Tag Archives: ADA

October 5, 2017

ADA Does Not Mandate Multi-month Leave of Absence As Accommodation, Says Seventh Circuit Court

Rarely do we receive definitive guidance on reasonable accommodations. But the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals came very close to providing that when it recently ruled that a multi-month leave of absence is beyond the scope of a reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

Back Condition Leads to FMLA Leave

In the recent Seventh Circuit case, Raymond Severson had long suffered from back myelopathy, a condition that caused degenerative changes in his back, neck, and spinal cord and impaired his functioning. Although he usually was able to perform his duties at Heartland Woodcraft, Inc., a fabricator of retail display fixtures, at times Severson experienced flare-ups that made it difficult for him to walk, bend, lift, sit, stand, or work.

Over the course of seven years of employment with Heartland Woodcraft, Severson rose from supervisor to shop superintendent and then to operations manager. The company, however, found that he performed poorly in the operations manager position and on June 5, 2013, notified Severson that it had demoted him to a second-shift lead position, which included performing manual labor in the production area.

That same morning, Severson had wrenched his back at home and he was visibly uncomfortable. He left work early and requested leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). He was granted FMLA leave, and his doctor provided certificates indicated that he had multiple herniated and bulging discs in his back which would make him unable to work until further notice.

Unable To Return To Work Following FMLA Leave

While out on FMLA leave, Severson’s doctor treated him with steroid injections, but they did not improve his condition. Severson scheduled disc decompression surgery for August 27, 2013, the same day that his 12 weeks of FMLA leave would expire.

About two weeks before his surgery, Severson requested an extension of his medical leave, explaining that typical recovery time for his surgery would be at least two months. The company contacted him on August 26, the day before his scheduled surgery, and informed him that his employment with Heartland would terminate on August 27 when his FMLA leave expired. He was told he could reapply for employment after he was medically cleared to work.

On August 27, Severson had his scheduled surgery, and on October 17, his doctor gave him a partial clearance to return to work with a 20-pound lifting restriction. On December 5, Severson’s doctor released him to work without restriction.

Leave As A Reasonable Accommodation

Severson sued the company for an ADA violation alleging that it failed to accommodate his physical disability by refusing to provide a three-month leave of absence following expiration of his FMLA leave. The federal court in Wisconsin rejected the claim as a matter of law, entering summary judgment in favor of Heartland Woodcraft, and Severson appealed.

The Seventh Circuit (whose decisions are binding on federal courts in Illinois, Wisconsin, and Indiana) affirmed judgment in favor of the employer. The Court was very clear in ruling that a long-term medical leave is not a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. Judge Sykes, writing for the three-judge panel, stated, “The ADA is an antidiscrimination statute, not a medical-leave entitlement.” The Court stated that a reasonable accommodation is intended to make it possible for the employee to perform his or her job. But a medical leave that lasts multiple months does not allow the employee to work and that inability to work removes the person from the class of “qualified individuals” protected by the ADA.

The Court stated that brief periods of time off may be an appropriate accommodation in some circumstances. For example, the Court noted that intermittent time off or a short leave of absence may be appropriate for someone with arthritis or lupus when brief periods of inflammation make it too painful for the individual to work. But the Court ruled that a multi-month leave of absence “is beyond the scope of a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.” Read more >>

April 19, 2017

Retroactive Leniency Is Not A Reasonable Accommodation

By Brad Cave

Is an employer required to excuse misconduct that was the result of the employee’s disability? The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently looked at this issue and came to an interesting conclusion.

Janna DeWitt has Type I diabetes and is insulin dependent. Beginning in 1997, DeWitt worked for Southwestern Bell Telephone Company (SW Bell) as a customer service representative in its Wichita, Kansas call center. Recognizing that DeWitt had a disability covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), SW Bell permitted her to take breaks as needed to eat or drink in order to raise her blood sugar level. SW Bell also granted DeWitt FMLA leave which she took intermittently for health issues related to her diabetes.

Last Chance Agreement

In 2010, DeWitt made an error by failing to shut down service on a customer’s account after the customer cancelled service. Failure to remove a service plan after cancellation was known as a cramming violation under SW Bell’s Code of Business Conduct and was a terminable offense. DeWitt was suspended following her cramming incident until she could address the issue with her supervisors in what the company called a “Day in Court.” Her Second and Third Line Supervisors decided to place DeWitt on a Last Chance Agreement under which any additional failure to perform satisfactorily could lead to further discipline, up to and including termination.

Terminated For Hanging Up On Customers

Two months after the cramming incident, DeWitt suffered a severe drop in blood sugar at work which she stated caused her to experience disorientation, confusion, and lethargy, making her unable to communicate with anyone. After DeWitt found that she was locked out of her computer, she contacted her First Line Supervisor, Tom Heumann, for assistance. Heumann did not address her locked computer but instead told the Center Support Manager, Beth Kloxin, that he had been monitoring De Witt’s calls and found that she had hung up on at least two customers. Kloxin responded by saying “I finally got that bitch” and did a little dance.

Later that day, Heumann and Kloxin met with DeWitt for a suspension meeting because of her two customer hang-ups. A union steward also attended the meeting. DeWitt explained that she did not remember taking the dropped calls and that she had been experiencing very low blood sugar levels at the time. Although they reviewed recordings of the dropped calls, DeWitt still did not remember them and asked if they were sure that the calls were hers. Heumann then told DeWitt that she was suspended and that a “Day in Court” would be held at a later date. In response to a request from Kloxin and the union steward, DeWitt provided her blood sugar levels for that afternoon.

About a week later, SW Bell held DeWitt’s “Day in Court.” DeWitt again explained that she did not remember taking the calls due to a severe drop in her blood sugar. Five days later, SW Bell terminated DeWitt for hanging up on two customers in violation of the company’s Code of Business Conduct and her Last Chance Agreement.

ADA and FMLA Claims

DeWitt filed discrimination charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and after receiving her notice of right to sue, filed a lawsuit against SW Bell in federal court. She alleged that the company failed to accommodate her disability and terminated her because of her disability in violation of the ADA, and retaliated against her for taking FMLA leave. After the district court ruled in favor of SW Bell on all of her claims on summary judgment, DeWitt appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals (whose decisions apply to Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, Oklahoma, Kansas, and New Mexico).

Employer Need Not Excuse Or Overlook Misconduct

DeWitt asserted that SW Bell failed to accommodate her disability by not excusing her dropped calls which she says were caused by her disability. The Court disagreed, stating that the ADA does not require employers to reasonably accommodate an employee’s disability by overlooking past misconduct, even when the misconduct is caused by the disability. Instead, the Court cited the EEOC’s ADA Enforcement Guidance which states that reasonable accommodations are “always prospective.”

The Court found that DeWitt had not requested a reasonable accommodation to address concerns that her diabetes could cause her to drop calls. Using a disability as an “after-the-fact excuse” for workplace misconduct is unreasonable and employers need not ignore or overlook past misconduct. Therefore, because asking for retroactive leniency is not a reasonable ADA accommodation, DeWitt’s accommodation claim failed.

Decision-Maker’s Honest Belief In Termination Reasons

On DeWitt’s ADA termination claim, the Court assumed (without deciding) that DeWitt had established that she was a disabled person under the ADA, and was qualified to perform the essential functions of her job. The Court also accepted that SW Bell had provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating DeWitt, namely that she had hung up on at least two customers while on a Last Chance Agreement. To prevail, DeWitt needed to show that SW Bell’s stated reasons for her termination were pretext for discriminating against her.

DeWitt argued that dropping the calls was not intentional but instead, was a result of her disability – her severely low blood sugar at the time. The Court said that didn’t matter. Instead what mattered was whether the decision-maker, Kimberly Baskett-McEnany, who was DeWitt’s Third Line Supervisor, honestly believed that the hang-ups were intentional and acted on that belief in good faith. Finding no evidence to undercut Baskett-McEnany’s belief, the Court ruled that DeWitt’s ADA discrimination claim failed.

FMLA Retaliation Claim Also Fails

DeWitt also argued that SW Bell terminated her in retaliation for her use of FMLA leave. She offered evidence from a former manager at the call center who stated that employees who used FMLA leave were targeted as employees that should be terminated and that the company would look for other reasons to terminate such employees. DeWitt also pointed to Kloxin’s response to Heumann’s revelation that DeWitt had hung up on customers, saying “I finally got that bitch,” as evidence that SW Bell terminated her for using FMLA leave.

Again, the Court rejected DeWitt’s arguments and her FMLA retaliation claim. The Court stated that the former manager’s comments about the company targeting employees who used FMLA leave was no more than speculation, as that person had no knowledge of and was not involved in the company’s decision to terminate DeWitt. In addition, the Court determined that Kloxin’s subjective beliefs were irrelevant as she was not the person who decided to terminate DeWitt. Finding no evidence to send DeWitt’s claims to a jury, the Court upheld the grant of summary judgment in favor of SW Bell on all claims.

Key Lessons

This case highlights some significant management practices that can help defeat discrimination and retaliation claims. First, hold all employees accountable to your standards of conduct. SW Bell terminated DeWitt for violating its code of conduct, providing the necessary legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for actions. In addition, because DeWitt could not provide evidence that other employees who similarly violated the conduct rules were treated more favorably than she was treated, she was unable to show pretext. Second, if a supervisor has a potentially unlawful animus or bias against an employee, take that person out of the decision-making process. Although Kloxin appeared to express animosity against DeWitt (although it is not clear that her animosity was driven by an unlawful motive), she was not involved in the decision to terminate DeWitt and that distinction drove the Court to reject DeWitt’s claims. Finally, remember that a reasonable accommodation applies prospectively. You need not excuse poor performance or misconduct for which no accommodation was requested. That said, when dealing with an employee with a known disability, weigh all employment decisions very carefully and make sure your actions are well supported by your policies and past practices.

January 10, 2017

Tips For Accommodating Depression, PTSD, and Other Employee Mental Illnesses

By Mark Wiletsky

An estimated 16.1 million adults in the United States had at least one major depressive episode in 2015, according to the National Institute of Mental Health. This number represents 6.7% of all adults age 18 or older in the U.S. About 7 or 8 out of every 100 people will have posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) at some point in their lives, says the U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs, National Center for PTSD. That number goes up to about 11 to 20 out of every 100 for veterans who served in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.

As these number show, depression, PTSD, and other mental illnesses are relatively prevalent in our society. At some point, you will be faced with an employee who suffers from a mental condition and you need to know your obligations related to potential accommodations for such employees. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) recently released information to help explain workplace rights for employees with mental health conditions under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). Incorporating the EEOC’s guidance, here are our top practical tips for accommodating individuals with mental impairments.

Tip #1 – Don’t Get Hung Up On Disability Definition

Following the 2008 enactment of the Americans With Disabilities Amendments Act (ADAAA), it is easier for an individual seeking protection under the ADA to establish that he or she has a disability within the meaning of the statute. In fact, the ADAAA states that the definition of disability should be interpreted in favor of broad coverage of individuals.

Mental conditions, such as depression, PTSD, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), need not be permanent or severe to be deemed a disability. Instead, as long as the condition substantially limits a major limit activity, such as the individual’s ability to concentrate, interact with others, communicate, sleep, eat, learn, think, or regulate emotions, it will be considered a disability. Even if the employee’s symptoms are sporadic or episodic, if they limit a major life activity when active, the condition will likely qualify. This means that in most cases, you should focus on whether you can accommodate the individual, rather than whether the individual meets the legal definition of having a “disability.”

Tip #2 – Accommodate “Known” Mental Impairments

You have an obligation to reasonably accommodate “known” impairments for otherwise qualified individuals. Generally, this means that an applicant or employee must ask for a reasonable accommodation. But remember that the disabled individual need not use any special words to trigger your accommodation obligation. In other words, the person does not need to specifically say he or she needs a reasonable accommodation or mention the ADA. The individual instead may simply say that they need a change at work, such as needing to arrive late on certain days in order to attend therapy sessions, and your accommodation responsibility begins.

Generally, however, you are not obligated to provide an accommodation when one has not been requested or no work-related change has been mentioned. But, if you have knowledge of an employee’s mental condition (perhaps from prior conversations or medical documentation) and that “known” disability impairs the employee’s ability to know of, or effectively communicate a need for, an accommodation that is obvious, you should engage in a discussion with the employee about potential accommodations.

Tip #3 – Ask For Documentation

When an employee requests a reasonable accommodation due to a disabling condition, ask the employee to put the request in writing, describing the condition and how it affects his or her work. You may also request a letter from the employee’s health care provider documenting the mental condition and that the employee needs a work accommodation because of it. However, even if the employee declines to provide a request for accommodation in writing, you still have an obligation to engage in the interactive process and potentially accommodate that individual.

Be careful not to discriminate in your requests for documentation. It is best to have a uniform practice of requesting this written information for all accommodation requests, for both physical and mental disabilities, so that you cannot be charged with singling out a particular employee based on a mental illness.

Tip #4 – Keep An Open Mind About Accommodations

Don’t jump to the conclusion that an accommodation will necessarily be burdensome or costly. Some reasonable accommodations for mental disabilities may be relatively benign. Examples may include allowing the employee to wear headphones to drown out excessive noise, writing down work instructions rather than verbal instructions, changing shifts or start/end times to allow for doctor or therapy appointments, or working in a private room.

Of course, if an accommodation will result in significant expense or disruption to your business, you may be able to decline it due to undue hardship. But don’t assume that upon first request. Instead, engage in an interactive process with the employee, including input from his or her health care provider, to consider possible accommodations. A brainstorming session can often produce a variety of workable solutions, and you can choose the one that best suits your business, as long as it permits the employee to perform his or her job. Be sure to confirm those discussions in writing with the employee to avoid disputes down the road about what was discussed and/or agreed upon. Read more >>

April 14, 2015

EEOC Fails to Show Telecommuting Would Be A Reasonable Accommodation

By Mark Wiletsky

The Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) “does not endow all disabled persons with a job—or job schedule—of their choosing,” according to the majority of judges on the full Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. In an 8 to 5 decision, the Sixth Circuit Court ruled en banc that Ford Motor Company did not violate the ADA when it denied an employee’s request to telecommute up to four days per week in order to accommodate her irritable bowel syndrome. EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., No. 12-2484 (6th Cir. Apr. 10, 2015).

“Good, Old-Fashioned Interpersonal Skills” Made In-Person Attendance Essential

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) argued that a resale buyer for Ford, Jane Harris, who had irritable bowel syndrome that made it difficult for her to be far from a restroom, should be allowed to work from home up to four days per week. The agency cited Ford’s telecommuting policy that allowed other workers, including some resale buyers, to telecommute as evidence that Harris’ telecommuting request was a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.

The Court disagreed. It ruled that regular and predictable on-site attendance was an essential function of the resale-buyer position at Ford. Resale buyers needed to purchase raw steel from steel suppliers and then resell it to parts manufacturers to make parts used in Ford vehicles. Although some interactions could be done by email and telephone, the Court found that many required “good, old-fashioned interpersonal skills,” and resale buyers needed to be able to meet face to face with suppliers, parts manufacturers and Ford employees during core business hours.

Importantly, the Court reiterated the general rule is that regular attendance at work is essential to most jobs, especially interactive ones. It pointed to past court opinions as well as to EEOC regulations that support the premise that regular and predictable on-site attendance is an essential job function. The Court even relied on that “sometimes-forgotten guide” – common sense, stating that non-lawyers (as well as judges in other appellate circuits) recognize that regular in-person attendance is an essential function, and a prerequisite to other essential functions, of most jobs.

Other Buyers Telecommuted on a Predictable, Limited Basis

But what about the fact that Ford had a telecommuting policy that allowed other employees, including resale buyers like Harris, to work from home? Wouldn’t that make telecommuting a reasonable accommodation for Harris?

The Court said no, because she proposed to telecommute four days per week on a schedule of her choosing. The other resale buyers who telecommuted did so only one established day per week and they agreed in advance that they would come into work that day, if needed. They were also able to perform well and maintain productivity. Harris, on the other hand, wanted to be able to pick and choose which days she would telecommute, up to four days per week, without agreeing to come in those days, if necessary. The Court found that none of these other employees’ more predictable and more limited telecommuting schedules removed regular on-site attendance from the resale buyer’s job.

As a result, the Court ruled that Harris’ proposed telecommuting accommodation unreasonable.

In addition, Ford had allowed Harris to telecommute on an as-needed basis on three separate occasions and her performance suffered. Other attempts to improve Harris’ attendance also failed. The Court found that Harris could not perform the essential functions of her job and was unable to establish regular and consistent work hours. Therefore, it ruled that she was not a “qualified individual” under the ADA.

Technology Did Not Carry the Day

The EEOC argued that advances in technology make on-site attendance less essential. The Court disagreed in this case, stating that there was no evidence presented that specific technology made personal interactions unnecessary for resale buyers.

No Blind Deference to Employer’s Judgment

The Court made a point of stating that its opinion did not open the door for courts to blindly accept as essential whatever an employer says is essential for a particular job. It emphasized that an employer’s words, policies and practices were all important in deciding whether a particular task or requirement is an essential job function.

In Ford’s case, the evidence supported Ford’s judgment that regular and predictable in-person attendance was essential for resale buyers. The Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Ford.

No Retaliation For Termination

The Court also ruled that Ford did not retaliate against Harris when it fired her for poor performance just four months after she had filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Key was Ford’s good documentation of Harris’ performance and interpersonal issues. She had been ranked in the bottom 10% of her peer group before she filed her charge. Documentation showed that she failed to update spreadsheets, complete her paperwork, schedule training sessions, price items correctly and finish her work on time. Despite the closeness in time of the firing to her charge filing, the Court ruled that the EEOC failed to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the real reason that Ford terminated Harris was unlawful retaliation instead of poor performance.

Dissent: Either Physical Presence is Not Essential or Telecommuting is A Reasonable Accommodation

Five judges on the Sixth Circuit dissented, believing that the EEOC had presented enough evidence to send the EEOC’s claims to a jury. Specifically, the dissent stated that the evidence was sufficient to show that there remained genuine disputes over whether Harris was a qualified individual, either because in-person attendance was not an essential function of her job, or because telecommuting would be a reasonable accommodation for her. It pointed to Ford’s telecommuting policy which allowed for “one to four days” of telework each week. It noted that Harris proposed that she be able to work from home up to four days each week, as was arguably allowed under the policy, not that she be permitted to telecommute four days each and every week.

The dissent also asserted that Harris’ past attendance issues that were a result of her disability should not be used against her in deciding whether a telecommuting arrangement during core business hours would be a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. Moreover, the dissent found that Ford should have engaged in a more interactive process to clarify Harris’ telecommuting accommodation request. Finally, the dissent believed that there was a genuine dispute over whether Ford retaliated against Harris for filing her discrimination charge.

Lessons for Employers Facing ADA Telecommuting Accommodation Requests

The majority’s decision finding that regular and predictable in-person attendance is an essential function of most jobs, especially interactive ones, is favorable for employers. But it does not mean that telecommuting can never be a reasonable accommodation. In fact, the dissent in this case demonstrates that telecommuting requests for disabled employees is likely to continue to be an issue with which employers will grapple in coming years.

If face-to-face interactions and in-person attendance at meetings or other work-related functions is essential for certain jobs at your workplace, be certain to include those tasks in your job descriptions. If you generally allow telecommuting, be sure to have a written policy and apply it consistently. If presented with a request to telecommute in order to accommodate a disability, engage in an interactive process to discuss whether telecommuting would be appropriate for that particular position and employee, whether it would constitute an undue hardship for your organization and if alternative accommodations would allow the employee to perform his or her essential functions. And by all means, make sure you have concrete documentation of an employee’s poor performance or policy infractions before taking adverse action against anyone who has filed a discrimination charge.

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March 26, 2015

Supreme Court: Pregnant Worker With Lifting Restrictions May Continue Lawsuit

By Jude Biggs

In a divided decision, on March 25, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court released a long-awaited ruling involving a pregnant worker’s claim under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA). In its ruling, the Court held that the worker could proceed with her lawsuit, because disputes remain as to whether her employer treated more favorably at least some non-pregnant employees whose situation could not reasonably be distinguished from hers.

The majority of the Court forcefully rejected the 2014 guidance of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) concerning the application of Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to the PDA, as it fell short on a number of fronts needed to “give it power to persuade.” Without ruling for either party, the Court adopted a new standard for courts to use when deciding PDA cases brought under a disparate treatment theory. Young v. UPS, 575 U.S. ___ (2015).

Despite the Court’s guidance, employers still will face many questions on what accommodations will be required in the future. The standards for “disparate treatment” and “disparate impact” cases may be more confusing in the future for employers who need to make decisions regarding whether and how to accommodate pregnant employees. As a result, employers are wise to respond carefully to accommodation requests by pregnant workers. Employers should review any policies that might have a disproportionate effect on pregnant workers, such as rules limiting job accommodations. In addition, employers should be careful to review restrictions on use of sick pay/sick time, leave eligibility outside of FMLA, lifting restrictions, and light duty assignments to determine: (1) if they disparately affect pregnant employees while accommodating others; and (2) what “strong” business rationale you can offer to defend the distinction.

For additional analysis of the Court's opinion and what it means for employers, please see our full article here.

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September 23, 2014

Cheyenne Jury Awards $1,481,000+ On FMLA Retaliation Claim

By Brad Cave

The series of large verdicts for Wyoming employees seems to be marching forward. The most recent example occurred recently when a Cheyenne jury awarded over $740,000 to a trona miner after deciding that he was fired because he took FMLA leave. With liquidated damages available in an FMLA case, the Wyoming court entered judgment in an amount in excess of $1.48 million in favor of the employee. This case stands as yet another example about the importance of supervisor training and careful, well-documented and consistent decision making.

Long Term Employee With A Pain in the Neck. We first told you about this case in March of this year, when the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals sent the case back to Wyoming for trial after reversing the trial court’s dismissal of the case. (Safety Violation or Too Much Intermittent FMLA Leave?). Here is a short recap of the facts.

Steven Smothers had been employed by Solvay Chemical for 18 years when his employment was terminated. Smothers had experienced back problems since 1994 resulting in three surgeries on his neck and other medical procedures, and an extended course of medical treatment by specialists. Over the years, Smothers took intermittent FMLA leave for his medical appointments and when he was unable to work due to the pain. The amount of FMLA leave he took did not go unnoticed. He was pressured by the production superintendent to change shifts to lessen the additional overtime cost caused by his absences, but such a change would have cost him about $7,000 per year in shift differential pay. Solvay also gave Smothers a negative rating on his performance evaluation because of his absences, and he was told that he was rejected for a promotion because of the leave.

Smothers’ Safety Rule Violation. In August 2008, Smothers and his coworkers were performing an acid wash, which Solvay did every six months to clean residual trona out of the equipment. When Smothers noticed that a damaged spool piece had caused a leak, he began to fix it without obtaining a line break permit which was required by Solvay safety rules. Smothers and a co-worker, Mahaffey, argued about whether the permit was necessary, and after Smothers removed the spool piece without first getting the permit, Mahaffey immediately reported Smothers’ actions to a supervisor.

Solvay terminated Smothers’ employment on August 28, 2008, based on a joint decision of six Solvay managers. Five of the six decision makers testified that the argument between Smothers and Mahaffey weighed heavily in the group’s decision to fire Smothers. Although the trial court originally dismissed the case, the Tenth Circuit believed that Smothers had presented enough evidence to create doubt about the real reasons for Smothers’ termination. So, the case was sent back to the trial court for trial.

What’s the Real Reason for Smothers’ termination? Like all retaliation cases, the jury in this trial was asked to decide whether Smothers was fired for a safety rule violation, as the employer contended, or because his employer retaliated against him for using intermittent FMLA leave or discriminated against him because of his disability. We don’t have a transcript of the trial, so we cannot tell you what evidence the jury heard or what facts persuaded the jury. We do know that the Tenth Circuit reasoned that the jury could disbelieve Solvay’s reasons because:

Supervisors criticized Smothers informally and in his performance evaluation for taking FMLA-protected leave, and rejected him for a promotion because of his time off;
Solvay did not give Smothers an opportunity to describe or explain his side of the argument with Mahaffey, even though the argument was a central reason for the decision to terminate Smothers’ employment;
Other Solvay employees who committed safety rule violations were not terminated.

And the Jury Returns.The jury found in favor of Smothers on his FMLA claim, and awarded Smothers the amount of $740,535 for his lost wages and benefits from the date of his termination, August 27, 2008, through the date of trial. But the potential damages don’t stop with the lost wages. Under the FMLA, the successful employee may be entitled to an additional amount equivalent to the jury’s award for liquidated damages – in other words, a penalty against the employer for the violation. As a result, the court has entered judgment against Solvay in the total amount of $1,481,070, twice the amount of the jury’s verdict, plus interest since the date of termination. The trial court declined to award Smothers any future lost wages. However, Smothers is entitled to an additional judgment for his reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, which could add hundreds of thousands of dollars to the total.

Bottom Line. Regardless of the final number after adding prejudgment interest and attorneys’ fees, this is one of the largest judgments ever entered against a Wyoming employer. We cannot speculate about what evidence led the jury to its verdict, but we can share some lessons, with the benefit of twenty-twenty hindsight, that will help any employer avoid this kind of result:

Managers and supervisors must be trained and committed to the fact that taking FMLA leave is protected by federal law, and must not be the reason for formal criticism, denied opportunities, or informal complaining. FMLA-protected leave cannot be held against an employee for any reason whatsoever. Any comment or suggestion to the contrary can be used as evidence of pretext.
Investigations must be thorough and even-handed. While we don’t know all the evidence in this case, the jury may have heard that Solvay spent much more time asking Mahaffey about the argument with Smothers, while never asking Smothers for his side of the argument. Everybody should get the same opportunity to tell their side of the story. An inadequate investigation can be used as evidence of pretext.
Employees must be treated consistently. Smothers had evidence that other Solvay employees intentionally violated safety rules without being terminated. Employers need to mete out comparable discipline for comparable violations, or have a compelling reason why an employee gets tougher punishment.
Employers must respect long years of service. Of course, keeping a job for eighteen years does nothing to technically change the legal relationship or create any new rights or protection for the employee. But, after that length of time with a good performance record, it becomes difficult for a jury to believe that termination is an appropriate response for one incident.

Wyoming juries have delivered substantial employee verdicts over the last few years. Employers should pay attention.

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June 2, 2014

Disabled Employee Not Entitled to Additional Leave as Reasonable Accommodation

By Jude Biggs

After Kansas State University denied her request to extend a leave of absence for longer than six months, assistant professor Grace Hwang, who suffers from cancer, filed suit against the University alleging disability discrimination and retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the University had not violated the Rehabilitation Act because Ms. Hwang could not show that she was able to perform the essential functions of her job. In addition, the Tenth Circuit held that requiring the University to extend the six-month’s leave was not a reasonable accommodation. Hwang v. Kansas State Univ., No. 13-2070 (10th Cir. May 29, 2014).

Policy Provided Six-Month’s Paid Leave of Absence

Ms. Hwang was set to teach classes at Kansas State University under a one-year contract that covered all three academic terms — fall, spring and summer. Before the fall term, Ms. Hwang was diagnosed with cancer. She asked for a leave of absence to seek medical treatment. The University granted her a paid six-month leave under its regular policy which capped the length of a leave at six months.

As the six-month leave was coming to an end, Ms. Hwang’s doctor advised her to seek more time off of work. She asked the University to extend her leave through the end of the spring semester, intending to return before the summer term. The University refused to extend her leave but instead arranged for Ms. Hwang to receive long-term disability benefits, effectively ending her employment with the University.

Ms. Hwang sued the University in federal court alleging that the University’s denial of her request for extended leave constituted disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act. The Rehabilitation Act prohibits disability discrimination by entities that receive federal funds, such as Kansas State. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The federal district court dismissed her lawsuit on a motion to dismiss (before any discovery was done), and Ms. Hwang appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which covers the states of Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, Kansas, Oklahoma and New Mexico.

Extended Leave Not A Reasonable Accommodation Under Rehabilitation Act

The University did not dispute that Ms. Hwang was a capable teacher and that her cancer rendered her disabled as defined by the Rehabilitation Act. The central issue in the appeal was whether the University was required to ignore the six-month time limit in its leave policy to extend Ms. Hwang’s leave of absence beyond six months. The Court said no. Because Ms. Hwang wasn’t able to work for an extended period of time, she was not capable of performing the essential functions of her job. In addition, requiring the University to keep her job open for that extended period of time did not qualify as a reasonable accommodation. The Court wrote: “[a]fter all, reasonable accommodations – typically things like adding ramps or allowing more flexible working hours – are all about enabling employees to work, not to not work.”

The Court noted that a “brief absence from work” for medical care may be required as a reasonable accommodation, as it likely allows the employee to continue to perform the essential functions of the job. Determining how long employers must provide for leave as a reasonable accommodation depends on factors such as the duties essential to the job in question, the nature and length of the leave sought and the impact of the leave on co-workers. That said, the Court stated that it would be difficult to find a six-month leave of absence in which the employee performs no work (e.g., no part-time hours or work from home) reasonable in any job in the national economy today. Ms. Hwang’s terrible problem, in the Court’s view, was one other forms of social security aim to address. In addition, the Court noted that the aim of the Rehabilitation Act is to prevent employers from denying reasonable accommodations that would allow disabled employees to work, not to turn employers into a “safety net” for those who cannot work.

“Inflexible” Six-Month Leave Policy Not Inherently Discriminatory

Ms. Hwang asserted that the University’s “inflexible” sick leave policy that capped the maximum length of sick leave at six months violated the Act. She cited the EEOC’s guidance manual which states that if a disabled employee needs additional unpaid leave as a reasonable accommodation, the employer must modify its “no-fault” leave policy to provide the additional leave, unless the employer can show that there is another effective accommodation that would allow the individual to perform the essential functions of her job, or that granting additional leave would cause the employer an undue hardship. The Court, however, pointed to another section of the EEOC’s guidance manual to counter Ms. Hwang’s argument, as the EEOC manual states “ . . . six months is beyond a reasonable amount of time.” In fact, the Court stated that an “inflexible” leave policy can actually help protect the rights of disabled employees rather than discriminate against them because such a policy does not permit individual requests for leave to be singled out for discriminatory treatment.

Not all leave policies will past muster, however. The Court stated that policies that provide an unreasonably short sick leave period may not provide enough accommodation for a disabled employee who would be capable of performing his or her job with just a bit more time off. Alternatively, policies that are applied inconsistently, such as where some employees are allowed more time off and others are held to a strict time limit, could be discriminatory. In this case, however, the Court found that Ms. Hwang did not allege any facts to support a claim that she was treated differently than other similarly situated employees.

Retaliation Claim Fails As Well

Ms. Hwang also asserted that she was unlawfully retaliated against for reporting disability discrimination. In particular, she based her claims on two theories : (1) the University failed to explain her COBRA health benefits before or immediately after her termination; and (2) she wasn’t hired for two other positions at the University that she applied for after losing her teaching job. The Court easily dispensed with both theories.

First, COBRA allows thirty days for an employer to provide separating employees with a COBRA notice. Consequently, the University was not required to provide Ms. Hwang with notice of her COBRA benefits before or immediately after her termination of employment. Second, although Ms. Hwang alleged that she was not hired for two other University positions for which she applied, she failed to allege any facts suggesting that the University’s decision not to hire her was because she had engaged in legally protected opposition to discrimination. She not only failed to provide facts showing that she was qualified for the two jobs, but she also failed to offer facts suggesting that the University officials who decided not to hire her knew about her disability and her complaint about disability discrimination. Without such allegations, the Court ruled that Ms. Hwang’s retaliation claim failed.

ADA Application

Although this case alleged a violation of the Rehabilitation Act, courts typically analyze such claims similarly to those alleging a violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). Consequently, this case may prove helpful to employers defending ADA claims where the employer denies an employee’s request for an extended leave of absence. Employers should heed the Court’s warning about leave policies that may be discriminatory if they provide an unreasonably short leave or are inconsistently applied. However, lengthy leaves of six months or more, or leaves of an unlimited duration in which the disabled employee provides no work, will likely not be considered a reasonable accommodation.

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March 10, 2014

Safety Violation Or Too Much Intermittent FMLA Leave? Tenth Circuit Says Jury Must Decide Wyoming Employee’s FMLA and ADA Case

By Brad Cave

Did Solvay Chemicals fire long-time employee Steven Smothers because of a first-time safety violation or because the company was tired of his frequent absences due to an ongoing medical disability? The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled that Smothers provided sufficient evidence to suggest that Solvay’s stated reason for his termination was pretextual, allowing his claims for unlawful retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to proceed. Smothers v. Solvay Chem., Inc., No. 12-8013 (Jan. 21, 2014). The Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on his state law claim for breach of an implied employment contract.

Medical Treatments and Severe Pain Lead to Frequent FMLA-Protected Absences

For eighteen years, Smothers worked as a surface maintenance mechanic in Solvay’s trona mine in Sweetwater County, Wyoming. The company considered him to be an excellent mechanic who did great work and got along with everyone. In 1994, Smothers injured his neck and developed degenerative disc disease in his spine. Over the next five years, Smothers had three surgeries to his neck as well as numerous other medical procedures. Despite treatment by a specialist, Smothers continued to have severe ongoing neck pain, severe migraine headaches and lower back problems. At times, Smothers was unable to work without pain treatments and he often was able to sleep only a few hours each night due to the pain.

Smothers asked for and was granted FMLA leave for intermittent absences caused by his condition. Managers and co-workers began to complain about his absenteeism, especially because he worked on the graveyard shift where there were fewer workers to absorb his absences resulting in increased overtime costs. Solvay’s production superintendent Melvin Wallendorf pressured Smothers to change to the day shift, but Smothers refused as the shift change would have cost him about $7,000 a year. Solvay’s human resources department advised Wallendorf that urging Smothers to switch shifts would violate the FMLA so Wallendorf stopped pressuring Smothers but did not stop complaining about his absences.

At one point, Wallendorf and Rick Wehrle, Smothers’ direct supervisor, gave Smothers a poor performance rating on his evaluation due to his absenteeism. In 2005 or 2006, Smothers applied for a promotion but was told that he was rejected because of his absences.

Safety Issue Explodes into Argument

In 2008, the graveyard crew conducted a routine maintenance acid wash to remove build up in its equipment. After a line ruptured, Smothers saw that a damaged “spool piece” had caused the problem and prepared to remove it. Another mechanic, Dan Mahaffey, suggested that Smothers wait for a line break permit, which is a form that certifies that employees have completed a checklist of precautions before a line can be safely disconnected. Smothers said that a permit wasn’t required because the line was already broken. Mahaffey and Smothers then argued. Mahaffey offered help on the repair which Smothers refused. Mahaffey took offense and accused Smothers of hypocrisy since Smothers had previously reported others for safety violations. Smothers made an offensive comment to Mahaffey and told him he did not want his kind of help. Smothers removed the broken piece and began the repair.

Mahaffey immediately reported the argument and Smothers’ removal of the spool piece without a line break permit to the area supervisor. Later that same day, three managers called Smothers in to discuss the safety violation. Although completing the line break permit may not have been absolutely necessary, Smothers later conceded that he should have locked out the pump valve before removing the part according to Solvay’s safety policies. Smothers apologized for not locking the pump valve before removing the piece and promised it wouldn’t happen again. Smothers was sent home pending an investigation.

Six managers were involved in deciding what to do about the argument and the safety violation. Three of the managers personally talked with Mahaffey about the argument but no one spoke to Smothers about it. About eight days later, Solvay fired Smothers. Smothers sued in Wyoming federal court, alleging, among other claims, unlawful FMLA retaliation, ADA discrimination and breach of an implied employment contract based on Solvay’s employee handbook.

FMLA Claim Bolstered By Disparate Treatment and Previous Retaliatory Acts

The trial court granted summary judgment to Solvay on Smothers’ FMLA and ADA claims. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit decided that Smothers presented enough evidence for a trial about whether Solvay’s real reason for his termination was his use of FMLA leave or his disability. Smothers provided evidence that other employees who committed similar safety violations were not fired. Five of the six decision-makers who fired Smothers were also involved in at least one decision in which a similarly situated employee was treated more favorably after violating the same or comparable safety rules. Smothers also pointed to the negative comments, negative performance rating, failure to promote and pressure to change shifts because of his FMLA-protected absences as evidence that the safety violation was a pretext for firing him for his FMLA leave. Moreover, Smothers showed that the decision-makers had failed to sufficiently investigate the argument he had with Mahaffey, basing their decision almost entirely on Mahaffey’s version of events. The Court decided that a reasonable jury could find that Solvay’s investigation into the quarrel was not fair or adequate. Based on this evidence, the Court found that there were issues of fact on whether Solvay’s termination reasons were pretextual and reversed the dismissal of Smothers’ FMLA retaliation claim.

Smothers Was Disabled Under ADA

Smothers also asserted that his firing was in violation of the ADA. He presented evidence that his medical condition was an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity, specifically his ability to sleep. Because the facts would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Smothers’ sleep was substantially limited, Smothers satisfied his burden of establishing a prima facie case of disability discrimination. As with the FMLA claim, the Court found sufficient evidence that Solvay’s stated termination reasons may have been a pretext for disability discrimination. Therefore, the Court reversed the dismissal of Smothers’ ADA claim as well.

No Breach of Implied Contract Based on Employee Handbook

Smothers also alleged that Solvay violated the terms of its employee handbook, giving rise to a claim for breach of implied contract under Wyoming law. The Court disagreed. Wyoming recognizes a claim for breach of implied contract if an employer fails to follow its own required procedures, such as the procedures laid out in an employee handbook. Solvay’s handbook contained a four-step progressive disciplinary process, with termination as the last step. But it also contained a provision that allowed Solvay to terminate an employee immediately for a serious offense, including a safety violation. Because the discipline policy unambiguously gave Solvay the discretion to fire employees who violate safety rules, the Court found that Solvay’s decision to terminate Smothers for violating a safety rule did not violate the terms of the employee handbook. Therefore, the appeals court upheld the trial court’s dismissal of Smothers’ breach of implied contract claim.

Back To Court They Go

We don’t know whether Smothers or Solvay will prevail if this case goes to trial but we do know that the appellate court thought that some of the evidence about the actions of Solvay managers could demonstrate that Solvay acted with a discriminatory motive:

Supervisors and co-workers gave Smothers a hard time about taking FMLA-protected leave.
Solvay failed to properly investigate all sides in the quarrel, accepting one employee’s version of events as fact.
The decision-makers treated Smothers more harshly than other similarly-situated employees who had violated similar safety rules.
Managers and supervisors considered Smothers’ FMLA absences when providing his performance evaluation and rejecting him for a promotion.

Evidence of these actions prevented Solvay from obtaining a grant of summary judgment on appeal. While Solvay may dispute Smothers’ evidence when the case actually goes to trial, this case stands as a lesson about the kinds of supervisory comments and actions that can feed into a discrimination claim, and a good reminder of how carefully employers must manage employees with injuries or disabilities.

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September 11, 2013

Family Medical History Request Results in First EEOC GINA Lawsuit

By Dora Lane

Employers may not request a family medical history from employees or applicants, even as part of a post-offer medical examination. In its first lawsuit alleging a violation of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued an employer whose contracted medical examiner required applicants to complete a family medical history questionnaire. EEOC v. Fabricut, Inc., No. 13-cv-248 (N.D. Okla. filed May 7, 2013). Review of this case offers a timely opportunity for employers to review their employment practices for compliance with GINA.

Investigation of ADA Claim Finds Illegal Family Medical History

Temporary employee, Rhonda Jones, worked for Fabricut, a distributor of decorative fabrics, as a memo clerk for 90 days. She then applied to work in the same position as a regular employee. Fabricut made her an offer of employment, contingent on the results of a pre-employment drug test and physical. Fabricut sent Jones to Knox Laboratory, a medical examining facility that provided examination services to Fabricut on a contract basis. As part of the process, Knox Laboratory instructed Jones to complete a questionnaire that asked about the existence of heart disease, hypertension, cancer, tuberculosis, diabetes, arthritis and mental disorders in her family.

The examiner conducting Jones’ pre-employment physical concluded that Jones may be predisposed to or already suffer from carpal tunnel syndrome and recommended further evaluation. Although Jones’ personal physician conducted a battery of tests and concluded that she did not have carpal tunnel syndrome, Fabricut withdrew its offer of employment. Jones filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC alleging a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) on grounds that she was denied employment because Fabricut regarded her as having a disability, carpal tunnel syndrome.

As part of its investigation of Jones’ ADA claim, the EEOC obtained from Fabricut copies of Jones’ post-offer, pre-employment medical examination. The records revealed the family medical history questionnaire that Jones had been instructed to complete at the start of her pre-employment physical. Finding that the questionnaire included unlawful inquiries into genetic information, the EEOC notified Fabricut that its investigation would look into its compliance with GINA regarding its solicitation of family medical histories of applicants.

EEOC Pursues GINA Lawsuit

The EEOC filed suit against Fabricut in federal court alleging violations of both the ADA and GINA. GINA, which took effect in 2009, makes it illegal for employers to discriminate against employees or applicants because of genetic information, which includes family medical history, and restricts employers from requesting, requiring or purchasing such information, among other things. The lawsuit alleges that Fabricut violated GINA by requesting and requiring Jones and other applicants to indicate whether or not they had a family medical history for a variety of diseases and disorders as part of its post-offer, pre-employment medical examination as conducted for Fabricut by its agent, Knox Laboratory, who then provided the information to Fabricut for its use in hiring and employment decisions.

Lawsuit Settled for $50,000 and Additional Relief

Without admitting any violation of law, Fabricut agreed to settle the case for payment of $50,000 to Jones as compensatory damages. The settlement also requires Fabricut to post notices in its workplace stating that Fabricut will comply with all federal employment laws, including the ADA and GINA, conduct two hours of live training for all management and human resources personnel, create or revise personnel policies prohibiting discrimination and be subject to monitoring and reporting requirements for two years.

Review Practices for GINA Compliance

Although GINA has been in effect since 2009, many employers may not be familiar with its requirements and prohibitions. What may have been routine employment practices in past years, such as collecting a family medical history from employees or applicants, may now be unlawful under GINA. Employers should review their job applications, interview questions and any employment medical testing practices to ensure that no family medical history is requested. The regulations implementing GINA specifically state that a covered entity must tell health care providers not to collect genetic information, including family medical history, as part of a medical examination used to determine an individual’s ability to perform a job. 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8(d). In addition, if an employer finds out that family medical histories are being collected, it must take reasonable measures, including not using the health care provider, to prevent the information from being collected in the future.

Under certain circumstances, employers may receive genetic information that it did not request. Such inadvertent acquisition of genetic information is not a violation of GINA. To help establish that genetic information was acquired inadvertently, employers should take advantage of a safe harbor provision in the GINA regulations. When an employer needs to request health-related information, such as to support a request for sick leave or a reasonable accommodation under the ADA, the employer should warn the employee and the health care provider not to provide genetic information. The regulations suggest the following language to accompany the request for health-related information:

The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA) prohibits employers and other entities covered by GINA Title II from requesting or requiring genetic information of an individual or family member of the individual, except as specifically allowed by this law. To comply with this law, we are asking that you not provide any genetic information when responding to this request for medical information. "Genetic information," as defined by GINA, includes an individual's family medical history, the results of an individual's or family member's genetic tests, the fact that an individual or an individual's family member sought or received genetic services, and genetic information of a fetus carried by an individual or an individual's family member or an embryo lawfully held by an individual or family member receiving assistive reproductive services.

When employers provide this warning, any resulting acquisition of genetic information will generally be considered inadvertent and therefore, not in violation of GINA.

Disclaimer: This article is designed to provide general information on pertinent legal topics. The statements made are provided for educational purposes only. They do not constitute legal advice and are not intended to create an attorney-client relationship between you and Holland & Hart LLP. If you have specific questions as to the application of the law to your activities, you should seek the advice of your legal counsel.

May 28, 2013

Addressing ADA Concerns When Employee is Physically Able But Psychologically Impaired

By Jude Biggs

The Tenth Circuit's decision in Koessel v. Sublette County Sheriff's Dep't, No. 11-8099 (10th Cir. May 14, 2013) raises an interesting issue: if an employee’s doctor says he can physically perform the essential functions of his job, but another doctor says psychological issues may interfere with his ability to perform his job, must an employer keep him on the job? The good news? Koessel says , “No.”

Kevin Koessel worked as a patrol officer with the Sublette County Sheriff's Office when he suffered a stroke. After he recovered, he worked part-time until he was cleared to work full-time. Co-workers reported concerns about his behavior, so a neurologist examined him. The neurologist found him physically able to work from a neurological standpoint, but recommended Koessel be examined by a psychologist due to cognitive issues. The psychologist found some of Koessel's symptoms (for instance, fatigue, episodes of lightheadedness, and weeping) could interfere with the performance of the high-stress parts of his job. Koessel returned to a temporary position, but was terminated after funds were cut from the Sheriff’s budget. Koessel sued for, among other things, disability discrimination under the ADA.

Koessel’s employer argued it properly let him go, as he was unable to do essential functions of his job. The psychologist had recommended Koessel be placed in a low-stress position that did not require frequent contact with the public; hence, he could not preserve the peace at public gatherings, neighborhood disputes and family quarrels; testify in court; or apprehend suspects. Koessel agreed those were essential job functions, but argued he could do them because his own doctor cleared him to return to work full time and he had performed 35 traffic stops without incident after returning from work.

The Tenth Circuit concluded Koessel’s examples only showed he could do the job physically, not that he could handled his job psychologically in high-stress situations. In so ruling, the Tenth Circuit disagreed that a jury should decide the issue of whether Koessel was qualified for his job, because there was no indication the psychologist's report was unreliable; there was no question Koessel remained impaired cognitively and psychologically; and there was no evidence Koessel had encountered high-stress situations after returning to work.

Employers will deal more and more with Koessel-like situations as baby boomers age and suffer strokes, heart attacks, or other medical issues that can have an impact on cognitive abilities. It shows the importance of getting an expert/specialist’s opinion before making a termination decision, as a specialist’s opinion is more likely to “trump” a general practitioner’s opinion. Still, given the risk of disability and age related discrimination issues, and the sympathy a jury is likely to feel for a former employee who has health issues, it also shows the importance of proceeding with great care (and with the advice of counsel) before making such termination decisions.