Category Archives: Labor Law

August 20, 2013

NLRB Judge Strikes Down Employer’s Dress Code Following “Slave” Shirt Discipline

What is wrong with an employer’s dress code that prohibits clothing that displays vulgar or obscene phrases, remarks or images which may be racially, sexually or otherwise offensive as well as clothing that displays words or images that are derogatory to the Company? It is overly broad and interferes with employees’ Section 7 rights under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act) to engage in union and/or protected concerted activity, according to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The ALJ’s review of the dress code came after the employer disciplined an employee who wore a T-shirt with the word “slave” on it next to a picture of a ball and chain and the employee’s time clock number. Dismissing the employer’s argument that the shirt would be racially offensive to visitors who toured its facility, the ALJ found that the employer violated the Act by sending the employee home without pay to change his “slave shirt.”

The History of the “Slave Shirt”

Mark Gluch was a long time employee of automotive parts manufacturer Alma Products Company and a vigorous supporter of the union representing his bargaining unit. The 2012 incident that gave rise to this case occurred when Gluch wore the “slave shirt” to work during a period of contentious negotiations for a new union contract. The origin of the shirt, however, dated back to 1993 when company employees developed and paid for the “slave shirts” to send the company a message during an earlier round of difficult contract negotiations. The shirts resurfaced in 1996 when the bargaining unit employees wore them while picketing during a strike. Immediately following the strike, as many as 30% of the unit employees wore the “slave shirts” to work on any given Friday. No discipline or policy infraction was noted or enforced at that time.

Company Seeks to Avoid Racially Offensive Shirt

When a new president and CEO, Alan Gatlin, took over for Alma Products in 2005, he noticed employees wearing the “slave shirt.” Finding the shirts to be racially offensive, he felt embarrassed that customers and visitors to the facility would see employees wearing the shirt and be offended. He testified that in his view, the shirts did not reflect well on the Company with customers as they tried to get new business. Gatlin asked the human resources manager to draft a dress code policy which was implemented in early 2006. The dress code policy did not specifically reference the “slave shirt” but included general prohibitions against clothing that displayed “vulgar/obscene phrases, remarks or images which may be racially, sexually or otherwise offensive and clothing displaying words or images derogatory to the Company . . .” The policy also stated “[i]f you are uncertain whether an article of clothing is appropriate under this policy, follow the old adage of better safe than sorry and refrain from wearing it at work.”

After implementing the dress code in 2006, it appears that employees seldom wore the “slave shirt” to work. However, during difficult union contract negotiations in April 2012, Gluch and other employees began wearing pro-union shirts and pins and Gluch wore the “slave shirt” to work. Gluch’s supervisor gave Gluch the option of removing the shirt or turning it inside out so that the writing would not be visible. When Gluch refused to do so, he was sent home without pay for wearing the shirt.

ALJ Rejects Company’s Concerns About Racial Discrimination

The union filed an unfair labor practice charge claiming, among other things, that the policy and the Company’s enforcement of the policy, violated the Act. The Company argued that the shirt’s “slave” reference was offensive to African-Americans due to the history of slavery in the United States. Noting that an important buyer from Chrysler was African-American as was a new production supervisor at the facility, the Company asserted that it was entitled to discipline Gluch for wearing the racially offensive shirt. The ALJ rejected this argument, stating that the NLRB has repeatedly found employees to be protected even when they displayed messages that likened their working conditions to those of a slave. The ALJ noted that the dictionary definition of “slave” does not reference race, but instead focuses on the condition of servitude or being subject to a person or influence. In addition, given the shirt’s history that it had been worn to work over the past two decades as support for the union, the ALJ determined that it would not be seen as carrying a racial message. Moreover, the Company had a policy prohibiting racial discrimination since the 1990s, yet had failed to take any action to prohibit wearing the “slave shirt” as racially offensive prior to Gluch’s wearing of the shirt in 2012.

Key to the ALJ’s analysis of the dress code policy was its general prohibition of words or images that are derogatory to the Company. The ALJ found that the policy interfered with employees’ Section 7 activity, such as protected statements to coworkers, supervisors or third parties who deal with the Company, because it would prohibit employees from objecting to their working conditions and seeking the support of others in improving them. The dress code policy was found to be unlawfully overbroad because it prohibits all communications derogatory to the company regardless of whether the words are racially or sexually discriminatory or are protected as concerted activities under the National Labor Relations Act. In addition, by directing employees to be “safe” not “sorry,” the ALJ stated that the policy directs employees to construe the prohibition on derogatory comments such that it prohibits Section 7 activity.

Dress Code Policies That Do Not Restrict Section 7 Activity

With the NLRB (and its ALJs) striking down a variety of employer policies relating to both union and non-union employees, it is difficult to draw a bright line to determine which policies pass scrutiny and which do not. That said, employers can learn lessons from this recent decision that may help keep their dress code policy away from NLRB review. First, use specific examples of acceptable versus unacceptable attire rather than general statements that require interpretation. Second, if your workplace warrants different dress standards for different segments of employees (e.g., public-facing employees vs. behind the scenes employees), make those standards clear and justified by business necessity. Third, if you include a statement that prohibits derogatory words or images on clothing, include a statement that communications protected by Section 7 are permissible under the dress code. Finally, enforce your policy in a uniform and consistent manner, so that all dress code violations are treated similarly regardless of the employee or supervisor involved.

Disclaimer:This article is designed to provide general information on pertinent legal topics. The statements made are provided for educational purposes only. They do not constitute legal advice and are not intended to create an attorney-client relationship between you and Holland & Hart LLP. If you have specific questions as to the application of the law to your activities, you should seek the advice of your legal counsel.

May 14, 2013

D.C. Circuit Court Tears Down NLRB Poster Rule

By Brad Williams

The writing’s still not on the wall. On May 7, 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) controversial poster rule requiring 6 million private employers to post a government-issued notice advising employees of their union-related rights. The rule remains in limbo pending a related appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and potential appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Poster Rule and Business Group Backlash

The controversial rule was issued in August 2011 under the NLRB’s purported statutory authority to enact rules “necessary” to carrying out the National Labor Relation Act’s provisions. The Board had long been empowered under Section 6 of the Act to engage in administrative rulemaking, but had generally eschewed this power to enforce union-related rights through case-by-case adjudication. In justifying its unusual poster rule, the NLRB claimed that many employees were unaware of their union-related rights. It cited the small percentage of unionized employees in the private workforce, and claimed that immigrants and high school students were particularly unlikely to be aware of their workplace rights.

The NLRB poster rule required all private employers covered by the Act—6 million businesses—to post an 11-by-17 inch government-issued notice in “conspicuous places,” and on intranet or internet sites used to communicate with employees. The poster advised employees of their rights to organize and join unions, to collectively bargain, and to strike and picket. Failure to post was an unfair labor practice, and could separately be used as evidence of an employer’s unlawful motive in other Board cases. The statute of limitations on unfair labor practice charges would also be tolled in cases where employers failed to post.

Business groups excoriated the rule as unbalanced. The poster did not advise employees of their additional rights to decertify unions, to refuse to pay dues in right-to-work states, or to object to dues payments in excess of those needed for representational purposes. The rule also arguably implicated employers’ free speech rights, and exceeded the NLRB’s Section 6 authority because the Act does not expressly mandate that the Board educate employees about workplace rights. Some groups claimed that the Obama administration was also improperly attempting to bypass the legislative process through substantive rulemaking.

District Court Challenges and the D.C. Circuit Court’s Injunction

The rule was originally slated to become effective in November 2011, but implementation was twice delayed due to litigation in the U.S. District Courts for the Districts of Columbia and South Carolina. In the former case, a district court judge upheld the rule as a valid exercise of the Board’s Section 6 power, but invalidated two of its enforcement mechanisms. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 846 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 2012). In the latter case, a judge held that the Board had exceeded its Section 6 authority because the Act nowhere required employers to post notices of employee rights. Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 856 F. Supp. 2d 778 (D.S.C. 2012).

Both district court opinions were appealed. Just two weeks before it was finally scheduled to become effective—on April 30, 2012— the D.C. Circuit Court enjoined the rule’s enforcement pending resolution of the District of Columbia appeal. The NLRB directed its regional offices to not implement the rule pending resolution of the issues before the D.C. Circuit Court.

D.C. Circuit Court’s Opinion

On May 7, 2013, Judges A. Raymond Randolph, Karen Henderson, and Janice Rogers Brown of the D.C. Circuit Court—all Republican appointees—rejected the rule after finding each of its enforcement mechanisms incompatible with the Act.

Writing for the court, Judge Randolph first noted that the Act’s free speech provision—Section 8(c)—precluded the NLRB from finding employer speech containing no threat of reprisal or promise of benefit to be an unfair labor practice, or evidence of such a practice. But he found that the poster rule did precisely that. It provided that failure to post was both an unfair labor practice, and could be used as evidence of other unfair labor practices. Drawing on First Amendment jurisprudence, he rejected any claim that the government-issued poster merely reflected the Board’s, and not an employer’s, speech. First Amendment principles protect both the “dissemination” and the “creation” of messages. They also protect the right not to speak, so the “right to disseminate another’s speech necessarily includes the right to decide not to disseminate it.” Judge Randolph thus found two of the rule’s enforcement mechanisms invalid.

He next held that the rule’s purported tolling of the statute of limitations in cases where employers failed to post the notice was incompatible with Congressional intent. The Board failed to prove that in enacting the 6-month statute of limitations on unfair labor practice charges, Congress contemplated potential tolling where employers failed to post, or where employees were unaware of their union-related rights. Judge Randolph thus held that the rule’s remaining enforcement mechanism was also invalid.

Because each of its enforcement mechanisms conflicted with the Act, Judge Randolph rejected the rule’s notice posting requirement after noting that the NLRB had expressly rejected the option of issuing a rule that depended solely on voluntary compliance.

In a concurring opinion, Judges Henderson and Brown agreed with Judge Randolph’s reasoning, but would have taken his decision one step further. They argued that, regardless of whether the enforcement mechanisms were valid, the NLRB lacked Section 6 authority to issue the poster rule. They urged that the Act invested with Board with only reactive power—such as responding to unfair labor practice charges, or responding to election petitions filed by parties—but not any proactive authority to guard against potential statutory violations. “The NLRA,” they concluded, “simply does not authorize the Board to impose on an employer a freestanding obligation to educate its employees on the fine points of labor relations law.” Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, No. 12-5068 (D.C. Cir. May 7, 2013).

Fourth Circuit Appeal and Potential U.S. Supreme Court Review

While the D.C. Circuit Court firmly rejected the poster rule, the related challenge from South Carolina remains pending before the Fourth Circuit. That court heard oral arguments in the case in March 2013, and the parties have already submitted their differing interpretations of the D.C. Circuit court’s opinion in supplemental filings. The Board has not yet updated its website to address the effect, if any, the D.C. Circuit’s opinion may have on its own enforcement position.

Regardless of how the Fourth Circuit eventually rules, the NLRB’s poster rule seems likely to end up before the U.S. Supreme Court. The writing’s still not on the wall, but the Supreme Court is one step closer to posting its own thoughts on the matter.

November 9, 2012

NLRB: Irrelevant Union Requests Demand Timely Response

by Bradford J. Williams

A union’s request for information demands a timely response, even if the requested information is irrelevant to the collective bargaining relationship or any underlying grievance. That’s the ruling of a recent National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) decision expanding an employer’s duty to bargain in good faith under Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Employers must now timely respond to all requests for information involving bargaining unit members or risk an unfair labor practice charge.

The statutory duty to bargain in good faith includes the duty to provide unions with information needed to engage in collective bargaining or administration of a collective bargaining agreement (e.g., through a grievance procedure). As such, the NLRB has long held that employers must timely provide unions with information that is relevant and necessary to their performance as collective bargaining representatives. It has also long held that employers must timely object to requests for relevant information that might lawfully be withheld on the basis of confidentiality, privacy, or other interests.

Before its decision last month, however, the NLRB had never previously decided whether an employer must timely respond to a union’s request for information that is determined (or admitted) to be irrelevant. An employer must now timely respond.

In its October 23, 2012, decision, the NLRB held that a company engaged in interstate trucking violated Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the NLRA by failing for a period of four and one-half months to respond to a union’s request for information involving the company’s drivers. This was so even though the union admitted that the request was irrelevant to any pending grievance. In its ruling, the Board characterized the requested information as “presumptively relevant” at the time the request was made because it related to unit employees. The Board determined that the company had a duty to “respond promptly” to the union’s request, even if just to explain its reason for refusing to provide the (irrelevant) requested information.

The Board’s latest decision is troubling. Employers may now no longer ignore union requests, even when the requested information is clearly irrelevant to collective bargaining or contract administration. Instead, they must promptly respond to all requests and either (a) provide the requested information, or (b) explain why it is being withheld. This is true with respect to any requests involving bargaining unit members. Employers are thus encouraged to consult counsel immediately after receiving information requests to ensure the preparation of an adequate and timely response. Failure to do so may expose employers to unfair labor practice charges and give unions leverage in ongoing negotiations or grievance proceedings.

June 22, 2012

NLRB’s New Website

The U.S. Department of Labor received much fanfare when it rolled out its new timesheet app. In its news release of 2011 (http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/whd/WHD20110686.htm), DOL indicated that it believed the application would ensure that workers received the wages to which they were entitled.

Not to be outdone, although not as an application, the National Labor Relations Board announced that it has launched a new interactive website to describe the rights of employees to engage in protected concerted activity under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. The webpage can be found at: http://www.nlrb.gov/concerted-activity.

You will see that the NLRB details numerous case examples where it found the conduct of employers to violate the act. The interactive map serves to lead the reader to the detail of a case that provides factual detail about the violation. This is just another example of how the social media network can be used as a public relations effort to justify an agency's public purpose and to inform employees of their rights.

For more information on the NLRB or other traditional labor relations questions, feel free to send a comment or reach me directly.

Steven M. Gutierrez

May 15, 2012

Court Invalidates NLRB’s “Ambush Election” Rule

A federal district court judge invalidated the National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB's) controversial "ambush election" rule yesterday, ruling that the Board had lacked a three-member quorum needed to pass the rule last December. The ruling followed a failed Congressional attempt to halt the rule, and came just two weeks after the rule became effective on April 30th. For more information, see the article written by my colleagues Brian Mumaugh and Brad Williams.

April 16, 2012

Court Strikes Down NLRB Notice-Posting Requirement, Leaves Employers Hanging

By Brian M. Mumaugh and Bradford J. Williams

The U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina just became the second federal district court to weigh in on the legality of a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) rule requiring most private employers to post a notice informing employees of their rights under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). In his April 13, 2012, decision, Judge David C. Norton held that the notice-posting rule exceeded the NLRB’s authority in violation of administrative law. The decision leaves employers hanging regarding their obligations in advance of the April 30, 2012, notice-posting deadline.

In August 2011, the NLRB issued a final administrative rule requiring all private employers covered by the Act to post 11-by-17 inch posters “in conspicuous places” advising employees of their rights under the NLRA. These rights include the right to form, join, or assist unions; to negotiate with employers through unions; to bargain collectively through representatives of employees’ own choosing; and to strike and picket. The rule was stridently opposed by business groups which felt that it violated employers’ First Amendment rights, and mandated the posting of an excessively pro-union message. The final rule required employers who customarily communicate with employees regarding personnel matters using an intranet or internet site to post the notice prominently on that site.

To ensure compliance, the rule provided that failure to post the required notice would be deemed an unfair labor practice (ULP) under Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The Board could automatically toll (or stay) the six-month statute of limitations for all ULP actions—not just those arising out of a failure to post—where employers failed to post the notice. In addition, the knowing and willful refusal to post the notice could be used “as evidence of unlawful motive” in ULP cases in which motivation was at issue.

In late 2011, the NLRB’s final administrative rule was challenged in lawsuits filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, and the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina. Due in part to this pending litigation, the rule’s effective date was postponed to January 31, 2012, and then to April 30, 2012.

On March 2, 2012, Judge Amy Jackson of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued a ruling in the first of the two lawsuits, National Association of Manufacturers v. NLRB, No.11-1629 (ABJ) (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2012). Judge Jackson broadly upheld the NLRB’s right to issue the notice-posting rule, but struck down automatic sanctions for failure to post the required notice. She held that failure to post might constitute an ULP, and might toll the statute of limitations, but found that the Board would have to make specific findings in each ULP case to impose such sanctions. Judge Jackson’s decision is currently on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and the appellate court has not yet ruled on a motion that would enjoin the rule’s enforcement pending the court’s decision.

Last Friday, Judge Norton stepped into this fray by issuing a diametrically opposed decision in the second of the two lawsuits, Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, No. 11-cv-2516 (DCN) (D.S.C. Apr. 13, 2012). Judge Norton found that the Board had exceeded its authority under Section 6 of the Act by issuing the notice-posting rule. Noting that Section 6 gives the Board the power to make “such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of the [NLRA],” the judge found that the notice-posting rule was not “necessary” to any of the Act’s provisions. On the contrary, the NLRA empowers the Board to prevent and resolve ULP charges and to conduct representative elections. Judge Norton noted that these duties are inherently “reactive,” and found that nothing in the Act requires employers to “proactively” post notices of employee rights. As Judge Norton concluded: “Neither Section 6 nor any other section of the NLRA even mentions the issue of notice posting.”

Judge Norton further rejected the argument that the Board had acted appropriately by filling a statutory “gap” in the NLRA. He observed that Congress had inserted at least eight explicit notice requirements into federal labor statutes since 1934, while the NLRA had “remained silent.” He concluded that Congress “clearly knows how to include a notice-posting requirement in a federal labor statute when it so desires,” but found that there is “not a single trace of statutory text that indicates Congress intended for the Board to proactively regulate employers in this manner.”

Interestingly, Judge Norton did not discredit the Board’s factual finding that there is an increased need for employees to learn of their NLRA rights, and he did not dispute Judge Jackson’s conclusion that the Board had articulated a rational connection between this finding, and the Board’s decision to promulgate the notice-posting rule. Nonetheless, he implicitly found that any such connection was irrelevant in light of the plain language and structure of the Act, which he said compelled his conclusion that the Board lacked the authority to promulgate the rule.

Judge Norton’s decision is extremely favorable for employers, but is it unfortunately only likely controlling in the District of South Carolina. Conversely, Judge Jackson’s decision is broadly disappointing for employers, but is only likely controlling in the District of Columbia. Courts in other jurisdictions—including in the Tenth Circuit—have yet to weigh in on the issue. If Judge Norton’s decision is eventually appealed (as is likely), and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reaches a different decision than the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the notice-posting issue could end up before the U.S. Supreme Court.

A spokesman for the NLRB announced last Friday that the Board was studying Judge Norton’s decision, and would be deciding on an appropriate course of action. As it has done before, the Board might postpone enforcement of the rule pending further court action. Alternatively, the Board might take the position that the rule is only unenforceable in the District of South Carolina, but is enforceable elsewhere. The U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, or the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (or even the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, if Judge Norton’s ruling is appealed), could separately enjoin enforcement of the rule given the current split in legal opinion.

In the wake of Judge Norton’s decision, employers are advised to monitor further developments in both the District of South Carolina case, and in the District of Columbia case. Employers may also want to monitor the NLRB’s website. As the April 30th notice-posting deadline approaches, employers may wish to consult with legal counsel about the potential costs of posting an arguably pro-union poster, and the likelihood that the notice-posting rule may eventually be invalidated in their jurisdiction.

For more information or advice on compliance, please contact Brian M. Mumaugh or Bradford J. Williams of Holland & Hart’s Labor & Employment Practice Group.

March 27, 2012

Furor Over Facebook Continues

By Mark Wiletsky

Following up on my post last week, the flap over employers asking applicants to turn over their passwords to social media accounts, such as Facebook, rages on. Two senators–Sens. Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) and Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.)–on March 25 asked the Department of Justice and the EEOC to investigate this practice (http://blumenthal.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/blumenthal-schumer-employer-demands-for-facebook-and-email-passwords-as-precondition-for-job-interviews-may-be-a-violation-of-federal-law-senators-ask-feds-to-investigate). Facebook joined the fray by warning employers about this practice, and of course the ACLU has raised concerns as well (http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/23/tech/social-media/facebook-employers/index.html?hpt=hp_t3). Is this issue being overblown? Other than media reports about a couple of public entities, it is unclear how many employers are demanding applicants turn over passwords to social media accounts as a condition of employment (or consideration for employment). Still, the heightened media attention is a good reminder for employers to review their hiring practices and their social media policies. If you have not yet read the NLRB's January 25, 2012 Operations Management Memo (http://www.nlrb.gov/news/acting-general-counsel-issues-second-social-media-report), I recommend doing so. Even though I disagree with certain aspects of the Memo, it provides some good examples of things to avoid in both social media policies and discipline/termination situations involving social media–for Union and non-Union work environments.

March 5, 2012

Court Upholds NLRB Notice-Posting Requirement, Strikes Down Automatic Sanctions for Failure to Post

By Bradford J. Williams

The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued a highly anticipated ruling last Friday, broadly upholding the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB’s) right to issue a rule requiring most private employers to notify employees of their rights under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by posting a notice. The ruling struck down automatic sanctions for failure to post the required notice, but did not altogether eliminate the possibility that failure to post might constitute an unfair labor practice (ULP) under the Act. Absent further Board postponement in light of a likely appeal, or a contrary ruling from a second district court still considering the matter, the notice-posting requirement will go into effect on April 30, 2012.

In August 2011, the NLRB issued a final administrative rule requiring all private employers covered by the Act to post 11-by-17 inch posters “in conspicuous places” advising employees of their rights under the NLRA. Employers who customarily communicate with employees regarding personnel matters using an intranet or internet site were further required to post the notice prominently on that site. As originally written, the rule provided that failure to post would be deemed an ULP under Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. It further permitted the Board to automatically toll (or stay) the six-month statute of limitations for all ULP actions—not just those arising out of a failure to post—where employers had failed to post the required notice.

In late 2011, the NLRB’s final rule was challenged in lawsuits filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, and the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina. Due in part to this pending litigation, the rule’s original November 14, 2011, effective date was initially postponed to January 31, 2012, and then postponed again to April 30, 2012.

Last Friday, Judge Amy Jackson of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued her ruling in one of the two lawsuits, National Association of Manufacturers v. NLRB, No.11-1629 (ABJ) (D.D.C. March 2, 2012). The judge rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that the NLRB had exceeded its authority in promulgating the notice-posting requirement. Finding that Congress had not “unambiguously intended to preclude the Board from promulgating a rule that requires employers to post a notice informing employees of their rights under the Act,” she upheld the notice-posting requirement as a valid exercise of the Board’s authority under the deferential standard of review applicable to administrative rulemaking.

Despite upholding the notice-posting requirement, Judge Jackson found that the NLRB had nonetheless exceeded its authority in automatically deeming all failures to post to be ULPs under the Act. Because Section 8(a)(1) only prohibited employers from “interfer[ing]” with rights guaranteed by the Act, it only prohibited employers from “getting in the way – from doing something that impedes or hampers an employee’s exercise of the rights guaranteed by [Section 7] of the statute.” The automatic sanction of an ULP for any employer who failed to post would not distinguish between situations in which an employer’s failure was intended to or did exert influence over employees’ organizational efforts, and those in which an employer merely declined or failed to post the required notice. As such, the judge found that the automatic sanction of an ULP was inconsistent with the Act’s plain meaning.

Critically, Judge Jackson noted that her decision did not “prevent[] the Board from finding that a failure to post constitutes an unfair labor practice in any individual case brought before it.” As such, the Board may still determine that any particular failure to post constitutes an ULP, at least assuming it makes specific findings that the failure actually interfered with an employee’s exercise of his or her rights.

For similar reasons, Judge Jackson struck down the rule’s provision permitting the Board to automatically stay the statute of limitations in any ULP action where the employer had failed to post the required notice. The judge found that the Act provided an unambiguous six-month statute of limitations, and that the rule effectively supplanted this limitations period for a broad class of employers regardless of particular circumstances. Again, she nonetheless observed that, under a well-established common law doctrine, her decision did not “prevent the Board from considering an employer’s failure to post the employee rights notice in evaluating a plaintiff’s equitable tolling defense in an individual case before it.”

Judge Jackson’s March 2nd ruling is broadly disappointing for employers. It upholds the notice-posting requirement that will go into effect on April 30th absent further Board postponement, or a contrary ruling in the second pending lawsuit, Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, D.S.C., No. 11-cv-2516. It further permits the NLRB to find individual failures to post to be ULPs under the Act, at least given appropriate factual findings. Finally, the judge’s statute of limitations ruling may expose employers to stale ULP charges where employees succeed in showing that they were unaware of their rights under the NLRA due to an employer’s failure to post.

The plaintiffs in National Association of Manufacturers have already vowed to appeal Judge Jackson’s ruling. Pending any eventual reversal by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, or any contrary ruling by the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, employers should prepare now to comply with the rule’s notice-posting requirement before April 30th. For more information or questions, please contact Bradford J. Williams of Holland & Hart’s Labor & Employment Practice Group at (303) 295-8121 or bjwilliams@hollandhart.com.

October 6, 2011

NLRB Postpones Posting Rule

Good news. The NLRB (National Labor Relations Board) has postponed the effective date on the private business posting rule that informs workers about their right to form a union. The Board indicated on Wednesday that there has been too much confusion over which business are covered under the rule. For a good summary of the posting rule from my partner Jeff Johnson click on this link: http://www.hollandhart.com/newsitem.cfm?ID=1873

For more information, feel free to reach out.

Steven M. Gutierrez

June 6, 2011

Newspaper Loses Arbitration Argument, but Can Hold Employee to His Word

By Jude Biggs

Introduction

Unionized employees file grievances when they believe their employer has not followed the collective bargaining agreement (CBA”); usually such an employee argues the employer did not have “just cause” to discipline, demote, or fire him. If the grievance is not decided in favor of the employee, the employee can take the grievance to arbitration. In most cases, however, union employees need not grieve or arbitrate their statutory discrimination claims; they still have a right outside of the CBA to claim discrimination, just as a non-union employee does, so they can still litigate the claim in court. In 2009, the Supreme Court muddied the waters and said some CBAs may be worded clearly enough that a union employee may only arbitrate a discrimination or retaliation claim through the CBA process. Since then, courts have attempted to sort out just what “clearly enough” means. Courts have also struggled with what to do when an employee says he is disabled when he applies for social security benefits, but then claims he was qualified for a job and should be allowed to sue for discrimination. The following case is the latest word from the Tenth Circuit on both of these issues.

Background

John Mathews, a unionized employee of the Denver Newspaper Agency (the “Agency”), worked for the Agency from 1983 through 2005. At the time his claims arose, he was a Unit Supervisor (but still a union employee). In June 2005, a female employee complained that Mathews had made inappropriate comments; Mathews was placed on paid leave while the complaint was investigated. Once the investigation was completed, the union filed a grievance against Mathews on behalf of the complaining employee, and the Agency demoted him from his Unit Supervisor position on July 1, 2005. That same day, Mathews obtained a doctor’s note saying he could not return to work for medical reasons.

Mathews was originally from southern India. He filed a grievance against the Agency, claiming his demotion was due to his national origin and it violated the union contract’s anti-discrimination provision. He also claimed he was demoted in retaliation for complaints of race, color, and national origin discrimination that he had made in May and June of 2005. He later amended the grievance to remove any reference to a violation of anti-discrimination statutes, but he still claimed he was “discriminated” against when he was demoted. Under the CBA, Mathews could choose to arbitrate his grievance or litigate it in court; in this case, he chose to pursue arbitration. The arbitrator held a 4-day evidentiary hearing on the claims and ruled against Mathews. Mathews then filed a claim for disability benefits with the Social Security Administration (“SSA”), alleging complete and total disability beginning on June 11, 2005 (the date of the alleged comments that led to his demotion).

Mathews filed a lawsuit in district court, claiming he had been discriminated and retaliated against, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and §1981 (another civil rights statute that prohibits race discrimination). The district judge ruled Mathews’s decision to arbitrate his claims prevented him from doing so again in court; in other words, he could not have two bites at the apple. In addition, the judge ruled that Mathews’s statement to the SSA that he was totally disabled and unable to work prevented him from claiming he could still do the job he held before. Hence, he was “judicially estopped” or prevented from maintaining a claim for discrimination, as he could not prove he was qualified for the job. Mathews then appealed to the Tenth Circuit.

The Tenth Circuit Says Mathews Gets Two Bites at the Apple

The Tenth Circuit looked first at when a union employee is limited to bringing a statutory discrimination claim under the arbitration procedure in a CBA, and when a union employee may file the discrimination claim under the CBA (if he wishes) and also in court. The Tenth Circuit explained that, based on a 2009 Supreme Court decision (Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009)), a CBA may be worded in such a way as to be the exclusive remedy for claims based on anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation statutes. However, normally, a union employee has both contractual rights under the CBA and statutory rights not to be discriminated or retaliated against. The CBA preempts statutory rights only when the CBA expressly says that statutory claims are to be arbitrated under the CBA. In Mathews’s case, the CBA did say the company and union would not discriminate “in accordance with and as required by applicable state and federal laws.” That language, to the Tenth Circuit, meant only that the company and union agreed discriminatory conduct could violate both the CBA and anti-discrimination statutes; it did not mean submitting a claim of discrimination to arbitration waived the right to sue in court. In addition, Mathews had amended his initial grievance to delete any reference to statutory claims. As a result, the Tenth Circuit held the CBA arbitration process was not Mathews’s exclusive remedy and Mathews could also sue in court.

But the Tenth Circuit Says Mathews Can’t Have It Both Ways

The Tenth Circuit then turned to Mathews’s claim that he could be totally disabled for purposes of getting social security disability benefits but not disabled for purposes of claiming he could still do his job. The Tenth Circuit pointed out that Mathews had to prove he could do the job before he could prove he was discriminated against. Mathews admitted he could not do the job anymore, but blamed the company for his disability. Since the company caused his disability, he argued, it should not escape liability. The Tenth Circuit did not buy his arguments.

In reaching that conclusion, the Tenth Circuit confirmed that, just because an employee claims to be disabled for purposes of gaining social security disability benefits, he is not necessarily estopped (or prevented) from saying he was qualified for a job in a subsequent lawsuit. However, such an employee must explain why he has taken inconsistent positions.

Looking at the medical evidence, the Tenth Circuit saw that Mathews had persuaded the social security judge that he was disabled due to a bulging disc of the cervical spine and an affective disorder as of June 11, 2005. In the discrimination case, he claimed “to the best of his recollection,” his disabling depression occurred after the Agency placed him on administrative leave on June 17, 2005. The two positions were entirely inconsistent, and he made no effort to explain the discrepancy. Mathews’s inconsistent statement to the SSA gave him the benefit of significant disability payments, and allowing him to recover for a lawsuit based on inconsistent statements would give him an unfair advantage. As a result, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district judge had not abused his discretion by concluding Mathews could not establish a claim of discriminatory demotion.

Retaliatory Demotion Claim Still Survives

The court then reviewed whether Mathews could still sue for retaliatory demotion. Since that claim was not waived in the arbitration process, the court looked at the evidence supporting such a claim, and concluded a jury might rule in Mathews’s favor. The record showed Mathews was placed on leave on June 17, 2005, but he had made complaints to his supervisors on May 31 and sometime after June 17 but before his July 1 demotion. Given that timing, it was possible a jury might conclude the demotion was due to his complaints. As a result, the court remanded the case for further proceedings on the retaliatory demotion claim.

Lessons Learned

The Mathews case teaches union employers in Colorado (and other states within the Tenth Circuit’s reach) that, if they want employees’ statutory discrimination claims to be resolved only through the arbitration process under the CBA, the CBA must say clearly that the arbitrator has the exclusive authority to hear statutory claims. It also helps if the employee says in the grievance that he believes the conduct he is complaining about violates the CBA and anti-discrimination statutes. To avoid the Mathews result, union employers may consider negotiating provisions in their CBAs stating not only that the arbitrator has exclusive authority to hear statutory claims, but also that any general claim of “discrimination” will be deemed both a contract and statutory violation. That may often be impractical, given the dynamics of negotiations, but it may work with some unions.

For more information on this case or arbitration law in general, please contact Jude Biggs at jbiggs@hollandhart.com.

This article is posted with permission from Colorado Employment Law Letter, which is published by M. Lee Smith Publishers LLC. For more information, go to www.hrhero.com.