Tag Archives: Holland & Hart

January 20, 2016

Unaccepted Settlement Offer of Complete Relief Does Not Moot Plaintiff’s Case

In a 6-to-3 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that a plaintiff who rejects a settlement offer or an offer of judgment of complete relief may continue litigating the case. Relying on principles of contract law, the Court ruled that once a settlement offer is rejected by the plaintiff, it has no continuing effect. Because the plaintiff remains empty-handed, he may continue to pursue all available remedies in court, on both an individual basis and on behalf of a class. Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. ___ (2016).

Resolving Circuit Court Split on Whether Offer Moots Claim

The dilemma is this: if a defendant offers the plaintiff complete monetary and all other relief that he is entitled to recover on his claims, what is left to be decided or awarded? If there is no case or controversy, a federal court must dismiss the case as moot pursuant to Article III of the Constitution.

The Supreme Court agreed to hear this case because the Circuit Courts of Appeals did not agree on this issue. The First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals had previously ruled that an unaccepted offer does not render a plaintiff’s claim moot. However, the Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits had ruled oppositely, holding that an unaccepted offer of complete relief can moot a plaintiff’s claim.

Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, pointed to Justice Kagan’s words from her dissent in an earlier case: “When a plaintiff rejects such an offer – however good the terms – [the plaintiff’s] interest in the lawsuit remains just what it was before. And so too does the court’s ability to grant her relief.” Therefore, the Court reasoned, a case is not rendered moot by an unaccepted offer to satisfy the plaintiff’s individual claim.

Chief Justice Roberts Dissents

Chief Justice Roberts dissented, joined by Justices Scalia and Alito. (Justice Thomas concurred with the majority in its holding, but not its reasoning, writing a separate concurrence.) The dissenting justices stated that the “federal courts exist to resolve real disputes, not to rule on a plaintiff’s entitlement to relief already there for the taking.” The dissent would have rendered the case moot on the basis that there is no case or controversy after a defendant agrees to fully redress the injury alleged by a plaintiff.

Can Defendants Still “Pick Off” Named Plaintiffs?

Settling a named plaintiff’s individual claim prior to class certification is appealing to defendants who want to avoid the greater liability and cost of a class action. While this “picking off” strategy may have been undermined, in part, by the Supreme Court’s decision, the Court did not decide whether payment of complete relief would render the case moot.

This case arose when Jose Gomez sued a marketing firm, Campbell-Ewald, for sending him text messages without his permission. Gomez filed a nationwide class action, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), which permits consumers to recover treble damages of $1,500 per call/text message, plus litigation costs. Gomez sought the maximum statutory damages, costs, attorney’s fees, and an injunction against Campbell-Ewald barring further unsolicited messaging.

Before Gomez could file a motion for class certification, Campbell-Ewald offered to settle Gomez’s individual claim and filed an offer of judgment under Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Campbell-Ewald offered to pay Gomez $1,503 per unsolicited message and his court costs, but not attorney’s fees, which Campbell-Ewald argued were not available under the TCPA. Campbell-Ewald also offered to stipulate to an injunction that would bar it from sending text messages in violation of the TCPA. Gomez rejected the settlement offer and allowed the Rule 68 offer of judgment to lapse. Campbell-Ewald then sought dismissal of Gomez’s case, arguing that its offer of complete relief rendered his claim moot. The Supreme Court disagreed.

However, the Court did not decide whether the result would be different if a defendant actually deposits the full amount resolving the plaintiff’s individual claim in an account payable to the plaintiff, with the court then entering judgment in that amount. As Chief Justice Roberts stated in his dissent, the good news is that this case is limited to its facts, and that issue has been left for a future case.

Click here to print/email/pdf this article.

January 12, 2016

Anticipating Revisions To The “Persuader Rules” – What You Need To Know

By Brian Mumaugh

As early as March, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) plans to issue its final rules that will significantly narrow the type of union-avoidance activities that employers and their labor attorneys and relations consultants may engage in without having to report those activities to the government. The tightening of the so-call “persuader rules” will mean that employers who utilize labor relations consultants, including lawyers, to help with union-avoidance or collective bargaining activities will need to disclose many more of those activities, and the fees paid for them.

Evolution of the “Persuader Rules”

In the late 1950’s, because of perceived questionable conduct by both unions and employers involved in union organizing and collective bargaining campaigns, Congress enacted the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA). The LMRDA seeks to make labor-management relations more transparent by imposing reporting and disclosure requirements on labor organizations and their officials, employers, and labor relations consultants.

Under the LMRDA, the reporting requirements for employers and their labor consultants are triggered when they undertake activities intended to directly or indirectly persuade employees to exercise (or not to exercise) the employees’ right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. Employers must file a Form LM-10 (Employer Report) that discloses all payments made to unions and union officials, persuader payments made to employees and employee committees, persuader agreements/arrangements made with labor relations consultants, including lawyers, which includes the amount and dates of payments made to such consultants, and any expenditures made to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees, or otherwise obtain information concerning employees or a labor organization. Labor relations consultants must file a Form LM-20 specifying, among other things, information about the consultant and the nature of the “persuader activities” to be performed. Under the LMRDA, the DOL must make all such forms available for public inspection.

The “Advice” Exemption

The LMRDA contains an exemption from the reporting requirements for persuader activities for services that give “advice” to the employer. Except for brief periods when the LMRDA was first enacted and again in 2001, the DOL has interpreted this “advice” exemption to apply to activities where a consultant or lawyer prepares a speech or documents for use by the employer, or revises materials initially drafted by the employer. In other words, as long as the consultant or lawyer did not directly deliver or disseminate speeches or materials to employees for the purpose of persuading them with respect to their organizational or bargaining rights, behind-the-scenes activities where the consultant/lawyer drafts materials for use by the employer would not trigger a reporting obligation. Under the proposed rules, that is about to change.

Expanded Proposed Interpretation of “Advice” Exemption

Believing its long-standing interpretation of the “advice” exemption to be overly broad, the DOL proposed a narrower interpretation that would require reporting in any case in which the agreement or arrangement with a labor consultant/lawyer in any way calls for the consultant to engage in persuader activities, regardless of whether or not advice is also given. The revised interpretation would define reportable “persuader activity” to include activities where a lawyer or consultant provides material or communications to, or engages in other actions, conduct, or communications on behalf of an employer that at least in part, has the objective of persuading employees concerning their rights to organize or bargain collectively. Exempt “advice” would be limited to recommendations, verbal or written, regarding an employer’s decision or course of conduct.

Stated examples of covered persuader activities that would require disclosure include:

drafting, revising, or providing written materials for presentation, dissemination, or distribution to employees
drafting, revising, or providing a speech, video, or multi-media presentation to be presented, shown or distributed to employees
drafting, revising, or providing website content for employees
planning or conducting individual or group employee meetings, and training supervisors or employer representatives to do the same
coordinating or directing the activities of supervisors or employer representatives
establishing or facilitating employee committees
developing personnel policies or practices
deciding which employees to target for persuader activity or disciplinary action
conducting a seminar for supervisors or employer representatives

The DOL justifies this expansion of the reporting circumstances, in part, because the role of outside consultants and law firms in managing employers’ anti-union efforts has grown substantially over the years, citing reports that somewhere between 71% and 87% of employers facing organizing drives hire third-party consultants to assist in their counter-organizing efforts. The DOL also states that underreporting of persuader activities is a problem as “employees are not receiving the information that Congress intended they receive.” Regardless of its reasoning, the DOL’s proposed change of its 50-year old interpretation will result in significant burdens on both employers and their consultants.

March 2016 Is New Target Date for Final Rule

Almost five years has passed since the DOL published its proposed rule changing the “persuader rules.” After numerous delays in publishing its final rules, the DOL’s regulatory agenda indicates that it expects to issue the final “persuader rules” this March. We will let you know when the final rules are published, or if the timeline changes. In the meantime, you might want to take advantage of the next few months before the new rules kick in to obtain union-avoidance materials and training from your consultants now. At a minimum, talk to your labor relations consultant/labor lawyer about the upcoming changes so that you are aware of how they may impact your labor strategies in the future.

Click here to print/email/pdf this article.

January 4, 2016

Pregnancy-Related Accommodation Bill To Be Introduced in Colorado Legislature

Following the national trend, a bill to be introduced during Colorado’s next legislative session intends to expand protection for pregnancy-related leave. Specifically, the draft bill would require employers to provide reasonable accommodations to applicants and employees for conditions related to pregnancy and childbirth. If passed, the bill would mean that employers must engage in an interactive process to assess potential reasonable accommodations, provide notice of employee rights, and refrain from retaliating against employees and applicants that request or use a pregnancy-related accommodation.

With the 2016 Colorado legislative session set to convene on January 13th, here are the highlights of the draft bill.

Reasonable Accommodation Requirement

Under the draft bill, an employer would commit an unfair employment practice if it refuses to make a reasonable accommodation for a job applicant or an employee for conditions related to pregnancy or childbirth, unless doing so would impose an undue hardship on the employer’s business. Employers would need to engage in a good-faith interactive process with the employee to determine possible, effective reasonable accommodations.

Most employers should be familiar with the interactive process as it should be used when assessing accommodations for qualified individuals with a disability. Possible reasonable accommodations listed in the draft bill include more frequent or longer break periods, temporary transfer to a less strenuous or hazardous position, job restructuring, light duty, time off to recover from childbirth, acquisition or modification of equipment, seating, assistance with manual labor, modified schedules, and break-time and private non-bathroom space for expressing breast milk. Employers would not be required hire new employees, or discharge, transfer, or promote another employee in order to make a reasonable accommodation.

The bill would further prohibit employers from requiring an applicant or employee to accept a reasonable accommodation that the individual chooses not to accept. The bill also would prevent employers from requiring an employee to take leave if there are other reasonable accommodations that may be made. These provisions seem to suggest that the employee has veto power over offered accommodations. This differs significantly from disability law as under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), an employer meets its reasonable accommodation duty if it provides an accommodation that allows the employee to perform the essential functions of his or her job, even if that accommodation is not the one preferred by the employee.

Undue Hardship Analysis

An “undue hardship” is defined in the bill as an action requiring significant difficulty or expense proven by the employer. Factoring into that determination would be:

the nature and cost of the accommodation
the overall financial resources of the employer
the overall size of the employer’s business with respect to the number of employees and the number, type, and location of the available facilities, and
the accommodation’s effect on expenses and resources or its impact on the operations of the employer.

If the employer provides a similar accommodation to other classes of employees, it will be presumed that the accommodation does not impose an undue hardship. Employers would have to rebut that presumption if they fail to offer the same or similar accommodation for pregnancy-related conditions.

Retaliation Prohibited

Employers would be prohibited from taking adverse action against an employee who requests or uses a reasonable accommodation for a pregnancy-related condition. An adverse action is defined in the bill as a retaliatory action, such as the failure to reinstate the employee to her original job or to an equivalent position with equivalent pay and accumulated seniority, retirement, fringe benefits and other applicable service credits.

Notice and Posting Requirement

If this bill were to become law, employers would be required to provide employees with written notice of their rights under this provision. New employees would have to be provided the written notice at the start of their employment. Additionally, employers would have ten days to provide the notice to individual employees who inform their employer of their pregnancy. There is also a provision to notify existing employees within a specified time after the effective date of the new law. Finally, employers would be required to post the written notice in a conspicuous place at their business in an area accessible to employees.

Likelihood of Bill Passage

Remember that at present, this bill is only a draft and after it is introduced in the House, it will be assigned to a committee. There are many opportunities for legislators to amend, add, or delete provisions in the bill throughout the legislative process.

That said, some form of the bill stands a reasonable chance of passage within the Democratically controlled Colorado House. It has less chance of success in the Republican-controlled Senate. We will watch to see if other legislators add their names as co-sponsors, or if an alternative (perhaps less onerous) bill is introduced in the Senate. We will track this bill and keep you informed of any important developments.

Click here to print/email/pdf this article.

April 14, 2015

EEOC Fails to Show Telecommuting Would Be A Reasonable Accommodation

By Mark Wiletsky

The Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) “does not endow all disabled persons with a job—or job schedule—of their choosing,” according to the majority of judges on the full Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. In an 8 to 5 decision, the Sixth Circuit Court ruled en banc that Ford Motor Company did not violate the ADA when it denied an employee’s request to telecommute up to four days per week in order to accommodate her irritable bowel syndrome. EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., No. 12-2484 (6th Cir. Apr. 10, 2015).

“Good, Old-Fashioned Interpersonal Skills” Made In-Person Attendance Essential

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) argued that a resale buyer for Ford, Jane Harris, who had irritable bowel syndrome that made it difficult for her to be far from a restroom, should be allowed to work from home up to four days per week. The agency cited Ford’s telecommuting policy that allowed other workers, including some resale buyers, to telecommute as evidence that Harris’ telecommuting request was a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.

The Court disagreed. It ruled that regular and predictable on-site attendance was an essential function of the resale-buyer position at Ford. Resale buyers needed to purchase raw steel from steel suppliers and then resell it to parts manufacturers to make parts used in Ford vehicles. Although some interactions could be done by email and telephone, the Court found that many required “good, old-fashioned interpersonal skills,” and resale buyers needed to be able to meet face to face with suppliers, parts manufacturers and Ford employees during core business hours.

Importantly, the Court reiterated the general rule is that regular attendance at work is essential to most jobs, especially interactive ones. It pointed to past court opinions as well as to EEOC regulations that support the premise that regular and predictable on-site attendance is an essential job function. The Court even relied on that “sometimes-forgotten guide” – common sense, stating that non-lawyers (as well as judges in other appellate circuits) recognize that regular in-person attendance is an essential function, and a prerequisite to other essential functions, of most jobs.

Other Buyers Telecommuted on a Predictable, Limited Basis

But what about the fact that Ford had a telecommuting policy that allowed other employees, including resale buyers like Harris, to work from home? Wouldn’t that make telecommuting a reasonable accommodation for Harris?

The Court said no, because she proposed to telecommute four days per week on a schedule of her choosing. The other resale buyers who telecommuted did so only one established day per week and they agreed in advance that they would come into work that day, if needed. They were also able to perform well and maintain productivity. Harris, on the other hand, wanted to be able to pick and choose which days she would telecommute, up to four days per week, without agreeing to come in those days, if necessary. The Court found that none of these other employees’ more predictable and more limited telecommuting schedules removed regular on-site attendance from the resale buyer’s job.

As a result, the Court ruled that Harris’ proposed telecommuting accommodation unreasonable.

In addition, Ford had allowed Harris to telecommute on an as-needed basis on three separate occasions and her performance suffered. Other attempts to improve Harris’ attendance also failed. The Court found that Harris could not perform the essential functions of her job and was unable to establish regular and consistent work hours. Therefore, it ruled that she was not a “qualified individual” under the ADA.

Technology Did Not Carry the Day

The EEOC argued that advances in technology make on-site attendance less essential. The Court disagreed in this case, stating that there was no evidence presented that specific technology made personal interactions unnecessary for resale buyers.

No Blind Deference to Employer’s Judgment

The Court made a point of stating that its opinion did not open the door for courts to blindly accept as essential whatever an employer says is essential for a particular job. It emphasized that an employer’s words, policies and practices were all important in deciding whether a particular task or requirement is an essential job function.

In Ford’s case, the evidence supported Ford’s judgment that regular and predictable in-person attendance was essential for resale buyers. The Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Ford.

No Retaliation For Termination

The Court also ruled that Ford did not retaliate against Harris when it fired her for poor performance just four months after she had filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Key was Ford’s good documentation of Harris’ performance and interpersonal issues. She had been ranked in the bottom 10% of her peer group before she filed her charge. Documentation showed that she failed to update spreadsheets, complete her paperwork, schedule training sessions, price items correctly and finish her work on time. Despite the closeness in time of the firing to her charge filing, the Court ruled that the EEOC failed to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the real reason that Ford terminated Harris was unlawful retaliation instead of poor performance.

Dissent: Either Physical Presence is Not Essential or Telecommuting is A Reasonable Accommodation

Five judges on the Sixth Circuit dissented, believing that the EEOC had presented enough evidence to send the EEOC’s claims to a jury. Specifically, the dissent stated that the evidence was sufficient to show that there remained genuine disputes over whether Harris was a qualified individual, either because in-person attendance was not an essential function of her job, or because telecommuting would be a reasonable accommodation for her. It pointed to Ford’s telecommuting policy which allowed for “one to four days” of telework each week. It noted that Harris proposed that she be able to work from home up to four days each week, as was arguably allowed under the policy, not that she be permitted to telecommute four days each and every week.

The dissent also asserted that Harris’ past attendance issues that were a result of her disability should not be used against her in deciding whether a telecommuting arrangement during core business hours would be a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. Moreover, the dissent found that Ford should have engaged in a more interactive process to clarify Harris’ telecommuting accommodation request. Finally, the dissent believed that there was a genuine dispute over whether Ford retaliated against Harris for filing her discrimination charge.

Lessons for Employers Facing ADA Telecommuting Accommodation Requests

The majority’s decision finding that regular and predictable in-person attendance is an essential function of most jobs, especially interactive ones, is favorable for employers. But it does not mean that telecommuting can never be a reasonable accommodation. In fact, the dissent in this case demonstrates that telecommuting requests for disabled employees is likely to continue to be an issue with which employers will grapple in coming years.

If face-to-face interactions and in-person attendance at meetings or other work-related functions is essential for certain jobs at your workplace, be certain to include those tasks in your job descriptions. If you generally allow telecommuting, be sure to have a written policy and apply it consistently. If presented with a request to telecommute in order to accommodate a disability, engage in an interactive process to discuss whether telecommuting would be appropriate for that particular position and employee, whether it would constitute an undue hardship for your organization and if alternative accommodations would allow the employee to perform his or her essential functions. And by all means, make sure you have concrete documentation of an employee’s poor performance or policy infractions before taking adverse action against anyone who has filed a discrimination charge.

Click here to print/email/pdf this article.

October 21, 2014

EEOC’s Failure to Engage in Conciliation Dooms Its Separation Agreement Lawsuit Against CVS Pharmacy

By Mark Wiletsky

Chalk up a loss for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in its lawsuit against CVS Pharmacy’s separation agreements. As we reported earlier, the EEOC sued CVS alleging that CVS’s separation agreements deterred employees from filing charges and communicating with the EEOC about discrimination and retaliation. Dismissing the case, a federal judge recently ruled that the EEOC failed to engage in the required procedural steps, including conciliation, before filing its lawsuit.

EEOC Dismissed Employee’s Charge, Then Went After Employer

This lawsuit is an example of the aggressive, proactive nature of the EEOC in extending the protections of Title VII to new and novel claims. The case arose after CVS terminated Tonia Ramos, a pharmacy manager. Ms. Ramos signed CVS’s standard separation agreement, which included a release of claims and a covenant not to sue. She then proceeded to file a charge with the EEOC claiming that her discharge was based on sex and race in violation of Title VII. Almost two years later, the EEOC dismissed Ms. Ramos’s charge.

The EEOC then contacted CVS asserting that based on the separation agreement, CVS was engaging in a pattern or practice of resistance to their employees’ full enjoyment of rights under Title VII. In other words, the EEOC concluded that even though the individual employee did not have a valid discrimination claim against CVS, it would bring a pattern or practice case against CVS based on the language in its standard separation agreement used with potentially hundreds of former employees.

No Conciliation, No Lawsuit

Under Title VII enforcement procedures, the EEOC has the authority to investigate and act on a charge of a pattern or practice of discrimination, whether filed on behalf of an allegedly harmed employee or by the EEOC itself. The procedures require that the EEOC try to resolve any alleged unlawful employment practices through informal means before filing a lawsuit. Such means include conferences, conciliation and persuasion. Although the EEOC and CVS discussed potential settlement by telephone twice before the EEOC filed suit, the EEOC failed to engage in conciliation, which proved fatal to its case. Because an attempt at reaching a conciliation agreement is a prerequisite to the EEOC filing suit and it was undisputed that the EEOC did not engage in any conciliation process, the federal court dismissed the EEOC’s case against CVS.

Judge’s Guidance is in the Footnotes

The case was dismissed on procedural grounds, but the judge took the opportunity to offer his view on the merits of the EEOC’s arguments in several footnotes in the opinion. First, the EEOC argued that the term “resistance” as used in Title VII should be interpreted broadly to extend to the language in CVS’s separation agreement even if that language did not amount to discrimination or retaliation under the Act. The judge rejected that argument, stating that the term “resistance” requires some retaliatory or discriminatory act.

Second, the judge discussed the “covenant not to sue” provision in CVS’s separation agreement. Even though the provision stated that an employee could not “initiate or file . . . a complaint or proceeding asserting any of the Released Claims,” the release of claims (in another paragraph of the separation agreement) stated that it did not limit “any rights that the Employee cannot lawfully waive.” In addition, the agreement contained two carve out provisions specifying an employee’s “right to participate in a proceeding with any appropriate federal, state or local government agency enforcing discrimination laws” and that the agreement did not prohibit the employee from cooperating with any such agency in its investigation. The judge wrote that these provisions would allow an employee to file an EEOC charge. He went on to write that even if the separation agreement explicitly banned filing charges, those provisions would be unenforceable and could not constitute “resistance” under Title VII.

One Case Down; One Still Pending

The dismissal of the CVS lawsuit is good news for employers who use separation agreements, especially in light of the judge’s comments signaling that the EEOC’s arguments were without merit. However, a similar case filed by the EEOC against College America is still proceeding through the federal court in the District of Colorado. (We wrote about the College America case here.) Like CVS, College America has asked the court to dismiss the EEOC’s case. We will let you know when the court rules on that motion. In the meantime, employers should review their separation agreements to ensure they include a provision that the agreement does not prohibit employees from filing a charge, participating in an investigation or otherwise cooperating with an appropriate federal, state or local government agency that enforces discrimination laws.

Click here to print/email/pdf this article.

June 13, 2014

Forced “Onionhead” Practices At Work Result in EEOC Religious Discrimination Lawsuit

By Brad Cave

“I love you, man.” Appropriate for beer commercials but perhaps not for the workplace. A New York employer who allegedly required employees to participate in prayer circles, thank God for their job and say “I love you” to managers and co-workers faces a religious discrimination lawsuit filed recently by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC seeks compensatory and punitive damages on behalf of three employees who were fired, allegedly for opposing the required “Onionhead” practices, and a class of similarly harmed individuals. EEOC v. United Health Programs of America, No. 14-cv-3673 (E.D.N.Y. filed June 11, 2014).

Company Required “Harnessing Happiness” or “Onionhead” Practices

According to the EEOC complaint, three former employees of United Health Programs of America filed charges alleging religious discrimination in violation of Title VII because the company required employees to engage in practices under a belief system called “Harnessing Happiness” or “Onionhead.” According to the Harnessing Happiness website, Onionhead is an “incredibly pure, wise and adorable character” who “wants everyone to know how they feel and then know what to do with those feelings.” The three women claim that the company required them to participate in various Onionhead-related activities on a daily and weekly basis, including praying, reading spiritual texts, burning candles, keeping lights at work very dim, thanking God for their employment and saying “I love you” to colleagues and managers. They assert that every day, employees were asked to select Onionhead-related cards to keep next to their computers and to wear Onionhead-related pins. In addition, one of the company’s upper managers and the aunt of the company owner, “Denali,” was the leader of the Onionhead practices and allegedly would require employees to attend one-on-one sessions with her in order to read and discuss books about “divine plans,” “moral codes” and “enlightenment.”

Fired – Allegedly for Opposing Onionhead Practices

Each of the three Charging Parties, Elizabeth Ontaneda, Francine Pennisi and Faith Pabon, were allegedly fired for objecting to the Onionhead practices. Pennisi, an Account Manager and IT Project Manager, spoke up at a managers’ meeting in July 2010, stating that she was Catholic and did not want to participate in the Onionhead activities. Ontaneda, a Senior Accounting Manager for Customer Service, also spoke up at the meeting, saying she felt the same way. A few weeks later, both women were relocated to work in an open area on the customer service floor, rather than in their offices, and their duties were changed to require answering phones. Denali placed a large statue of Buddha in Pennisi’s empty office. Denali also spoke of “demons” in connection with Ontaneda’s and Pennisi’s resistance to Onionhead practices. The day after losing their offices, the women called in sick and were terminated by the company owner by phone and voicemail.

Pabon, a Customer Care Consultant, attended a spa weekend in Connecticut with Denali and about 20 other customer service employees. Pabon alleges that Denali stated that the purpose of the trip was spiritual enlightenment and that they were to be together at all times, holding hands, praying and chanting. Pabon refused to participate in some of the group activities and on Monday following the spa weekend, Denali fired Pabon for “insubordination.”

Hostile Work Environment, Failure to Accommodate and Retaliation

The EEOC asserts numerous religious discrimination claims against the company, including creating a hostile work environment based on religion, failure to accommodate the employees’ own religious beliefs or lack thereof, terminating employees based on religion and retaliating against employees for opposing the required Onionhead practices in the workplace. The EEOC also alleges that some employees were constructively discharged when they felt compelled to leave the company to avoid participating in the required Onionhead activities.

Reports suggest that the company denies any merit to the lawsuit and that they expect it to be dismissed. We don’t yet know the basis of their defense and must remember that at present, the allegations are unproven. It will be an interesting case to follow. We will keep you posted as it proceeds through the court

Click here to print/email/pdf this article.

June 2, 2014

Disabled Employee Not Entitled to Additional Leave as Reasonable Accommodation

By Jude Biggs

After Kansas State University denied her request to extend a leave of absence for longer than six months, assistant professor Grace Hwang, who suffers from cancer, filed suit against the University alleging disability discrimination and retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the University had not violated the Rehabilitation Act because Ms. Hwang could not show that she was able to perform the essential functions of her job. In addition, the Tenth Circuit held that requiring the University to extend the six-month’s leave was not a reasonable accommodation. Hwang v. Kansas State Univ., No. 13-2070 (10th Cir. May 29, 2014).

Policy Provided Six-Month’s Paid Leave of Absence

Ms. Hwang was set to teach classes at Kansas State University under a one-year contract that covered all three academic terms — fall, spring and summer. Before the fall term, Ms. Hwang was diagnosed with cancer. She asked for a leave of absence to seek medical treatment. The University granted her a paid six-month leave under its regular policy which capped the length of a leave at six months.

As the six-month leave was coming to an end, Ms. Hwang’s doctor advised her to seek more time off of work. She asked the University to extend her leave through the end of the spring semester, intending to return before the summer term. The University refused to extend her leave but instead arranged for Ms. Hwang to receive long-term disability benefits, effectively ending her employment with the University.

Ms. Hwang sued the University in federal court alleging that the University’s denial of her request for extended leave constituted disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act. The Rehabilitation Act prohibits disability discrimination by entities that receive federal funds, such as Kansas State. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The federal district court dismissed her lawsuit on a motion to dismiss (before any discovery was done), and Ms. Hwang appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which covers the states of Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, Kansas, Oklahoma and New Mexico.

Extended Leave Not A Reasonable Accommodation Under Rehabilitation Act

The University did not dispute that Ms. Hwang was a capable teacher and that her cancer rendered her disabled as defined by the Rehabilitation Act. The central issue in the appeal was whether the University was required to ignore the six-month time limit in its leave policy to extend Ms. Hwang’s leave of absence beyond six months. The Court said no. Because Ms. Hwang wasn’t able to work for an extended period of time, she was not capable of performing the essential functions of her job. In addition, requiring the University to keep her job open for that extended period of time did not qualify as a reasonable accommodation. The Court wrote: “[a]fter all, reasonable accommodations – typically things like adding ramps or allowing more flexible working hours – are all about enabling employees to work, not to not work.”

The Court noted that a “brief absence from work” for medical care may be required as a reasonable accommodation, as it likely allows the employee to continue to perform the essential functions of the job. Determining how long employers must provide for leave as a reasonable accommodation depends on factors such as the duties essential to the job in question, the nature and length of the leave sought and the impact of the leave on co-workers. That said, the Court stated that it would be difficult to find a six-month leave of absence in which the employee performs no work (e.g., no part-time hours or work from home) reasonable in any job in the national economy today. Ms. Hwang’s terrible problem, in the Court’s view, was one other forms of social security aim to address. In addition, the Court noted that the aim of the Rehabilitation Act is to prevent employers from denying reasonable accommodations that would allow disabled employees to work, not to turn employers into a “safety net” for those who cannot work.

“Inflexible” Six-Month Leave Policy Not Inherently Discriminatory

Ms. Hwang asserted that the University’s “inflexible” sick leave policy that capped the maximum length of sick leave at six months violated the Act. She cited the EEOC’s guidance manual which states that if a disabled employee needs additional unpaid leave as a reasonable accommodation, the employer must modify its “no-fault” leave policy to provide the additional leave, unless the employer can show that there is another effective accommodation that would allow the individual to perform the essential functions of her job, or that granting additional leave would cause the employer an undue hardship. The Court, however, pointed to another section of the EEOC’s guidance manual to counter Ms. Hwang’s argument, as the EEOC manual states “ . . . six months is beyond a reasonable amount of time.” In fact, the Court stated that an “inflexible” leave policy can actually help protect the rights of disabled employees rather than discriminate against them because such a policy does not permit individual requests for leave to be singled out for discriminatory treatment.

Not all leave policies will past muster, however. The Court stated that policies that provide an unreasonably short sick leave period may not provide enough accommodation for a disabled employee who would be capable of performing his or her job with just a bit more time off. Alternatively, policies that are applied inconsistently, such as where some employees are allowed more time off and others are held to a strict time limit, could be discriminatory. In this case, however, the Court found that Ms. Hwang did not allege any facts to support a claim that she was treated differently than other similarly situated employees.

Retaliation Claim Fails As Well

Ms. Hwang also asserted that she was unlawfully retaliated against for reporting disability discrimination. In particular, she based her claims on two theories : (1) the University failed to explain her COBRA health benefits before or immediately after her termination; and (2) she wasn’t hired for two other positions at the University that she applied for after losing her teaching job. The Court easily dispensed with both theories.

First, COBRA allows thirty days for an employer to provide separating employees with a COBRA notice. Consequently, the University was not required to provide Ms. Hwang with notice of her COBRA benefits before or immediately after her termination of employment. Second, although Ms. Hwang alleged that she was not hired for two other University positions for which she applied, she failed to allege any facts suggesting that the University’s decision not to hire her was because she had engaged in legally protected opposition to discrimination. She not only failed to provide facts showing that she was qualified for the two jobs, but she also failed to offer facts suggesting that the University officials who decided not to hire her knew about her disability and her complaint about disability discrimination. Without such allegations, the Court ruled that Ms. Hwang’s retaliation claim failed.

ADA Application

Although this case alleged a violation of the Rehabilitation Act, courts typically analyze such claims similarly to those alleging a violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). Consequently, this case may prove helpful to employers defending ADA claims where the employer denies an employee’s request for an extended leave of absence. Employers should heed the Court’s warning about leave policies that may be discriminatory if they provide an unreasonably short leave or are inconsistently applied. However, lengthy leaves of six months or more, or leaves of an unlimited duration in which the disabled employee provides no work, will likely not be considered a reasonable accommodation.

Click here to print/email/pdf this article.

May 13, 2014

Independent Contractor Status — Colorado Supreme Court Sets Forth Applicable Test

By Bradford J. Williams

Yesterday we posted an article describing the unsettled test for independent contractor status under Colorado’s unemployment insurance benefits laws after the Colorado Court of Appeals issued a new decision last week. Now, that test has been settled as the Colorado Supreme Court issued its decision in the Softrock and Western Logistics cases.

The Colorado Supreme Court ruled yesterday that determining whether a worker is “customarily engaged in an independent trade, occupation, profession, or business” in order to be deemed an “independent contractor” under Colorado’s unemployment insurance benefits laws requires an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the relationship between the worker and the putative employer. In two companion cases, the Court rejected a stringent, single-factor test for determining whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor for purposes of unemployment insurance tax liability and benefits. Reversing decades of case law, the Court ruled that no single factor is dispositive of an employer-employee relationship. Instead, courts and agencies may consider nine factors enumerated in a statute pertaining to independent contractor agreements, as well as “any other information relevant to the nature of the work and the relationship between the employer and the individual.” ICAO v. Softrock Geological Servs., 2014 CO 30; Western Logistics, Inc. v. ICAO, 2014 CO 31.

Putative Employer Must Prove Independent Contractor Status

Under the Colorado Employment Security Act (CESA), employers must pay unemployment taxes on wages paid to employees, but not on compensation paid to independent contractors. Similarly, employees are entitled to collect unemployment insurance benefits under the CESA whereas independent contractors are not. Putative employers bear the burden of proving that workers are independent contractors, not employees, for purposes of the CESA.

In order to establish that a worker is an independent contractor, a putative employer must prove that the individual (i) is free from control and direction in the performance of his or her service, and (ii) is customarily engaged in an independent trade, occupation, profession, or business related to the service performed. C.R.S. § 8-70-115(1)(b). The CESA does not define what must be shown to satisfy the second part of this test.

2012 Court of Appeals Decisions on the Single-Factor Test

For years, the Colorado Division of Employment and Training and most courts have applied a single-factor test, rejecting claims that workers are independent contractors, and thus ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits, where they do not provide similar services to others while working for the putative employer. It has not mattered, for instance, whether the workers were directed or controlled by the putative employer, whether they maintained separate business entities, whether they set their own hours, whether they were trained by the putative employer, whether they were paid an hourly or fixed rate, whether they provided their own equipment, whether they had their own offices, or whether they advertised their own businesses. If they did not provide similar services to others while working for the putative employer, they were almost always deemed to be employees for purposes of receiving unemployment insurance benefits.

In 2012, one division of the Colorado Court of Appeals reaffirmed this decades-old case law effectively mandating a single-factor test. Western Logistics, Inc. v. ICAO, 2012 COA 186. Another division of the Court of Appeals, however, rejected the stringent, single-factor test, holding for the first time that agencies and courts must instead apply a multi-factor test to determine whether an individual “is customarily engaged in an independent trade, occupation, or business related to the service performed.” Softrock Geological Servs. v. ICAO, 2012 COA 97. In Softrock, the Court of Appealsstated that the factors to be considered in the “customarily engaged” inquiry are the nine factors set forth in statutory section 8-70-115(1)(c), which defines evidence that must be included in an independent contractor agreement to create a presumption that a worker is an independent contractor rather than an employee. In March 2013, the Colorado Supreme Court agreed to hear the appeals in both the Western Logistics and Softrock cases in order to finally determine the appropriate test for deciding whether a worker is customarily engaged in an independent business for purposes of the CESA.

Single-Factor Test No Longer Dispositive

In its decision yesterday, the Supreme Court concluded that the appropriate test for courts and agencies to apply is a totality of the circumstances test that looks at all the relevant factors bearing upon the relationship between a worker and his or her putative employer. The Court rejected the stringent, single-factor test used in Western Logistics and numerous other cases, finding that relying on a single factor – i.e., whether a worker provides similar services to others at the same time he or she works for the putative employer – is unfair to putative employers because it leaves the independent contractor determination up to the unpredictable decisions of workers. For instance, it ignores the putative employer’s own intent regarding the working relationship, and also ignores whether workers even desire to find other work in the same field.

In its decision, the Court broadly adopted the Court of Appeal’s approach in Softrock, concluding that the statutory factors should be considered in determining whether a worker is engaged in an independent business under the CESA. However, the Supreme Court went even further, holding that other factors may also be relevant to this determination. The Court rejected “a rigid check-box type inspection,” and opted instead for a fact-specific inquiry into the nature of the working relationship between a worker and his or her putative employer where no single factor is dispositive of the worker’s status.

Interestingly, just last week, yet another division of the Colorado Court of Appeals anticipated the Supreme Court’s ruling in these two cases, concluding that virtually any relevant circumstances may be considered in weighing independent contractor status. The decision rejected both the Western Logistics single-factor test and the Softrock multi-factor test that limited the determination to just those factors specifically delineated in statute. See Visible Voices, Inc. v. ICAO, 2014 COA 63.

Many Factors May Determine Independent Contractor Status

The Supreme Court’s new totality of the circumstances test is very helpful to putative employers because it allows them to prove independent contractor status based on the entire working relationship between the worker and the putative employer. A putative employer seeking to prove that a worker is an independent contractor engaged in an independent business or trade may now produce evidence bearing upon the nine factors set forth in statute, showing that the putative employer did not:

Require the worker to work exclusively for the putative employer; except that the worker may choose to work exclusively for that business for a finite period of time specified in the independent contractor agreement;
Establish a quality standard for the worker; except that the putative employer can provide plans and specifications regarding the work but cannot oversee the actual work or instruct the worker as to how the work will be performed;
Pay a salary or hourly rate but rather a fixed or contract rate;
Terminate the worker during the contract period unless the worker violates the terms of the contract or fails to produce a result that meets the specifications of the contract;
Provide more than minimal training for the worker;
Provide tools or benefits to the worker; except that materials and equipment may be supplied;
Dictate the time of performance; except that a completion schedule and a range of mutually agreeable work hours may be established;
Pay the worker personally but rather makes checks payable to the trade or business name of the worker; and
Combine the putative employer’s business operations in any way with the worker’s business, but instead maintains such operations as separate and distinct.

The putative employer may also invoke other evidence not set forth in the statute, but nonetheless relevant to whether the worker maintains an independent trade or business. As suggested in recent cases, these factors include, but are not limited to, whether the worker:

Maintains an independent business card, listing, address, or telephone;
Has a financial investment in the project or risks suffering a loss;
Uses his or her own equipment on the project;
Sets the price for performing the project;
Employs others to complete the project; or
Carries liability insurance.

Although we have yet to see how the courts and agencies will apply this new totality of the circumstances test, putative employer should try to satisfy as many of these factors as possible in order to establish that workers are independent contractors, not employees. Putative employers should also continue to use independent contractor agreements that satisfy all the statutory factors needed to create a presumption that workers are independent contractors. However, there is now no limit to the types of evidence putative employers may invoke to establish independent contractor status, and putative employers are no longer bound by the outdated rule that workers must always offer their services to others at the same time the work for the putative employer in order to be considered independent contractors.

Click here to print/email/pdf this article.

May 12, 2014

Independent Contractor Status Dependent On More Than One Factor, Says Second Colorado Court

By Bradford J. Williams

A second division of the Colorado Court of Appeals has just rejected a stringent, single-factor test for determining whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor for purposes of receiving unemployment insurance benefits. On May 8, 2014, a division of the Court of Appeals issued a decision in an unemployment insurance tax liability case, rejecting longstanding case law holding that a worker is an employee, and thus entitled to unemployment insurance benefits, unless he “actually and customarily provides similar services to others while working for the putative employer.” Visible Voices, Inc. v. ICAO, 2014 COA 63.

For years, the Colorado Division of Employment and Training has rejected claims that workers are independent contractors, and thus ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits, based solely upon the fact that they do not provide similar services to others while working for the putative employer. It has not mattered whether the workers were directed or controlled by the putative employer, whether they maintained separate business entities, whether they set their own hours, whether they were trained by the putative employer, whether they were paid an hourly or fixed rate, whether they provided their own equipment, whether they had their own offices, or whether they advertised their own businesses. If they did not provide similar services to others while working for the putative employer, they were almost always deemed to be employees for purposes of receiving unemployment insurance benefits.

In rejecting this stringent, single-factor test, the Visible Voices court followed the 2012 lead of another division of the Colorado Court of Appeals in Softrock Geological Servs. v. ICAO, 2012 COA 97 (cert. granted Mar. 25, 2013). First breaking with the decades-old, single-factor assessment, the Softrock court held that the Division of Employment and Training must instead apply a multi-factor test to determine whether an individual “is customarily engaged in an independent trade, occupation, or business related to the service performed.” This multi-factor test considers factors set forth in Colorado statute.

While broadly adopting the Softrock court’s reasoning, the Visible Voices court went even further, holding that factors not listed in the Colorado statute may also be considered in assessing independent contractor status. The Visible Voices court further noted that some of the statutory factors might also not be relevant to a particular worker depending on the circumstances. In short, the Visible Voices court concluded that virtually any relevant circumstances may be considered when weighing independent contractor status, and rejected the argument that the multi-factor test is limited to just those factors specifically delineated in statute.

By choosing to consider multiple factors, the Visible Voices court expressly declined to follow Western Logistics, Inc. v. ICAO, 2012 COA 186 (cert. granted Mar. 25, 2013), in which yet another division of the Colorado Court of Appeals recently reaffirmed the decades-old cases effectively mandating a single-factor test. Unlike the Western Logistics court, the Visible Voices and Softrock courts have decided that no single factor is determinative of independent contractor status.

Two divisions of the Colorado Court of Appeals have now rejected the single-factor test that has long stymied putative employers’ attempts to prove that their workers are independent contractors for purposes of unemployment insurance benefits. However, the Colorado Supreme Court will have the last word on the proper test for determining independent contractor status as it is currently reviewing both the Softrock and Western Logistics cases. The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in both cases on March 6, 2014 (audio of the oral arguments may be accessed here), and a decision is expected in the coming months. Based on the oral arguments, a favorable ruling for putative employers seems possible. We will let you know the outcome as soon as the Supreme Court rules on this issue.

Click here to print/email/pdf this article.

May 9, 2014

Colorado Legislative Wrap-Up: Wage Theft, Disability Definition and Workers’ Comp Physician Choice Bills Pass

By Emily Hobbs-Wright

The Colorado General Assembly wrapped up its 2014 Legislative Session this week, passing a number of bills that change the landscape for Colorado employers. Here is a look at the significant employment-related bills that passed and are expected to be signed into law by Governor Hickenlooper as well as other bills that were introduced but did not make it through the legislative process.

Bills that Passed This Session.

Wage Protection Act of 2014. Senate Bill 14-005 establishes an administrative procedure to adjudicate wage claims under Colorado law. For wages and compensation earned on or after January 1, 2015, the Colorado Division of Labor may receive complaints and adjudicate claims for nonpayment of wages or compensation of $7,500 or less. The written demand for unpaid wages to the employer may come from or on behalf of the employee and is satisfied if a notice of complaint filed with the Division is sent to the employer. In addition to existing fines that may be levied against employers who fail to pay wages, the new law allows the Director of the Division of Labor or a hearing officer to impose a fine of $250 on an employer who fails to respond to a notice of complaint or any other notice from the Division when a response is required. All fines collected will be credited to the State Wage Theft Enforcement Fund to be used for enforcement of this law.

The Wage Protection Act also requires Colorado employers to keep payroll records, including the information contained in an employee’s itemized pay statement, for at least 3 years after payment of wages and to make such records available to the employee and the Division of Labor. (C.R.S. §8-4-103 (4.5)). Employers who violate this record retention requirement are subject to a fine of $250 per employee per month, up to a maximum fine of $7,500.

This new law also provides for the recovery of reasonable attorney fees and court costs for an employee who recovers unpaid wages under Colorado’s minimum wage requirement. Additionally, the new law sets forth procedural requirements for employers responding to a demand for payment and procedures for resolving wage disputes through the administrative procedure. The majority of the new provisions in this law go into effect on January 1, 2015.

Definition of Disabled Individuals Aligned with Americans With Disabilities Act. Senate Bill 14-118 conforms state law definitions of a disability to match definitions under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Specifically, the terms “disability” and “qualified individual with a disability” under Colorado Revised Statute section 24-34-301 are given the same meaning as under the ADA. This bill also moves the definition of “sexual orientation” out of the Employment Practices definition section (C.R.S. § 24-34-401) and into the general definition section for the Civil Rights Division (C.R.S. § 24-34-301.) It also changes the term “assistance dog” to “service animal” and provides additional penalties for violations of the rights of an individual with a disability who uses a service animal and for persons who cause harm to service animals. The law also expanded the available remedies for retaliation and violations of the fair housing and public accommodations discrimination prohibitions. Once signed into law by the Governor, these provisions will go into effect on August 6, 2014.

Expanded Doctor Choice for Workers’ Compensation. House Bill 14-1383 changes the Colorado workers’ compensation law to allow injured workers more choice of doctors. Currently, an employer or workers’ compensation insurer must provide a list of at least 2 physicians or corporate medical providers from which an injured employee may select a treating physician. This bill expands that number to 4. There are additional provisions related to the location and shared ownership status of the health care providers. After signed into law by the Governor, this law will become effective on April 1, 2015.

Clarification of Credit Report Restriction Allowing Employment Use By Financial Institutions. Senate Bill 14-102 amends last year’s Employment Opportunity Act which restricts an employer’s use of credit reports. This amendment clarifies that all positions at a bank or financial institution are jobs for which credit information is deemed to be “substantially related to the employee’s current or potential job.” As a result, financial institutions will be able to obtain and use credit information on employees and applicants when making employment decisions for all job positions. Governor Hickenlooper signed this bill into law on March 27, 2014 and it became effective immediately.

Bills that Failed to Pass This Session.

Paid Sick Leave. Called the Family and Medical Leave Insurance Act (FAMLI), Senate Bill 14-196 sought to create an insurance program to provide pay to employees who take unpaid FMLA or sick leave. The program would be paid for by employees who pay premiums into a “fund” in the state treasury; employers would not be funding it. Eligible employees would be able to receive a percentage of their pay while on leave, not to exceed $1,000 per week. The bill would have prohibited Colorado employers from discharging, discriminating or retaliating against employees who seek to use benefits under the program or assist in a related-proceeding. Advocated by the Colorado chapter of 9 to 5, this bill, introduced on April 15th, differed from previous paid sick leave bills as it did not require employers to fund the program. On May 1, this bill was postponed indefinitely in committee and therefore, did not make it to a vote.

Drug Testing Misdemeanor. House Bill 14-1040 would have established a drug misdemeanor for an employee who is legally required to undergo drug testing as a condition of his or her job and either tests positive for a controlled substance without a prescription, or knowingly defrauds the administration of the drug test by an employer. To “defraud the administration of a drug test” is defined in the bill to include submitting a sample from someone else or a sample collected at a different time or some other conduct intended to produce a false or misleading outcome. This bill passed the House but the Senate sent it to committee where it was postponed indefinitely.

Anti-Union Bills. – House Bills 14-1087 would have prohibited collective bargaining for the state’s public employees. House Bill 14-1098 and Senate Bill 14-113 would have prohibited employers from entering into agreements to require employees to join a union. All three bills failed shortly after introduction as expected due to the democratic majority in both chambers of Colorado’s legislature.

The bills that passed in the 2014 Legislative Session reflect a continued trend at the state level to implement new or refine existing employment-related laws. We will keep you posted on any further developments.

Click here to print/email/pdf this article.