Category Archives: Legal

September 11, 2013

Family Medical History Request Results in First EEOC GINA Lawsuit

Employers may not request a family medical history from employees or applicants, even as part of a post-offer medical examination. In its first lawsuit alleging a violation of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued an employer whose contracted medical examiner required applicants to complete a family medical history questionnaire. EEOC v. Fabricut, Inc., No. 13-cv-248 (N.D. Okla. filed May 7, 2013). Review of this case offers a timely opportunity for employers to review their employment practices for compliance with GINA.

Investigation of ADA Claim Finds Illegal Family Medical History

Temporary employee, Rhonda Jones, worked for Fabricut, a distributor of decorative fabrics, as a memo clerk for 90 days. She then applied to work in the same position as a regular employee. Fabricut made her an offer of employment, contingent on the results of a pre-employment drug test and physical. Fabricut sent Jones to Knox Laboratory, a medical examining facility that provided examination services to Fabricut on a contract basis. As part of the process, Knox Laboratory instructed Jones to complete a questionnaire that asked about the existence of heart disease, hypertension, cancer, tuberculosis, diabetes, arthritis and mental disorders in her family.

The examiner conducting Jones’ pre-employment physical concluded that Jones may be predisposed to or already suffer from carpal tunnel syndrome and recommended further evaluation. Although Jones’ personal physician conducted a battery of tests and concluded that she did not have carpal tunnel syndrome, Fabricut withdrew its offer of employment. Jones filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC alleging a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) on grounds that she was denied employment because Fabricut regarded her as having a disability, carpal tunnel syndrome.

As part of its investigation of Jones’ ADA claim, the EEOC obtained from Fabricut copies of Jones’ post-offer, pre-employment medical examination. The records revealed the family medical history questionnaire that Jones had been instructed to complete at the start of her pre-employment physical. Finding that the questionnaire included unlawful inquiries into genetic information, the EEOC notified Fabricut that its investigation would look into its compliance with GINA regarding its solicitation of family medical histories of applicants.

EEOC Pursues GINA Lawsuit

The EEOC filed suit against Fabricut in federal court alleging violations of both the ADA and GINA. GINA, which took effect in 2009, makes it illegal for employers to discriminate against employees or applicants because of genetic information, which includes family medical history, and restricts employers from requesting, requiring or purchasing such information, among other things. The lawsuit alleges that Fabricut violated GINA by requesting and requiring Jones and other applicants to indicate whether or not they had a family medical history for a variety of diseases and disorders as part of its post-offer, pre-employment medical examination as conducted for Fabricut by its agent, Knox Laboratory, who then provided the information to Fabricut for its use in hiring and employment decisions.

Lawsuit Settled for $50,000 and Additional Relief

Without admitting any violation of law, Fabricut agreed to settle the case for payment of $50,000 to Jones as compensatory damages. The settlement also requires Fabricut to post notices in its workplace stating that Fabricut will comply with all federal employment laws, including the ADA and GINA, conduct two hours of live training for all management and human resources personnel, create or revise personnel policies prohibiting discrimination and be subject to monitoring and reporting requirements for two years.

Review Practices for GINA Compliance

Although GINA has been in effect since 2009, many employers may not be familiar with its requirements and prohibitions. What may have been routine employment practices in past years, such as collecting a family medical history from employees or applicants, may now be unlawful under GINA. Employers should review their job applications, interview questions and any employment medical testing practices to ensure that no family medical history is requested. The regulations implementing GINA specifically state that a covered entity must tell health care providers not to collect genetic information, including family medical history, as part of a medical examination used to determine an individual’s ability to perform a job. 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8(d). In addition, if an employer finds out that family medical histories are being collected, it must take reasonable measures, including not using the health care provider, to prevent the information from being collected in the future.

Under certain circumstances, employers may receive genetic information that it did not request. Such inadvertent acquisition of genetic information is not a violation of GINA. To help establish that genetic information was acquired inadvertently, employers should take advantage of a safe harbor provision in the GINA regulations. When an employer needs to request health-related information, such as to support a request for sick leave or a reasonable accommodation under the ADA, the employer should warn the employee and the health care provider not to provide genetic information. The regulations suggest the following language to accompany the request for health-related information:

The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA) prohibits employers and other entities covered by GINA Title II from requesting or requiring genetic information of an individual or family member of the individual, except as specifically allowed by this law. To comply with this law, we are asking that you not provide any genetic information when responding to this request for medical information. "Genetic information," as defined by GINA, includes an individual's family medical history, the results of an individual's or family member's genetic tests, the fact that an individual or an individual's family member sought or received genetic services, and genetic information of a fetus carried by an individual or an individual's family member or an embryo lawfully held by an individual or family member receiving assistive reproductive services.

When employers provide this warning, any resulting acquisition of genetic information will generally be considered inadvertent and therefore, not in violation of GINA.

Disclaimer: This article is designed to provide general information on pertinent legal topics. The statements made are provided for educational purposes only. They do not constitute legal advice and are not intended to create an attorney-client relationship between you and Holland & Hart LLP. If you have specific questions as to the application of the law to your activities, you should seek the advice of your legal counsel.

August 29, 2013

DOJ Will Not Challenge State Marijuana Legalization Laws – New Federal Enforcement Policy Unlikely to Affect Colorado Employers

By Emily Hobbs-Wright

On August 29, 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that it will not challenge the state ballot initiatives in Colorado and Washington that legalize the possession and use of small amounts of marijuana under state law. The DOJ makes clear, however, that marijuana remains an illegal drug under the federal Controlled Substances Act. This clarification means Colorado employers may still enforce their drug-free workplace policies and take appropriate action when an employee or applicant tests positive for marijuana.

DOJ Expects States to Enforce Strict Regulatory Schemes

In its August 29, 2013 Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement, the DOJ identifies eight enforcement priorities for federal law enforcement and prosecutors, such as preventing distribution of marijuana to minors, preventing the diversion of marijuana from states where it is legal to other states, and preventing drugged driving and the exacerbation of other public health consequences of marijuana use. The DOJ states that it expects that states and local governments to not only establish, but also enforce robust controls in their marijuana regulatory schemes to meet its federal objectives. The guidance instructs federal prosecutors to review marijuana cases on an individual basis, weighing all available information and evidence but to no longer “consider the size or commercial nature of a marijuana operation alone as a proxy for assessing whether marijuana trafficking implicates the Department’s enforcement priorities . . .” The DOJ further stated that if states fail to develop or enforce a strict regulatory scheme and the stated harms result, federal prosecutors will step in to enforce federal marijuana priorities and may challenge the regulatory schemes in those states.

Courts in Colorado Uphold Employer Terminations for Employee Marijuana Use

In April 2013, the Colorado Court of Appeals ruled that terminating an employee who tested positive for marijuana following his off-duty, off-premises use of medical marijuana did not violate Colorado’s lawful activities statute. Coats v. Dish Network LLC, 2013 COA 62. Brandon Coats, a quadriplegic who obtained a license to use medical marijuana under Colorado’s Amendment 20, was fired for violating his employer’s drug policy after testing positive for marijuana. Coats asserted that he never used marijuana on his employer’s premises, was never under the influence of marijuana at work and never used marijuana outside the limits of his medical marijuana license. He sued his employer, Dish Network, alleging that his termination violated Colorado’s lawful off-duty activities statute, CRS § 24-34-402.5(1), which prohibits an employer from discharging an employee for engaging in “any lawful activity off the premises of the employer during nonworking hours.”

The Coats court looked to the plain meaning of the term “lawful” in the statute and decided that “for an activity to be ‘lawful’ in Colorado, it must be permitted by, and not contrary to, both state and federal law.” Because marijuana was, and remains, illegal under federal law, the court held that marijuana use is not a “lawful activity” under the Colorado lawful activities statute and therefore, the employer did not violate the statute when it terminated him for testing positive for marijuana.

Earlier this week, the federal district court in Colorado ruled that enforcement of a drug-free workplace policy is a lawful basis for an employer’s decision to terminate an employee who tests positive for marijuana, whether from medical or any other use. Curry v. MillerCoors, Inc., No. 12-cv-2471 (Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, D.Colo. Aug. 21, 2013). In granting the employer’s motion to dismiss, the federal court rejected all of the former employee’s claims related to his medical use of marijuana that resulted in a positive drug test and his termination under the employer’s drug policy. Significantly, the court dismissed his disability discrimination claim under Colorado’s anti-discrimination statute as a matter of law, finding that it was lawful for the employer to discharge the employee under its drug-free workplace policy despite the employee’s allegation that he was terminated because of using medical marijuana to treat disabling medical conditions. Judge John L. Kane wrote “anti-discrimination law does not extend so far as to shield a disabled employee from the implementation of his employer’s standard policies against employee misconduct.” In dismissing the employee’s claim for violation of Colorado’s lawful activities statute, Judge Kane relied on the Coats decision and similarly ruled that because marijuana use is illegal under federal law, the employee’s medical marijuana use was not a “lawful activity” under the statute.

DOJ’s Announcement Should Not Change Workplace Decisions

The DOJ’s announcement of relaxed marijuana enforcement in states that have legalized marijuana does not alter employers’ ability to enforce their drug-free workplace policies. On the contrary, because the DOJ reinforced that marijuana remains an illegal drug under federal law, the analysis used by courts in Colorado to uphold termination decisions based on positive drug tests should continue to apply. Employers should create or revise their drug policies to state that use of any drug that is illegal under state or federal law will violate the policy. Employers then should enforce their policies in a consistent and uniform manner, regardless of the legalization of marijuana use in Colorado.

Disclaimer:This article is designed to provide general information on pertinent legal topics. The statements made are provided for educational purposes only. They do not constitute legal advice and are not intended to create an attorney-client relationship between you and Holland & Hart LLP. If you have specific questions as to the application of the law to your activities, you should seek the advice of your legal counsel.

August 20, 2013

NLRB Judge Strikes Down Employer’s Dress Code Following “Slave” Shirt Discipline

By Brian Mumaugh

What is wrong with an employer’s dress code that prohibits clothing that displays vulgar or obscene phrases, remarks or images which may be racially, sexually or otherwise offensive as well as clothing that displays words or images that are derogatory to the Company? It is overly broad and interferes with employees’ Section 7 rights under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act) to engage in union and/or protected concerted activity, according to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The ALJ’s review of the dress code came after the employer disciplined an employee who wore a T-shirt with the word “slave” on it next to a picture of a ball and chain and the employee’s time clock number. Dismissing the employer’s argument that the shirt would be racially offensive to visitors who toured its facility, the ALJ found that the employer violated the Act by sending the employee home without pay to change his “slave shirt.”

The History of the “Slave Shirt”

Mark Gluch was a long time employee of automotive parts manufacturer Alma Products Company and a vigorous supporter of the union representing his bargaining unit. The 2012 incident that gave rise to this case occurred when Gluch wore the “slave shirt” to work during a period of contentious negotiations for a new union contract. The origin of the shirt, however, dated back to 1993 when company employees developed and paid for the “slave shirts” to send the company a message during an earlier round of difficult contract negotiations. The shirts resurfaced in 1996 when the bargaining unit employees wore them while picketing during a strike. Immediately following the strike, as many as 30% of the unit employees wore the “slave shirts” to work on any given Friday. No discipline or policy infraction was noted or enforced at that time.

Company Seeks to Avoid Racially Offensive Shirt

When a new president and CEO, Alan Gatlin, took over for Alma Products in 2005, he noticed employees wearing the “slave shirt.” Finding the shirts to be racially offensive, he felt embarrassed that customers and visitors to the facility would see employees wearing the shirt and be offended. He testified that in his view, the shirts did not reflect well on the Company with customers as they tried to get new business. Gatlin asked the human resources manager to draft a dress code policy which was implemented in early 2006. The dress code policy did not specifically reference the “slave shirt” but included general prohibitions against clothing that displayed “vulgar/obscene phrases, remarks or images which may be racially, sexually or otherwise offensive and clothing displaying words or images derogatory to the Company . . .” The policy also stated “[i]f you are uncertain whether an article of clothing is appropriate under this policy, follow the old adage of better safe than sorry and refrain from wearing it at work.”

After implementing the dress code in 2006, it appears that employees seldom wore the “slave shirt” to work. However, during difficult union contract negotiations in April 2012, Gluch and other employees began wearing pro-union shirts and pins and Gluch wore the “slave shirt” to work. Gluch’s supervisor gave Gluch the option of removing the shirt or turning it inside out so that the writing would not be visible. When Gluch refused to do so, he was sent home without pay for wearing the shirt.

ALJ Rejects Company’s Concerns About Racial Discrimination

The union filed an unfair labor practice charge claiming, among other things, that the policy and the Company’s enforcement of the policy, violated the Act. The Company argued that the shirt’s “slave” reference was offensive to African-Americans due to the history of slavery in the United States. Noting that an important buyer from Chrysler was African-American as was a new production supervisor at the facility, the Company asserted that it was entitled to discipline Gluch for wearing the racially offensive shirt. The ALJ rejected this argument, stating that the NLRB has repeatedly found employees to be protected even when they displayed messages that likened their working conditions to those of a slave. The ALJ noted that the dictionary definition of “slave” does not reference race, but instead focuses on the condition of servitude or being subject to a person or influence. In addition, given the shirt’s history that it had been worn to work over the past two decades as support for the union, the ALJ determined that it would not be seen as carrying a racial message. Moreover, the Company had a policy prohibiting racial discrimination since the 1990s, yet had failed to take any action to prohibit wearing the “slave shirt” as racially offensive prior to Gluch’s wearing of the shirt in 2012.

Key to the ALJ’s analysis of the dress code policy was its general prohibition of words or images that are derogatory to the Company. The ALJ found that the policy interfered with employees’ Section 7 activity, such as protected statements to coworkers, supervisors or third parties who deal with the Company, because it would prohibit employees from objecting to their working conditions and seeking the support of others in improving them. The dress code policy was found to be unlawfully overbroad because it prohibits all communications derogatory to the company regardless of whether the words are racially or sexually discriminatory or are protected as concerted activities under the National Labor Relations Act. In addition, by directing employees to be “safe” not “sorry,” the ALJ stated that the policy directs employees to construe the prohibition on derogatory comments such that it prohibits Section 7 activity.

Dress Code Policies That Do Not Restrict Section 7 Activity

With the NLRB (and its ALJs) striking down a variety of employer policies relating to both union and non-union employees, it is difficult to draw a bright line to determine which policies pass scrutiny and which do not. That said, employers can learn lessons from this recent decision that may help keep their dress code policy away from NLRB review. First, use specific examples of acceptable versus unacceptable attire rather than general statements that require interpretation. Second, if your workplace warrants different dress standards for different segments of employees (e.g., public-facing employees vs. behind the scenes employees), make those standards clear and justified by business necessity. Third, if you include a statement that prohibits derogatory words or images on clothing, include a statement that communications protected by Section 7 are permissible under the dress code. Finally, enforce your policy in a uniform and consistent manner, so that all dress code violations are treated similarly regardless of the employee or supervisor involved.

Disclaimer:This article is designed to provide general information on pertinent legal topics. The statements made are provided for educational purposes only. They do not constitute legal advice and are not intended to create an attorney-client relationship between you and Holland & Hart LLP. If you have specific questions as to the application of the law to your activities, you should seek the advice of your legal counsel.

June 26, 2013

Employers Benefit From Supreme Court Ruling On Title VII Retaliation Claims

By Jude Biggs

In a favorable ruling for employers, on June 24 the U.S. Supreme Court held that a retaliation claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires an employee to show the employer’s desire to retaliate was the “but-for” cause of the challenged employment action. University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, No. 12-484 (U.S. June 24, 2013). This establishes a different causation standard for retaliation claims than is required for underlying Title VII discrimination claims, which only require an employee to show the motive to discriminate was one of the employer’s motives in making an adverse decision. Although cumbersome to have two standards, the decision is good news for employers, as often a jury will not find any discrimination by an employer, but may find retaliation after an employee speaks up about alleged discrimination. Making it more difficult to prevail on a retaliation claim will, hopefully, encourage plaintiffs to bring fewer cases or resolve them earlier than going through an expensive trial.

Employee Must Prove Employer Would Not Have Taken Action But For an Improper Motive

In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled a plaintiff making a retaliation claim under Title VII must establish that the employer would not have taken the alleged adverse employment action but for the plaintiff having engaged in protected activity. Protected activity that may trigger a retaliation claim includes the employee opposing, complaining of or participating in a proceeding about unlawful discrimination in the workplace. Through this ruling, the Court instructs that retaliation claims should fail if an employer had other reasons or motivations – singly or together — that caused the employer to take the adverse action (even if one other factor was retaliatory in nature). In less legal terms, the employer wins if it can show its non-retaliatory reasons caused it to make the decision, even if a small portion of the decision was based on retaliation against the employee for engaging in protected conduct.

Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority which included Justices Roberts, Scalia, Thomas and Alito, stated that the text of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision appears in a different section of the law from the provision that prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin. When Congress inserted the less rigorous “motivating factor” standard for discrimination cases in 1991, it could have inserted that standard into the anti-retaliation provision. In choosing to omit it, Congress deliberately concluded that retaliation claims are to be treated differently and retaliation is unlawful only when the employer takes adverse action against an employee “because” of their protected activity. The Court pointed to its interpretation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. to require “but for” causation for retaliation claims.

The Court also stated that this causation standard is essential to the fair and responsible allocation of judicial resources. Recognizing that retaliation claims have been on the rise, the Court recognized that lessening the causation standard could contribute to the filing of frivolous claims, diverting resources from employers, agencies and courts in other efforts to fight workplace harassment.

Dissent Urges Congressional Action

Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan dissented, alleging that fear of retaliation is the leading reason why employees do not speak up about discrimination in the workplace. Because Title VII plaintiffs often have been subjected to both discrimination and retaliation, they now will have to litigate their claims under two standards: (1) discrimination under the “motivating factor” test which requires a plaintiff to show only that a prohibited characteristic was a motivating factor in the employer’s adverse action, even if other factors also motivated the action; and (2) retaliation under the “but for” standard which requires a plaintiff to show that the employer would not have taken the adverse action but for a retaliatory motive. The dissent concluded that this decision is at odds with a line of previous decisions that recognize retaliation claims are inextricably bound up with an underlying discrimination claim. Justice Ginsburg, writing the dissenting opinion, stated “the Court appears driven by a zeal to reduce the number of retaliation claims filed against employers.” Calling the majority decision “misguided,” the dissent urges Congress to enact another Civil Rights Restoration Act to counter and remedy the injustice done by the majority opinion.

Employers May Face Fewer Retaliation Claims or At Least, Fewer Successful Claims

In practice, it is questionable how relevant the causation standard may be to potential litigants of retaliation claims. Employees believing they have been wronged after they complain about discrimination will likely still file retaliation claims, no matter what causation standard applies. Juries often will conclude retaliation occurred based on a general “fairness” standard. However, employers may be able to resolve such claims at the summary judgment stage (when a court decides a claim does not merit a trial), because proof of other factors that contributed to the adverse employment decision will defeat the retaliation claim.

Disclaimer:This article is designed to provide general information on pertinent legal topics. The statements made are provided for educational purposes only. They do not constitute legal advice and are not intended to create an attorney-client relationship between you and Holland & Hart LLP. If you have specific questions as to the application of the law to your activities, you should seek the advice of your legal counsel.

June 25, 2013

Supreme Court Limits Definition of Supervisor for Employer Liability in Workplace Harassment Claims

By Emily Hobbs-Wright

In a huge win for employers, the U.S. Supreme Court today decided that for purposes of determining employer liability for Title VII harassment cases, a “supervisor” is limited to those who are empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim. Vance v. Ball State Univ., No. 11-556 (U.S. June 24, 2013). This means that employees who oversee the daily activities of other employees, but do not have the power to discipline, fire, promote, transfer or take other actions against an employee, are not considered “supervisors” in workplace harassment cases under Title VII.

In drawing a sharp line between co-workers and supervisors, the Supreme Court adopted a clear standard that parties and reviewing courts can apply early in a case in order to determine which side has the burden of proof in Title VII harassment litigation.

Supervisor vs. Co-Worker as Harasser – Why It Matters

Determining employer liability for harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 depends on whether the alleged harasser is a “supervisor” or a “co-worker” of the individual being harassed. If the harasser is a co-worker, the employer will be liable for the harassing behavior only if the complainant can show that the employer was negligent, meaning that the employer knew or should have known of the conduct and failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. See 29 CFR § 1604.11(d).

If the harasser is a supervisor, however, the test for employer liability changes dramatically. If the harassing supervisor caused a tangible employment action such as firing, demoting or reducing the complainant’s pay, the employer will be automatically liable for the harassment. If there was no tangible employment action, the employer may still be liable, unless it can meet a two-pronged affirmative defense known as the Faragher/Ellerth defense.

In order to establish the Faragher/Ellerth defense, outlined by the Supreme Court in the companion cases of Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 24 U.S. 742 (1998), an employer must show: (1) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct the harassing behavior; and (2) the plaintiff-employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of preventative or corrective measures established by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.

The key difference between cases alleging harassment by a co-worker and a supervisor is the burden of proof. With co-worker harassment, the plaintiff-employee bears the burden of demonstrating employer negligence. When trying to avoid liability for supervisor harassment, however, the employer bears the burden of establishing the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense. The higher hurdle that must be met by employers when litigating supervisor harassment raises the opportunity for the plaintiff-employee to recover damages for harassment in the workplace. Consequently, an important issue in a harassment case is whether the alleged harasser is a supervisor or a co-worker.

Supreme Court Resolves Split in the Circuits on Definition of “Supervisor”

Lower courts have disagreed on the test for deciding whether an alleged harasser is a “supervisor” or merely a co-worker. Some federal appellate courts, including the First, Seventh and Eighth Circuits, have ruled that an employee is not a supervisor under Title VII unless he or she has the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline the victim. Other circuits, including the Second and Fourth Circuits, have followed the more expanded approach urged by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which applies “supervisor” status to those who have the ability to exercise significant direction over another employee’s daily work activities.

In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court resolved this split in authority by holding that an employer may be vicariously liable for an employee’s unlawful harassment only when the employer has empowered that employee to take tangible employment actions against the victim, that is, to effect a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits. Calling the EEOC’s definition of supervisor “nebulous,” the Court stated that it was not sufficient to deem an employee a “supervisor” based on his or her ability to direct another employee’s tasks. The Court noted that the EEOC Guidance that looks at the number (and perhaps the importance) of the tasks in question would be a “standard of remarkable ambiguity.” Relying on the Faragher and Ellerth decisions, the Court stated that a supervisor is instead empowered by the company as a distinct class of agent that may make economic decisions affecting other employees under his or her control.

Bright Line Between Co-Workers and Supervisors Will Aid Employers Facing Harassment Claims

The bright line test that the Court adopted for determining who is deemed a “supervisor” in Title VII cases eliminates murkiness and provides a clear test that reviewing courts can easily apply. The Court noted that it typically will be known before litigation is commenced whether an alleged harasser was a supervisor, and if not, it will become clear to both sides after discovery. The Court goes on to say “once this is known, the parties will be in a position to assess the strength of a case and to explore the possibility of resolving the dispute. Where this does not occur, supervisor status will generally be capable of resolution at summary judgment.” The Court clearly wanted employers to be able to get the supervisor issue resolved early in a lawsuit so that both sides will know who bears the burden of proof and can pursue early resolution of the case based on the strength of the evidence.

Employees Still Protected, but Must Prove Company Negligence

The Court’s majority, which includes Justices Alito, Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas, states that employees who face harassment by co-workers who possess the authority to inflict psychological injury by assigning unpleasant tasks or by altering the work environment in objectionable ways will still be protected under Title VII. The Court states that such victims will be able to prevail “simply by showing that the employer was negligent in permitting this harassment to occur, and the jury should be instructed that the nature and degree of authority wielded by the harasser is an important factor to be considered in determining whether the employer was negligent.” According to the majority, the fact that harassing co-workers may possess varying degrees of authority over daily tasks will not be a problem under the negligence standard “which is thought to provide adequate protection for tort plaintiffs in many other situations.”

Dissent Would Follow EEOC’s Guidance and Extend “Supervisor” Status Based on Authority to Direct an Employee’s Daily Activities

Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan, wrote a lengthy dissent opining that the majority’s rule diminishes the force of Faragher andEllerth, ignores the reality of the current workplace and strays from the objective of Title VII in preventing discrimination in the workplace. The dissent favors the EEOC’s Guidance, believing that employees who direct subordinates’ daily work are supervisors. Justice Ginsburg wrote that although one can walk away from a fellow employee’s harassment, “[a] supervisor’s slings and arrows, however, are not so easily avoided.” The dissent recites numerous cases in which a person vested with authority to control the conditions of a subordinate’s daily work life used his position to aid his harassment, and then points out that in none of the cases would the majority’s “severely confined definition of supervisor yield vicarious liability for the employer.” The dissent concludes that the majority decision embraces a position that relieves scores of employers of responsibility for the behavior of the supervisors they employ.

Conclusion – Victim Must Prove Employer Negligence When Harassed by a Non-Supervisor

The Vance opinion means that employees alleging harassment by another employee who does not have the power to hire, fire, promote, transfer or discipline them, bear the burden of proving the employer’s negligence in order for the employer to be liable for the harassment. This means the alleged victim must prove that the employer knew or should have known of the conduct and failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.

June 21, 2013

Arbitration Agreement Waiving Class Claims Upheld – What it Means for Employers

By Jeffrey T. Johnson

Arbitration is a matter of contract between the parties and courts are not permitted to invalidate an agreed-upon provision that prohibits claims from being arbitrated on a class action basis, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in its June 20, 2013 opinion in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant. Employers can benefit from this ruling by crafting arbitration agreements that limit an employee’s right to pursue employment claims on behalf of a class of employees.

Cost to Pursue Individual Arbitration Not a Factor

At issue in the American Express case was an arbitration agreement between American Express and merchants who accept its charge cards that required the parties to arbitrate all disputes. The agreement further stated that “there shall be no right or authority for any Claims to be arbitrated on a class action basis.”

When numerous merchants filed a class action lawsuit against American Express alleging violations of federal antitrust laws due to American Express’ alleged high card fees, American Express moved to dismiss the lawsuit and instead force each merchant to arbitrate its claim individually, as required by the arbitration agreement. The District Court agreed with American Express and dismissed the class action lawsuit. The merchants appealed the dismissal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the cost to prove the antitrust claims by each individual merchant would far exceed the amount they could recover as an individual plaintiff. The merchants submitted a declaration from an economist who estimated that the cost of expert analysis on the antitrust claims would be “at least several hundred thousand dollars, and might exceed $1 million.” The maximum amount of damages that each individual plaintiff could expect to recover was $38,549 as treble damages. The Second Circuit reversed the dismissal, ruling that because the cost for each merchant to arbitrate their claim individually was prohibitive, the class-action waiver in the arbitration agreement was unenforceable and arbitration could not proceed. American Express sought review by the Supreme Court.

In a 5-3 ruling, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not allow courts to invalidate a contractual waiver of class actions on the ground that the plaintiffs’ cost to arbitrate a federal statutory claim individually exceeds the potential recovery. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, rejected the merchants’ argument that cost vs. recovery should factor into the enforceability of an arbitration agreement. He wrote that “the antitrust laws do not guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim.” The Court drew a distinction between contract provisions that prohibit an individual from asserting their statutory rights at all (e.g., a waiver of certain claims) and prohibiting class claims. Relying on earlier precedent, the Court reiterated that it may invalidate arbitration agreements that operate as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies, but will not invalidate an agreement because it is not worth the expense involved in a party proving a statutory remedy. The Court also refused to create preliminary hurdles before a plaintiff could be held to contractually-agreed arbitration, such as requiring a court to evaluate the cost to prove claims as well as the damages that could be recovered if the plaintiff is successful. Justice Scalia wrote that “such a judicially created superstructure” would “undoubtedly destroy the prospect of speedy resolution that arbitration in general and bilateral arbitration in particular was meant to secure.”

Dissent: Majority’s Response to Merchants Was “Too Darn Bad”

Justice Elena Kagen, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Steven Breyer (Justice Sotomayor did not take part in the decision), wrote a stinging dissent in which she characterized the case as small business owners who were forced to accept a form contract by a monopolizing credit card company that violated antitrust laws. The dissent states that if the arbitration clause is enforceable, American Express has insulated itself from antitrust liability because it used its monopoly power to insist on a contract that “effectively deprives its victims of all legal recourse.” Justice Kagen wrote: the “nutshell version of today’s opinion, admirably flaunted rather than camouflaged: Too darn bad.” The three dissenting justices believe that the FAA was never meant to produce the outcome arrived at by the majority, and that the majority decision blocks the vindication of meritorious federal claims and insulates wrongdoers from liability. The dissent instead would rely on the “effective vindication” rule, namely that an arbitration clause will not be enforced if it prevents the effective vindication of federal statutory rights, however it achieves that result, to invalidate the bar on class arbitration in the American Express agreement.

Employment Arbitration Agreements

Recent Supreme Court decisions upholding arbitration agreements, such as the American Express opinion, may bolster efforts to use arbitration agreements in the employment context. Although there are pros and cons to utilizing arbitration agreements with employees, a significant advantage is the ability to prohibit class actions by requiring employees to arbitrate their employment disputes on an individual basis. In addition, arbitration can be less costly than litigating in court, and more confidential as most arbitration filings are not public records. Perhaps most significantly, arbitration allows employment cases to be heard by arbitrators, not juries, thereby reducing the risk of runaway verdicts. Employers should consult with employment counsel to determine if arbitration agreements are warranted with their workforce and if so, what provisions will best protect the company’s interests.