Tag Archives: EEOC

June 13, 2014

Forced “Onionhead” Practices At Work Result in EEOC Religious Discrimination Lawsuit

“I love you, man.” Appropriate for beer commercials but perhaps not for the workplace. A New York employer who allegedly required employees to participate in prayer circles, thank God for their job and say “I love you” to managers and co-workers faces a religious discrimination lawsuit filed recently by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC seeks compensatory and punitive damages on behalf of three employees who were fired, allegedly for opposing the required “Onionhead” practices, and a class of similarly harmed individuals. EEOC v. United Health Programs of America, No. 14-cv-3673 (E.D.N.Y. filed June 11, 2014).

Company Required “Harnessing Happiness” or “Onionhead” Practices

According to the EEOC complaint, three former employees of United Health Programs of America filed charges alleging religious discrimination in violation of Title VII because the company required employees to engage in practices under a belief system called “Harnessing Happiness” or “Onionhead.” According to the Harnessing Happiness website, Onionhead is an “incredibly pure, wise and adorable character” who “wants everyone to know how they feel and then know what to do with those feelings.” The three women claim that the company required them to participate in various Onionhead-related activities on a daily and weekly basis, including praying, reading spiritual texts, burning candles, keeping lights at work very dim, thanking God for their employment and saying “I love you” to colleagues and managers. They assert that every day, employees were asked to select Onionhead-related cards to keep next to their computers and to wear Onionhead-related pins. In addition, one of the company’s upper managers and the aunt of the company owner, “Denali,” was the leader of the Onionhead practices and allegedly would require employees to attend one-on-one sessions with her in order to read and discuss books about “divine plans,” “moral codes” and “enlightenment.”

Fired – Allegedly for Opposing Onionhead Practices

Each of the three Charging Parties, Elizabeth Ontaneda, Francine Pennisi and Faith Pabon, were allegedly fired for objecting to the Onionhead practices. Pennisi, an Account Manager and IT Project Manager, spoke up at a managers’ meeting in July 2010, stating that she was Catholic and did not want to participate in the Onionhead activities. Ontaneda, a Senior Accounting Manager for Customer Service, also spoke up at the meeting, saying she felt the same way. A few weeks later, both women were relocated to work in an open area on the customer service floor, rather than in their offices, and their duties were changed to require answering phones. Denali placed a large statue of Buddha in Pennisi’s empty office. Denali also spoke of “demons” in connection with Ontaneda’s and Pennisi’s resistance to Onionhead practices. The day after losing their offices, the women called in sick and were terminated by the company owner by phone and voicemail.

Pabon, a Customer Care Consultant, attended a spa weekend in Connecticut with Denali and about 20 other customer service employees. Pabon alleges that Denali stated that the purpose of the trip was spiritual enlightenment and that they were to be together at all times, holding hands, praying and chanting. Pabon refused to participate in some of the group activities and on Monday following the spa weekend, Denali fired Pabon for “insubordination.”

Hostile Work Environment, Failure to Accommodate and Retaliation

The EEOC asserts numerous religious discrimination claims against the company, including creating a hostile work environment based on religion, failure to accommodate the employees’ own religious beliefs or lack thereof, terminating employees based on religion and retaliating against employees for opposing the required Onionhead practices in the workplace. The EEOC also alleges that some employees were constructively discharged when they felt compelled to leave the company to avoid participating in the required Onionhead activities.

Reports suggest that the company denies any merit to the lawsuit and that they expect it to be dismissed. We don’t yet know the basis of their defense and must remember that at present, the allegations are unproven. It will be an interesting case to follow. We will keep you posted as it proceeds through the court

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May 6, 2014

Separation Agreements Targeted By EEOC Again

By Mark Wiletsky

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) recently filed a lawsuit seeking to stop a Colorado employer from using its form separation and release agreement and to allow employees who have signed the form agreement to file charges of discrimination and participate in EEOC and state agency fair employment investigations. In its federal court complaint, the EEOC alleges that CollegeAmerica Denver violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) by conditioning employees’ receipt of severance benefits on signing a separation and release agreement which, according to the EEOC, chills and interferes with the employees’ rights to file charges and/or cooperate with the EEOC and state fair employment practice agencies.

As we wrote on this blog earlier, the EEOC has been scrutinizing employers’ separation agreements. This is the second such lawsuit challenging language in the separation agreements that does not permit the filing of discrimination or retaliation charges with the EEOC or other government agencies. As in the EEOC’s earlier complaint against a national pharmacy, the recent complaint against CollegeAmerica Denver targets numerous provisions in the separation agreement, including the release of claims, a non-disparagement clause and provisions in which the employee represents that he/she has not filed any claims, has disclosed to the company all matters of non-compliance and will continue to cooperate with and assist the company with any investigation or litigation.

Many of the targeted provisions are standard clauses in form separation agreements. Although it remains to be seen whether the courts will agree with the EEOC’s claims, it is always a good idea for organizations to review their agreements and ensure they do not raise any red flags for the EEOC while still protecting the company from future payouts for employment-related claims. We will continue to provide updates as new developments arise.

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April 16, 2014

EEOC Loses Kaplan Credit Check Appeal

By Brad Cave

In 2010, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued Kaplan Higher Education Corporation, claiming that Kaplan’s use of credit reports had a disparate impact on black applicants. The trial court threw out the EEOC’s suit because it used an invalid method for determining the race of Kaplan’s applicants. The EEOC appealed, and lost again. In a stinging opinion, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Kaplan and rejected the methodology promoted by the EEOC’s expert witness. The Sixth Circuit’s opinion dooms the agency’s background check disparate impact lawsuit against Kaplan and slaps the EEOC for suing a private employer “for using the same type of background check that the EEOC itself uses.” The ruling also illustrates the EEOC’s failure to show that an employer’s use of neutral background checks results in a disparate impact on African-American applicants. EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp., No. 13-3408 (6th Cir. April 9, 2014).

Credit Checks Aimed At Preventing Employee Abuses

Kaplan is a for-profit test preparation and higher education provider. Because some Kaplan students receive financial aid, some Kaplan employees have access to students’ financial information, including information that is subject to the U.S. Department of Education confidentiality regulations. Years ago, Kaplan discovered that some of its financial-aid officers had stolen aid payments and some executives had engaged in self-dealing by hiring relatives as vendors for the company. To help stop these abuses, Kaplan began conducting credit checks on applicants for senior-executive positions as well as accounting, financial aid and other positions where employees have access to company or student financial information. Neither Kaplan nor its credit check vendor provided or linked the applicant’s race with the applicant’s credit report.

EEOC Alleges Kaplan’s Credit Checks Screen Out More African-Americans

Consistent with its efforts to target employers who use background check policies to screen applicants, the EEOC sued Kaplan alleging that Kaplan’s use of credit checks resulted in more African-Americans being rejected than whites, creating a disparate impact in violation of Title VII. To support its claim, the EEOC hired industrial and organizational psychologist Kevin Murphy to analyze Kaplan’s credit check data and offer an expert opinion based on the statistics. However, because the credit check information did not include the applicant’s race, Murphy and his team needed another method to determine race. They created a process that the EEOC called “race rating” in which a team of five “race raters” reviewed drivers’ license photos for a portion of the applicants to visually identify their race. Despite having credit information for 4,670 applicants, Murphy based his “expert” analysis on only 1,090 applicants, of whom 803 had been racially classified using Murphy’s “race rating” process.

“Homemade Methodology” Rejected by Court

The Sixth Circuit wholeheartedly rejected Murphy’s “race rating” process, stating that “[t]he EEOC brought this case on the basis of a homemade methodology, crafted by a witness with no particular expertise to craft it, administered by persons with no particular expertise to administer it, tested by no one, and accepted only by the witness himself.” The Court upheld the exclusion of Murphy’s testimony not only due to his faulty methodology, but also because the group of 1,090 applicants in Murphy’s statistical analysis was not representative of the applicant pool as a whole. Of Kaplan’s entire pool of 4,670 applicants, only 13.3% of the applicants were rejected on the basis of credit checks, but Murphy’s smaller pool of applicants had a fail rate of 23.8%. The Court found that Murphy’s unrepresentative sample might not equate to the respective fail rates of black versus white applicants and therefore, was an unreliable method for the EEOC to show disparate impact.

EEOC’s Own Background Check Policy Contradicts Its Attack on Private Employers For Use of Credit Checks

Although not central to the exclusion of the EEOC’s expert, the Court put the EEOC’s own background check policy front and center. Through the discovery process, Kaplan had successfully obtained information on the EEOC’s background check policies and pointed to the agency’s personnel handbook which states “[o]verdue just debts increase temptation to commit illegal or unethical acts as a means of gaining funds to meet financial obligations.” To address those potential concerns, the EEOC runs credit checks for 84 of the 97 positions within the agency. The Court highlighted the disconnect between the EEOC attacking Kaplan for a credit check policy that the agency used itself.

Future EEOC Challenges to Employer Use of Credit Checks

The Kaplan decision is the latest in a string of EEOC losses in class actions alleging disparate impact based on an employer’s use of a neutral background check process. The EEOC seems unable to provide evidence to support a finding that African-Americans, Hispanics or other groups are being rejected for employment at higher rates than whites based on background checks. In addition, the EEOC’s own use of credit checks in hiring will be used against it in any future similar lawsuits. Although it remains to be seen whether the EEOC will back off of its systemic enforcement efforts related to the use of background checks, the trend for employers is positive.

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October 4, 2013

EEOC’s Religious Accommodation Claim Fails Despite Retailer’s Assumption that a Female Job Applicant Wore a Headscarf for Religious Reasons

By John M. Husband

Does an employer have to engage in an interactive discussion about reasonably accommodating the wearing of a headscarf (i.e., hijab) in contravention of its dress code simply because a job applicant wears a headscarf to the job interview? No, according to a recent decision by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Court ruled that to establish a religious accommodation claim under Title VII, the plaintiff must establish that he/she informed the employer that he/she adheres to a particular practice for religious reasons and that the plaintiff needs an accommodation for that practice, due to a conflict between the practice and the employer’s neutral work rule. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., No. 11-5110 (10th Cir. October 1, 2013).

In the Abercrombie case, an assistant manager named Heather Cooke interviewed Samantha Elauf, a seventeen-year old applicant for an in-store sales position. Ms. Elauf wore a headscarf to the interview. Though they did not discuss religion, Ms. Cooke assumed that Ms. Elauf was Muslim and that her Muslim religion was the reason she wore a headscarf. During the interview, Ms. Cooke described some of the dress requirements expected of Abercrombie employees but neither she nor Ms. Elauf specifically referred to or discussed the wearing of a headscarf. After the interview, Ms. Cooke believed Ms. Elauf was a good candidate for the job but was unsure whether it would be a problem for her to wear a headscarf since Abercrombie has a strict “Look Policy” that forbids wearing of “caps” and black clothing. Ms. Cooke consulted with her district manager who rejected Ms. Elauf for hire because she wore a headscarf which was inconsistent with the Look Policy.

EEOC Files Lawsuit Alleging Retailer Failed to Accommodate Applicant’s Religious Practice

In 2009, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a lawsuit in federal court in Oklahoma alleging that Abercrombie violated Title VII by refusing to hire Ms. Elauf because she wore a headscarf and failing to accommodate her religious beliefs because it failed to make an exception to its Look Policy. The Oklahoma court ruled in favor of the EEOC on summary judgment, reasoning that Abercrombie had enough information to make it aware that there was a conflict between the applicant’s religious practice and its Look Policy that would require an accommodation. It emphasized that Abercrombie had made numerous exceptions to its Look Policy over the past decade or so, including eight or nine headscarf exceptions. The parties went to trial on the issue of damages where a jury awarded the EEOC $20,000 in compensatory damages.

Religious Accommodation Claim Requires Plaintiff to Inform Employer of Conflict between Religious Practice and Employer Policy

On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Abercrombie argued that it was entitled to summary judgment because there was no dispute that Ms. Elauf never informed the company that her practice of wearing a headscarf was based on her religious beliefs and that she would need an accommodation for the practice based on the conflict between it and the Look Policy. A divided Tenth Circuit agreed. Two of the three judges on the panel ruled that the plaintiff in a religious accommodation case must establish that he or she informedthe employer of his/her religious belief that contradicts with an employment requirement and the plaintiff must request an accommodation. Because Ms. Elauf never informed Abercrombie that she wore a headscarf for religious reasons and never requested an exception from the dress code, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment to the EEOC and vacated the jury award with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Abercrombie. The majority stated that it is only after an employer is put on notice of the need for a religious accommodation that it must actively engage in a dialogue with applicants or employees concerning their conflicting religious practices and possible accommodations.

Dissenting Opinion and Conflicting Circuit Court Decisions Set Up Possible Appeal to Supreme Court

The dissenting judge strongly disagreed with his two colleagues on the panel, believing that Abercrombie should not be permitted to avoid discussing reasonable accommodations for Ms. Elauf’s religious practice when it knew that she wore a headscarf, assumed she was Muslim and wore the headscarf for religious reasons and knew that its Look Policy prohibited its sales models from wearing headwear. The dissent noted that Ms. Elauf could not inform Abercrombie of a conflict between her religious practice and its dress code because she did not know the details of the Look Policy or that headwear, including a headscarf, was prohibited. The dissenting judge would have sent the entire matter to a jury to decide if Abercrombie was liable for religious discrimination.

The dissenting opinion points out that other circuit courts of appeal have held that a job applicant or employee can establish a religious failure-to-accommodate claim if he/she can show that the employer knew of a conflict between the plaintiff’s religious beliefs and a job requirement, regardless of how the employer acquired knowledge of that conflict. Unlike the Tenth Circuit, these other circuits do not require that the plaintiff actually inform the employer of the conflict. The stage is set for the EEOC to ask the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve the disagreement between the courts to ultimately decide whether a plaintiff must actually inform the employer of the conflict between his/her religious practice and a job requirement before the duty to discuss reasonable accommodations kicks in.

Employer Lessons

This opinion is favorable for employers in the states within the Tenth Circuit’s jurisdiction, namely Colorado, Oklahoma, Kansas, Utah, Wyoming and New Mexico. That said, employers should always be cautious about making adverse employment decisions when it has knowledge or information that relates to an applicant/employee’s religious beliefs or practices.

Disclaimer:This article is designed to provide general information on pertinent legal topics. The statements made are provided for educational purposes only. They do not constitute legal advice and are not intended to create an attorney-client relationship between you and Holland & Hart LLP. If you have specific questions as to the application of the law to your activities, you should seek the advice of your legal counsel.

September 11, 2013

Family Medical History Request Results in First EEOC GINA Lawsuit

By Dora Lane

Employers may not request a family medical history from employees or applicants, even as part of a post-offer medical examination. In its first lawsuit alleging a violation of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued an employer whose contracted medical examiner required applicants to complete a family medical history questionnaire. EEOC v. Fabricut, Inc., No. 13-cv-248 (N.D. Okla. filed May 7, 2013). Review of this case offers a timely opportunity for employers to review their employment practices for compliance with GINA.

Investigation of ADA Claim Finds Illegal Family Medical History

Temporary employee, Rhonda Jones, worked for Fabricut, a distributor of decorative fabrics, as a memo clerk for 90 days. She then applied to work in the same position as a regular employee. Fabricut made her an offer of employment, contingent on the results of a pre-employment drug test and physical. Fabricut sent Jones to Knox Laboratory, a medical examining facility that provided examination services to Fabricut on a contract basis. As part of the process, Knox Laboratory instructed Jones to complete a questionnaire that asked about the existence of heart disease, hypertension, cancer, tuberculosis, diabetes, arthritis and mental disorders in her family.

The examiner conducting Jones’ pre-employment physical concluded that Jones may be predisposed to or already suffer from carpal tunnel syndrome and recommended further evaluation. Although Jones’ personal physician conducted a battery of tests and concluded that she did not have carpal tunnel syndrome, Fabricut withdrew its offer of employment. Jones filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC alleging a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) on grounds that she was denied employment because Fabricut regarded her as having a disability, carpal tunnel syndrome.

As part of its investigation of Jones’ ADA claim, the EEOC obtained from Fabricut copies of Jones’ post-offer, pre-employment medical examination. The records revealed the family medical history questionnaire that Jones had been instructed to complete at the start of her pre-employment physical. Finding that the questionnaire included unlawful inquiries into genetic information, the EEOC notified Fabricut that its investigation would look into its compliance with GINA regarding its solicitation of family medical histories of applicants.

EEOC Pursues GINA Lawsuit

The EEOC filed suit against Fabricut in federal court alleging violations of both the ADA and GINA. GINA, which took effect in 2009, makes it illegal for employers to discriminate against employees or applicants because of genetic information, which includes family medical history, and restricts employers from requesting, requiring or purchasing such information, among other things. The lawsuit alleges that Fabricut violated GINA by requesting and requiring Jones and other applicants to indicate whether or not they had a family medical history for a variety of diseases and disorders as part of its post-offer, pre-employment medical examination as conducted for Fabricut by its agent, Knox Laboratory, who then provided the information to Fabricut for its use in hiring and employment decisions.

Lawsuit Settled for $50,000 and Additional Relief

Without admitting any violation of law, Fabricut agreed to settle the case for payment of $50,000 to Jones as compensatory damages. The settlement also requires Fabricut to post notices in its workplace stating that Fabricut will comply with all federal employment laws, including the ADA and GINA, conduct two hours of live training for all management and human resources personnel, create or revise personnel policies prohibiting discrimination and be subject to monitoring and reporting requirements for two years.

Review Practices for GINA Compliance

Although GINA has been in effect since 2009, many employers may not be familiar with its requirements and prohibitions. What may have been routine employment practices in past years, such as collecting a family medical history from employees or applicants, may now be unlawful under GINA. Employers should review their job applications, interview questions and any employment medical testing practices to ensure that no family medical history is requested. The regulations implementing GINA specifically state that a covered entity must tell health care providers not to collect genetic information, including family medical history, as part of a medical examination used to determine an individual’s ability to perform a job. 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8(d). In addition, if an employer finds out that family medical histories are being collected, it must take reasonable measures, including not using the health care provider, to prevent the information from being collected in the future.

Under certain circumstances, employers may receive genetic information that it did not request. Such inadvertent acquisition of genetic information is not a violation of GINA. To help establish that genetic information was acquired inadvertently, employers should take advantage of a safe harbor provision in the GINA regulations. When an employer needs to request health-related information, such as to support a request for sick leave or a reasonable accommodation under the ADA, the employer should warn the employee and the health care provider not to provide genetic information. The regulations suggest the following language to accompany the request for health-related information:

The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA) prohibits employers and other entities covered by GINA Title II from requesting or requiring genetic information of an individual or family member of the individual, except as specifically allowed by this law. To comply with this law, we are asking that you not provide any genetic information when responding to this request for medical information. "Genetic information," as defined by GINA, includes an individual's family medical history, the results of an individual's or family member's genetic tests, the fact that an individual or an individual's family member sought or received genetic services, and genetic information of a fetus carried by an individual or an individual's family member or an embryo lawfully held by an individual or family member receiving assistive reproductive services.

When employers provide this warning, any resulting acquisition of genetic information will generally be considered inadvertent and therefore, not in violation of GINA.

Disclaimer: This article is designed to provide general information on pertinent legal topics. The statements made are provided for educational purposes only. They do not constitute legal advice and are not intended to create an attorney-client relationship between you and Holland & Hart LLP. If you have specific questions as to the application of the law to your activities, you should seek the advice of your legal counsel.

August 12, 2013

EEOC Slapped with Order to Pay $4.6 Million for Pursuing Unreasonable and Groundless Discrimination Claims

By Mark Wiletsky

When a former employee sues for discrimination or retaliation, the employer generally is unable to recover its fees or costs for defending the lawsuit, even if the employer prevails. That was not the case, however, in a recent class action brought by the agency tasked with enforcing federal anti-discrimination laws, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). A federal court recently slammed the EEOC with over $4.6 million in attorneys’ fees, costs and out-of-pocket expenses after finding that the EEOC’s pattern or practice class action claim and 153 of the individual discrimination claims were unreasonable or groundless. EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., No. 07cv95 (N.D. Iowa, August 1, 2013).

EEOC Sued Employer Alleging Sexual Harassment

In September 2007, the EEOC filed a lawsuit against trucking company, CRST Van Expedited, Inc. (CRST) alleging that the company’s lead drivers and team drivers subjected female employees to sexual harassment and created a sexually hostile environment in violation of Title VII. The EEOC filed its action on behalf of employee Monika Starke and a class of similarly situated female employees.

After almost a year of discovery in the case, the EEOC was pressed to identify the total number of harmed individuals making up the purported class. In October 2008, the EEOC identified 270 allegedly aggrieved female employees. When the EEOC failed to make all of the individuals available for deposition by a court-ordered deadline, the District Court barred the EEOC from pursuing claims on behalf of those 99 individuals who were not deposed.

CRST filed multiple motions for summary judgment to get the remaining claims dismissed before trial. First, CRST succeeded in getting the EEOC’s pattern or practice claim dismissed, which meant that the EEOC was left to pursue harassment claims only on behalf of individual employees. CRST then hammered away at all of the individual claims and succeeded in getting them all dismissed for a multitude of reasons, ranging from lack of evidence that some individuals had suffered severe or pervasive harassment to some individuals not reporting any harassment to the company. Significantly, the Court dismissed 67 of the individual claims because the EEOC had failed to exhaust administrative prerequisites by failing to investigate or attempt conciliation of the claims. Having dismissed all claims against CRST, the District Court found that CRST was the prevailing party and was entitled to recover its attorneys’ fees and costs, which exceeded $4.5 million.

EEOC Appeals and Keeps Two Claims Alive

The EEOC appealed the dismissal of 107 of the claims to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Eighth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the claims on behalf of two female employees and consequently found that CRST was no longer the prevailing party entitled to recover its attorneys’ fees and costs. The case was sent back to the District Court for continuation of those two claims.

District Court Awards Millions in Attorneys’ Fees, Costs and Expenses

After the case was sent back to the District Court, the EEOC voluntarily dismissed one of the two remaining claims because it had failed to exhaust the administrative prerequisites as to her claim. CRST agreed to settle the remaining claim for $50,000 and the parties asked the Court to dismiss the case in its entirety as a result of the settlement. CRST then asked to recover its attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses for the claims on which it prevailed.

In order to recover its attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses, CRST needed to show that it was the prevailing party for purposes of Title VII and that the EEOC’s claims were frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. The Court ruled that CRST was the prevailing party on the EEOC’s pattern or practice claim and on 153 of the EEOC’s individual claims. CRST was not the prevailing party, however, for the claim it settled, for the three claims withdrawn by the EEOC and for 98 claims that the Court dismissed as a discovery sanction against the EEOC. The Court then ruled that the EEOC’s failure to exhaust Title VII administrative prerequisites of investigation and conciliation for 67 of the individual claims was unreasonable. It further ruled that the EEOC’s pattern or practice claim was unreasonable as it was based only on anecdotal evidence. In total, the Court found that 153 of the individual claims as well as the pattern or practice claim were unreasonable or groundless.

After discounting the total amount of CRST’s attorneys’ fees, costs and out-of-pocket expenses to reflect those claims for which CRST was not the prevailing party, the Court ordered the EEOC to pay CRST $4,694,442. This award represented $4,189,296 in CRST’s attorneys’ fees, $91,758 in costs and $413,387 in out-of-pocket expenses for expert witness fees, travel expenses, delivery fees, and similar expenses.

While the EEOC performs an important function and pursues meritorious cases, the case against CRST shows that employers can and should fight back when the EEOC brings a frivolous case. Significantly, this is not the first time a court has awarded fees against the EEOC or rejected its claims. Last year, the Tenth Circuit (which covers Colorado) slapped the EEOC with attorneys’ fees and costs in EEOC v. TriCore Reference Laboratories, No. 11-CV-2096 (10th Cir. 2012), affirmed summary judgment against the EEOC in EEOC v. The Picture People, Inc., No. 11-CV-1306 (10th Cir. 2012), and the court affirmed a district court’s decision that the EEOC’s administrative subpoena was overbroad in EEOC v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad. We also recently discussed a letter sent by nine state Attorney Generals, in which they criticized the EEOC’s lawsuits and position concerning employers’ ability to use background checks to screen employees with a criminal record. Hopefully, these losses, fee awards, and criticisms will cause the EEOC to more thoroughly evaluate which cases have merit before subjecting employers to the high cost and aggravation of defending meritless claims.

Disclaimer: This article is designed to provide general information on pertinent legal topics. The statements made are provided for educational purposes only. They do not constitute legal advice and are not intended to create an attorney-client relationship between you and Holland & Hart LLP. If you have specific questions as to the application of the law to your activities, you should seek the advice of your legal counsel.

July 29, 2013

The Battle Over Background Checks Continues — State AGs Accuse EEOC of “Gross Federal Overreach”

By Mark Wiletsky

Is it discriminatory if an employer does not hire anyone with a particular criminal conviction, regardless of that person’s race, gender, religion, or other protected characteristic? According to the EEOC’s April 2012 Enforcement Guidance, it might be. But in a July 24, 2013 letter sent to EEOC Commissioner Jacqueline Berrien and the four EEOC Board Members, nine state Attorneys’ General (AGs) disagree. The AGs chastise the EEOC for filing recent lawsuits against BMW Manufacturing Co., LLC and Dolgencorp (Dollar General), in which the EEOC alleges that these employers violated Title VII’s disparate impact prohibition by using a bright-line screening policy that rejected all individuals with past convictions in certain categories of crimes, such as murder, assault, reckless driving and possession of drug paraphernalia.

The letter then criticizes the EEOC’s April 2012 Enforcement Guidance on Arrest and Conviction Records, stating that the EEOC’s policy guidance incorrectly applies the law and constitutes an unlawful expansion of Title VII. The AGs argue that if Congress wishes to protect former criminals from employment discrimination, it can amend the law, but it is not the EEOC’s role to expand the protections of Title VII under the guise of preventing racial discrimination.

The Republican state AGs from Colorado, Montana, Utah, Kansas, Nebraska, West Virginia, Alabama, South Carolina and Georgia joined in this missive to say “enough is enough” on the EEOC’s background check lawsuits. Citing the burden on businesses to undertake more individualized assessments of an applicant’s criminal history, the AGs urge the EEOC to rescind its April 2012 Enforcement Guidance and dismiss the lawsuits against Dollar General and BMW. Not likely, but it may get the attention of federal lawmakers who may try to rein in the EEOC’s position on this issue.

January 30, 2013

EEOC Fails to Prove Credit Checks have Discriminatory Impact

By Mark B. Wiletsky

Is checking an applicant’s credit history discriminatory? According to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), using credit checks to screen out applicants may be discriminatory if it has a disproportionately significant impact on a protected group. Although a court recently dismissed an EEOC lawsuit against an organization concerning its use of credit checks, the case should serve as a reminder to review your own policies and procedures with respect to using background and credit checks in the hiring process, as this is likely not the last time the EEOC or the courts will address the issue.

EEOC Sues Claiming Use of Credit Checks Has Disparate Impact on Black Applicants

In December 2010, the EEOC sued Kaplan Higher Learning Education Corporation (Kaplan), alleging that Kaplan’s practice of using credit history in making hiring decisions has a disparate impact on Black applicants in violation of Title VII. In other words, the EEOC asserted that Kaplan’s use of credit histories—while not facially discriminatory—had a disproportionate impact in terms of screening out Black applicants. Kaplan, however, defended its use of credit histories in the hiring process. It claimed that it used credit reports to assess applicants for financial and operational positions after discovering system breaches that allowed business officers to misappropriate student funds. Kaplan asserted that it reviewed an applicant’s credit history to determine whether the individual is under “financial stress or burdens” that might compromise his or her ethical obligations.

In order to provide statistical analysis showing disparate impact on Black applicants, the EEOC relied on its expert, Dr. Kevin Murphy, to analyze the applicant pool and those rejected due to their credit report. Because the race of each applicant was not known, the EEOC’s expert tried to use other means to make determinations about the applicant’s race, even when it was not known.

Kaplan asked the Court to exclude Dr. Murphy’s testimony and report and ultimately, dismiss the EEOC’s case, arguing that Dr. Murphy’s method of determining race was scientifically unsound. The Court agreed. In the absence of any reliable, scientifically sound evidence to link the use of credit reports to race, the Court granted summary judgment to Kaplan.

Use of Credit Reports Going Forward

In the last four or five years, the EEOC has made an issue out of employers’ use of credit reports and criminal history records in hiring decisions, resulting in the filing of a number of lawsuits. The EEOC’s track record in these cases, however, is mixed. In an earlier case alleging disparate impact related to the use of criminal history records, the EEOC finally agreed to dismiss the case after more than three years while the federal court ordered sanctions of over $750,000 against the EEOC for continuing to litigate when it knew of fatal flaws in proving disparate impact. (See EEOC v. Peoplemark, Inc., No. 08-cv-907 (W.D. Mich. 2008)). On the other hand, the EEOC was able to obtain a $3.1 million settlement and policy revisions from Pepsi when it challenged Pepsi’s use of background checks in 2011.

Despite the EEOC’s spotty results in proving disparate impact in these background check cases, employers need to be careful and deliberate in how they use credit reports for hiring purposes. Credit reports should be used only where job-related, such as for applicants seeking positions involving financial responsibility, high level managerial decisions or as required by law. Conduct credit checks only after making a conditional job offer so as not to weed out candidates prematurely on the basis of credit. Finally, be aware that eight states currently have statutory restrictions on the use of credit history in employment decisions so if you are located or are hiring in California, Oregon, Washington, Illinois, Maryland, Connecticut, Hawaii or Vermont, you will need to comply with those restrictions.

November 12, 2012

Consider ADA Before Discharging Employee When Leave Expires

By Mark Wiletsky

Can you fire an employee who is unable to return to work due to a medical impairment if that individual has exhausted all of his available leave? What if the employee has been on an extended leave of absence, and has exhausted his Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave and short-term disability benefits, but still has some restrictions on his ability to work? The answer: maybe, but only if you have engaged in an individualized inquiry under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) before doing so.

Some companies provide generous amounts of leave for employees with health or medical issues. Still, a company should not have a policy by which it automatically terminates employees who cannot return to work when they have exhausted available leave, or if they are unable to return without restrictions. Such policies likely violate the ADA, which generally requires an individualized approach to working with individuals with disabilities. Automatically discharging an employee just because that person has exhausted available leave is not consistent with the ADA's individualized inquiry. Similarly, demanding that individuals be 100% recovered from an injury or impairment before returning to work typically violates the ADA's requirement to accommodate disabled employees who are qualified, but unable to perform the essential job functions without an accommodation.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has challenged a number of companies that maintained these blanket policies, and it continues to do so. On November 9, the EEOC announced that it entered into a consent decree (which is essentially a public settlement agreement) with a nationwide trucking company that supposedly discharged employees automatically upon exhausting their leave or when they were unable to return to work without restrictions. Although the company admitted no wrongdoing, to resolve the lawsuit it agreed to pay $4.85 million, revise its policies to comply with the ADA, provide mandatory periodic training to employees on the ADA, report particular employee complaints about the ADA to the EEOC, post a notice about the settlement, and appoint an internal monitor to ensure compliance with the consent decree.

To avoid these issues or a potential ADA violation due to your leave policies, consider the following tips:

If you have a policy that requires an employee to be able to work without restrictions, or if you discharge employees as soon as they exhaust available leave, you should work with counsel to revise those policies.
When an employee is nearing the end of his available leave, send a letter or call the employee to remind him that his leave is about to expire. If the employee is unable to return when the leave expires, set a time to meet with the employee to determine whether you can accommodate the employee, either with more leave (potentially) or with some other type of accommodation. While you are not required to provide indefinite leave, you may be required to grant some additional time off, or consider another accommodation, if the employee qualifies for protection under the ADA.
Follow-up in writing with the employee after the interactive meeting, to confirm the discussion and avoid any disputes down the road about what was said or agreed upon in terms of the employee's status and ability to return to work.

Managing employee leaves is not easy, and it often requires navigating a variety of statutory rights, including the FMLA, the ADA, and workers' compensation. But taking an individual approach is far better than relying on a "one-size-fits-all" policy, which may very well result in a lawsuit or enforcement action.

June 7, 2012

Last-Chance Agreements — Employer beware!

The EEOC, in its recent press release (http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/5-29-12.cfm) of May 29, 2012, announces a rare victory on summary judgment in what could be a bad trend for employers. In the underlying case of EEOC v. Cognis Corporation, a foreign multinational corporation, the federal judge ruled that the company retaliated against an employee for refusing to waive his rights to file a discrimination charge, both for past conduct and prospective conduct.

The employee, as a condition of continued employment, was asked to sign a last-chance agreement that prohibited him from filing a discrimination charge. According to the EEOC, Cognis conditioned the employment on the execution of the last chance agreement and when the employee refused to be bound by that agreement he was fired. As the Court noted in its opinion, it is not often that an employee is granted summary judgment on a Title VII retaliation claim.

The outcome here is problematic for two reasons. First, in most cases there is often a fact issue over the stated motivation for the adverse action taken by the employer because the motivation for the underlying decision is almost always in dispute; thus, there is a necessary question of fact that would defeat a summary judgment. Second, the Court’s willingness to discount the fact that had the employee not executed the last-chance agreement in the first instance he would have been terminated for a legitimate and non-discriminatory reason – poor performance – is worrisome. In rejecting Cognis’s argument on this point, the Court reasoned that even if it credited Cognis’s argument; it was the employee’s revocation of the last-chance agreement that constituted an adverse action, an act that might dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. (See Opinion). This reasoning, of course, doesn’t adequately address the fact that the worker essentially was given consideration to remain employed under the last-change agreement.

What is clear from the Court holding in Cognis is the fact that the last-chance agreement is said to have threatened termination for undertaking future protected activity, which the Court says satisfies one element of the prima facie case of retaliation – a preemptive retaliatory act. Now, all that remains for the Court is a determination of damages. If the Cognis last-chance agreement had not included this prospective provision, I wonder how the case would have turned.

This holding is sure to motivate the EEOC to seek out similar cases of this kind. The EEOC concludes its release by indicating that “[f]iling EEOC charges is a fundamental right of American employees, and this agency always stands ready to protect that right.” EEOC’s Chicago District Director John Rowe further states, “This court’s opinion should cause employers to remember that seeking to dissuade employees from exercising that right is not only bad policy, it’s a violation of federal law which can give rise to very substantial liability.”

Despite the Court’s finding and the threats by the EEOC, this author maintains that narrowly crafted last-chance agreements are often useful to employers, both to ensure employees understand that future satisfactory performance is demanded and to give the employee fair opportunity to improve his/her conduct.

For more information contact Steven M. Gutierrez.