Category Archives: Legal

June 5, 2019

Federal Courts Have Jurisdiction Over Title VII Discrimination Claims Even Where Administrative Remedies Have Not Been Exhausted

The United States Supreme Court ruled unanimously on June 3, 2019 that Title VII’s charge-filing requirement is not jurisdictional. In Fort Bend County, Texas v. Davis, Justice Ginsberg delivered the Court’s unanimous decision noting that while Title VII requires a complainant to first file a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the charge-filing precondition is not a jurisdictional requirement that can be raised at any stage of a proceeding. Rather, the charge-filing prerequisite is ranked among the claim processing rules that must be timely raised for it to apply.

The complainant in the Fort Bend, Lois M. Davis,case timely filed her initial charge of discrimination for retaliation after she claimed her supervisor retaliated against her by curtailing work responsibilities. Complainant alleged the supervisor wanted to punish her for a complaint she made against her supervisor’s friend who resigned following an investigation into a sexual harassment complaint. While her charge of discrimination was pending, Ms. Davis was instructed by her supervisor to report to work on a Sunday. Ms. Davis told her supervisor that she could not come in on Sunday, that she had a commitment at her church, and offered to have another employee replace her. Ms. Davis’ supervisor was insistent and told her that if she did not report to work on Sunday she would be terminated. Ms. Davis went to church instead of work and was promptly terminated. Thereafter, Ms. Davis attempted to supplement the allegations of her original Charge of Discrimination by adding to the intake questionnaire the word “religion.”

February 14, 2019

U.S. DOL Eases Restriction on Tipped Employees

Katarina Harris

By Katarina Harris

Employers in the hospitality industry have long struggled to follow U.S. DOL guidance limiting circumstances under which they may take a “tip credit” toward their employees’ federal minimum wage. New U.S. DOL guidance eases that restriction.

DOL Opinion Letter Retracts “80/20 Rule”

In a new opinion letter released November 8, 2018, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) decided to eliminate the “80/20 Rule” which had previously limited employers’ ability to take a “tip credit” toward their employees’ federal minimum wage. This retraction comes as a relief to many employers in the hospitality industry, as the previous rule effectively required employers to track and account for the time their employees spent on non-tipped tasks, such as rolling silverware, filling salt-shakers, and other types of daily “side work.” Under the 80/20 Rule, an employer could not take a tip credit for non-tip-generating duties performed by a tipped employee if the amount of time spent on such duties exceeded twenty percent of the employee’s overall work. Tracking and monitoring this time was a tedious and difficult task for employers, resulting in higher risk from wage and hour lawsuits.

“Dual Job” and “Dual Task” Rules Sowed Confusion

Under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), employers must currently pay employees a minimum wage of $7.25 per hour. State wage and hour laws may impose different and higher minimum wage requirements. However, if an employee qualifies as a “tipped” employee under federal regulations, his or her employer may pay the employee just $2.13 per hour in cash wages and take a “tip credit” arising from the employee’s actual tips to cover the remainder of the federal minimum wage. This credit may total $5.12 per hour.

However, the FLSA distinguishes between tipped employees who perform non-tip-generating duties and those considered to have “dual jobs.” For employers, this distinction is critical to avoiding wage and hour lawsuits. If an employee is employed in both a tipped occupation (e.g., as a server), and in a non-tipped occupation (e.g., as a janitor), for the same employer, the employer may only take the tip credit for that employee’s work in the tipped occupation. For all work performed in the non-tipped occupation, the employer must pay the employee his or her federal minimum wage in cash wages.

The old 80/20 Rule took this functional distinction even further. It effectively distinguished between “dual jobs” and those involving “dual tasks.” Even if a tipped employee was not engaged in a “dual job”—for instance, if he or she worked solely as a server—the employer could still not take a tip credit for any work the employee performed which was related to, but not directed toward, producing tips—at least if the employee spent more than 20% of his or her time on such duties. This was the old 80/20 Rule.

Employers Found “80/20 Rule” Unworkable

Many employers found the old 80/20 Rule burdensome, if not completely unworkable. It effectively required employers to track tipped employees’ time spent on non-tip-generating duties. It also opened the door to wage lawsuits requiring detailed fact-finding in order to reconstruct exactly how much time, minute-by-minute, a tipped employee spent on particular tasks. Even worse, the rule did not specify which tasks were considered “related” to tip-generating occupations, as opposed to constituting distinct, non-tipped work. If a customer dropped silverware on the floor and asked a server for a new set, was the time spent rolling a new set of silverware related to tip-generating work? Would the answer be different if the server rolled extra sets of silverware at the beginning of his or her shift before the first customers arrived? Issues like these created a fertile field for litigation.

New DOL Opinion Letter Revives Old Guidance

In January 2009, the DOL issued an opinion letter which briefly rescinded the 80/20 Rule. However, the DOL retracted this rescission just two months later after a new administration came into office. The 80/20 Rule remained in force at all times thereafter.

In its November 2018 opinion letter, the DOL has now reissued its previous January 2009 guidance rescinding the 80/20 Rule. In this new letter, the DOL acknowledges that its previous guidance created some “confusion and inconsistent application” of the tip credit. The letter also quotes a federal circuit court’s observation that, under the old 80/20 Rule, “nearly every person employed in a tipped occupation could claim a cause of action against his employer if the employer did not keep perpetual surveillance or require them to maintain precise time logs accounting for every minute of their shifts.”

Given the practical difficulties caused by the 80/20 Rule, the DOL announced in its new opinion letter that the agency no longer “intend[s] to place a limitation on the amount of duties related to a tip-producing occupation that may be performed” by a tipped employee, at least if such non-tipped duties are performed “contemporaneously with the duties involving direct service to customers.” The related, but non-tip-producing, duties may also be performed “for a reasonable time immediately before or after” a tipped employee performs his or her direct-service duties without imperiling the credit. For employers, this means no more logging, tracking, and monitoring tipped employees’ daily activities.

The DOL’s new letter also acknowledges the need to provide front-end guidance to employers on which duties are entirely unrelated to tip-producing occupations, and thus not subject to the tip credit. To this end, the letter references a list of “core” and “supplemental” duties for certain tip-producing occupations provided by the Occupational Information Network (O*NET). Employers may consult this list to determinine whether certain tasks are related to tip-producing occupations, in which case they are subject to the tip credit. Conversely, employers may not take the tip credit in relation to any duties which do not appear on this list, unless they are very minimal in duration (i.e., “de minimis”)

Greater Clarity for Hospitality Employers

Although additional uncertainties regarding the tip credit may persist into future—e.g., what is a “reasonable time” immediately before or after a tip-producing activity for purposes of related duties?—the DOL’s new opinion letter provides much-needed guidance to employers in the hospitality industry. Employers need no longer track time spent on tip-producing versus “related” tasks in order to claim the tip credit. Nonetheless, hospitality employers should remain vigilant in distinguishing between “dual jobs,” and those with “dual tasks,” because any time spent in non-tipped occupations remains ineligible for the tip credit. When in doubt, employers should consult experienced employment law counsel for additional guidance.

September 26, 2016

Tax Reporting For Deferred Compensation Payments Following Death of Employee: Are You Reporting Correctly?

By Rebecca Hudson and Arthur Hundhausen

When an employee dies, deferred compensation may be due and payable to the employee’s beneficiary or estate. Employers are often tripped up by the corresponding tax reporting and withholding requirements and whether income tax and FICA tax withholdings are due from such payments. This article briefly addresses these tricky questions.

No Income Taxes Should Be Withheld

Under many employer-sponsored deferred compensation arrangements, employees earn compensation in one year that will not be paid until a future date. This may include traditional deferred compensation plans, short-term and long-term incentive arrangements, and stock awards, to name a few. When an employee/plan participant dies, the terms of the plan or arrangement typically dictate when and how the future payments are to be made to the employee’s beneficiary or estate. Employers should follow the terms of the plan and make payments and plan distributions to beneficiaries at the required times.

The proper income tax treatment of compensation that is earned preceding death, but is unpaid at the time of death, and is ultimately paid to a beneficiary or the estate of the deceased employee is outlined in IRS Revenue Rulings 71-456 and 86-109. These rulings provide that for income tax withholding purposes, these amounts do not constitute “wages.” Consequently, employers should not withhold income taxes on the amounts paid to a beneficiary or estate following an employee’s death.

FICA Taxes Still Withheld and Due If Compensation Paid In Year of Death

In an odd, and less-than-intuitive provision, the federal tax code (Code) treats FICA tax withholding differently depending on whether the compensation payments are made to the beneficiary/estate in the calendar year of the employee’s or former employee’s death, or in succeeding calendar years. Section 3121(a)(14) of the Code states that if compensation amounts are paid in the calendar year of the employee’s death or former employee’s death, such amounts will constitute FICA “wages” and therefore, are subject to FICA (Social Security and Medicare) tax withholding. However, Code Section 3121(a)(14) also confirms that these amounts will not constitute “wages” for FICA purposes, and therefore will not be subject to FICA tax withholding, if they are paid in the calendar year or years after the year in which the employee or former employee died.

Form W-2 or 1099?

So what tax reporting forms must be issued to the beneficiary or estate to reflect the compensation payments made following an employee’s death? Under IRS Revenue Ruling 64-150, all amounts earned but unpaid at an employee’s or former employee’s death received by an estate or beneficiary of a deceased employee should be reported as non-employee compensation on a Form 1099-MISC. But, as explained below, the amounts reported on the Form 1099-MISC must take into account FICA tax withholding and therefore, will depend on whether the payments are made in the calendar year of the employee’s or former employee’s death or in the calendar year(s) after the death.

Specifically, for payments made in the same calendar year as the employee or former employee died, the payments are not subject to income tax withholding but are subject to FICA withholding. Therefore, employers should issue a Form W-2 for that year in the name of the employee or former employee (with the social security number of the employee), solely to reflect the FICA wages and the corresponding FICA tax withheld. The compensation/plan distributions should be reported in box 3, Social Security wages, and box 5, Medicare wages and tips, on the Form W-2. The corresponding employee Social Security tax withheld should be reported in box 4, and the corresponding employee Medicare tax withheld should be reported in box 6, on the same Form W-2. Finally, the net amount of the compensation/plan distributions made to the beneficiary/estate in that calendar year (“net” meaning the full amount of the payment less the amount of FICA taxes withheld) should be reported on a Form 1099-MISC, box 3, Other income, issued to the beneficiary/estate.

For payments made in the calendar year(s) following the year in which the employee or former employee died, no income tax or FICA taxes should be withheld and no Form W-2 is required. Instead, the full amount of the distribution payments should be reported on a Form 1099-MISC, box 3, Other income, issued to the beneficiary/estate.

April 3, 2014

Severance Payments Are Wages Subject to FICA Tax

By Arthur Hundhausen and Mark Wiletsky

Employers offer severance payments to separating employees for numerous reasons, including rewarding long-time employees affected by a plant closure, to maintain goodwill, to secure a release and waiver of existing or potential claims, or to comply with company policies or agreements that require such payments. But whether the severance is dictated by policy or an individually-negotiated benefit, one sticky issue that employers may neglect to address is whether severance payments are subject to FICA taxes. The U.S. Supreme Court recently settled that issue by confirming that severance payments made to employees terminated against their will are taxable wages under FICA. United States v. Quality Stores, Inc., No. 12-1408, 572 U.S. ___ (2014). The Supreme Court’s ruling was consistent with the longtime IRS historical position on this issue.

Involuntary Terminations Due to Bankruptcy Triggered Severance Payments

Quality Stores terminated thousands of employees in connection with its involuntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing in 2001. The employees received severance payments under one of two plans, ranging from six to eighteen months of severance pay. Initially, Quality Stores reported the severance payments as wages for FICA purposes on the Forms W-2 filed with the IRS and the employees. Consistent with such reporting, Quality Stores paid the employer’s required share of FICA taxes and withheld the employees’ share of FICA taxes as well. Quality Stores then decided to file FICA tax refund claims with the IRS, totaling over $1 million in paid FICA taxes. The IRS neither allowed nor denied the refund claims, so Quality Stores sought a refund as part of its bankruptcy proceeding. Both the District Court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that severance payments were not “wages” under FICA, meaning Quality Stores and its affected employees were entitled to a refund of the FICA taxes paid.

The Sixth Circuit’s decision, however, directly contradicted rulings by other Courts of Appeals, which concluded that at least some severance payments constitute “wages” for purposes of FICA taxes. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to review the issue to resolve the split among the courts.

FICA’s Broad Definition of Wages Includes Severance Payments

FICA defines wages as “all remuneration for employment, including the cash value of all remuneration (including benefits) paid in any medium other than cash.” Under the plain meaning of this definition, the Court found that severance payments made to terminated employees constitutes “remuneration for employment.” The Court noted that severance payments are made to employees only, often will vary depending on length of service, and are made in consideration for past services in the course of employment.

Looking at statutory history, the Court noted that in 1950, Congress repealed an exception from “wages” for “[d]ismissal payments which the employer is not legally required to make” from the Social Security Act and since that time, FICA has not excepted severance payments from the definition of “wages.” Agreeing with the government’s position in the case, the Court ruled that severance payments are taxable wages for FICA purposes.

Implications for Employers

The Court’s ruling confirms that employers are obligated to pay their portion of FICA taxes and withhold the employees’ portion of FICA taxes from severance payments. Depending on the amount of the severance at issue, this FICA obligation can greatly change the total payout amount for the employer. It also can catch unknowing employees off guard if they are expecting to receive a higher severance payment without FICA taxes being withheld. Employers should factor the FICA tax obligation into any severance offer to ensure that both the company and the separating employee understand the total amount that is at issue and the final amount that the employee will receive. In addition, employers offering severance payments should review their policies and practices to ensure that proper tax payments are made.

If employers identify past severance payments where no FICA taxes were paid or withheld, such employers should consult with their tax counsel to determine whether any corrective steps are required. In general, the applicable statute of limitations for an employer’s payroll tax liability begins on April 15 of the year following the year in which wages are paid (when prior year payroll tax returns are “deemed” to be filed), and expires after three years. For example, the applicable statute of limitations for payroll taxes owed for 2010 began on April 15, 2011 and expires on April 15, 2014.

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March 10, 2014

Safety Violation Or Too Much Intermittent FMLA Leave? Tenth Circuit Says Jury Must Decide Wyoming Employee’s FMLA and ADA Case

By Brad Cave

Did Solvay Chemicals fire long-time employee Steven Smothers because of a first-time safety violation or because the company was tired of his frequent absences due to an ongoing medical disability? The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled that Smothers provided sufficient evidence to suggest that Solvay’s stated reason for his termination was pretextual, allowing his claims for unlawful retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to proceed. Smothers v. Solvay Chem., Inc., No. 12-8013 (Jan. 21, 2014). The Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on his state law claim for breach of an implied employment contract.

Medical Treatments and Severe Pain Lead to Frequent FMLA-Protected Absences

For eighteen years, Smothers worked as a surface maintenance mechanic in Solvay’s trona mine in Sweetwater County, Wyoming. The company considered him to be an excellent mechanic who did great work and got along with everyone. In 1994, Smothers injured his neck and developed degenerative disc disease in his spine. Over the next five years, Smothers had three surgeries to his neck as well as numerous other medical procedures. Despite treatment by a specialist, Smothers continued to have severe ongoing neck pain, severe migraine headaches and lower back problems. At times, Smothers was unable to work without pain treatments and he often was able to sleep only a few hours each night due to the pain.

Smothers asked for and was granted FMLA leave for intermittent absences caused by his condition. Managers and co-workers began to complain about his absenteeism, especially because he worked on the graveyard shift where there were fewer workers to absorb his absences resulting in increased overtime costs. Solvay’s production superintendent Melvin Wallendorf pressured Smothers to change to the day shift, but Smothers refused as the shift change would have cost him about $7,000 a year. Solvay’s human resources department advised Wallendorf that urging Smothers to switch shifts would violate the FMLA so Wallendorf stopped pressuring Smothers but did not stop complaining about his absences.

At one point, Wallendorf and Rick Wehrle, Smothers’ direct supervisor, gave Smothers a poor performance rating on his evaluation due to his absenteeism. In 2005 or 2006, Smothers applied for a promotion but was told that he was rejected because of his absences.

Safety Issue Explodes into Argument

In 2008, the graveyard crew conducted a routine maintenance acid wash to remove build up in its equipment. After a line ruptured, Smothers saw that a damaged “spool piece” had caused the problem and prepared to remove it. Another mechanic, Dan Mahaffey, suggested that Smothers wait for a line break permit, which is a form that certifies that employees have completed a checklist of precautions before a line can be safely disconnected. Smothers said that a permit wasn’t required because the line was already broken. Mahaffey and Smothers then argued. Mahaffey offered help on the repair which Smothers refused. Mahaffey took offense and accused Smothers of hypocrisy since Smothers had previously reported others for safety violations. Smothers made an offensive comment to Mahaffey and told him he did not want his kind of help. Smothers removed the broken piece and began the repair.

Mahaffey immediately reported the argument and Smothers’ removal of the spool piece without a line break permit to the area supervisor. Later that same day, three managers called Smothers in to discuss the safety violation. Although completing the line break permit may not have been absolutely necessary, Smothers later conceded that he should have locked out the pump valve before removing the part according to Solvay’s safety policies. Smothers apologized for not locking the pump valve before removing the piece and promised it wouldn’t happen again. Smothers was sent home pending an investigation.

Six managers were involved in deciding what to do about the argument and the safety violation. Three of the managers personally talked with Mahaffey about the argument but no one spoke to Smothers about it. About eight days later, Solvay fired Smothers. Smothers sued in Wyoming federal court, alleging, among other claims, unlawful FMLA retaliation, ADA discrimination and breach of an implied employment contract based on Solvay’s employee handbook.

FMLA Claim Bolstered By Disparate Treatment and Previous Retaliatory Acts

The trial court granted summary judgment to Solvay on Smothers’ FMLA and ADA claims. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit decided that Smothers presented enough evidence for a trial about whether Solvay’s real reason for his termination was his use of FMLA leave or his disability. Smothers provided evidence that other employees who committed similar safety violations were not fired. Five of the six decision-makers who fired Smothers were also involved in at least one decision in which a similarly situated employee was treated more favorably after violating the same or comparable safety rules. Smothers also pointed to the negative comments, negative performance rating, failure to promote and pressure to change shifts because of his FMLA-protected absences as evidence that the safety violation was a pretext for firing him for his FMLA leave. Moreover, Smothers showed that the decision-makers had failed to sufficiently investigate the argument he had with Mahaffey, basing their decision almost entirely on Mahaffey’s version of events. The Court decided that a reasonable jury could find that Solvay’s investigation into the quarrel was not fair or adequate. Based on this evidence, the Court found that there were issues of fact on whether Solvay’s termination reasons were pretextual and reversed the dismissal of Smothers’ FMLA retaliation claim.

Smothers Was Disabled Under ADA

Smothers also asserted that his firing was in violation of the ADA. He presented evidence that his medical condition was an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity, specifically his ability to sleep. Because the facts would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Smothers’ sleep was substantially limited, Smothers satisfied his burden of establishing a prima facie case of disability discrimination. As with the FMLA claim, the Court found sufficient evidence that Solvay’s stated termination reasons may have been a pretext for disability discrimination. Therefore, the Court reversed the dismissal of Smothers’ ADA claim as well.

No Breach of Implied Contract Based on Employee Handbook

Smothers also alleged that Solvay violated the terms of its employee handbook, giving rise to a claim for breach of implied contract under Wyoming law. The Court disagreed. Wyoming recognizes a claim for breach of implied contract if an employer fails to follow its own required procedures, such as the procedures laid out in an employee handbook. Solvay’s handbook contained a four-step progressive disciplinary process, with termination as the last step. But it also contained a provision that allowed Solvay to terminate an employee immediately for a serious offense, including a safety violation. Because the discipline policy unambiguously gave Solvay the discretion to fire employees who violate safety rules, the Court found that Solvay’s decision to terminate Smothers for violating a safety rule did not violate the terms of the employee handbook. Therefore, the appeals court upheld the trial court’s dismissal of Smothers’ breach of implied contract claim.

Back To Court They Go

We don’t know whether Smothers or Solvay will prevail if this case goes to trial but we do know that the appellate court thought that some of the evidence about the actions of Solvay managers could demonstrate that Solvay acted with a discriminatory motive:

Supervisors and co-workers gave Smothers a hard time about taking FMLA-protected leave.
Solvay failed to properly investigate all sides in the quarrel, accepting one employee’s version of events as fact.
The decision-makers treated Smothers more harshly than other similarly-situated employees who had violated similar safety rules.
Managers and supervisors considered Smothers’ FMLA absences when providing his performance evaluation and rejecting him for a promotion.

Evidence of these actions prevented Solvay from obtaining a grant of summary judgment on appeal. While Solvay may dispute Smothers’ evidence when the case actually goes to trial, this case stands as a lesson about the kinds of supervisory comments and actions that can feed into a discrimination claim, and a good reminder of how carefully employers must manage employees with injuries or disabilities.

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March 6, 2014

SOX Whistleblower Protection Extends to Employees of Private Contractors, According to Supreme Court

By Jude Biggs and Jeff Johnson

On March 4, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that employees of private contractors and subcontractors who contract with public companies are protected under the whistleblower provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. ___ (2014). The ruling means that private employers who have a contract with a public company may not retaliate against their employees who report a potential fraud. As pointed out in the dissenting opinion, the holding by the six-justice majority creates the potential for increased litigation as it offers private sector employees another avenue to bring retaliation claims. In addition, it implies private sector employers with such contracts may need to strengthen their corporate compliance and complaint procedures to discover and fix problems early.

Whistleblowers Reported Potential Fraud In Mutual Fund Operations

Two former employees of private companies that contracted to advise and manage mutual funds filed separate administrative complaints alleging retaliation under 18 U.S.C. §1514A, the whistleblower provision of SOX. The mutual funds themselves were public companies, but they did not have any employees. Instead, the funds contracted with private companies to handle the day-to-day operation of the funds, including making investment decisions, preparing reports for shareholders and filing reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

Jackie Hosang Lawson was the Senior Director of Finance for a private advisory firm that contracted to provide services to the Fidelity family of mutual funds. Lawson alleged that she suffered a series of adverse employment actions that resulted in her constructive discharge after she raised concerns about certain cost accounting methods being used with the funds. She alleged that she believed that expenses associated with operating the funds were being overstated.

The second petitioner, Jonathan M. Zang, was a portfolio manager for a different division of the company that advised Fidelity mutual funds. Zang alleged that he was fired after he expressed concerns about inaccuracies contained in a draft SEC registration statement concerning some of the mutual funds.

After pursuing their administrative complaints, both whistleblowers filed retaliation lawsuits under §1514A in federal court in Massachusetts. Their employers, collectively referred to as FMR, moved to dismiss the suits, arguing that §1514A only protects employees of public companies, and because FMR is a private company, neither plaintiff had a viable claim under §1514A. The District Court denied FMR’s motion to dismiss. FMR sought an interlocutory appeal to the First Circuit, which reversed, ruling that §1514A only refers to employees of public companies, not a contractor’s own employees. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to resolve a division of opinion on the issue. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the SOX whistleblower provision shields only those employed by a public company itself, or also shields employees of privately held contractors and subcontractors who perform work for the public company.

“Employee” Presumes an Employer-Employee Relationship Between the Retaliator and the Whistleblower

Section 1514A provides: “No [public] company . . ., or any officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such company, may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment because of [whistleblowing or other protected activity].” FMR argued that the prohibition against retaliating against “an employee” meant an employee of the public company. The Court (in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg) disagreed. It looked at the provision as stating that “no . . . contractor . . . may discharge . . . an employee” and found that the ordinary meaning of “an employee” in that context was the contractor’s own employee. The Court stated that contractors are not ordinarily in a position to take adverse actions against employees of the public company for which they contract so to interpret the provision as FMR did would “shrink to insignificance the provision’s ban on retaliation by contractors.” The Court rejected FMR’s argument that Congress included contractors in §1514A’s list of governed parties only to prevent companies from hiring contractors to carry out retaliatory terminations, such as the “ax-wielding specialist” portrayed by George Clooney in the movie “Up in the Air.” The majority believed that Congress presumed that there must be an employer/employee relationship between the retaliating company and the whistleblower.

Purpose of SOX Supports Extending Whistleblower Protections to Employees of Private Contractors

The Court emphasized that SOX was enacted to safeguard investors in public companies and to restore trust in the financial markets after the collapse of Enron Corporation. The Court found that because outside professionals, such as accountants, lawyers and consultants, have great responsibility for reporting fraud by the public companies with which they contract, such employees of contractors and subcontractors must be afforded protection from retaliation by their employers when they comply with SOX’s reporting requirements. The fear of retaliation was a major deterrent to the employees of Enron’s contractors in reporting fraud. Consequently, the Court’s reading of §1514A extending whistleblower protection to the employees of private contractors is consistent with the purpose for which SOX was enacted.

Mutual Fund Industry Should Not Escape Ban on Retaliation

Because virtually all mutual funds are structured as public companies without any employees of their own, the Court expressed the need to protect the employees of the investment advisors who are often the only firsthand witnesses to shareholder fraud in the mutual fund industry. To rule otherwise, said the Court, would insulate the entire mutual fund industry from §1514A.

Dissent Worries About Opening the Floodgates to More Retaliation Claims

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito, dissented from the majority, believing that the Court’s holding creates an “absurd result” that subjects “private companies to a costly new front of employment litigation.” According to Sotomayor, the Court’s ruling means that any employee of an officer, employee, contractor or subcontractor of a public company, including housekeepers, nannies and gardeners, can sue in federal court under §1514A if they suffer adverse consequences after reporting potential fraud, such as mail fraud by their employer’s teenage kids. The majority dispels this concern, stating that there is “scant evidence that [this] decision will open any floodgates for whistlelowing suits outside §1514A’s purposes” given that FMR did not identify a single case in the past decade in which an employee of a private contractor had asserted a §1514A claim based on anything other than shareholder fraud. Still, the dissent believes that only employees of a public company should be protected from retaliation for whistleblowing activities under §1514A.

Private Employer Take-Aways

Despite the majority’s reassurances that employers will not see a substantial increase in new whistleblower retaliation cases, only time will tell if they are right. Private employers who contract with public companies should review their employment policies to ensure that employees are protected from retaliation as a result of reporting concerns or unlawful activities involving the public companies with whom they do business. Employers also should train their managers, supervisors and human resources professionals on this new development so that decision-makers do not inadvertently expose their company to the risk of a whistleblower retaliation claim under §1514A.

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January 30, 2014

Firing for Off-Duty Medical Marijuana Use to be Reviewed by Colorado Supreme Court

By Emily Hobbs-Wright

The Colorado Supreme Court announced that it will review last year’s lower court decision that upheld the termination of an employee who tested positive for marijuana but was unimpaired at work following his off-duty marijuana use for medical reasons. As we previously wrote on this blog (see this post), last April, the Colorado Court of Appeals ruled that using pot during non-working hours is not a “lawful activity” under the state’s lawful off-duty activity statute (C.R.S. §24-34-402.5). Coats v. Dish Network LLC, 2013 COA 62. The Court of Appeals reached its decision by relying on the fact that marijuana use remains illegal under federal law and therefore, medical marijuana use, though legal in Colorado, was not “lawful” for purposes of the Colorado lawful off-duty activity statute.

The Colorado Supreme Court will review two questions:

1. Whether the Lawful Activities Statute protects employees from discretionary discharge for lawful use of medical marijuana outside the job where the use does not affect job performance; and

2. Whether Colorado’s Medical Marijuana Amendment makes the use of medical marijuana “lawful” and confers a right to use medical marijuana to persons lawfully registered with the state.

Over the next few months, the parties will submit written briefs to the Court presenting their positions on these two questions. With the importance of this case for both Colorado businesses and the marijuana industry, watch for additional groups to ask permission to submit briefs advocating their respective viewpoints. Though the case before the Colorado Supreme Court deals with medical marijuana, the Court’s decision could establish precedent that would apply to the legal use of recreational marijuana. We will watch this case very closely and will report on any new developments as they occur.

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December 3, 2013

Divided Fifth Circuit Overturns D.R. Horton on Enforceability of Employer’s Arbitration Agreement Prohibiting Class Claims

By Jeffrey T. Johnson

In a much-anticipated decision, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the National Labor Relations Board’s controversial D.R. Horton decision, which held that an arbitration agreement requiring an employee to waive his or her right to bring class claims violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Agreeing with its sister circuit courts, the Fifth Circuit held that the NLRA did not override the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) meaning the employer’s arbitration agreement must be enforced according to its terms, including the agreement’s preclusion of class claims. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, No. 12-60031 (5th Cir. Dec. 3, 2013). The Court upheld, however, the NLRB’s finding that the arbitration agreement could be misconstrued by employees as precluding the filing of unfair labor practice charges which violates Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.

Arbitration Agreement Prohibiting Class Claims Does Not Violate NLRA

The Fifth Circuit’s ruling puts to rest a thorny issue for employers who have struggled with the Board’s D.R. Horton decision. The controversy arose in early 2012 when the NLRB concluded that home builder D.R. Horton violated Sections 7 and 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by requiring employees to sign a Mutual Arbitration Agreement that precluded employees from filing class or collective claims related to their wages, hours or other working conditions. In re D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB No. 184 (Jan. 3, 2012). The Board found that the agreement interfered with the exercise of employees’ substantive rights under Section 7 of the NLRA which allows employees to act in concert with each other for their mutual aid or protection.

Two of the three judges on the Fifth Circuit panel disagreed. First, the majority found that the use of class action procedures is not a substantive right but is instead a procedural device. Then, the judges analyzed whether there is a conflict between the NLRA and the FAA that would preclude application of the FAA to enforce the arbitration agreement according to its terms. Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011), the Fifth Circuit determined that requiring a class mechanism is an impediment to arbitration and violates the FAA so the Board’s attempt to fit its rationale into the FAA’s “savings clause” failed. The Court then concluded that neither the NLRA’s statutory text nor its legislative history contains a congressional command to override the FAA. Failing to find an inherent conflict between the NLRA and the FAA, the Court ruled that the arbitration agreement must be enforced according to its terms under the FAA.

The Fifth Circuit pointed out that every one of its sister circuits to consider this issue had refused to defer to the NLRB’s rationale in D.R. Horton, and had held arbitration agreements containing class waivers enforceable. The two judges in the majority stated, “we are loath to create a circuit split.” Judge Graves dissented, stating that he agreed with the Board that the arbitration agreement interfered with the exercise of employees’ substantive rights under Section 7 of the NLRA.

Agreement Violates NLRA Because Employees Might Believe it Prohibits Filing Unfair Labor Practice Charges

The arbitration agreement used by D.R. Horton required that employees agree to arbitrate “without limitation[:] claims for discrimination or harassment; wages, benefits, or other compensation; breach of any express or implied contract; [and] violation of public policy.” Although the agreement provided four exceptions to arbitration, none of the exclusions referred to unfair labor practice charges. All three judges found that this could create a reasonable belief that employees were waiving their administrative rights, including the right to file unfair labor practice charges under Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. Therefore, the Court enforced the Board’s order that D.R. Horton violated Section 8(a)(1) because an employee would reasonably interpret the arbitration agreement as prohibiting the filing of a claim with the Board, validating the need for D.R. Horton to take the ordered corrective action.

Challenges to Composition of the Board Rejected

While this case was on appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the D.C. Circuit issued its Noel Canning decision which vacated an order of the three-member panel of the Board by ruling that recess appointments of the panel members were invalid. Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C.Cir. 2013) cert. granted 133 S.Ct. 2861 (U.S. June 24, 2013)(No. 12-1281). Because the panel that decided the D.R. Horton case included a member appointed by recess appointment, the Fifth Circuit asked the parties to submit briefs on whether it must consider the constitutionality of the recess appointments. The Court ultimately decided it need not consider the issue, finding that it retained jurisdiction to resolve the dispute at hand and leaving it to the U.S. Supreme Court to decide the constitutionality of the Board’s recess appointments. The Fifth Circuit also rejected D.R. Horton’s challenges that Board Member Becker’s recess appointment expired before the Board issued its decision, and that the Board had not been delegated authority to act as a three-member panel.

Favorable Result for Employers

Although there are pros and cons to using arbitration agreements in the employment context, today’s ruling by the Fifth Circuit (absent review by the Supreme Court) removes the impediment to incorporating class action waivers in employment arbitration agreements. The decision reinforces, however, that certain language within an arbitration agreement may violate the NLRA if it is reasonably seen as limiting an employee’s right to file an unfair labor practice charge. Employers should consult with employment counsel to review whether arbitration agreements are appropriate for their workforce, and if so, to ensure the wording of the agreement is enforceable.

Disclaimer: This article is designed to provide general information on pertinent legal topics. The statements made are provided for educational purposes only. They do not constitute legal advice and are not intended to create an attorney-client relationship between you and Holland & Hart LLP. If you have specific questions as to the application of the law to your activities, you should seek the advice of your legal counsel.

October 21, 2013

Tips for Paying Wages via Payroll Cards

By Mark Wiletsky

Offering payroll cards for the payment of employee wages may be a viable, cost effective alternative to paper paychecks. It also can be an attractive offering for workers who do not have a checking or savings account at a bank or other financial institution. Employers must be aware, however, that certain federal and state laws regulate payroll card accounts. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) recently issued Bulletin 2013-10 describing the application of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA) and Regulation E, which implements the EFTA, to payroll card accounts. Here are some tips for keeping your payroll card program in compliance with these laws.

No Mandatory Use of Payroll Cards. You may not require that employees be paid on a payroll card from a particular institution. You may offer payroll cards as a method of wage payment as long as you offer an alternative method, such as direct deposit to an account of the employee’s choosing or paper paychecks. Acceptable methods of paying wages typically are governed by state wage payment laws.
Disclosure of Fees, Transfers, and Other Payroll Card Requirements. Employees to be paid on a payroll card are entitled to be informed of any fees, limitations or requirements related to making electronic fund transfers with the card that will be imposed by the financial institution who issues the card. Clear, understandable written disclosures must be provided to cardholders in a form that the consumer may keep.
Account History Must Be Accessible. The payroll card issuer must make each cardholder’s account history available, either through periodic statements, telephone balance inquiries, internet/web-based account history, or by providing 60 days of written account history upon request of the cardholder.
Cardholder Liability for Unauthorized Use Must Be Limited. Payroll cardholders are entitled to limited liability protections for the unauthorized use of their payroll cards, however they must report any unauthorized transfers in a timely period.
Cardholders’ Rights to Error Resolution. Upon the timely report of an error regarding a payroll card account, financial institutions must respond to the cardholder. In order to ensure a response, the cardholder must report an error within 60 days of either accessing his or her payroll card account history or receiving a written account history containing the error, whichever is earlier, or within 120 days after the alleged error occurred.

In addition to the federal payroll card laws, state wage payment laws often regulate when and how payroll cards may be used to pay employee wages. For example, in Colorado, employers may deposit employee wages on a payroll card provided the employee may access the full amount on the card for free at least once during the pay period, or the employee is given the choice to receive their pay through other means, such as direct deposit to an account of the employee’s choosing or a paycheck. Be certain to check the wage payment laws in the states in which you operate to ensure compliance with any state payroll card requirements.

October 9, 2013

Idaho Supreme Court Changes Tack and Applies McDonnell Douglas Burden Shifting Analysis at Summary Judgment Stage

By A. Dean Bennett

Since 2008, employers defending employment claims in Idaho have faced a higher burden of proof, thanks to the Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue decision of the Idaho Supreme Court. In that case, the Court decided that the well-known McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis used in employment cases did not apply at the summary judgment stage, making it more difficult for employers to get a favorable outcome without going to trial. Recently, however, the Idaho Supreme Court changed its position, deciding that the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis did apply at the summary judgment stage, resolving a five-year debacle in which Idaho employers faced different burdens of proof depending on whether employment claims were litigated in state or federal court. See Hatheway v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Idaho, No. 39507 (Idaho Sept. 6, 2013).

Federal Framework Applied to Age Discrimination Claim Under the Idaho Human Rights Act (IHRA)

The McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis has been widely used to resolve a variety of federal employment law claims since 1973. The analysis allows a plaintiff to put forth indirect evidence of discrimination to establish a prima facie case. The burden of production then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer’s actions. If the employer provides such reason, the burden of production then swings back to the plaintiff to show that the proffered reason is in fact pretext for unlawful discrimination. At all times, the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion, meaning the plaintiff must convince the judge or jury that his or her position is correct.

Many state courts have adopted the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis when adjudicating employment claims brought under analogous state laws. In Curlee, the Idaho Supreme Court appeared to adopt the McDonnell Douglas analysis, but went on to rule that the analysis explicitly governed the burden of persuasion at tria, and did not apply at the summary judgment stage.

The Hatheway decision appears to change that. Without specifically mentioning or overruling its Curlee decision, the Court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis at the summary judgment stage of Hatheway’s IHRA discrimination claims against the University of Idaho. The Court reiterated that federal law guides the interpretation of the IHRA and applied the same degree of proof and standards to an IHRA age discrimination claim as is used to analyze discrimination claims under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act.

Why Employers Should Care

If this all sounds like legal mumbo-jumbo, let’s put it in practical, real-life terms. Employers want to get employment claims dismissed at the earliest possible stage for numerous reasons, including avoiding expensive litigation, disruption to their operations and unfavorable publicity. Following the 2008 Curlee decision, Idaho employers had to prove more of their case early on, making it difficult to get a favorable judgment prior to trial. This prolonged meritless cases and cost employers more in legal fees and litigation-related expenses. Now, with the application of the traditional burden shifting analysis at the summary judgment stage, employers facing employment claims in Idaho state courts will have a better chance of getting employment claims dismissed earlier in the legal process with fewer cases proceeding to trial.