Category Archives: Utah

November 16, 2015

Overtime Pay Changes May Be Delayed Until Mid-to-Late 2016

The Department of Labor (DOL) does not expect to issue its final rule changing the overtime exemptions until mid-to-late 2016, according to a recent report in the Wall Street Journal. The report states that Solicitor of Labor, Patricia Smith, provided the new timeline at an American Bar Association Labor and Employment Law conference in Philadelphia last week. The final rule is expected to greatly expand the number of employees who are eligible for minimum wage and overtime pay. If the final rule is delayed until mid-to-late next year, the changes probably won’t go into effect until sometime in 2017.

Why The Delay?

In March 2014, President Obama directed the DOL to update its regulations defining which white collar employees are exempt from the minimum wage and overtime pay requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). It took over a year – until July 6, 2015 – for the DOL to issue its proposed changes. The proposed rules raise the salary threshold for white collar exemptions to the 40th percentile of weekly earnings for full-time salaried workers nationwide, or an estimated $970 per week/$50,440 per year. The salary threshold for highly compensated exempt employees would go up from $100,000 to about $122,148 per year. The proposed rules include a mechanism for automatic annual increases to the salary thresholds. See an earlier blog post for a more detailed explanation of the proposed changes.

After the proposed rules came out in July, businesses and organizations flooded the DOL with an estimated 290,000 comments. Solicitor Smith reportedly told the ABA conference attendees that the large volume of comments and the complex nature of the changes were the cause of the delay in issuing the final rules. Another explanation could be politics and the desire to wait to issue the new rules until after next year’s presidential election.

Next Steps

Employers may have more time to prepare for the expected overtime pay changes, but the timing remains uncertain despite the Solicitor’s comments. Plan to review the employees you currently consider to be exempt and note those positions and persons that are being paid close to the salary threshold. Those will be the ones who may no longer be exempt after the salary thresholds go up. Although no changes to the duties requirements were part of July’s proposed rule, the DOL asked for comments on the duty rules. Accordingly, the FLSA white collar exemption duty requirements could change after the final rules come out. We will keep you posted on any new developments.

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November 12, 2015

Are Your Background Check Disclosure Forms FCRA-Compliant?

By Mark Wiletsky

A rash of class action lawsuits is forcing employers to defend their background check disclosure and authorization forms. The current focus is on disclosure forms that include extraneous information. Here’s what you need to know to lessen your risk of a similar class action lawsuit.

FCRA Disclosure Requirement

If you obtain background check reports from a third party, such as a consumer reporting agency that provides employment-related screening services, you need to comply with the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). The FCRA, among other things, requires that employers disclose to applicants/employees that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes before requesting the report. Specifically, an employer or prospective employer must provide “a clear and conspicuous disclosure” in writing to the individual on whom the report is to be conducted and that disclosure must be “in a document that consists solely of the disclosure.”

It is this stand-alone disclosure requirement that is now the subject of many class action lawsuits. Applicants (and their class-action counsel) scrutinize the background check disclosure forms used by employers and if there is any extraneous information included on the form, they file a lawsuit alleging that the employer violated the FCRA by failing to provide a stand-alone disclosure. The applicants can allege a statutory FCRA violation without suffering any actual damages, seeking recovery of between $100 and $1,000 for each member of the class of applicants who were provided the same form. They also seek punitive damages for willful violations of the FCRA.

Extraneous Information on FCRA Forms

The text of the FCRA does not define what it means to be a “document that consists solely of the [required] disclosure.” It does, however, state that the required written authorization from the applicant/employee may be included with the disclosure. Consequently, employers may combine the FCRA disclosure with the authorization/consent requirement, but any other information on the form may jeopardize compliance.

As these cases proceed through the courts, judges have found certain types of additional information on the FCRA disclosure form to be problematic, including:

Imbedding the FCRA disclosure within a job application
Release of liability, e.g., “I hereby release [employer] and any of its authorized agents from liability”
Acknowledgement of no discrimination, e.g., “I fully understand that all employment decisions are based on legitimate non-discriminatory reasons”
Ramifications of falsified information, e.g., “I understand that submission of false information on this or any employment forms may result in non-selection or termination if hired”
State-specific notices, e.g., notices specific to California or New York applicants, etc.
Statements about how background information will be gathered and from which sources
Procedures for how to dispute information on the reports, including time frames for challenging the accuracy of any report
Name, address and contact information of the consumer reporting agency

In most cases, the courts have refused to dismiss these lawsuits at an early stage, allowing the class representatives to proceed with their allegations of FCRA violations based on these types of extraneous information in disclosure forms. It is unclear whether a judge or jury will ultimately conclude that an FCRA violation exists in these cases, but the affected employers face significant risk of liability as well as the time, expense and public notoriety related to defending these actions in court.

Don’t Rely On Your Screener

If you think you are out of danger because you rely on FCRA forms provided by your background screening company, think again. Consider the recent class action filed against Big Lots in Philadelphia. The national chain of retail stores used a “Consent to Request Consumer Report & Investigative Consumer Report Information” form provided by its background check provider, Sterling Infosystems, that did not contain the required disclosure language. Instead, the form included allegedly extraneous information, including an implied liability waiver, a full page of state-specific notices, and information about how background information will be gathered and how disputed information may be challenged.

The class action seeks to hold Big Lots liable for its alleged violation of its FCRA disclosure obligations, and it will be up to Big Lots to try to hold Sterling Infosystems liable for providing non-compliant forms. However, because many background screening providers limit their liability in their service contracts, sometimes to only two or three months’ worth of screening costs, you may be left without much recourse.

Review Your FCRA Forms

Take the time to review your background check disclosure and authorization forms now. Make sure your FCRA disclosure and authorization is not imbedded or buried in your employment application. If your disclosure forms include extraneous statements, such as liability waivers, state-specific disclosures, or other background check procedures, your forms may not meet the FCRA requirement to be a stand-alone disclosure. Consider removing the extra wording from the FCRA disclosure forms and move them to a different, non-FCRA-related document. These sorts of class actions can be easy pickings, so taking action now will go a long way toward avoiding being hauled into court.

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October 29, 2015

NLRB To Revisit Whether Graduate Teaching Assistants May Collectively Bargain

By Steve Gutierrez

Seeking to overturn long-standing precedent, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) recently agreed to review whether graduate students who work as teaching or research assistants at universities are “employees” for purposes of voting for a union. The United Auto Workers (UAW) is seeking to represent student employees at The New School, a not-for-profit operator of higher education institutions in New York. Like a dog with a bone, the current NLRB is unwilling to give up on finding coverage for grad student assistants, despite two rejections of the representation petition by the Regional Director.

Is It Work or Educational?

The UAW petitioned to represent all student employees who provide teaching or research services at The New School. The proposed bargaining unit includes teaching assistants, fellows and tutors, as well as research assistants and associates.

The facts related to these positions are as follows:

About 350 individuals work in the proposed bargaining unit
The positions typically require between 10 and 20 hours of work per week
Each graduate assistant position typically lasts for one 15-week semester, but many graduate assistants are renewed for multiple semesters
The New School provides approximately $5 million annually to grad students in these positions
Each faculty member is allotted up to $5,100 per year to be used for student assistants
Teaching assistants are paid $4,500 per semester; teaching fellows receive $5,500 per semester, and tutors are paid an hourly rate, typically $17.00 per hour
Research associates can receive stipends of up to $40,000 per year due to grants from the federal government
Graduate assistants must provide I-9 forms to be eligible for the positions
Payments to the graduate assistants are made through a payroll account and taxes are withheld
Payments are disbursed biweekly but do not vary based on the number of hours worked (except for tutors)
Graduate assistants are not required to track, and the university does not monitor the amount of time spent on their duties
Applicants for these positions must maintain a minimum GPA
Some are selected using a formal process of interviews and appointment letters from the Human Resources department while others are offered positions more informally directly from a professor
Selection for the position is not dependent on financial need

When the UAW first petitioned to represent this group of student employees in December 2014, the Regional Director for the New York region dismissed the petition based on the NLRB’s 2004 decision in Brown University, which held that graduate student assistants were not “employees” under the National Labor Relations Act, and therefore, could not be unionized. The 2004 Board had decided that the graduate assistants had a primarily academic relationship with their school, not an economic, work-related one. Case closed, right? Wrong.

Will Graduate Assistant Precedent Be Overturned?

In March 2015, the Board reviewed the initial dismissal of the petition and sent it back to the region for a hearing. The Hearing Officer heard testimony and received evidence during a seven-day hearing, but in late July, the Regional Director found that Brown University still controlled, and dismissed the petition again.

The UAW requested (again) that the Board review the dismissal of its representation petition. On October 21, 2015, on a 3-1 vote, the Board granted the request for review, finding that it “raises substantial issues warranting review.”

The vote goes along political lines, with the three democratic members voting to review the graduate assistant issue and the sole republican member dissenting. (Note: the Board is currently short one member.) In his dissent, member Philip Miscimarra wrote that the sole basis for the UAW to seek review is its desire to have the Board overrule Brown University. Miscimarra believes there is no reason to overturn Brown University, pointing, in part, to the prevailing view for more than 40 years that graduate student assistants are not statutory employees, except for a four-year period from 2000-2004 when the ruling flip-flopped in favor of finding they were employees.

Is another flip-flop likely? It very well could be, given that the current majority of the Board continues to look to expand the reach of the NLRA. But even if the Board should find that graduate student assistants are statutory employees, it will need to address an argument by The New School that they are “casual” or “temporary” employees which would still deny them union representation.

We will continue to follow this case and pass along any developments as they occur.

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September 23, 2015

HHS Proposes To Ban Discrimination in Health Programs

By Patricia Dean

Under a newly proposed rule from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), consumers cannot be discriminated against or denied health services or health coverage because of their race, color, national origin, sex, age, or disability. The proposed rule is called Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities and is intended to provide equal access to health care services to individuals who historically have been vulnerable to discrimination, including discrimination based on gender identity. The new rule would also require language assistance for people with limited proficiency in the English language.

The proposed rule applies to any health program administered by HHS, that receives funding in any part from HHS, such as providers who treat Medicare patients, and to all plans offered through the Marketplaces. Read our full alert about this proposed rule here.

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September 11, 2015

Broader Joint-Employer Test Leads to Teamsters Win At Browning-Ferris

By Steve Gutierrez

In a previous article, we noted that the NLRB’s recent Browning-Ferris ruling was significant for those employers who use temporary or staffing agencies to provide workers. The Board set a new, broader test for joint-employer status that does not require the purported joint employer to exercise control over the workers in question. Instead, if the company has the right to exercise control over the terms and conditions of certain workers, it can be deemed a joint employer even if it never actually exercises that control. Now we can see the significance of the impact.

Based upon the joint-employer determination, the impounded ballots of the workers of Leadpoint Business Services, the entity that staffed Browning-Ferris’s California recycling plant, were counted as part of the bargaining unit, which provided a 73-17 margin in favor of representation by the Teamsters. Depending on the outcome of any objections filed by the company, the NLRB will certify the union as the collective bargaining representative for the recycling center’s workers. This allows the unit to collectively bargain over the terms and conditions of employment at that facility.

Bargaining Over Terms Of Contingent Workers

Think about this: Browning-Ferris does not “employ” the workers placed at its facility by staffing agency, Leadpoint. It doesn’t hire, pay, provide benefits to, or fire them. Yet, it will be required to sit down at the bargaining table across from the Teamsters to negotiate the terms and conditions of employment of those contingent workers over which it retains authority to control. That is the result of being found a joint employer of the bargaining-unit workers.

Extension of Joint-Employer Test to Other Contexts?

Joint-employer status is a critical determination for companies that use contingent workers as well as for franchises. And, it can apply not only in the union context, but also in other employment law contexts, such as for pay purposes under the Fair Labor Standards Act or for discrimination under Title VII. Even though the standards and policy behind a joint-employer relationship under other employment laws may differ from those behind the National Labor Relations Act, this new, broader test will likely be asserted in these other contexts in order to bring in franchisors and companies that use contingent workers as potentially liable parties.

Appeal Over Joint-Employer Test Coming?

Because of the high stakes involved in this ruling, it would not be surprising if Browning-Ferris (which is part of Republic Services, Inc.) appealed the NLRB’s ruling, taking its case to the applicable court of appeals. Another option is that after the union is certified, Browning-Ferris could refuse to bargain with the Teamsters which would lead to more proceedings before the Board, and ultimately, the courts. Given that the Board has already ruled in favor of the union on this matter, the company will likely have a better chance seeking review by circuit judges. Either way, this matter is probably not over.

Stay tuned and we will let you know what develops further. What we do know, is the NLRB will not sit idle and we should expect it to use its power to push the envelope in favor of the nation’s unions.

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September 2, 2015

Utah Supreme Court: Misappropriation of Trade Secrets Presumes Irreparable Harm

By Bryan Benard

A Utah employer has dodged a $229,482 fee award and can continue its lawsuit against a former employee for misappropriation of company trade secrets and violation of a non-disclosure agreement. The Utah Supreme Court recently revived InnoSys, Inc.’s claims against a former engineer, Amanda Mercer, holding that the company established a prima facie case of trade secret misappropriation that gave rise to a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm. The divided Court reversed the grant of Mercer’s summary judgment motion, allowing the company to take its claims to trial. InnoSys, Inc. v. Mercer, 2015 UT 80.

Employee Copied Sensitive Company Information to Thumb Drive and Personal Email Account

During her employment as an engineer for InnoSys, Mercer forwarded confidential company emails to her personal Gmail account. On the day that she was terminated for poor performance, Mercer copied the company’s confidential business plan onto a thumb drive.

Following her termination, Mercer filed a claim for unemployment benefits with the Utah Department of Workforce Services. After her claim was denied, she appealed, submitting a number of protected documents, including the confidential business plan and protected emails, into the administrative record. At that point, InnoSys began asking for details as to when and how she gained access to the confidential materials. Mercer then deleted all of the emails and InnoSys files. InnoSys filed a complaint in court, alleging that Mercer had breached her non-disclosure agreement (NDA), misappropriated company trade secrets in violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) and breached her fiduciary duty to the company.

Employee Changed Her Story But Still Won Judgment From Lower Court

Throughout discovery, Mercer changed her story regarding the use of her Gmail account and the timing of her acquisition of the company’s confidential business plan. Despite first claiming that she had IT’s permission to transfer company emails to her personal Gmail account, Mercer later admitted that she did not have anyone’s permission to do so. As to the business plan, Mercer initially testified in her deposition that she had copied the business plan onto a thumb drive because she had been asked to review the plan the day before her termination and was unable to access it via the company’s secure remote network. She later admitted that she copied it on the day of her termination and did not have it in her possession the day before she was fired.

Despite Mercer’s inconsistent statements regarding how she obtained the company’s confidential information, the district court ruled in Mercer’s favor on all of InnoSys’s claims. It did so after concluding that “there was no objectively reasonable basis to believe that Mercer had harmed InnoSys or was threatening to do so.” In addition to dismissing all of InnoSys’s claims against Mercer, the lower court also granted Mercer’s motion for sanctions against InnoSys and to collect attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party. The court ordered InnoSys to pay Mercer $229,481.58. InnoSys appealed.

Evidence of Harm

At the crux of the appeal was whether InnoSys needed to provide sufficient evidence of harm or threatened harm as a result of Mercer’s misappropriation and/or disclosure of company trade secrets to avoid summary judgment and proceed to trial. The lower court had found that InnoSys had not presented sufficient evidence that it had been harmed by Mercer’s admitted taking and disclosure of confidential company information and therefore, could not support its claims.

The Utah Supreme Court disagreed, holding that where a company establishes a prima facie case of misappropriation of trade secrets under the UTSA, it is entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm. The company was not required to produce evidence of financial damages as it also sought an injunction to prevent Mercer from further disclosing or using its confidential information.

The presumption of irreparable harm, as well as affirmative evidence of threatened harm, was also enough to keep alive the company’s claim for breach of the NDA. By reversing the grant of summary judgment in Mercer’s favor, the Court overturned the award of sanctions and attorneys’ fees against InnoSys.

Lessons Learned

First, put procedures in place to retain all signed employee agreements and documents. InnoSys initially could not find the NDA that Mercer had signed when her employment began. The lower court was hard on the company for that failure, and did not want to accept a copy of its standard NDA as evidence of what Mercer signed. The company eventually found the NDA signed by Mercer but the turmoil caused by its absence highlights the importance of strict record keeping for important employee agreements. Be certain to keep your signed agreements and acknowledgments in a secure location. You never know when you might need to enforce them.

Second, when employment ends for any reason, take steps to ensure that the departing employee returns all company information and property without retaining any copies. It is unclear from the opinion whether InnoSys asked Mercer for the return of any company materials when she was fired but it appears that it learned she had confidential company information after she submitted the company documents as part of her unemployment appeal. Don’t wait until after there has been a disclosure or further misappropriation but instead, proactively cut off access to company materials and seek the return of all company property. And remind departing employees of their continued obligations under confidentiality policies and NDAs.

Finally, enforce your NDAs to ensure continued protection of your company trade secrets and other proprietary information. Allowing a former employee to retain or disclose confidential information will undermine your future chances of arguing that such information is indeed a trade secret. You must continually guard that information or it will lose its protected status.

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August 28, 2015

NLRB Throws Out Years of Joint-Employer Precedent – Adopts Two-Part Test For Joint-Employer Status

By Brian Mumaugh

The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) has thrown employers a curve by overruling 30 years of long-standing decisions that narrowed the circumstances under which a joint-employer relationship could be found to exist. In a closely-watched decision, the Board revised its joint-employer standard, dictating a broader two-step test that will result in entities that use contingent workers more likely being deemed joint employers for union representation purposes. Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc., 362 NLRB No. 186 (Aug. 27, 2015).

Two-Part Joint Employer Test

In its 3-to-2 decision, the Board reaffirmed a 1982 joint-employer standard under which the Board will find that two or more statutory employers are joint employers of the same employees if they share or codetermine the essential terms and conditions of employment. First, the Board will determine whether the putative employer has a common-law employment relationship with the employees in question. If that relationship exists, the Board then will determine whether the employer possesses sufficient control over the employees’ essential terms and conditions of employment to permit meaningful collective bargaining.

Employer Need Not Exercise Control Over Employees

Over the past 30 years, joint-employer cases have defined the degree of control that an employer must assert over the workers to be deemed a joint employer. Those cases, including Laerco and TLI, required that the putative employer actually exercise control over the terms and conditions of employment to be deemed a joint employer. In addition, exercising that control had to be direct and immediate, not of a limited and routing nature. Simply possessing the authority to exercise control, without actually exercising that control, was not enough under long-standing Board law.

That requirement is now gone. The Board ruled, in Browning-Ferris, it will no longer require that a joint employer exercise its authority to control the terms and conditions of the employees’ employment. The proper inquiry will be whether the statutory employer “possesses sufficient control over the work of the employees to qualify as a joint employer with” another employer. In addition, control exercised indirectly, such as through an agent or intermediary, may be sufficient to establish joint-employer status.

BFI Deemed A Joint Employer With Temp Agency

After articulating its revised test, the Board applied it to the BFI case at hand. The case arose after a union sought to include certain workers at the BFI Newby Island Recyclery in a bargaining unit during a union election. The workers were employed by Leadpoint Business Services, a temporary labor services agency, and were assigned to work at BFI’s recycling plant as sorters, screen cleaners and housekeepers. The contract between BFI and Leadpoint specifically stated that Leadpoint was the sole employer of the workers and there was no employment relationship between BFI and those workers.

The Board concluded that BFI was a joint employer of the workers with Leadpoint. Contributing factors leading the Board to determine that BFI is a common-law employer and shares or codetermines essential terms and conditions of employment include:

BFI retained the right to require that Leadpoint meet or exceed BFI’s own standard selection procedures and tests, requires drug tests and prohibits Leadpoint from hiring workers deemed to be ineligible for rehire by BFI;
BFI retained the right to reject any worker that Leadpoint refers to its facility “for any or no reason” and to discontinue the use of any personnel that Leadpoint assigned to it;
BFI managers had requested the immediate dismissal of certain workers due to misconduct and Leadpoint dismissed them from BFI’s facility shortly afterward;
BFI controlled the speed of the material streams and specific productivity standards for sorting;
BFI managers assigned specific tasks that need to be completed, determined where workers are to be positions and exercised near-constant oversight of workers’ performance;
BFI identified the number of workers it needs, the timing of the shifts and when overtime is necessary, even though Leadpoint selects the specific employees who will do the work;
Despite Leadpoint determining pay rates, administering payroll and benefits and retaining payroll records, BFI prevented Leadpoint from paying employees more than BFI employees in comparable jobs and used a cost-plus model under the contract;
After a new minimum wage law went into effect, BFI and Leadpoint entered into an agreement for BFI to pay a higher rate for the services of Leadpoint employees.

As a result of finding that BFI was a joint employer of these workers, the Board ordered the Regional Director to open and count the impounded ballots cast by the employees in the petitioned-for unit. If the employees voted for union representation, BFI will have to collectively bargain over the terms and conditions of employment over which it retains the right to control.

Implications For Employers

The Board seeks to prevent companies from insulating themselves from the application of labor laws by using temporary or other contingent workforces and this new standard will further their goal. This new, broader standard for joint-employer status will make it easier for unions to include contingent workers into bargaining units at the facilities for which they are providing services. In addition, as pointed out by the dissent, this change “will subject countless entities to unprecedented new joint-bargaining obligations that most do not even know they have, to potential joint liability for unfair labor practices and breaches of collective-bargaining agreements, and to economic protest activity, including what have heretofore been unlawful secondary strikes, boycotts and picketing.”

If your organization uses contingent workers, you should review your existing labor services agreements and, to the extent possible, renegotiate any terms that reserve your right to control the terms and conditions of the contingent workers’ employment. You also should attempt to eliminate any functional oversight and decision-making to ensure that you are not exercising any control, whether directly or indirectly, over the contingent workers. The reservation of the right to dictate any terms or conditions of employment, or the actual exercise of that control in any way, is likely to lead you to be deemed a joint employer of those workers.

We will keep you posted of further developments, including any appeals of this decision.

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August 24, 2015

Home Care Workers Entitled to Minimum Wage and Overtime

By Mark Wiletsky

Agencies that provide companionship or live-in care services for the elderly, ill or disabled will now have to pay their home care workers minimum wage and overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Reversing a lower court decision, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the Department of Labor’s (DOL’s) new regulations that removed those employees from the “domestic service” exemption. The Court also struck down the challenge to the DOL’s revised definition of companionship services that now places a duty restriction on workers who may be considered exempt.

Extension of FLSA Protections Is Reasonable

For years, individuals who provide companionship or live-in care services were exempt from the minimum wage and overtime rules under the FLSA, even if those individuals were employed by a third party. In 2013, however, the DOL reversed its prior interpretation of the domestic service exemption, adopting new regulations stating that third-party employers of companionship-services and live-in employees could no longer use the exemption to avoid paying minimum wage and overtime pay to their home care workers. The new regulations also narrowed the definition of companionship services: a worker providing exempt services can spend no more than 20 percent of his or her total hours worked on the provision of care, including meal preparation, driving, light housework, managing finances, assistance with the physical taking of medications, and arranging medical care.

Before the new rules went into effect, trade associations representing third-party agencies that employ home care workers challenged the DOL’s new regulations in court and the district judge declared them invalid. The lower court ruled that the DOL’s decision to exclude a class of employees from the exemption because they were employed by a third-party agency contravened the plain terms of the FLSA. The court also threw out the DOL’s revised definition of companionship services, with its 20 percent limit on care-related tasks, as contrary to both the text and intent of the statutory exemption.

On August 21, 2015, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia disagreed and upheld the new regulations. The appellate court found that the FLSA exemption did not specifically address the third-party employment question and therefore, the DOL had the authority to create rules and regulations to fill in the gap.

The court also determined that the DOL’s new interpretation was “entirely reasonable.” The DOL explained that its change in policy was due to the change in the market for home health care. In the 1970’s, professional care for the elderly and disabled was primarily provided in hospitals and nursing homes so that services in the home were largely that of an “elder sitter” or companion. More recently, however, individuals needing a significant amount of care were now receiving that care in their own homes, provided by professionals employed by third-party agencies rather than by workers hired directly by care recipients or their families. These changes, as well as Congress’s intent to bring more workers within the FLSA’s protections, convinced the court that the DOL’s changed interpretation was reasonable.

Potential Adverse Effects of FLSA Coverage Unfounded

The third-party agencies challenging the DOL’s regulations argued that requiring minimum wage and overtime pay for home care workers would raise the cost of their services, making home care less affordable and creating a “perverse incentive for re-institutionalization of the elderly and disabled.” The DOL countered by pointing to fifteen states where minimum wage and overtime protections already extend to most third-party-employed home care workers and noted that there was no reliable data that these pay protections led either to increased institutionalization or a decline in the continuity of care. The DOL also cited the industry’s own survey that indicated that home care agencies operating in those fifteen states had a similar percentage of consumers receiving 24-hour care as those agencies in non-overtime states.

The DOL further argued that the new rules would improve the quality of home care services, thus benefitting consumers, because the revised regulations would result in better qualified employees and lower turnover. It would also reflect the reality that home care workers employed by third-party agencies are professional caregivers, many of whom have training or certifications, who work for agencies that profit from their employees’ services. The appellate court found the DOL’s position reasonable, upholding its regulations.

No Standing to Challenge Narrowed Definition of Companionship Services

By ruling that the third-party agencies could not use the domestic services exemption, the court removed the ability of those agencies to use the companionship services definition to exempt home care workers from minimum wage and overtime protections. As a result, the trade associations’ members challenging the new, narrowed definition of companionship services would not be directly harmed by the revised definition. Because they would not suffer any injury from the narrowed definition, the challengers lacked standing to oppose the revision, denying the court of jurisdiction to resolve that issue. Consequently, the court ordered that judgment be entered in favor of the DOL.

Practical Effect for Home Care Employers

Pending any appeals, the DOL’s new regulations removing the ability of third-party home care agencies to exempt their home care workers from FLSA minimum wage and overtime pay will go into effect. Employers of home care workers should take steps now to ensure that they comply with the FLSA minimum wage requirement for all hours worked as well as paying an overtime premium for all hours worked over 40 per week. In addition to updating your pay practices, be sure to revise any affected policies and statements in your employee handbook, operational manual, timekeeping procedures, job advertisements and recruiting materials.

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August 18, 2015

NLRB Unanimously Declines Jurisdiction Over Northwestern University Football Player Union Petition

By Steve Gutierrez

The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) declined to assert jurisdiction over the petition filed by a union seeking to represent Northwestern University’s scholarship football players. In 2014, the Regional Director for the Region covering Northwestern University found that Northwestern’s football players who received grant-in-aid scholarships were employees within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act) and were entitled to petition for union representation. In its unanimous decision announced yesterday, the Board dismissed that union petition, deciding that it would not assert jurisdiction over these specific college athletes as doing so would not promote stability in labor relations or further the purposes of the Act.

Board Refuses to Decide Whether College Athletes Are Statutory Employees

After considering the positions of the union seeking to represent Northwestern’s football players, the University, who contended that its scholarship players were not statutory employees, and the many interested parties who submitted briefs, the Board refused to decide the controversial issue raised by the Regional Director’s 2014 decision, namely whether Northwestern’s grant-in aid scholarship football players are employees under the NLRA. Instead, by refusing to assert jurisdiction, the Board dismissed the union’s petition to represent this group of college athletes, effectively nullifying the impounded ballots that had been cast in the union election in April 2014.

Single Team Athletes Unlike Other Covered Cases

The Board distinguished this group of athletes from other types of students and athletes for which the Board has asserted jurisdiction. First, the Board focused on the nature of the college sports leagues and structure of college football bowl divisions. It noted that the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and the Big Ten Conference (to which Northwestern University belongs) dictate eligibility requirements, minimum academic standards, scholarship terms, amateur status, mandatory practice hours and other rules under which the scholarship athletes may compete. The Board saw these rules as distinguishing the scholarship players from graduate student assistants or student janitors and cafeteria workers whose employee status the Board had considered in other cases.

The Board then distinguished Northwestern’s scholarship players from professional sports leagues, which are covered by union contracts. Previous Board cases involving professional sports have involved leaguewide bargaining units that cover all players across the league. Here, the union sought to represent players from a single team. The Board cannot assert jurisdiction over the majority of colleges and universities that make up the college football divisions as the vast majority are public institutions which are not employers under the Act. Consequently, the Board could not assert jurisdiction over most of Northwestern’s primary competitors. The Board found that asserting jurisdiction over a single team, rather than across an entire league, would not promote stability in labor relations.

Rare Limit On Board’s Reach

In recent years, the Board has extended its reach, offering NLRA protections in expansive ways and revising rules to make it easier for unions to win elections. Today’s ruling is a rare exception to that expansive trend, curtailing the reach of the NLRA to the scholarship football players at a private university. The Board did, however, express the limited nature of this decision, noting that changed circumstances may prompt a reconsideration of this issue in the future. We’ll have to wait to see if unions try again to organize scholarship athletes under different conditions.

August 10, 2015

Dodd-Frank CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Rules Approved

By Bret Busacker

On August 5, 2015, the SEC approved the final rules on the so-called “CEO pay ratio disclosure” under the Dodd-Frank Act. The CEO pay ratio disclosure will require most publicly traded companies (referred to below as a “registrant”) to disclose the ratio of CEO pay to the median income of all other employees of the registrant.

Companies must first begin providing the pay ratio disclosure for the first full fiscal year that begins on or after January 1, 2017. Accordingly, for most companies with a December 31 year-end, disclosure will first be required in the registrant’s 10-K filed in 2018 for the 2017 fiscal year or in the 2018 proxy statement for the 2018 shareholder meeting (so long as the proxy is filed within 120 days of the 10-K).

Here is a general summary of the CEO pay ratio disclosure requirements as well as an explanation of the more significant changes adopted as part of the final rule.

Note: The CEO Pay Ratio Rule uses the term PEO (Principal Executive Officer) in lieu of CEO. We refer to the CEO below for simplicity.

General Overview of the CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule

Who does the rule apply to? Registrants who are required to provide executive compensation disclosure pursuant to Item 402 of Regulation S-K must comply with the CEO pay ratio disclosure. Emerging growth companies, smaller reporting companies and foreign private issuers are not subject to the rule. Special transition rules apply to companies that become publicly traded or become subject to the rule as a result of a merger or acquisition.

Where must the CEO pay ratio be disclosed? Generally, wherever executive compensation disclosure is otherwise required under Item 402 of Regulation S-K. Accordingly, disclosure will be required on Form 10-K, proxy statements and registration statements that require executive compensation disclosure (but not in current reports or quarterly reports). The pay ratio disclosure is considered “filed” with the SEC instead of “furnished.” Accordingly, the disclosure is subject to the applicable liability provisions under Section 18 of the Exchange Act and Section 11 of the Securities Act.

How does the CEO Pay Ratio Rule work? The focus of the rule is to identify the employee with the median income of the registrant and its affiliates (excluding the income of the CEO) and compare the median income employee’s total annual compensation to the CEO’s total annual compensation. This means the registrant must establish a compensation list of all employees (other than the CEO) and their compensation levels and then determine which employee has the same number of employee compensation levels above and below him or her on that list. Once the median income employee is identified, that employee’s total annual compensation must be described in a ratio to the CEO’s annual total compensation for the same year using the proxy statement summary compensation table rules in Item 402(c) of Regulation S-K (“SCT Compensation”).

May a registrant use a simplified method to identify the median income employee? Yes. A registrant may use W-2 wages or other types of consistent compensation records to identify the median income employee. In addition, a registrant may use statistical sampling of its employees or other reasonable methods in identifying the employee with median income. Accordingly, a registrant could use a statistical sample of the W-2 wages of its employees to identify the median income employee. However, once the median income employee is identified, that median income employee’s compensation must be calculated using SCT Compensation (defined above) in order to actually report the CEO pay ratio disclosure in the proxy or Form 10-K.

Which employees must be considered in determining the median income employee? All full-time, part-time, and seasonal workers worldwide of a registrant (and its affiliates) must be considered in identifying the median income employee. However, as explained below, the final rule does allow a registrant to exclude a limited number of non-U.S. employees and provides the registrant some flexibility in determining the date used to determine the list of employees considered in identifying the median income employee.

How may the CEO pay ratio be described? The ratio may be described numerically (e.g., “the ratio of the median of the total annual compensation of all employees (other than the CEO) to that of the CEO is 1 to 268”) or narratively (e.g., “the CEO’s annual total compensation is 268 times that of the median annual total compensation of all employees”). Registrants must also describe the methodology, assumptions and estimates used in creating the ratio. The pay ratio disclosure may be supplemented with additional information at the discretion of the registrant so long as such additional information does not detract from the required pay ratio disclosure and is not otherwise misleading.

Significant Changes to the Final CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule

The final CEO pay ratio disclosure rules include a number of changes from the proposed rules that will provide some flexibility in determining the median income employee.

A company may rely on the same median income employee determination to calculate the CEO pay ratio for as many as three years, so long as the registrant can reasonably determine that there has been no circumstance, such as a significant change in the number of employees of the registrant, that would require a new determination of the median income employee. If the median income employee identified in year one of the three-year reliance period changes positions, or is no longer employed by the registrant in years two or three of the reliance period, the registrant may identify a replacement median income employee with similar compensation.

A company may select any date within three months of the end of the registrant’s fiscal year to determine the registrant’s employees to be included in the median income employee determination. This date must be used consistently from year-to-year and the registrant must explain any change to the date selected in subsequent disclosure years.

A company may exclude from the median income employee calculation the non-U.S. employees whose compensation information is protected from disclosure by foreign data privacy rules. Non-U.S. employees may be excluded if they are located in a jurisdiction in which foreign data privacy laws would preclude disclosure of such employees’ compensation. To rely on this exclusion, the registrant must take reasonable steps to obtain a waiver from the foreign jurisdiction’s data privacy requirements, explain in the actual CEO pay ratio disclosure that the foreign data privacy exclusion was used, and obtain a legal opinion certifying that it is unable to comply with the foreign jurisdiction’s data privacy rules and that it was unable to obtain a waiver from the foreign jurisdiction’s data privacy rules.

A company may also exclude up to 5% of its employees who are non-U.S. employees so long as all employees of that same jurisdiction are excluded under the rule. Employees excluded from the median employee calculation under the foreign data privacy exclusion (described above) count against the number of employees that may be excluded under the general 5% exclusion. For example, if a registrant has excluded 4% of its employees of a jurisdiction in reliance on the data privacy exclusion, it may not exclude the employees in another foreign jurisdiction if the number of employees in that foreign jurisdiction exceed 1% of all employees of that registrant.

A company may use a cost of living adjustment to adjust the compensation of employees outside of the jurisdiction in which the CEO lives to determine the median income employee. If a cost of living adjustment is used to identify the median income employee, then such same cost of living adjustment must be used in calculating SCT Compensation as part of the actual CEO pay ratio disclosure. The cost of living adjustment method, the jurisdiction in which the median income employee resides, and a separate pay ratio comparison without the use of a cost of living adjustment must be included in the CEO pay ratio disclosure.

Only employees of a registrant and its consolidated subsidiaries, generally based on a 50% ownership threshold, will be included in the median income employee calculation.

Action Items

Although the CEO pay ratio disclosure is not required for more than two years, companies subject to the disclosure requirement should begin now to evaluate the best method of identifying the median income employee. Accordingly, registrants should consider the following:

Provide a summary of the final rule to the Board and/or compensation committee of the Board.
Identify any foreign jurisdictions in which data privacy laws may preclude the registrant from including employees of that jurisdiction in the CEO pay ratio disclosure calculations.
Determine whether non-U.S. employees may be excluded under the general 5% exclusion rule and determine which of those non-U.S. employees should be excluded.
Evaluate how the median income employee will be determined (i.e., based on SCT compensation, W-2, statistical sampling, etc.) and identify any limits or restrictions in collecting that information that may arise.
Begin to evaluate whether other disclosures may be appropriate to include with the CEO pay ratio disclosure to provide context and meaning to the CEO pay ratio disclosure.

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