Tag Archives: supervisor

March 13, 2014

Harassment Training for Supervisors is Key in Minimizing Risk

Most employers today have policies prohibiting harassment. But if your supervisors and employees are not trained on those policies, and if harassment is allowed to occur, your organization could face significant liability.

Female Bailiff Alleges Egregious Sexual Harassment By Her Supervisor

Camille Kramer was employed as a jailor and later as a bailiff by the Wasatch County Sheriff’s Department. While working at the jail, male co-workers allegedly made offensive comments about Kramer’s breasts, she was subjected to sexually explicit materials on work computers and had to listen to graphic sexual conversations. Kramer complained to Sheriff Kenneth Van Wagoner, the head of the Sheriff’s Department. Sheriff Van Wagoner said he’d “take care of it” and proceeded to call a staff meeting at which he used Kramer as a volunteer to act out the exact harassing scenarios that she had reported to him. Van Wagoner told the group: “[t]hat’s harassment. Don’t do it.” When the harassment got worse after the meeting, Kramer complained again to the Sheriff, who told her she might want to avoid that area.

Kramer transferred to the courthouse to work as a bailiff. Sergeant Rick Benson, also a bailiff, supervised both Kramer and one other bailiff. According to Kramer, Benson subjected Kramer to a campaign of sexual harassment and sexual assault that ranged from demanding foot rubs to groping and rape. Kramer did not report Benson’s conduct to the Sheriff because Benson threatened her job if she said anything and she believed nothing would be done about it anyway.

Later, Kramer told female co-workers about the rape and assault. She also told them that she was having a consensual affair with another man and was pregnant from that relationship. Sheriff Van Wagoner found out about Benson’s sexual assault of Kramer and her pregnancy from one of Kramer’s co-workers. He assigned a detective who was not trained in human resources or in conducting sexual harassment investigations to look into the misconduct. The detective focused his investigation exclusively on finding out who fathered Kramer’s baby, not on Benson’s conduct. When it was learned that Kramer was involved with a married county firefighter, the detective urged Kramer to resign and Kramer was disciplined with her certification suspended for six months for “actions unbecoming an officer.” Although the Sheriff decided to terminate Benson, Benson resigned before that could happen.

Benson directly supervised Kramer’s work as a bailiff. He wrote her performance evaluations, which could cause her to be promoted, demoted or fired. He could create a corrective action plan for her which might include transfer, reassignment or separation, if he deemed her performance was substandard. At all times, however, the Sheriff was the final decision-maker and the only person who had the actual authority to take tangible employment actions against Kramer.

Kramer sued the County and the Sheriff for sexual harassment in violation of Title VII, among other claims. The district court granted summary judgment to the County, holding that because Benson did not have the actual authority to unilaterally fire Kramer, the County could not be vicariously liable for Benson’s conduct. It also ruled that supervisor status could not be based on Benson having apparent authority over Kramer because no reasonable juror could find that Kramer reasonably believed that Benson had the power to fire her. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the County and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Kramer v. Wasatch Cty. Sheriff's Office, No. 12-4058 (10th Cir. Feb. 25, 2014).

Delegation of Power and Apparent Authority

The Tenth Circuit pointed to wording in the Supreme Court’s recent case, Vance v. Ball State, 570 U.S. ___ (2013), to determine whether the County could be vicariously liable for Benson’s conduct. Vance held that a “supervisor” for purposes of determining employer liability for workplace harassment under Title VII includes only those individuals who have the authority to take tangible employment actions against the victim. Although that seemed like a bright-line test, the Tenth Circuit stated that if Benson had or appeared to have the power to take or substantially influence tangible employment actions or used the threat of taking such actions to subject Kramer to a hostile work environment, then the County could be vicariously liable for Benson’s severe or pervasive sexual harassment. Because the Court found sufficient evidence in the record that raised genuine issues of fact as to whether the Sheriff effectively delegated to Benson the power to cause tangible employment actions by relying on Benson’s recommendations and performance evaluations when making decisions regarding firing, promotion, demotion and reassignment, the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment to the County. The Court stated that even if the Sheriff took some independent analysis when considering input from Benson on employment decisions, Benson could qualify as a supervisor if his recommendations were among the proximate causes of the Sheriff’s decision-making. The Court also found that there was evidence to suggest that Kramer reasonably believed that Benson had the power to take tangible employment actions against her meaning Benson qualified as a supervisor under apparent authority principles.

No Tangible Employment Actions

If Benson is a supervisor under the definition established in Vance, the County would be strictly liable for Benson’s harassment if it resulted in a tangible employment action. Kramer asserted that four actions constituted tangible employment actions. First, she argued that Benson’s rape was a tangible employment action. The Court disagreed, stating that while the rape was inarguably a severe form of sexual harassment, Benson did not commit the rape in an official company action. Next, Kramer asserted that Benson prepared a negative performance evaluation of her and argued that was a tangible employment action. However, Benson improved the evaluation after speaking with Kramer and before submitting it to the Sheriff, so even though the threatened poor evaluation contributed to a hostile work environment, it did not constitute a tangible employment action. The Court similarly rejected the final two alleged employment actions, a denial of leave time and assigning Kramer to an unfavorable duty that denied her the training needed for a promotion. The Court found that the loss of one day’s leave time was not a “significant” change in Kramer’s benefits and the assignment to an unfavorable duty did not have a deleterious economic consequence for Kramer or reduce her opportunity for advancement. Finding that Kramer did not suffer a tangible employment action, the Court remanded for consideration of whether the County established the Faragher/Ellerth defense.

Teachable Moments from the Tenth Circuit

The Court’s thorough discussion of Benson’s conduct and what the Sheriff did/did not do when he learned of potential misconduct reveals many teachable moments for employers. First and foremost, make sure to train your supervisors and employees on prohibited forms of harassment, and how important it is to promptly and appropriately address issues when they arise. For example, when an employee reports harassing behavior, as Kramer did when she first worked at the jail, take it seriously. Do not simply tell workers to “stop it” or tell the person who complained to “avoid the area” or stay away from the perpetrators. Make sure that the person conducting the investigation is trained in workplace harassment investigations. Do not focus the investigation solely on the potential wrongdoing of the complaining party, as the detective did when trying to determine the father of Kramer’s baby. Talk to all parties implicated in the misconduct, including any witnesses who may have knowledge of the hostile work environment. If the investigation reveals harassing behavior, take immediate steps to correct it and prevent it from happening again. Follow up with the person who reported it to make certain your corrective actions are effective and that no further incidents have occurred. And finally, do not retaliate against the complaining employee. Learning from these missteps will go along way in minimizing your risk of harassment liability.

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June 25, 2013

Supreme Court Limits Definition of Supervisor for Employer Liability in Workplace Harassment Claims

By Emily Hobbs-Wright

In a huge win for employers, the U.S. Supreme Court today decided that for purposes of determining employer liability for Title VII harassment cases, a “supervisor” is limited to those who are empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim. Vance v. Ball State Univ., No. 11-556 (U.S. June 24, 2013). This means that employees who oversee the daily activities of other employees, but do not have the power to discipline, fire, promote, transfer or take other actions against an employee, are not considered “supervisors” in workplace harassment cases under Title VII.

In drawing a sharp line between co-workers and supervisors, the Supreme Court adopted a clear standard that parties and reviewing courts can apply early in a case in order to determine which side has the burden of proof in Title VII harassment litigation.

Supervisor vs. Co-Worker as Harasser – Why It Matters

Determining employer liability for harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 depends on whether the alleged harasser is a “supervisor” or a “co-worker” of the individual being harassed. If the harasser is a co-worker, the employer will be liable for the harassing behavior only if the complainant can show that the employer was negligent, meaning that the employer knew or should have known of the conduct and failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. See 29 CFR § 1604.11(d).

If the harasser is a supervisor, however, the test for employer liability changes dramatically. If the harassing supervisor caused a tangible employment action such as firing, demoting or reducing the complainant’s pay, the employer will be automatically liable for the harassment. If there was no tangible employment action, the employer may still be liable, unless it can meet a two-pronged affirmative defense known as the Faragher/Ellerth defense.

In order to establish the Faragher/Ellerth defense, outlined by the Supreme Court in the companion cases of Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 24 U.S. 742 (1998), an employer must show: (1) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct the harassing behavior; and (2) the plaintiff-employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of preventative or corrective measures established by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.

The key difference between cases alleging harassment by a co-worker and a supervisor is the burden of proof. With co-worker harassment, the plaintiff-employee bears the burden of demonstrating employer negligence. When trying to avoid liability for supervisor harassment, however, the employer bears the burden of establishing the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense. The higher hurdle that must be met by employers when litigating supervisor harassment raises the opportunity for the plaintiff-employee to recover damages for harassment in the workplace. Consequently, an important issue in a harassment case is whether the alleged harasser is a supervisor or a co-worker.

Supreme Court Resolves Split in the Circuits on Definition of “Supervisor”

Lower courts have disagreed on the test for deciding whether an alleged harasser is a “supervisor” or merely a co-worker. Some federal appellate courts, including the First, Seventh and Eighth Circuits, have ruled that an employee is not a supervisor under Title VII unless he or she has the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline the victim. Other circuits, including the Second and Fourth Circuits, have followed the more expanded approach urged by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which applies “supervisor” status to those who have the ability to exercise significant direction over another employee’s daily work activities.

In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court resolved this split in authority by holding that an employer may be vicariously liable for an employee’s unlawful harassment only when the employer has empowered that employee to take tangible employment actions against the victim, that is, to effect a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits. Calling the EEOC’s definition of supervisor “nebulous,” the Court stated that it was not sufficient to deem an employee a “supervisor” based on his or her ability to direct another employee’s tasks. The Court noted that the EEOC Guidance that looks at the number (and perhaps the importance) of the tasks in question would be a “standard of remarkable ambiguity.” Relying on the Faragher and Ellerth decisions, the Court stated that a supervisor is instead empowered by the company as a distinct class of agent that may make economic decisions affecting other employees under his or her control.

Bright Line Between Co-Workers and Supervisors Will Aid Employers Facing Harassment Claims

The bright line test that the Court adopted for determining who is deemed a “supervisor” in Title VII cases eliminates murkiness and provides a clear test that reviewing courts can easily apply. The Court noted that it typically will be known before litigation is commenced whether an alleged harasser was a supervisor, and if not, it will become clear to both sides after discovery. The Court goes on to say “once this is known, the parties will be in a position to assess the strength of a case and to explore the possibility of resolving the dispute. Where this does not occur, supervisor status will generally be capable of resolution at summary judgment.” The Court clearly wanted employers to be able to get the supervisor issue resolved early in a lawsuit so that both sides will know who bears the burden of proof and can pursue early resolution of the case based on the strength of the evidence.

Employees Still Protected, but Must Prove Company Negligence

The Court’s majority, which includes Justices Alito, Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas, states that employees who face harassment by co-workers who possess the authority to inflict psychological injury by assigning unpleasant tasks or by altering the work environment in objectionable ways will still be protected under Title VII. The Court states that such victims will be able to prevail “simply by showing that the employer was negligent in permitting this harassment to occur, and the jury should be instructed that the nature and degree of authority wielded by the harasser is an important factor to be considered in determining whether the employer was negligent.” According to the majority, the fact that harassing co-workers may possess varying degrees of authority over daily tasks will not be a problem under the negligence standard “which is thought to provide adequate protection for tort plaintiffs in many other situations.”

Dissent Would Follow EEOC’s Guidance and Extend “Supervisor” Status Based on Authority to Direct an Employee’s Daily Activities

Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan, wrote a lengthy dissent opining that the majority’s rule diminishes the force of Faragher andEllerth, ignores the reality of the current workplace and strays from the objective of Title VII in preventing discrimination in the workplace. The dissent favors the EEOC’s Guidance, believing that employees who direct subordinates’ daily work are supervisors. Justice Ginsburg wrote that although one can walk away from a fellow employee’s harassment, “[a] supervisor’s slings and arrows, however, are not so easily avoided.” The dissent recites numerous cases in which a person vested with authority to control the conditions of a subordinate’s daily work life used his position to aid his harassment, and then points out that in none of the cases would the majority’s “severely confined definition of supervisor yield vicarious liability for the employer.” The dissent concludes that the majority decision embraces a position that relieves scores of employers of responsibility for the behavior of the supervisors they employ.

Conclusion – Victim Must Prove Employer Negligence When Harassed by a Non-Supervisor

The Vance opinion means that employees alleging harassment by another employee who does not have the power to hire, fire, promote, transfer or discipline them, bear the burden of proving the employer’s negligence in order for the employer to be liable for the harassment. This means the alleged victim must prove that the employer knew or should have known of the conduct and failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.

Disclaimer: This article is designed to provide general information on pertinent legal topics. The statements made are provided for educational purposes only. They do not constitute legal advice and are not intended to create an attorney-client relationship between you and Holland & Hart LLP. If you have specific questions as to the application of the law to your activities, you should seek the advice of your legal counsel.