral Policies Still Require Religious Accommodation

Abercrombie argued that its Look Policy was neutral and that it did not treat religious practices less favorably than similar secular practices so it could not be liable for intentional discrimination. The Court disagreed, stating that Title VII gives religious practices favored treatment. The Court acknowledged that an employer is entitled to have a neutral dress policy, such as a no headwear policy, but when an applicant or employee requires an accommodation as an aspect of a religious practice, Title VII requires that the employer accommodate that practice, in the absence of an undue hardship.

Lessons on Religious Accommodations

The practical implication of this decision is that you may not make employment decisions based on suspected religious accommodations. In other words, if you think that an applicant has certain religious beliefs which might lead to the need for an accommodation once hired, you cannot reject them – even if you never discussed or confirmed their religious practices. If the applicant’s potential need for an accommodation is a factor in your decision not to hire them, you may be found liable for discrimination under Title VII.

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May 18, 2015

Plan Fiduciaries Beware: Your Ongoing Duty to Monitor Investments Allows Beneficiaries To Claim Breach Within Six-Year Statute of Limitations

By Mike Beaver

In a ruling that will likely raise the anxiety level of plan fiduciaries, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously ruled today that beneficiaries of a 401(k) plan could pursue their claim against the plan’s fiduciaries related to mutual funds that were added to the plan eight years before the complaint was filed, despite the six-year statute of limitations normally applying to ERISA breach of fiduciary duty claims. The Court concluded that because fiduciaries have a continuing duty to monitor investments and remove those that are imprudent, a claim for breach of that duty is timely so long as the alleged failure to monitor occurred within six years of the filing of the complaint. Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 575 U.S. ___ (2015).

Higher Administrative Fees Prompted Lawsuit

In 2007, several beneficiaries of the Edison International 401(k) Savings Plan (Plan) filed a class action lawsuit against the Plan fiduciaries to recover alleged losses incurred as a result of excessive mutual fund fees. According to the beneficiaries, in selecting the investment choices available to Plan participants, the Plan fiduciaries had chosen six “retail-class” mutual funds, instead of identical “institutional class” funds. The retail-class funds carried higher administrative and management fees than the institutional-class offerings. Three of the funds were chosen in 1999, and the others in 2002.

As to the funds selected in 2002, the lower courts found that the Plan fiduciaries offered “no credible explanation” for selecting the higher-cost retail funds. However, as to the 1999 funds, the Plan fiduciaries argued that the ERISA statute of limitations applicable to fiduciary breaches would bar the beneficiaries’ claims involving the 1999 funds, because they were selected more than six years before the lawsuit was commenced. The statute, 29 U.S.C. § 1113, bars a fiduciary breach claim brought more than six years “after the date of the last action which constituted part of the breach or violation,” or “in the case of an omission the latest date on which the fiduciary could have cured the breach or violation” (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the fiduciaries, and dismissed all claims relating to the 1999 funds.

A unanimous Supreme Court, however, reinstated the beneficiaries’ claims pertaining to the 1999 funds. The Court found that, although the funds may have been chosen previous to the fiduciaries’ action in selecting the 1999 funds, the statute did not bar claims relating to the fiduciaries’ alleged omissions since that time. Specifically, the Court held that ERISA fiduciaries have a “continuing duty to monitor trust investments and remove imprudent ones.” This duty imposes a “continuing responsibility for oversight of the suitability of the investments already made.” Since such continuing reviews by the Plan fiduciaries might have been required within the six-year limitation period, a claim that the fiduciaries breached their oversight and review responsibilities could not be summarily dismissed.

No Guidance on Oversight Duty

Having held that Plan fiduciaries have a duty to oversee and monitor investment decisions previously made, the Court provided little guidance as to what that duty entails. The Court articulated the fiduciaries’ oversight and monitoring responsibilities only in a broad, theoretical way, holding that “a fiduciary normally has a continuing duty of some kind to monitor investments, and that “the nature and timing of the review [are] contingent on the circumstances.” Because these circumstances had not been fully developed by the lower courts, the Supreme Court remanded the case for further consideration, noting that it did not necessarily find that the Plan fiduciaries had violated any of their duties.

Lesson for Fiduciaries

The Supreme Court has made clear that benefit plan fiduciaries have a continuing responsibility to monitor the suitability and prudence of a plan’s investment choices, and that the six-year statute of limitations runs from the alleged breach of this ongoing responsibility, not from the date a particular investment was initially selected. However, the Court provided essentially no guidance concerning how fiduciaries can fulfill this ongoing responsibility. The parameters of a fiduciaries’ ongoing responsibility to monitor and evaluate investment choices will, in all likelihood, be developed only by extensive future litigation.

Because the Court provided little specific guidance concerning the ongoing duty to monitor investment choices, plan fiduciaries will need to increase their focus on what little regulatory guidance is provided by the U.S. Department of Labor, and many fiduciaries will likely increase their reliance on objective, professional investment advisors. Of course, the choice of an investment advisor is, itself, a fiduciary act, and under the guidance of the Tibble decision, it is likely the fiduciaries’ ongoing responsibility to monitor the suitability and performance of advisors as well. In short, the Tibble decision expands the potential for fiduciary liability without providing much guidance on how that liability might be minimized.

April 29, 2015

EEOC Conciliation Efforts Are Reviewable, Says Supreme Court

By Dustin Berger

Employers have a narrow right to seek judicial review of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC’s) statutory obligation to give an employer adequate notice of the charges against them, including the identity of the employees (or class of employees) claiming discrimination, and to engage in informal resolution of the charges. In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that courts have the authority to review whether the EEOC has met its duty under Title VII to attempt informal resolution of alleged discriminatory practices prior to filing suit. Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 575 U.S. ___ (2015).

While the scope of review is limited, it is good news for employers as it limits the EEOC’s ability to take high priority cases to court without first engaging in any discussion with the employer to remedy the alleged unlawful practices. Unfortunately, however, under the Supreme Court’s decision, the courts’ review of the EEOC’s conciliation efforts will be too limited to ensure that the EEOC makes a genuine and meaningful attempt to reach a voluntary resolution of a charge before the EEOC sues.

Title VII Mandates Informal Methods of Conciliation

Title VII, the primary federal law that prohibits employers from discriminating against individuals on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or national origin, sets forth a procedure to be followed by the EEOC when handling a complaint of employment discrimination. In part, the law requires that when the EEOC finds reasonable cause to believe discrimination occurred, it must first attempt to eliminate the alleged unlawful practice through “informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.” The EEOC may choose which informal method it chooses to attempt resolution of the charge, and the agency ultimately retains the right to accept any proposed settlement or to sue the employer.

Letter From EEOC Without Follow-Up Was Insufficient Conciliation Effort

In the case before the Court, a female applicant filed a charge alleging that Mach Mining, LLC had refused to hire her as a coal miner because of her sex. The EEOC investigated her charge and found reasonable cause to believe that Mach Mining had discriminated against not only that applicant, but also a class of women who had similarly applied for mining jobs.

The EEOC sent Mach Mining a letter inviting both the company and the female applicant to participate in informal conciliation and stated that an EEOC representative would contact them soon. That never happened. Instead, about a year later, the EEOC sent Mach Mining a second letter stating that “such conciliation efforts as are required by law have occurred and have been unsuccessful” and further stated that any further efforts would be “futile.” The EEOC proceeded to sue Mach Mining in federal court alleging sex discrimination in hiring.

Mach Mining asserted that the EEOC had failed to conciliate in good faith prior to filing suit, as was required by Title VII. Although the federal district court agreed with Mach Mining that it should review whether the EEOC had met its conciliation duty, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals overruled that decision and held that a party could not assert as a defense that the EEOC had failed to conciliate the claim as Title VII required. The Seventh Circuit explained that conciliation was solely within the EEOC’s expert judgment and that there was no workable standard that would allow judges to review that process. Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit believed that court review of conciliation would complicate Title VII lawsuits by allowing the focus of the litigation to drift from the merits of the Title VII claim to the sufficiency of the EEOC’s conciliation effort.

Although other federal appellate courts, however, have held that Title VII does allow a court to review the EEOC’s conciliation effort, there was no uniformity among the other appellate courts in what that review should entail. The Supreme Court agreed to take the Mach Mining case to resolve whether and to what extent courts may review the EEOC’s conciliation attempts.

Notice to Employer and Discussion Required

Justice Kagan, writing for a unanimous Court, first explained that courts routinely enforce compulsory prerequisites to suit in Title VII cases. Although Congress had given the EEOC wide latitude over the conciliation process, the Court refused to allow the EEOC to police itself on whether it had complied with its conciliation duty. Accordingly, it overruled the Seventh Circuit’s decision and held that courts have the authority to review whether the EEOC has fulfilled its Title VII duty to attempt conciliation of discrimination charges.

The Court then turned to the proper standard of judicial review. In other words, it considered what the EEOC must show in order to meet its conciliation duty as a precondition to filing suit. The agency argued for minimal review, suggesting that its letters to Mach Mining were a sufficient attempt at conciliation. Mach Mining argued for a much deeper review, urging that the Court adopt a standard from the National Labor Relations Act that would require a negotiation in good faith over discrimination claims. The Court rejected both approaches and took a middle line.

The Court explained that judicial review was available but was limited to ensuring that the EEOC provided the employer with notice and an opportunity to discuss the matter tailored to achieving voluntary compliance. The Court stated that the EEOC must inform the employer not only about the specific allegations of discrimination, but also about which employees (or what class of employees) have suffered as a result. Ordinarily, the Court noted, the EEOC’s “reasonable cause” letter will provide this notice. Then, the EEOC must attempt to engage in some form of discussion with the employer to give the employer a chance to remedy the allegedly discriminatory practices prior to being sued. That discussion may be in written or oral form and the EEOC will retain a great deal of discretion about how to conduct its conciliation efforts and when to end them.

Evidence of the conciliation efforts may be supported or challenged through written affidavits. Ordinarily, the EEOC’s affidavit will show it has met its conciliation duty, but employers may create a factual issue through affidavits or other credible evidence that indicates that the EEOC did not provide the requisite information about the charge or attempt to engage the employer in discussion prior to filing suit. If a reviewing court finds in the employer’s favor on such a challenge, the appropriate remedy is for the court to order the EEOC to engage in conciliation.

Confidentiality of Conciliation

In reaching its decision, the Court focused in part on Title VII’s non-disclosure provision. This provision states that “[n]othing said or done during and as a part of such informal endeavors may be made public by the [EEOC], its officers or employees, or used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding without the written consent of the persons concerned.” Mach Mining argued that this confidentiality provision meant only that the actions taken and statements made taken during conciliation could not be used as evidence of the merits of the claim. The Court rejected that argument and reiterated that the non-disclosure provision protects actions and statements made during conciliation from disclosure for any evidentiary purpose. And, the Court explained, the non-disclosure provision alone precluded the courts from engaging in any deeper inquiry into the EEOC’s actions during conciliation.

What This Means For You

As the EEOC has been aggressively pursuing employers on novel theories of discrimination, it is beneficial to have the ability to ask a court to review whether the EEOC provided proper notice of the allegedly discriminatory practice and the employees allegedly affected by it and offered the employer an effort to discuss the matter for the purpose of achieving voluntary compliance. Although this review is narrow, it is an improvement over the Seventh Circuit’s view because it gives employers a limited opportunity to hold the EEOC accountable for satisfying its statutory obligation to conciliate claims. If your organization receives a “reasonable cause” finding, be sure to track what efforts the EEOC makes to engage you in discussions to pursue voluntary compliance. If those efforts do not meet the standard announced by the Court, you can seek to compel the EEOC to make an effort compliant with its statutory obligations before it proceeds with its suit.

What the Mach Mining decision will not do, however, is allow an employer to seek the aid of a court in requiring the EEOC to make a genuine effort to achieve a voluntary resolution of a charge. For instance, the Mach Mining decision does not require the EEOC to negotiate in good faith, apprise an employer of “the smallest remedial award the EEOC would accept,” lay out the legal and factual basis for its position or any request for a remedial award, refrain from “take-it-or-leave-it” offers, or provide any particular amount of time for an employer to consider and respond to the EEOC’s position or offers. Accordingly, you are well advised to set expectations of the conciliation process at a low threshold and, to the extent you believe voluntary resolution is desirable, take the initiative in working with the EEOC after receiving a reasonable cause determination letter.

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April 28, 2015

Retirement Plans: Proposed Changes to the Fiduciary Rules Offer An Opportunity For Introspection

By Bret Busacker

The Department of Labor (DOL) recently published long-promised revisions to the rules regulating investment advisers to retirement plans and their fiduciaries, participants and beneficiaries, as well as IRAs and their owners and beneficiaries (Advice Recipients). The new proposed fiduciary regulations (2015 Proposed Rule) are the DOL’s most recent attempt to modernize long-standing labor rules that predate the creation of the 401(k) plan and the widespread use of IRAs. In 2010, the DOL attempted to revise these same regulations, but withdrew the proposed changes after receiving significant pushback from stakeholders. We’ll have to see if its second effort is more successful.

Role of Investment Advisors Are At Issue

The crux of the issue is that plan fiduciaries must act in the best interest of their Advice Recipients. Under ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code, if a fiduciary uses plan or IRA assets for their own advantage, it is a prohibited transaction. For example, a fiduciary adviser who receives compensation from a third party (i.e., the plan recordkeeper or platform provider) to recommend a particular investment to an Advice Recipient may be engaging in a prohibited transaction. Fiduciaries who are a party to a prohibited transaction may be subject to penalties and lawsuits from plan participants.

In the past, investment advisers have navigated around this issue by serving in a non-fiduciary consulting capacity with respect to their Advice Recipients. The current long-standing regulations generally treat an adviser as a fiduciary only if the adviser enters into an agreement with an Advice Recipient to regularly provide individualized investment advice that will serve as the primary basis upon which the Advice Recipient will make investment decisions. (This is generally referred to as the “five-part test.”) Each element of the five-part test must be satisfied in order for an adviser to be considered a fiduciary.

Investment consultants take the position that they are not fiduciaries under the five-part test because they either do not provide regular advice to the Advice Recipient or the advice they provide is not the primary basis of the Advice Recipient’s investment decision. Plans that use investment consultants who do not assume fiduciary responsibility should be aware that the 2015 Proposed Rule may ultimately characterize these consultants as fiduciaries.

Expanded Fiduciary Activity

Under the 2015 Proposed Rule, an adviser will be a fiduciary to an Advice Recipient even if the adviser does not regularly provide investment advice to the Advice Recipient and even if the advice is not the primary basis for the Advice Recipient’s investment decision. Instead, under the 2015 Proposed Rule, an adviser may become a fiduciary if the adviser receives a fee for the advice and the adviser either (i) represents or acknowledges that he or she is acting as a fiduciary with respect to the Advice Recipient or (ii) agrees in writing or verbally to provide the Advice Recipient with advice that is individualized or specifically directed to the Advice Recipient.

Under the 2015 Proposed Rule, investment advice generally includes:

a recommendation to acquire, hold, dispose or exchange an investment, including in connection with a participant’s distribution or rollover from a plan or IRA;
a recommendation with respect to the management of an investment, including in connection with a participant’s distribution or rollover from a plan or IRA;
an appraisal, fairness opinion, or similar oral or written statement concerning the value of an investment in connection with a transaction involving a plan or IRA; or
a recommendation to hire another service provider who will provide investment advice.

Under the 2015 Proposed Rule, a “recommendation” includes an adviser’s suggestion for the Advice Recipient to take a particular course of action with respect to an investment under the Advice Recipient’s control.

Common Plan Administration Carve-Outs

Notwithstanding the apparent breadth of the 2015 Proposed Rule, the rule contains a number of helpful carve-outs that identify common situations in which an adviser will not be considered a plan fiduciary, as summarized below.

Providing a plan or IRA with an investment platform, provided that the recordkeeper or platform provider notifies the Advice Recipient that it is not providing investment advice or serving as a fiduciary.
Identifying investment options that satisfy the pre-established investment criteria of an independent plan fiduciary (e.g., expense ratios, size of fund, type of asset, etc.) and/or providing benchmarking information to the independent plan fiduciary.
Providing basic investment information that assists a plan in complying with reporting and disclosure requirements.
Providing investment education that is limited to investment concepts (e.g., risk and return, diversification and dollar-cost averaging) and objective questionnaires, worksheets and interactive software.
Selling investments to an Advice Recipient who has the requisite investment background and who is properly informed that the broker is not undertaking to impartially advise the plan. This carve-out generally only applies to larger retirement plans.

The 2015 Proposed Rule also provides a means by which an adviser who falls within the definition of a fiduciary may continue to receive conflict-of-interest compensation by satisfying certain safeguards and disclosure requirements.

Take Aways

The definition of a fiduciary under the 2015 Proposed Rule is quite broad and, if adopted, will certainly expand the number of advisers who are treated as adviser fiduciaries to retirement plans and IRAs. However, even if the 2015 Proposed Rule is not adopted, Advice Recipients should take this opportunity to review their relationship with their current investment adviser. If an adviser is not currently a fiduciary, but provides recommendations with respect to investments, consider asking the adviser whether he or she is able to be a fiduciary and whether changes will be required to the relationship if the rule is finalized. These questions may spark a helpful conversation that clarifies the adviser’s role and informs the Advice Recipient of whether changes to the relationship may be required (even if the rule is not finalized).

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April 3, 2015

Presidential Veto Quashes Congressional Attempt to Overturn NLRB “Quickie” Election Rules

By John Husband and Brad Williams

On March 31, 2015, President Obama vetoed a joint resolution passed by both houses of Congress that sought to overturn the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB’s) rules designed to speed up the union election process. Scheduled to go into effect on April 14, 2015, these so-called “quickie” or “ambush” election rules significantly shorten the period of time between a petition for a union election and a vote.

History of “Quickie” Election Rules

The “quickie” election rules have a tortured history. First proposed in June 2011, the rules faced immediate and severe criticism that led to a watered-down version of the rules being adopted in December 2011. These watered-down rules went briefly into effect in April 2012, but were quickly invalidated by a federal court just two weeks later. The court ruled that the Board had lacked a statutorily mandated quorum when it voted to adopt the rules.

Notably, the federal court also stated that nothing prevented a properly constituted quorum of the Board from voting to re-adopt the rules in the future. That is exactly what the Board did in February 2014. It re-proposed its original rules, and subsequently adopted the rules in December 2014. The new rules are slated to become effective on April 14th.

Legal Challenges Continue

Despite Congress’s ill-fated attempt to block the rules under the Congressional Review Act, the rules still face potential hurdles. For instance, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce filed a lawsuit in the District of Columbia in January 2015 seeking to vacate the rules and enjoin their enforcement. Business groups in Texas filed a similar lawsuit in January 2015. These lawsuits allege numerous reasons why the rules should be invalidated, including alleged violations of the National Labor Relations Act and Congressional intent, alleged violations of the First Amendment and due process protections, and arbitrary and capricious rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act. However, the lawsuits will take time to wind through the courts, and their chances of success are uncertain.

Anticipated Effects of Rules

Barring any unexpected injunction before April 14th, employers should anticipate big changes from the new rules. The rules will shorten the period of time between a petition for a union election and a vote to perhaps fifteen or fewer days (as opposed to the five or more weeks under current practice). The rules are expected to boost organizing activity as unions attempt to increase their membership – and dues-generated revenue – through “ambush” elections. The compressed timeline between a petition and vote will limit employers’ ability to fully explain the pros and cons of union representation before an election, and limit employees’ ability to cast an informed vote. To retain flexibility in dealing directly with their employees, employers should be ready at the first hint of union organizing to educate their employees about the desirability of union representation. Advance preparation, and a properly orchestrated counter-organizational campaign, will be key.

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March 30, 2015

Drafting Employee Handbook Policies That Pass NLRB Muster

By Brian Mumaugh

All employers, union and non-union alike, should think about making a thorough review of their employee handbook and policies in light of a recent report on employer workplace rules by the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB’s) General Counsel, Richard Griffin. In his report, Griffin describes a variety of employment policies that the Board has found unlawful and offers the Board’s reasoning as to why. He also points out acceptable policies and explains what wording or context made that policy lawful. The bottom line: a single word or phrase can, in this Board’s view, make the difference between an acceptable policy or one that violates the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).

Overly Broad Handbook Policies Can Chill Employees’ Rights

The Board has long taken the position that even neutrally worded employment policies can violate the NLRA if they have a chilling effect on the right of employees to engage in protected concerted activities. These activities, referred to as Section 7 activities, include discussing wages, benefits, and other terms and conditions of employment with other employees and with outside parties, such as government agencies, union representatives and the news media.

In his March 18th Report, GC Griffin explains that the majority of policies found by the Board to violate the NLRA, were unlawful because employees could reasonably construe the language of the rule as prohibiting or infringing on Section 7 activities. Consequently, many well-intentioned, seemingly common-sense policies prove problematic for employers due to their possible interpretation as limiting an employee’s right to discuss their pay or working conditions with others.

Handbook Policies That Result in Violations

The report sets out eight categories of work rules that frequently violate the NLRA and then distinguishes between unacceptable and acceptable language for such rules. The categories and the unlawful aspects of each may be summarized as follows:

Confidentiality Policies: may not prohibit employees from discussing their wages, hours, workplace complaints or other personal information; prohibiting the disclosure of the company’s confidential information may be acceptable;
Employee Conduct Toward the Company and Supervisors: may not prohibit employees from engaging in negative, disrespectful or rude behavior or other conduct that may harm the company’s business or reputation; prohibiting employees from disparaging the company’s products, or requiring employees to be respectful to customers, vendors and competitors will typically be acceptable;
Conduct Toward Fellow Employees: may not prohibit “all” negative, derogatory, insulting or inappropriate comments between employees as that may interfere with the employees’ right to argue and debate with each other about management, unions and the terms and conditions of their employment; requiring employees to treat each other professionally and with respect as well as banning harassing and discriminatory conduct will typically be lawful;
Interactions with Third Parties: may not completely ban employees from talking to the media or government agencies; a policy noting that employees are not authorized to speak on behalf of the company without authorization may be considered lawful;
Restricting the Use of Company Logos, Copyrights and Trademarks: may not prohibit all use of company logos and intellectual property because the NLRB upholds employees’ right to use company names, logos and trademarks on picket signs, leaflets and other protest materials; policies that require employees to respect all copyright and intellectual property laws is acceptable;
Restricting Photos and Recordings: may not ban employees from taking pictures or making recordings on company property; a policy may limit the scope of such a prohibition depending on a competing protective right (such as a healthcare facility protecting patient privacy by limiting photos of patients);
Restrictions on Leaving Work: because employees have the right to go on strike, a policy that prohibits employees from “walking off the job” will be unlawful; policies stating that failure to report for a scheduled shift or leaving early without permission as grounds for discipline may be acceptable; and
Conflict-of-Interest Policies: policy may not ban any activity “that is not in the company’s best interest;” policies that give examples of what constitutes a conflict-of-interest, such as having a financial or ownership interest in a customer, supplier or competitor, or exploiting one’s position for personal gain will likely be lawful.

Few Bright Lines for Lawful Policies

The report goes on to offer analysis of additional policies dealing with topics such as handbook disclosure, social media and employee conduct related to a particular employer who agreed to revise their policies as part of a settlement agreement with the NLRB. You may have similar policies in your handbook, making it worthwhile to read what policy language the Board considers problematic and what may pass muster. The takeaway, however, is that the lawfulness of many policies may turn on a single word or phrase. At the present time, it is unclear whether GC Griffin’s report will withstand legal challenge. The best advice is that given the report and its contents, it is important to take time to review your handbook and compare your wording to the examples provided in the report. Although the report is not a legally binding interpretation of the NLRA, it can help you make an informed decision about the risks involved in including certain provisions in your employee handbook.

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