Category Archives: Montana

March 6, 2014

SOX Whistleblower Protection Extends to Employees of Private Contractors, According to Supreme Court

On March 4, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that employees of private contractors and subcontractors who contract with public companies are protected under the whistleblower provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. ___ (2014). The ruling means that private employers who have a contract with a public company may not retaliate against their employees who report a potential fraud. As pointed out in the dissenting opinion, the holding by the six-justice majority creates the potential for increased litigation as it offers private sector employees another avenue to bring retaliation claims. In addition, it implies private sector employers with such contracts may need to strengthen their corporate compliance and complaint procedures to discover and fix problems early.

Whistleblowers Reported Potential Fraud In Mutual Fund Operations

Two former employees of private companies that contracted to advise and manage mutual funds filed separate administrative complaints alleging retaliation under 18 U.S.C. §1514A, the whistleblower provision of SOX. The mutual funds themselves were public companies, but they did not have any employees. Instead, the funds contracted with private companies to handle the day-to-day operation of the funds, including making investment decisions, preparing reports for shareholders and filing reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

Jackie Hosang Lawson was the Senior Director of Finance for a private advisory firm that contracted to provide services to the Fidelity family of mutual funds. Lawson alleged that she suffered a series of adverse employment actions that resulted in her constructive discharge after she raised concerns about certain cost accounting methods being used with the funds. She alleged that she believed that expenses associated with operating the funds were being overstated.

The second petitioner, Jonathan M. Zang, was a portfolio manager for a different division of the company that advised Fidelity mutual funds. Zang alleged that he was fired after he expressed concerns about inaccuracies contained in a draft SEC registration statement concerning some of the mutual funds.

After pursuing their administrative complaints, both whistleblowers filed retaliation lawsuits under §1514A in federal court in Massachusetts. Their employers, collectively referred to as FMR, moved to dismiss the suits, arguing that §1514A only protects employees of public companies, and because FMR is a private company, neither plaintiff had a viable claim under §1514A. The District Court denied FMR’s motion to dismiss. FMR sought an interlocutory appeal to the First Circuit, which reversed, ruling that §1514A only refers to employees of public companies, not a contractor’s own employees. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to resolve a division of opinion on the issue. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the SOX whistleblower provision shields only those employed by a public company itself, or also shields employees of privately held contractors and subcontractors who perform work for the public company.

“Employee” Presumes an Employer-Employee Relationship Between the Retaliator and the Whistleblower

Section 1514A provides: “No [public] company . . ., or any officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such company, may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment because of [whistleblowing or other protected activity].” FMR argued that the prohibition against retaliating against “an employee” meant an employee of the public company. The Court (in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg) disagreed. It looked at the provision as stating that “no . . . contractor . . . may discharge . . . an employee” and found that the ordinary meaning of “an employee” in that context was the contractor’s own employee. The Court stated that contractors are not ordinarily in a position to take adverse actions against employees of the public company for which they contract so to interpret the provision as FMR did would “shrink to insignificance the provision’s ban on retaliation by contractors.” The Court rejected FMR’s argument that Congress included contractors in §1514A’s list of governed parties only to prevent companies from hiring contractors to carry out retaliatory terminations, such as the “ax-wielding specialist” portrayed by George Clooney in the movie “Up in the Air.” The majority believed that Congress presumed that there must be an employer/employee relationship between the retaliating company and the whistleblower.

Purpose of SOX Supports Extending Whistleblower Protections to Employees of Private Contractors

The Court emphasized that SOX was enacted to safeguard investors in public companies and to restore trust in the financial markets after the collapse of Enron Corporation. The Court found that because outside professionals, such as accountants, lawyers and consultants, have great responsibility for reporting fraud by the public companies with which they contract, such employees of contractors and subcontractors must be afforded protection from retaliation by their employers when they comply with SOX’s reporting requirements. The fear of retaliation was a major deterrent to the employees of Enron’s contractors in reporting fraud. Consequently, the Court’s reading of §1514A extending whistleblower protection to the employees of private contractors is consistent with the purpose for which SOX was enacted.

Mutual Fund Industry Should Not Escape Ban on Retaliation

Because virtually all mutual funds are structured as public companies without any employees of their own, the Court expressed the need to protect the employees of the investment advisors who are often the only firsthand witnesses to shareholder fraud in the mutual fund industry. To rule otherwise, said the Court, would insulate the entire mutual fund industry from §1514A.

Dissent Worries About Opening the Floodgates to More Retaliation Claims

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito, dissented from the majority, believing that the Court’s holding creates an “absurd result” that subjects “private companies to a costly new front of employment litigation.” According to Sotomayor, the Court’s ruling means that any employee of an officer, employee, contractor or subcontractor of a public company, including housekeepers, nannies and gardeners, can sue in federal court under §1514A if they suffer adverse consequences after reporting potential fraud, such as mail fraud by their employer’s teenage kids. The majority dispels this concern, stating that there is “scant evidence that [this] decision will open any floodgates for whistlelowing suits outside §1514A’s purposes” given that FMR did not identify a single case in the past decade in which an employee of a private contractor had asserted a §1514A claim based on anything other than shareholder fraud. Still, the dissent believes that only employees of a public company should be protected from retaliation for whistleblowing activities under §1514A.

Private Employer Take-Aways

Despite the majority’s reassurances that employers will not see a substantial increase in new whistleblower retaliation cases, only time will tell if they are right. Private employers who contract with public companies should review their employment policies to ensure that employees are protected from retaliation as a result of reporting concerns or unlawful activities involving the public companies with whom they do business. Employers also should train their managers, supervisors and human resources professionals on this new development so that decision-makers do not inadvertently expose their company to the risk of a whistleblower retaliation claim under §1514A.

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March 5, 2014

NLRB GC Identifies Initiatives and Policy Concerns

By Steve Gutierrez

Richard Griffin, General Counsel for the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) recently issued a memorandum that identifies his initiatives and the areas of labor policy and law that are particularly concerning to him. The memo informs the NLRB regions which cases must be submitted to the Division of Advice at the Board’s Washington, D.C. headquarters so that the General Counsel’s office may “provide a clear and consistent interpretation of the [National Labor Relations] Act.”

The list of mandatory advice cases is split into three categories: (1) matters that are particularly concerning to the General Counsel and involve his initiatives; (2) cases involving difficult legal issues that are relatively rare in the regions and issues where there is no established precedent or the law is changing; and (3) cases that have traditionally been submitted to headquarters for legal advice. A look at the issues identified in the first two categories provides employers with useful insight into areas that will be targeted for further legal scrutiny and possible reversal of existing labor precedent.

General Counsel Initiatives and Issues of Labor Policy Concerns

GC Griffin points out a dozen labor issues that are top initiatives for him, including the following:

The applicability of Weingarten rights in non-unionized settings. (Weingarten rights provide union employees the right to have a union representative present during an employer’s investigation interview that could result in disciplinary action against the employee. In 2004, the NLRB ruled that non-union employees are not entitled to have a representative present during such meetings. IBM Corp., 341 NLRB 1288 (2004)).
Whether employees have a right to use an employer’s e-mail system for union-related communications and the standard concerning discriminatory enforcement of company rules and policies. (In 2007, the NLRB established a narrow standard for discrimination regarding company rules about solicitation and communications, ruling that an employer could make distinctions in its rules that might adversely affect employees’ NLRB Section 7 rights so long as the policies (and enforcement of the policies) did not discriminate along union-related lines. Register Guard, 351 NLRB 1110 (2007)).
Whether a “perfectly clear” successor must bargain with a union before setting the initial terms of employment. (The NLRB takes the position that in cases when it is obvious that a new employer that acquired a unionized workplace will retain all of the employees in the bargaining unit, the successor employer is obligated to bargain even over the initial terms of employment – the so-called “perfectly clear” exception.)
Whether an employer violates the NLRA when it acts with an unlawful motive in hiring permanent strike replacements. (Under NLRB precedent going back to 1964, the employer’s motive for replacing economic strikers is essentially irrelevant. Hot Shoppes, 146 NLRB 802 (1964). The GC is likely looking for an appropriate case to overrule this long-standing decision so that an employer’s desire to defeat the economic strikers’ rights to reinstatement will be deemed unlawful.

Additional issues that are on the GC’s list include cases where the possible remedies for unfair labor practices related to an organizational campaign include access to nonwork areas, access to the employer’s electronic communications systems and equal time for the union to respond to captive audience speeches.

Difficult Labor Issues or Cases Without Clear Precedent

Griffin also instructs the regions to submit to headquarters cases that involve difficult legal issues or those without clear, established legal precedent. Some of those issues include:

Mandatory arbitration agreements with class action waivers not resolved by D.R.Horton
Cases involving “at-will” provisions in employer handbooks that are not resolved by existing advice memoranda.
Cases concerning undocumented workers where the issues are unresolved.
Union access to lists of employee names and addresses during an organizing campaign where the employees are widely dispersed or have no fixed work location.
The validity of partial lockouts.
Cases involving novel conduct, such as excessive use of loudspeakers, coordinated “shopping” or corporate campaigns.

Don’t Be The Precedent Setting Case

Employers should review and become familiar with the GC’s list of priority issues. If any of the noted issues arise in your workplace, you’d be wise to consult with legal counsel early on because if the NLRB gets involved, the regional directors and officers will be forwarding your case to Washington for advice from the GC’s office. Proper handling of the matter from the start may help avoid your case being the conduit for the GC to establish new precedent that furthers his initiatives.

A copy of the memorandum may be found here.

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February 20, 2014

EEOC Challenges Separation Agreements

By Mark Wiletsky

If you use standard separation agreements to secure a release and waiver of claims from employees who are laid off, fired, or who otherwise threaten a claim, you might want to review your agreement. In a lawsuit filed recently in Illinois federal court, the EEOC alleges that a company with national operations interfered with its employees’ right to file charges with the EEOC and state fair employment practices agencies by conditioning the employees’ receipt of severance pay on signing an overly broad separation agreement.

According to the EEOC, five separate paragraphs (which are commonly found in separation agreements) are improper:

Cooperation: Employee agrees to promptly notify the Company’s General Counsel by telephone and in writing if the employee receives a subpoena, deposition notice, interview request or other process relating to any civil, criminal or administrative investigation or suit.
Non-Disparagement: Employee will not make any statements that disparage the business or reputation of the company or any of its officers or employees.
Non-Disclosure of Confidential Information: Employee agrees not to disclose to any third party or use for him/herself or anyone else Confidential Information without the prior written authorization of the company.
General Release of Claims: Employee releases company for any and all causes of action, lawsuits, charges or claims, including any claim of unlawful discrimination, that the employee may have prior to the date of the agreement.
No Pending Actions; Covenant Not to Sue: Employee represents that he/she has not filed or initiated any complaints prior to signing the agreement and agrees not to initiate or file any actions, lawsuits or charges asserting any of the released claims.

Disclaimer Allowing Workers to Bring Claims to the EEOC Not Enough

Recognizing that employers may not prevent workers from filing charges with the EEOC or participating in EEOC or state agency investigations, the paragraph containing the covenant not to sue contained a sentence stating “[n]othing in this paragraph is intended to or shall interfere with Employee’s right to participate in a proceeding with any appropriate federal, state or local government agency enforcing discrimination laws, nor shall this Agreement prohibit Employee from cooperating with any such agency in its investigation.” In its complaint, the EEOC says this disclaimer is insufficient as it is contained in only one of the paragraphs that contain limits on the employees’ rights.

What does this mean for employers?

It’s important to remember that the Court has not agreed with the EEOC’s allegations—and, in fact, it might reject them outright. Regardless, the risk of such actions is enough to justify a closer look at your standard separation or release agreement. Even an agreement that has been repeatedly reviewed and revised can likely be improved for clarity. Make sure the agreement is understandable, does not contain excessive “legalese,” and it should not contain provisions that interfere with an employee’s right to file a charge with the EEOC or state agency.

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February 7, 2014

NLRB Again Proposes Rules to Speed Union Elections

By John M. Husband

After dropping its appeal of a District Court ruling that invalidated its “ambush election” rules, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) has proposed those rules again. By a vote of 3-2, the Board reissued proposed amendments to its representation case procedures. The Board states that the amendments are designed to remove unnecessary delays and inefficiencies in representation case procedures. The effect, however, is expected to be an increase in union wins as the union election procedures are streamlined and votes occur quicker.

Board Lacked Quorum When Rules Adopted in 2011

The NLRB first proposed its rules to speed up the union election process in June of 2011. At the time, the Board had just three members as two positions were vacant. Despite an outcry by the business community and receipt of almost 66,000 comments, two of the three Board members voted to adopt the rules. The final rules were published in December of 2011 and went into effect on April 30, 2012.

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other interested groups sought to stop the implementation of the ambush election rules by suing the NLRB in federal court in the District of Columbia. Just two weeks after the rules went into effect, the judge in the case invalidated the rules, finding the Board lacked a three-member quorum needed to pass the rules. Although two of the Board members voted in favor of the rules, the third Board member, the sole Republican, did not participate in the vote. Finding that the rules were invalid for lack of the statutorily-mandated quorum, the judge did not need to address the challenge to the rules’ constitutionality and the lack of authority of the NLRB to adopt the rules. In a distinct incident of foreshadowing of this week’s events, the judge specifically stated “nothing appears to prevent a properly constituted quorum of the Board from voting to adopt the rule if it has the desire to do so."

The NLRB appealed the District Court’s decision, asking the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to reverse the lower court’s ruling. On December 9, 2013, the NLRB withdrew its appeal pursuant to a joint stipulation by the parties. It did so in anticipation of doing exactly what the District Court judge had suggested, namely proposing the rules again so that a properly constituted quorum of the Board can vote to adopt the rules. Board Chairman Mark Gaston Pearce and Board members Kent Y. Hirozawa and Nancy Schiffer approved the re-issuance of the proposed rules.

“Ambush Election” Rules Would Speed Union Election Process

Published in the February 6, 2014 Federal Register, the proposed changes are virtually identical to those proposed in 2011. Highlights of the proposed amendments include:

A union may file its representation petition electronically, rather than by hand or regular mail.
A hearing must be held within 7 days of the union filing its petition.
Employers must provide a comprehensive “statement of position” on the union’s representation petition in advance of the hearing; any issues not included in the statement are waived.
Pre-election hearing is to determine only whether a question concerning representation exists; issues related to individual voter eligibility may be deferred to post-election procedures.
The parties right to file a post-hearing brief is discretionary as allowed by the hearing officer.
Deadline for employer to provide voter eligibility list is shortened from 7 work days to 2 work days from the Direction of Election.
Employer must provide email addresses and telephone numbers for employees eligible to vote in addition to the required names and home addresses.
Election need not wait for 25 days after the issuance of a Direction of Election.
Pre-election appeals to the Board are eliminated, leaving only a discretionary appeal of both pre- and post-election issues after the election occurs.

Two Board Members Dissented

Board members Philip A. Miscimarra and Harry I. Johnson III are not in favor of the proposed rules. Although stating that they share in the majority’s desire to protect and safeguard the rights and obligations of those subject to the National Labor Relations Act, they do not believe it necessary to adopt a “wholesale rewrite” of the Board’s election procedure.

Interested parties and the public may submit comments on the proposed rules until April 7. Electronic comments may be submitted through http://www.regulations.gov. Comments may also be mailed or hand delivered to: Gary Shinners, Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1099 14th Street NW., Washington, DC 20570. The Board intends to hold a hearing on the amendments during the week of April 7. We will keep you informed of developments on this issue.

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January 27, 2014

Union Membership: By the Numbers – 2013

By Jeffrey T. Johnson (retired)

The results are in. For 2013, the percentage of union members in the private sector ticked up slightly, to 6.7%. The percentage for 2012 was 6.6%. The total number of union members working in the private sector rose from 7.0 million in 2012 to 7.3 million in 2013.

Numbers for the public sector dipped slightly from 2012, with 35.9 percent of public sector employees reported to be union members in 2012 and 35.3 percent in 2013. The total number of public sector union members remained relatively flat, with 7.2 million union members in 2013, down just over 100,000 members from 2012.

In analyzing the data provided by the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the trend in both percentage and total number of union members has been a steady downward one. For example, in 2005, 7.8% of private sector employees were union members. In 2005, 15.7 million workers (private and public) were union members; in 2013, only 14.5 million.

The BLS report breaks down the union membership data by many categories, including by state, gender, age, industry, and occupation. It also provides comparative earnings information. Here are some highlights:

Men had a higher union membership rate (11.9%) than women (10.5%).
The age category with the highest percentage of union members was age 55-64 (14.3%).
The occupations with the highest percentage of private sector union members were protective service occupations (35.3%), utilities (25.6%), and transportation and warehousing (19.6%)
New York continues to have the highest union membership rate (24.4%), while North Carolina had the lowest rate (3.0%).

Statistics for 2013 union membership in the primary states served by Holland & Hart’s offices were as follows:

Nevada – 14.6% unionized, total of 169,000 members
Montana – 13.0% unionized, total of 52,000 members
Colorado – 7.6% unionized, total of 171,000 members
New Mexico – 6.2% unionized, total of 751,000 members
Wyoming – 5.7% unionized, total of 15,000 members
Idaho – 4.7% unionized, total of 29,000 members
Utah – 3.9% unionized, total of 49,000 members

Note: Above figures are private and public sectors combined

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December 26, 2013

ERISA Plan’s Limitation Period Is Enforceable, Says U.S. Supreme Court

By Elizabeth Nedrow

The U.S. Supreme Court recently issued a decision that provides some welcome guidance to insurers and employers sponsoring ERISA employee benefit plans. The Court upheld a three-year limitations period in a long term disability plan. The terms of the plan required participants to file a lawsuit to recover benefits within three years after “proof of loss.” Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co.,No. 12-729, 571 U.S. ___ (Dec. 16, 2013). The Court ruled that because ERISA itself does not specify a limitations period, the plan’s three year deadline was reasonable and therefore enforceable.

Benefit Plan Participant Filed Lawsuit After Benefits Were Denied

Julie Heimeshoff, a senior public relations manager for Wal-Mart Stores, was a participant in a long term disability plan administered by Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Company (Hartford). In 2005, she filed a claim for disability benefits following a diagnosis of lupus and fibromyalgia. On her claim form, her rheumatologist listed her symptoms as extreme fatigue, significant pain and difficulty in concentration. Hartford denied her claim after her rheumatologist failed to respond to its requests for more information. In 2006, Heimeshoff provided Hartford with an evaluation from another physician who also determined that she was disabled. Hartford retained a physician to review Heimeshoff’s records who concluded that she was able to perform the activities of her sedentary job. Hartford again denied her disability claim.

After granting Heimeshoff an extension to the appeal deadline to provide additional evidence and retaining two additional physicians to review her claim, Hartford issued its final denial of benefits on November 26, 2007. On November 18, 2010, Heimeshoff filed suit in district court seeking review of her denied claim under ERISA’s judicial review provision, known as ERISA Section 502. Hartford and Wal-Mart asked the court to dismiss her suit because she did not file the case within the limitations period provided for in the plan, namely within three years after the time that written proof of loss is required to be furnished to Hartford. The district court agreed that the lawsuit was untimely and dismissed her case. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case in order to resolve a split among the Courts of Appeal on the enforceability of an ERISA plan’s contractual limitations period.

ERISA Contractual Limitations Provisions Should Be Enforced As Written

The long-term disability plan at issue stated that legal action against Hartford could not be taken more than three years after the time that written proof of loss is required to be furnished according to the terms of the policy. Written proof of loss is necessarily due before Hartford and the participant complete the internal review process and before a plan participant is notified of a final denial of benefits which is necessary before filing a lawsuit in court. The result of this contractual limitations period is that a participant has less than three years to file a lawsuit in court after learning that their benefit claim has been finally denied.

In reviewing whether to enforce this limitations period, the Supreme Court relied on well-established precedent which states that in the absence of a limitations period provided by a controlling statute, a provision in a contract may validly limit the time for parties to bring an action on such contract to a period less than that prescribed in the general statute of limitations as long as the shorter period is reasonable. The Court noted that ERISA does not specify a statute of limitations. Consequently, the Court ruled that a participant and a plan may agree by contract to a particular limitations period as long as it is reasonable.

Heimeshoff argued that the contractual limitations period at issue was not reasonable because it began to run before a claimant could exhaust the internal review process which is required before seeking judicial review. The Court unanimously disagreed, concluding that the three-year limitations period from the date that proof of loss is due was not unreasonably short and therefore, was enforceable. Although Hartford’s administrative review process took longer than usual, Heimeshoff still had approximately one year to file suit before the limitations period was up. Because Heimeshoff filed her lawsuit more than three years after her proof of loss was due, as required contractually by the plan, her complaint was time barred. Therefore, the Court upheld the dismissal of Heimeshoff’s suit.

Significance for Employee Benefit Plans

The Court’s decision is welcome news for insurers and employers who want efficient resolution of ERISA claims disputes. Plan documentation should be reviewed, and where appropriate, language should be added or clarified to provide a reasonable limit on the time a participant has to bring a lawsuit to challenge a denied claim for benefits.

Disclaimer: This article is designed to provide general information on pertinent legal topics. The statements made are provided for educational purposes only. They do not constitute legal advice and are not intended to create an attorney-client relationship between you and Holland & Hart LLP. If you have specific questions as to the application of the law to your activities, you should seek the advice of your legal counsel.

July 29, 2013

The Battle Over Background Checks Continues — State AGs Accuse EEOC of “Gross Federal Overreach”

By Mark Wiletsky

Is it discriminatory if an employer does not hire anyone with a particular criminal conviction, regardless of that person’s race, gender, religion, or other protected characteristic? According to the EEOC’s April 2012 Enforcement Guidance, it might be. But in a July 24, 2013 letter sent to EEOC Commissioner Jacqueline Berrien and the four EEOC Board Members, nine state Attorneys’ General (AGs) disagree. The AGs chastise the EEOC for filing recent lawsuits against BMW Manufacturing Co., LLC and Dolgencorp (Dollar General), in which the EEOC alleges that these employers violated Title VII’s disparate impact prohibition by using a bright-line screening policy that rejected all individuals with past convictions in certain categories of crimes, such as murder, assault, reckless driving and possession of drug paraphernalia.

The letter then criticizes the EEOC’s April 2012 Enforcement Guidance on Arrest and Conviction Records, stating that the EEOC’s policy guidance incorrectly applies the law and constitutes an unlawful expansion of Title VII. The AGs argue that if Congress wishes to protect former criminals from employment discrimination, it can amend the law, but it is not the EEOC’s role to expand the protections of Title VII under the guise of preventing racial discrimination.

The Republican state AGs from Colorado, Montana, Utah, Kansas, Nebraska, West Virginia, Alabama, South Carolina and Georgia joined in this missive to say “enough is enough” on the EEOC’s background check lawsuits. Citing the burden on businesses to undertake more individualized assessments of an applicant’s criminal history, the AGs urge the EEOC to rescind its April 2012 Enforcement Guidance and dismiss the lawsuits against Dollar General and BMW. Not likely, but it may get the attention of federal lawmakers who may try to rein in the EEOC’s position on this issue.

Disclaimer:This article is designed to provide general information on pertinent legal topics. The statements made are provided for educational purposes only. They do not constitute legal advice and are not intended to create an attorney-client relationship between you and Holland & Hart LLP. If you have specific questions as to the application of the law to your activities, you should seek the advice of your legal counsel.