Category Archives: Policies & Employee Handbooks

March 26, 2015

Supreme Court: Pregnant Worker With Lifting Restrictions May Continue Lawsuit

In a divided decision, on March 25, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court released a long-awaited ruling involving a pregnant worker’s claim under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA). In its ruling, the Court held that the worker could proceed with her lawsuit, because disputes remain as to whether her employer treated more favorably at least some non-pregnant employees whose situation could not reasonably be distinguished from hers.

The majority of the Court forcefully rejected the 2014 guidance of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) concerning the application of Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to the PDA, as it fell short on a number of fronts needed to “give it power to persuade.” Without ruling for either party, the Court adopted a new standard for courts to use when deciding PDA cases brought under a disparate treatment theory. Young v. UPS, 575 U.S. ___ (2015).

Despite the Court’s guidance, employers still will face many questions on what accommodations will be required in the future. The standards for “disparate treatment” and “disparate impact” cases may be more confusing in the future for employers who need to make decisions regarding whether and how to accommodate pregnant employees. As a result, employers are wise to respond carefully to accommodation requests by pregnant workers. Employers should review any policies that might have a disproportionate effect on pregnant workers, such as rules limiting job accommodations. In addition, employers should be careful to review restrictions on use of sick pay/sick time, leave eligibility outside of FMLA, lifting restrictions, and light duty assignments to determine: (1) if they disparately affect pregnant employees while accommodating others; and (2) what “strong” business rationale you can offer to defend the distinction.

For additional analysis of the Court's opinion and what it means for employers, please see our full article here.

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March 17, 2015

Utah Adds Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity to Anti-Discrimination Laws

By Cecilia Romero

On March 12, 2015, Utah signed into law a bill that protects individuals on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity in employment and housing. The law contains certain exceptions for religious organizations and permits employers to maintain reasonable dress codes and sex-specific facilities. Here are the details on the employment protections.

Discrimination, Harassment and Retaliation Prohibited

The new law adds sexual orientation and gender identity to the list of protected characteristics under Utah’s employment discrimination law, making it unlawful for Utah employers to refuse to hire, promote, discharge, demote, terminate, retaliate against, harass or discriminate in compensation or any other terms of employment because of an individual’s sexual orientation or gender identity. The full list of protected groups under Utah law is now race, color, sex, pregnancy/childbirth, age, religion, national origin, disability, sexual orientation and gender identity.

Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Defined

Sexual orientation is defined as an individual’s actual or perceived orientation as heterosexual, homosexual or bisexual. Gender identity is defined by reference to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-5) which refers to individuals who see and feel themselves to be a different gender than their assigned gender.

Reasonable Dress Codes and Sex-Specific Facilities Permitted

The new law specifically addresses two frequent concerns for employers. First, the new law allows employers to adopt reasonable dress and grooming standards and second, employers are allowed to adopt reasonable policies that designate sex-specific facilities, such as restrooms, shower rooms and dressing facilities.

Exemptions for Religious Organizations and Protecting Religious Expression

The new law protects religious organizations and the expression of religious beliefs. The list of excluded religious groups was expanded through this law to include not only religious organizations, associations and corporations, but also religious societies, educational institutions and leaders, and the Boy Scouts of America.

State Law Trumps Local Laws

This new state law supersedes and preempts any laws, ordinances or regulations related to the prohibition of employment discrimination passed by a city, county or other local or state governmental entity. This should help employers maintain uniform policies statewide without having to account for local anti-discrimination laws. Complaints will be handled by the state antidiscrimination division. Recovery under the law is limited to actual damages, not punitive damages.

Practice Points to Employers

These new employment protections will affect many of your employment communications so take time now to:

Review and understand the new law;
Revise harassment and retaliation policies to include sexual orientation and gender identity as prohibited bases for harassment and retaliation; remember such statements might be contained in your employee handbook, on your job applications, in recruiting and training materials and on your website; and
Train managers and supervisors on the new law.

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January 14, 2015

How a Health Benefit Can Be a Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing

by Bret Busacker and Bret Clark (formerly of Holland & Hart)

Group health plans provided by employers to employees are subject to 40 years of federal regulation from ERISA, to COBRA, to HIPAA, to ACA. What many employers don’t realize is that the definition of group health plan is not limited to traditional major medical plans. These federal laws generally apply to any arrangement sponsored by an employer that directly or indirectly provides health-related benefits to employees.

In an effort to control health insurance costs, we have observed employers looking at unique ways to provide their employees with medical benefits outside of the standard group health plan structure. However, employers should be aware that virtually any arrangement that provides employees with medical benefits is subject to the often burdensome federal laws that regulate employer provided medical benefits.

Employers may be surprised to know that the arrangements described below are generally subject to a variety of restrictive federal benefits laws.

Account-Based Arrangements

Some employers (including many small businesses) would like to assist employees in purchasing health insurance but because of cost, risk and other factors cannot sponsor a traditional major medical plan. In the past, some of these employers provided employees an allowance that employees could use to purchase individual health insurance (in some cases, on a pre-tax basis). These types of arrangements are especially attractive now that the healthcare exchanges under the ACA have been established (where employees can sometimes get subsidized health insurance).

However, the ACA prohibits an employer from establishing an arrangement through which employees may purchase health insurance on an ACA exchange. Even employer-sponsored arrangements that help employees purchase non-exchange individual health insurance policies may run afoul of federal benefits laws. Employers may increase an employee’s taxable wages to help the employee purchase health insurance, but if the increase is conditioned on the employee purchasing health insurance, the arrangement may become subject to federal benefits laws.

Employers may continue to use traditional account-based arrangements to supplement employer-provided health insurance, such a Health Flexible Spending Account, Health Reimbursement Arrangement, or Health Savings Account. However, employers should examine closely any arrangement that permits (or requires) employees to purchase individual health insurance.

Discount Arrangements

We have also encountered employers that provide discounts to employees for medical services. These programs generally involve employers that are healthcare providers. They generally provide employee discounts or allowances that may be used for in-house healthcare services. These programs can also involve discounts negotiated between an employer and a third-party healthcare provider.

Because these employer-sponsored arrangements provide health-related benefits to employees, they are generally group health plans subject to federal regulation, including the ACA. To the extent such a program is offered to employees who are not concurrently enrolled in the employer’s group health plan, the programs must separately satisfy ERISA, COBRA, HIPAA and the ACA.

It some cases, these programs violate the ACA because they do not satisfy the ACA prohibition on annual and life-time limits, among other requirements. In other cases, it may be possible to structure these arrangements to comply with the ACA, but employers should be aware that the notice, disclosure and plan document requirements generally applicable to group health plans also apply to these arrangements.

Skinny Plans

Under the ACA, certain large employers must offer health coverage to their full-time employees or pay a penalty. The coverage must pay 60% or more of a participant’s healthcare expenses, determined on an actuarial basis (referred to as “minimum value”).

Employers and service providers have closely analyzed plan structures to determine how to minimize the cost of a plan and still provide minimum value. Service providers discovered that a plan may be structured to exclude in-patient hospitalization and/or physician services and still satisfy the minimum value requirement. Such plans are known as Skinny Plans.

Many employers found that excluding in-patient hospitalization and/or physician services significantly reduced the cost of coverage, and took significant steps to implement Skinny Plans for 2015. However, once the IRS became aware of this practice, it moved very quickly to prohibit it, and left many employers that were planning on offering Skinny Plans scrambling to find alternative coverage.

Skinny Plans are clearly group health plans and are designed to satisfy applicable federal regulations. However, they highlight the risk an employer takes on in exploring non-traditional coverage in this highly regulated area.

Conclusion

Employers and service providers have become creative in structuring benefit plans in order to minimize costs. In some cases, employers inadvertently provide benefits that do not fully comply with applicable requirements. In other cases, employers push the boundaries of current guidance and risk the IRS invalidating the arrangement with subsequent guidance. In either case, the employer may face significant penalties for noncompliance with applicable law. Accordingly, employers should ensure that their non-traditional health benefit arrangements fully comply with applicable federal requirements.

Bret Busacker and Bret Clark are attorneys in Holland & Hart’s Boise office, where they provide legal services to the firm’s employee-benefits and executive-compensation clients. Bret Busacker can be reached at bfbusacker@hollandhart.com; Bret Clark can be reached at sbclark@hollandhart.com

December 15, 2014

Are Your Employee Handbooks and Policies Up-to-Date?

By Mark Wiletsky

As 2014 comes to a close, employers should consider reviewing and, if necessary, updating handbooks, policies, and employment agreements. Organizations sometimes devote significant resources to developing policies or handbooks, but if they are not regularly updated or revised, the policies and handbooks may not be particularly useful. In fact, an outdated policy may end up causing confusion among employees and managers, or create issues for the organization if a dispute arises. To avoid these issues, consider (among other things):

Changing your handbook to eliminate old or outdated policies, and ensure the current policies accurately reflect current practices;
Reminding employees about key policies, such as anti-discrimination/harassment and nondisclosure policies; and
Revising or updating nondisclosure, noncompetition, and/or nonsolicitation agreements. In Colorado, continued employment is generally sufficient consideration for such agreements, but in other states or jurisdictions, that might not be the case, so tying an update to a year-end bonus, raise, or promotion may be a good way to ensure adequate consideration exists for new or revised agreements.

Rolling out new or updated policies in the first quarter of 2015 may be a good way to introduce new and existing employees to the changes or updates. In addition, if you do not already do so, consider highlighting key policies, such as anti-discrimination and anti-harassment, or conducting an annual training on critical policies. Doing so may limit potential claims, or at least put you in a better position to defend against a claim down the road.

October 21, 2014

EEOC’s Failure to Engage in Conciliation Dooms Its Separation Agreement Lawsuit Against CVS Pharmacy

By Mark Wiletsky

Chalk up a loss for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in its lawsuit against CVS Pharmacy’s separation agreements. As we reported earlier, the EEOC sued CVS alleging that CVS’s separation agreements deterred employees from filing charges and communicating with the EEOC about discrimination and retaliation. Dismissing the case, a federal judge recently ruled that the EEOC failed to engage in the required procedural steps, including conciliation, before filing its lawsuit.

EEOC Dismissed Employee’s Charge, Then Went After Employer

This lawsuit is an example of the aggressive, proactive nature of the EEOC in extending the protections of Title VII to new and novel claims. The case arose after CVS terminated Tonia Ramos, a pharmacy manager. Ms. Ramos signed CVS’s standard separation agreement, which included a release of claims and a covenant not to sue. She then proceeded to file a charge with the EEOC claiming that her discharge was based on sex and race in violation of Title VII. Almost two years later, the EEOC dismissed Ms. Ramos’s charge.

The EEOC then contacted CVS asserting that based on the separation agreement, CVS was engaging in a pattern or practice of resistance to their employees’ full enjoyment of rights under Title VII. In other words, the EEOC concluded that even though the individual employee did not have a valid discrimination claim against CVS, it would bring a pattern or practice case against CVS based on the language in its standard separation agreement used with potentially hundreds of former employees.

No Conciliation, No Lawsuit

Under Title VII enforcement procedures, the EEOC has the authority to investigate and act on a charge of a pattern or practice of discrimination, whether filed on behalf of an allegedly harmed employee or by the EEOC itself. The procedures require that the EEOC try to resolve any alleged unlawful employment practices through informal means before filing a lawsuit. Such means include conferences, conciliation and persuasion. Although the EEOC and CVS discussed potential settlement by telephone twice before the EEOC filed suit, the EEOC failed to engage in conciliation, which proved fatal to its case. Because an attempt at reaching a conciliation agreement is a prerequisite to the EEOC filing suit and it was undisputed that the EEOC did not engage in any conciliation process, the federal court dismissed the EEOC’s case against CVS.

Judge’s Guidance is in the Footnotes

The case was dismissed on procedural grounds, but the judge took the opportunity to offer his view on the merits of the EEOC’s arguments in several footnotes in the opinion. First, the EEOC argued that the term “resistance” as used in Title VII should be interpreted broadly to extend to the language in CVS’s separation agreement even if that language did not amount to discrimination or retaliation under the Act. The judge rejected that argument, stating that the term “resistance” requires some retaliatory or discriminatory act.

Second, the judge discussed the “covenant not to sue” provision in CVS’s separation agreement. Even though the provision stated that an employee could not “initiate or file . . . a complaint or proceeding asserting any of the Released Claims,” the release of claims (in another paragraph of the separation agreement) stated that it did not limit “any rights that the Employee cannot lawfully waive.” In addition, the agreement contained two carve out provisions specifying an employee’s “right to participate in a proceeding with any appropriate federal, state or local government agency enforcing discrimination laws” and that the agreement did not prohibit the employee from cooperating with any such agency in its investigation. The judge wrote that these provisions would allow an employee to file an EEOC charge. He went on to write that even if the separation agreement explicitly banned filing charges, those provisions would be unenforceable and could not constitute “resistance” under Title VII.

One Case Down; One Still Pending

The dismissal of the CVS lawsuit is good news for employers who use separation agreements, especially in light of the judge’s comments signaling that the EEOC’s arguments were without merit. However, a similar case filed by the EEOC against College America is still proceeding through the federal court in the District of Colorado. (We wrote about the College America case here.) Like CVS, College America has asked the court to dismiss the EEOC’s case. We will let you know when the court rules on that motion. In the meantime, employers should review their separation agreements to ensure they include a provision that the agreement does not prohibit employees from filing a charge, participating in an investigation or otherwise cooperating with an appropriate federal, state or local government agency that enforces discrimination laws.

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April 16, 2014

EEOC Loses Kaplan Credit Check Appeal

By Brad Cave

In 2010, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued Kaplan Higher Education Corporation, claiming that Kaplan’s use of credit reports had a disparate impact on black applicants. The trial court threw out the EEOC’s suit because it used an invalid method for determining the race of Kaplan’s applicants. The EEOC appealed, and lost again. In a stinging opinion, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Kaplan and rejected the methodology promoted by the EEOC’s expert witness. The Sixth Circuit’s opinion dooms the agency’s background check disparate impact lawsuit against Kaplan and slaps the EEOC for suing a private employer “for using the same type of background check that the EEOC itself uses.” The ruling also illustrates the EEOC’s failure to show that an employer’s use of neutral background checks results in a disparate impact on African-American applicants. EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp., No. 13-3408 (6th Cir. April 9, 2014).

Credit Checks Aimed At Preventing Employee Abuses

Kaplan is a for-profit test preparation and higher education provider. Because some Kaplan students receive financial aid, some Kaplan employees have access to students’ financial information, including information that is subject to the U.S. Department of Education confidentiality regulations. Years ago, Kaplan discovered that some of its financial-aid officers had stolen aid payments and some executives had engaged in self-dealing by hiring relatives as vendors for the company. To help stop these abuses, Kaplan began conducting credit checks on applicants for senior-executive positions as well as accounting, financial aid and other positions where employees have access to company or student financial information. Neither Kaplan nor its credit check vendor provided or linked the applicant’s race with the applicant’s credit report.

EEOC Alleges Kaplan’s Credit Checks Screen Out More African-Americans

Consistent with its efforts to target employers who use background check policies to screen applicants, the EEOC sued Kaplan alleging that Kaplan’s use of credit checks resulted in more African-Americans being rejected than whites, creating a disparate impact in violation of Title VII. To support its claim, the EEOC hired industrial and organizational psychologist Kevin Murphy to analyze Kaplan’s credit check data and offer an expert opinion based on the statistics. However, because the credit check information did not include the applicant’s race, Murphy and his team needed another method to determine race. They created a process that the EEOC called “race rating” in which a team of five “race raters” reviewed drivers’ license photos for a portion of the applicants to visually identify their race. Despite having credit information for 4,670 applicants, Murphy based his “expert” analysis on only 1,090 applicants, of whom 803 had been racially classified using Murphy’s “race rating” process.

“Homemade Methodology” Rejected by Court

The Sixth Circuit wholeheartedly rejected Murphy’s “race rating” process, stating that “[t]he EEOC brought this case on the basis of a homemade methodology, crafted by a witness with no particular expertise to craft it, administered by persons with no particular expertise to administer it, tested by no one, and accepted only by the witness himself.” The Court upheld the exclusion of Murphy’s testimony not only due to his faulty methodology, but also because the group of 1,090 applicants in Murphy’s statistical analysis was not representative of the applicant pool as a whole. Of Kaplan’s entire pool of 4,670 applicants, only 13.3% of the applicants were rejected on the basis of credit checks, but Murphy’s smaller pool of applicants had a fail rate of 23.8%. The Court found that Murphy’s unrepresentative sample might not equate to the respective fail rates of black versus white applicants and therefore, was an unreliable method for the EEOC to show disparate impact.

EEOC’s Own Background Check Policy Contradicts Its Attack on Private Employers For Use of Credit Checks

Although not central to the exclusion of the EEOC’s expert, the Court put the EEOC’s own background check policy front and center. Through the discovery process, Kaplan had successfully obtained information on the EEOC’s background check policies and pointed to the agency’s personnel handbook which states “[o]verdue just debts increase temptation to commit illegal or unethical acts as a means of gaining funds to meet financial obligations.” To address those potential concerns, the EEOC runs credit checks for 84 of the 97 positions within the agency. The Court highlighted the disconnect between the EEOC attacking Kaplan for a credit check policy that the agency used itself.

Future EEOC Challenges to Employer Use of Credit Checks

The Kaplan decision is the latest in a string of EEOC losses in class actions alleging disparate impact based on an employer’s use of a neutral background check process. The EEOC seems unable to provide evidence to support a finding that African-Americans, Hispanics or other groups are being rejected for employment at higher rates than whites based on background checks. In addition, the EEOC’s own use of credit checks in hiring will be used against it in any future similar lawsuits. Although it remains to be seen whether the EEOC will back off of its systemic enforcement efforts related to the use of background checks, the trend for employers is positive.

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March 13, 2014

Harassment Training for Supervisors is Key in Minimizing Risk

By Mark Wiletsky

Most employers today have policies prohibiting harassment. But if your supervisors and employees are not trained on those policies, and if harassment is allowed to occur, your organization could face significant liability.

Female Bailiff Alleges Egregious Sexual Harassment By Her Supervisor

Camille Kramer was employed as a jailor and later as a bailiff by the Wasatch County Sheriff’s Department. While working at the jail, male co-workers allegedly made offensive comments about Kramer’s breasts, she was subjected to sexually explicit materials on work computers and had to listen to graphic sexual conversations. Kramer complained to Sheriff Kenneth Van Wagoner, the head of the Sheriff’s Department. Sheriff Van Wagoner said he’d “take care of it” and proceeded to call a staff meeting at which he used Kramer as a volunteer to act out the exact harassing scenarios that she had reported to him. Van Wagoner told the group: “[t]hat’s harassment. Don’t do it.” When the harassment got worse after the meeting, Kramer complained again to the Sheriff, who told her she might want to avoid that area.

Kramer transferred to the courthouse to work as a bailiff. Sergeant Rick Benson, also a bailiff, supervised both Kramer and one other bailiff. According to Kramer, Benson subjected Kramer to a campaign of sexual harassment and sexual assault that ranged from demanding foot rubs to groping and rape. Kramer did not report Benson’s conduct to the Sheriff because Benson threatened her job if she said anything and she believed nothing would be done about it anyway.

Later, Kramer told female co-workers about the rape and assault. She also told them that she was having a consensual affair with another man and was pregnant from that relationship. Sheriff Van Wagoner found out about Benson’s sexual assault of Kramer and her pregnancy from one of Kramer’s co-workers. He assigned a detective who was not trained in human resources or in conducting sexual harassment investigations to look into the misconduct. The detective focused his investigation exclusively on finding out who fathered Kramer’s baby, not on Benson’s conduct. When it was learned that Kramer was involved with a married county firefighter, the detective urged Kramer to resign and Kramer was disciplined with her certification suspended for six months for “actions unbecoming an officer.” Although the Sheriff decided to terminate Benson, Benson resigned before that could happen.

Benson directly supervised Kramer’s work as a bailiff. He wrote her performance evaluations, which could cause her to be promoted, demoted or fired. He could create a corrective action plan for her which might include transfer, reassignment or separation, if he deemed her performance was substandard. At all times, however, the Sheriff was the final decision-maker and the only person who had the actual authority to take tangible employment actions against Kramer.

Kramer sued the County and the Sheriff for sexual harassment in violation of Title VII, among other claims. The district court granted summary judgment to the County, holding that because Benson did not have the actual authority to unilaterally fire Kramer, the County could not be vicariously liable for Benson’s conduct. It also ruled that supervisor status could not be based on Benson having apparent authority over Kramer because no reasonable juror could find that Kramer reasonably believed that Benson had the power to fire her. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the County and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Kramer v. Wasatch Cty. Sheriff's Office, No. 12-4058 (10th Cir. Feb. 25, 2014).

Delegation of Power and Apparent Authority

The Tenth Circuit pointed to wording in the Supreme Court’s recent case, Vance v. Ball State, 570 U.S. ___ (2013), to determine whether the County could be vicariously liable for Benson’s conduct. Vance held that a “supervisor” for purposes of determining employer liability for workplace harassment under Title VII includes only those individuals who have the authority to take tangible employment actions against the victim. Although that seemed like a bright-line test, the Tenth Circuit stated that if Benson had or appeared to have the power to take or substantially influence tangible employment actions or used the threat of taking such actions to subject Kramer to a hostile work environment, then the County could be vicariously liable for Benson’s severe or pervasive sexual harassment. Because the Court found sufficient evidence in the record that raised genuine issues of fact as to whether the Sheriff effectively delegated to Benson the power to cause tangible employment actions by relying on Benson’s recommendations and performance evaluations when making decisions regarding firing, promotion, demotion and reassignment, the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment to the County. The Court stated that even if the Sheriff took some independent analysis when considering input from Benson on employment decisions, Benson could qualify as a supervisor if his recommendations were among the proximate causes of the Sheriff’s decision-making. The Court also found that there was evidence to suggest that Kramer reasonably believed that Benson had the power to take tangible employment actions against her meaning Benson qualified as a supervisor under apparent authority principles.

No Tangible Employment Actions

If Benson is a supervisor under the definition established in Vance, the County would be strictly liable for Benson’s harassment if it resulted in a tangible employment action. Kramer asserted that four actions constituted tangible employment actions. First, she argued that Benson’s rape was a tangible employment action. The Court disagreed, stating that while the rape was inarguably a severe form of sexual harassment, Benson did not commit the rape in an official company action. Next, Kramer asserted that Benson prepared a negative performance evaluation of her and argued that was a tangible employment action. However, Benson improved the evaluation after speaking with Kramer and before submitting it to the Sheriff, so even though the threatened poor evaluation contributed to a hostile work environment, it did not constitute a tangible employment action. The Court similarly rejected the final two alleged employment actions, a denial of leave time and assigning Kramer to an unfavorable duty that denied her the training needed for a promotion. The Court found that the loss of one day’s leave time was not a “significant” change in Kramer’s benefits and the assignment to an unfavorable duty did not have a deleterious economic consequence for Kramer or reduce her opportunity for advancement. Finding that Kramer did not suffer a tangible employment action, the Court remanded for consideration of whether the County established the Faragher/Ellerth defense.

Teachable Moments from the Tenth Circuit

The Court’s thorough discussion of Benson’s conduct and what the Sheriff did/did not do when he learned of potential misconduct reveals many teachable moments for employers. First and foremost, make sure to train your supervisors and employees on prohibited forms of harassment, and how important it is to promptly and appropriately address issues when they arise. For example, when an employee reports harassing behavior, as Kramer did when she first worked at the jail, take it seriously. Do not simply tell workers to “stop it” or tell the person who complained to “avoid the area” or stay away from the perpetrators. Make sure that the person conducting the investigation is trained in workplace harassment investigations. Do not focus the investigation solely on the potential wrongdoing of the complaining party, as the detective did when trying to determine the father of Kramer’s baby. Talk to all parties implicated in the misconduct, including any witnesses who may have knowledge of the hostile work environment. If the investigation reveals harassing behavior, take immediate steps to correct it and prevent it from happening again. Follow up with the person who reported it to make certain your corrective actions are effective and that no further incidents have occurred. And finally, do not retaliate against the complaining employee. Learning from these missteps will go along way in minimizing your risk of harassment liability.

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March 10, 2014

Safety Violation Or Too Much Intermittent FMLA Leave? Tenth Circuit Says Jury Must Decide Wyoming Employee’s FMLA and ADA Case

By Brad Cave

Did Solvay Chemicals fire long-time employee Steven Smothers because of a first-time safety violation or because the company was tired of his frequent absences due to an ongoing medical disability? The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled that Smothers provided sufficient evidence to suggest that Solvay’s stated reason for his termination was pretextual, allowing his claims for unlawful retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to proceed. Smothers v. Solvay Chem., Inc., No. 12-8013 (Jan. 21, 2014). The Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on his state law claim for breach of an implied employment contract.

Medical Treatments and Severe Pain Lead to Frequent FMLA-Protected Absences

For eighteen years, Smothers worked as a surface maintenance mechanic in Solvay’s trona mine in Sweetwater County, Wyoming. The company considered him to be an excellent mechanic who did great work and got along with everyone. In 1994, Smothers injured his neck and developed degenerative disc disease in his spine. Over the next five years, Smothers had three surgeries to his neck as well as numerous other medical procedures. Despite treatment by a specialist, Smothers continued to have severe ongoing neck pain, severe migraine headaches and lower back problems. At times, Smothers was unable to work without pain treatments and he often was able to sleep only a few hours each night due to the pain.

Smothers asked for and was granted FMLA leave for intermittent absences caused by his condition. Managers and co-workers began to complain about his absenteeism, especially because he worked on the graveyard shift where there were fewer workers to absorb his absences resulting in increased overtime costs. Solvay’s production superintendent Melvin Wallendorf pressured Smothers to change to the day shift, but Smothers refused as the shift change would have cost him about $7,000 a year. Solvay’s human resources department advised Wallendorf that urging Smothers to switch shifts would violate the FMLA so Wallendorf stopped pressuring Smothers but did not stop complaining about his absences.

At one point, Wallendorf and Rick Wehrle, Smothers’ direct supervisor, gave Smothers a poor performance rating on his evaluation due to his absenteeism. In 2005 or 2006, Smothers applied for a promotion but was told that he was rejected because of his absences.

Safety Issue Explodes into Argument

In 2008, the graveyard crew conducted a routine maintenance acid wash to remove build up in its equipment. After a line ruptured, Smothers saw that a damaged “spool piece” had caused the problem and prepared to remove it. Another mechanic, Dan Mahaffey, suggested that Smothers wait for a line break permit, which is a form that certifies that employees have completed a checklist of precautions before a line can be safely disconnected. Smothers said that a permit wasn’t required because the line was already broken. Mahaffey and Smothers then argued. Mahaffey offered help on the repair which Smothers refused. Mahaffey took offense and accused Smothers of hypocrisy since Smothers had previously reported others for safety violations. Smothers made an offensive comment to Mahaffey and told him he did not want his kind of help. Smothers removed the broken piece and began the repair.

Mahaffey immediately reported the argument and Smothers’ removal of the spool piece without a line break permit to the area supervisor. Later that same day, three managers called Smothers in to discuss the safety violation. Although completing the line break permit may not have been absolutely necessary, Smothers later conceded that he should have locked out the pump valve before removing the part according to Solvay’s safety policies. Smothers apologized for not locking the pump valve before removing the piece and promised it wouldn’t happen again. Smothers was sent home pending an investigation.

Six managers were involved in deciding what to do about the argument and the safety violation. Three of the managers personally talked with Mahaffey about the argument but no one spoke to Smothers about it. About eight days later, Solvay fired Smothers. Smothers sued in Wyoming federal court, alleging, among other claims, unlawful FMLA retaliation, ADA discrimination and breach of an implied employment contract based on Solvay’s employee handbook.

FMLA Claim Bolstered By Disparate Treatment and Previous Retaliatory Acts

The trial court granted summary judgment to Solvay on Smothers’ FMLA and ADA claims. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit decided that Smothers presented enough evidence for a trial about whether Solvay’s real reason for his termination was his use of FMLA leave or his disability. Smothers provided evidence that other employees who committed similar safety violations were not fired. Five of the six decision-makers who fired Smothers were also involved in at least one decision in which a similarly situated employee was treated more favorably after violating the same or comparable safety rules. Smothers also pointed to the negative comments, negative performance rating, failure to promote and pressure to change shifts because of his FMLA-protected absences as evidence that the safety violation was a pretext for firing him for his FMLA leave. Moreover, Smothers showed that the decision-makers had failed to sufficiently investigate the argument he had with Mahaffey, basing their decision almost entirely on Mahaffey’s version of events. The Court decided that a reasonable jury could find that Solvay’s investigation into the quarrel was not fair or adequate. Based on this evidence, the Court found that there were issues of fact on whether Solvay’s termination reasons were pretextual and reversed the dismissal of Smothers’ FMLA retaliation claim.

Smothers Was Disabled Under ADA

Smothers also asserted that his firing was in violation of the ADA. He presented evidence that his medical condition was an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity, specifically his ability to sleep. Because the facts would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Smothers’ sleep was substantially limited, Smothers satisfied his burden of establishing a prima facie case of disability discrimination. As with the FMLA claim, the Court found sufficient evidence that Solvay’s stated termination reasons may have been a pretext for disability discrimination. Therefore, the Court reversed the dismissal of Smothers’ ADA claim as well.

No Breach of Implied Contract Based on Employee Handbook

Smothers also alleged that Solvay violated the terms of its employee handbook, giving rise to a claim for breach of implied contract under Wyoming law. The Court disagreed. Wyoming recognizes a claim for breach of implied contract if an employer fails to follow its own required procedures, such as the procedures laid out in an employee handbook. Solvay’s handbook contained a four-step progressive disciplinary process, with termination as the last step. But it also contained a provision that allowed Solvay to terminate an employee immediately for a serious offense, including a safety violation. Because the discipline policy unambiguously gave Solvay the discretion to fire employees who violate safety rules, the Court found that Solvay’s decision to terminate Smothers for violating a safety rule did not violate the terms of the employee handbook. Therefore, the appeals court upheld the trial court’s dismissal of Smothers’ breach of implied contract claim.

Back To Court They Go

We don’t know whether Smothers or Solvay will prevail if this case goes to trial but we do know that the appellate court thought that some of the evidence about the actions of Solvay managers could demonstrate that Solvay acted with a discriminatory motive:

Supervisors and co-workers gave Smothers a hard time about taking FMLA-protected leave.
Solvay failed to properly investigate all sides in the quarrel, accepting one employee’s version of events as fact.
The decision-makers treated Smothers more harshly than other similarly-situated employees who had violated similar safety rules.
Managers and supervisors considered Smothers’ FMLA absences when providing his performance evaluation and rejecting him for a promotion.

Evidence of these actions prevented Solvay from obtaining a grant of summary judgment on appeal. While Solvay may dispute Smothers’ evidence when the case actually goes to trial, this case stands as a lesson about the kinds of supervisory comments and actions that can feed into a discrimination claim, and a good reminder of how carefully employers must manage employees with injuries or disabilities.

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August 29, 2013

DOJ Will Not Challenge State Marijuana Legalization Laws – New Federal Enforcement Policy Unlikely to Affect Colorado Employers

By Emily Hobbs-Wright

On August 29, 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that it will not challenge the state ballot initiatives in Colorado and Washington that legalize the possession and use of small amounts of marijuana under state law. The DOJ makes clear, however, that marijuana remains an illegal drug under the federal Controlled Substances Act. This clarification means Colorado employers may still enforce their drug-free workplace policies and take appropriate action when an employee or applicant tests positive for marijuana.

DOJ Expects States to Enforce Strict Regulatory Schemes

In its August 29, 2013 Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement, the DOJ identifies eight enforcement priorities for federal law enforcement and prosecutors, such as preventing distribution of marijuana to minors, preventing the diversion of marijuana from states where it is legal to other states, and preventing drugged driving and the exacerbation of other public health consequences of marijuana use. The DOJ states that it expects that states and local governments to not only establish, but also enforce robust controls in their marijuana regulatory schemes to meet its federal objectives. The guidance instructs federal prosecutors to review marijuana cases on an individual basis, weighing all available information and evidence but to no longer “consider the size or commercial nature of a marijuana operation alone as a proxy for assessing whether marijuana trafficking implicates the Department’s enforcement priorities . . .” The DOJ further stated that if states fail to develop or enforce a strict regulatory scheme and the stated harms result, federal prosecutors will step in to enforce federal marijuana priorities and may challenge the regulatory schemes in those states.

Courts in Colorado Uphold Employer Terminations for Employee Marijuana Use

In April 2013, the Colorado Court of Appeals ruled that terminating an employee who tested positive for marijuana following his off-duty, off-premises use of medical marijuana did not violate Colorado’s lawful activities statute. Coats v. Dish Network LLC, 2013 COA 62. Brandon Coats, a quadriplegic who obtained a license to use medical marijuana under Colorado’s Amendment 20, was fired for violating his employer’s drug policy after testing positive for marijuana. Coats asserted that he never used marijuana on his employer’s premises, was never under the influence of marijuana at work and never used marijuana outside the limits of his medical marijuana license. He sued his employer, Dish Network, alleging that his termination violated Colorado’s lawful off-duty activities statute, CRS § 24-34-402.5(1), which prohibits an employer from discharging an employee for engaging in “any lawful activity off the premises of the employer during nonworking hours.”

The Coats court looked to the plain meaning of the term “lawful” in the statute and decided that “for an activity to be ‘lawful’ in Colorado, it must be permitted by, and not contrary to, both state and federal law.” Because marijuana was, and remains, illegal under federal law, the court held that marijuana use is not a “lawful activity” under the Colorado lawful activities statute and therefore, the employer did not violate the statute when it terminated him for testing positive for marijuana.

Earlier this week, the federal district court in Colorado ruled that enforcement of a drug-free workplace policy is a lawful basis for an employer’s decision to terminate an employee who tests positive for marijuana, whether from medical or any other use. Curry v. MillerCoors, Inc., No. 12-cv-2471 (Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, D.Colo. Aug. 21, 2013). In granting the employer’s motion to dismiss, the federal court rejected all of the former employee’s claims related to his medical use of marijuana that resulted in a positive drug test and his termination under the employer’s drug policy. Significantly, the court dismissed his disability discrimination claim under Colorado’s anti-discrimination statute as a matter of law, finding that it was lawful for the employer to discharge the employee under its drug-free workplace policy despite the employee’s allegation that he was terminated because of using medical marijuana to treat disabling medical conditions. Judge John L. Kane wrote “anti-discrimination law does not extend so far as to shield a disabled employee from the implementation of his employer’s standard policies against employee misconduct.” In dismissing the employee’s claim for violation of Colorado’s lawful activities statute, Judge Kane relied on the Coats decision and similarly ruled that because marijuana use is illegal under federal law, the employee’s medical marijuana use was not a “lawful activity” under the statute.

DOJ’s Announcement Should Not Change Workplace Decisions

The DOJ’s announcement of relaxed marijuana enforcement in states that have legalized marijuana does not alter employers’ ability to enforce their drug-free workplace policies. On the contrary, because the DOJ reinforced that marijuana remains an illegal drug under federal law, the analysis used by courts in Colorado to uphold termination decisions based on positive drug tests should continue to apply. Employers should create or revise their drug policies to state that use of any drug that is illegal under state or federal law will violate the policy. Employers then should enforce their policies in a consistent and uniform manner, regardless of the legalization of marijuana use in Colorado.

Disclaimer:This article is designed to provide general information on pertinent legal topics. The statements made are provided for educational purposes only. They do not constitute legal advice and are not intended to create an attorney-client relationship between you and Holland & Hart LLP. If you have specific questions as to the application of the law to your activities, you should seek the advice of your legal counsel.

August 20, 2013

NLRB Judge Strikes Down Employer’s Dress Code Following “Slave” Shirt Discipline

By Brian Mumaugh

What is wrong with an employer’s dress code that prohibits clothing that displays vulgar or obscene phrases, remarks or images which may be racially, sexually or otherwise offensive as well as clothing that displays words or images that are derogatory to the Company? It is overly broad and interferes with employees’ Section 7 rights under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act) to engage in union and/or protected concerted activity, according to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The ALJ’s review of the dress code came after the employer disciplined an employee who wore a T-shirt with the word “slave” on it next to a picture of a ball and chain and the employee’s time clock number. Dismissing the employer’s argument that the shirt would be racially offensive to visitors who toured its facility, the ALJ found that the employer violated the Act by sending the employee home without pay to change his “slave shirt.”

The History of the “Slave Shirt”

Mark Gluch was a long time employee of automotive parts manufacturer Alma Products Company and a vigorous supporter of the union representing his bargaining unit. The 2012 incident that gave rise to this case occurred when Gluch wore the “slave shirt” to work during a period of contentious negotiations for a new union contract. The origin of the shirt, however, dated back to 1993 when company employees developed and paid for the “slave shirts” to send the company a message during an earlier round of difficult contract negotiations. The shirts resurfaced in 1996 when the bargaining unit employees wore them while picketing during a strike. Immediately following the strike, as many as 30% of the unit employees wore the “slave shirts” to work on any given Friday. No discipline or policy infraction was noted or enforced at that time.

Company Seeks to Avoid Racially Offensive Shirt

When a new president and CEO, Alan Gatlin, took over for Alma Products in 2005, he noticed employees wearing the “slave shirt.” Finding the shirts to be racially offensive, he felt embarrassed that customers and visitors to the facility would see employees wearing the shirt and be offended. He testified that in his view, the shirts did not reflect well on the Company with customers as they tried to get new business. Gatlin asked the human resources manager to draft a dress code policy which was implemented in early 2006. The dress code policy did not specifically reference the “slave shirt” but included general prohibitions against clothing that displayed “vulgar/obscene phrases, remarks or images which may be racially, sexually or otherwise offensive and clothing displaying words or images derogatory to the Company . . .” The policy also stated “[i]f you are uncertain whether an article of clothing is appropriate under this policy, follow the old adage of better safe than sorry and refrain from wearing it at work.”

After implementing the dress code in 2006, it appears that employees seldom wore the “slave shirt” to work. However, during difficult union contract negotiations in April 2012, Gluch and other employees began wearing pro-union shirts and pins and Gluch wore the “slave shirt” to work. Gluch’s supervisor gave Gluch the option of removing the shirt or turning it inside out so that the writing would not be visible. When Gluch refused to do so, he was sent home without pay for wearing the shirt.

ALJ Rejects Company’s Concerns About Racial Discrimination

The union filed an unfair labor practice charge claiming, among other things, that the policy and the Company’s enforcement of the policy, violated the Act. The Company argued that the shirt’s “slave” reference was offensive to African-Americans due to the history of slavery in the United States. Noting that an important buyer from Chrysler was African-American as was a new production supervisor at the facility, the Company asserted that it was entitled to discipline Gluch for wearing the racially offensive shirt. The ALJ rejected this argument, stating that the NLRB has repeatedly found employees to be protected even when they displayed messages that likened their working conditions to those of a slave. The ALJ noted that the dictionary definition of “slave” does not reference race, but instead focuses on the condition of servitude or being subject to a person or influence. In addition, given the shirt’s history that it had been worn to work over the past two decades as support for the union, the ALJ determined that it would not be seen as carrying a racial message. Moreover, the Company had a policy prohibiting racial discrimination since the 1990s, yet had failed to take any action to prohibit wearing the “slave shirt” as racially offensive prior to Gluch’s wearing of the shirt in 2012.

Key to the ALJ’s analysis of the dress code policy was its general prohibition of words or images that are derogatory to the Company. The ALJ found that the policy interfered with employees’ Section 7 activity, such as protected statements to coworkers, supervisors or third parties who deal with the Company, because it would prohibit employees from objecting to their working conditions and seeking the support of others in improving them. The dress code policy was found to be unlawfully overbroad because it prohibits all communications derogatory to the company regardless of whether the words are racially or sexually discriminatory or are protected as concerted activities under the National Labor Relations Act. In addition, by directing employees to be “safe” not “sorry,” the ALJ stated that the policy directs employees to construe the prohibition on derogatory comments such that it prohibits Section 7 activity.

Dress Code Policies That Do Not Restrict Section 7 Activity

With the NLRB (and its ALJs) striking down a variety of employer policies relating to both union and non-union employees, it is difficult to draw a bright line to determine which policies pass scrutiny and which do not. That said, employers can learn lessons from this recent decision that may help keep their dress code policy away from NLRB review. First, use specific examples of acceptable versus unacceptable attire rather than general statements that require interpretation. Second, if your workplace warrants different dress standards for different segments of employees (e.g., public-facing employees vs. behind the scenes employees), make those standards clear and justified by business necessity. Third, if you include a statement that prohibits derogatory words or images on clothing, include a statement that communications protected by Section 7 are permissible under the dress code. Finally, enforce your policy in a uniform and consistent manner, so that all dress code violations are treated similarly regardless of the employee or supervisor involved.